I’ve just returned from a nine-day trip to China, where I spoke at the “International Symposium on Ecological Images and Media” at Jimei University in Xiamen, and lectured at four different universities (Jimei University, Xiamen Technological University, Shanghai’s East China Normal University, and Shanghai University). My hosts, including Minjiang Scholar and professor Kunyu Wang, lead translator of my book Ecologies of the Moving Image, were gracious and delightful.
I want to share two sets of thoughts here: one on academic relationships with Chinese universities, and the second on the politics of media.
The big picture
On the first, China is far too massive a country for anyone to become expert in it from just a few short visits. But I do get asked if academics traveling to China aren’t lending its government more credibility than it deserves, and I have two responses to that. The first is that whatever miniscule “credibility” visiting China might give its government is far outweighed by the actual relationships built with people doing good and important work. I think that anyone who’s been engaging with Chinese scholars (or, I assume, with Chinese business people, artists, activists, et al.) understands that, and understands that this kind of cross-border cooperation undergoes its “freezes” and “thaws”; they are part of the weather systems to be navigated, just as U.S. universities today are navigating the rather different landscape for knowledge generation created by the Trump administration.
The second is a longer term view. The transformation undergone by China in less than five decades is remarkable, in some ways seeming even miraculous. From the political upheavals, large-scale violence, famines, and economic stagnation of the 1960s and early 1970s, the country catapulted itself into an economic powerhouse, and its cities and transportation networks have become beacons of modernity in practically every respect. In the process, over half the population has become middle class by global standards, and China’s poverty levels were reduced from constituting over 40% of the world’s (ultra) poor in 1991 to near zero today.
You don’t have to be a fan of the Chinese Communist Party to recognize that much of the credit for that transformation can hardly avoid going to its leadership. How to distribute it within that is another question. Deng Xiaoping is likely to get a disproportionate share of it, but the Party is a complicated apparatus whose inner workings, meritocratic or otherwise, will always remain somewhat mysterious.
The shortcomings of China’s government today don’t seem to be in a different league from the shortcomings of many other governments. Its pandemic response was problematic. Youth unemployment is high, and China’s geopolitical role is disappointing to those of us who care about democracy, national self-determination, and the like. How much more disappointing they are from the disappointments we have with the U.S. under Trump, for instance, is a relative question. China’s development of a surveillance state may be particularly draconian, but the mixture of surveillance capitalism (of the Googles, Amazons, et al) and tech oligarchy (of the Musks, Thiels, Ellisons, et al) that’s come to dominate in the West is not exactly that much more comforting.
From an environmental perspective, that China’s slogans about “ecological civilization” are largely just slogans can only disappoint those of us who’d like them to be much more. But they are still better than what many western governments have arrived at. The big difference there — and it’s a crucial one — is that western nongovernmental organizations take up the slack from our own governments’ failings. But something similar can and does occur in China. It’s just less visible and more vulnerable, which makes supporting it all the more important.
If all of that sounds like bothsidesism, I don’t intend it that way: the differences matter, which is why the role of monitoring organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International remains important, and why censorship should still be a primary interest of ours. It’s worth acknowledging that there are few leaders on the global political stage who unproblematically represent the interests of humanity writ large; they all deserve criticism. There are places where that criticism isn’t allowed, and others where such criticism is deployed toward echo-chambered confusion. I prefer the latter, but neither is ideal. I can also understand where the Chinese penchant for censorship and the maintenance of stability is coming from. Knowing Chinese history is helpful for that, as is understanding the lessons Chinese officials might have taken from the unraveling of the Soviet Union.
The Great Firewall
That brings us to the second theme: the politics of media. It’s a topic I write a lot about, and I want to report here specifically on my internet experience. For those familiar with travel in China, there’s probably not much new here, but I’m sharing my observations in case they’re useful.
Unlike some people I know, who use non-Google alternative browsers like DuckDuckGo, I’m Google-dependent. Whatever browser I use (Chrome, Safari, Opera, Firefox), I tend to google things. It keeps me plugged into western surveillance capitalism (with some limitations I can opt into with effort), but it’s very convenient and allows me to access as much of the internet as I need to. In China that isn’t possible. Google, as well as a lot of western news sites and other sites I rely on for my work, are either completely inaccessible or only accessible with difficulty, due to what’s known as The Great Firewall. I’ve been told you can work around that firewall using VPNs, but I tried doing that with Nord VPN (one of the better ones that’s supposed to work here, which I’ve used before) and did not have much success. Only by avoiding hotel wifis and other such systems and relying on roaming from my Canadian mobile carrier (Freedom Mobile) was I able to work around the Great Firewall. (That itself is a bit surprising.) I suspect that Chinese citizens who wish to access western news sites and the like have ways to do that, but I’m not sure what they are.
One of the few browsers I know that works in China but isn’t Chinese in origin is Bing China (cn.bing.com), Microsoft’s browser that works in compliance with Chinese internet restrictions. While in China, I asked it “What is The Great Firewall?” Here’s part of what it told me. (It appears to be an AI answer, with sources; I’ve taken out the latter, though they are informative.)
“The Great Firewall, officially known as the Golden Shield Project, is a comprehensive internet censorship and surveillance system implemented by the Chinese government. It was launched in the late 1990s and has evolved into a complex network designed to regulate internet traffic in and out of China. The primary aim of the Great Firewall is to maintain strict control over information, ensuring that online content aligns with the government’s cultural and political ideologies.
“The Great Firewall operates by blocking access to specific websites and filtering content based on keywords and phrases. It employs a combination of automated systems and human intervention to monitor and censor online activities. The system can block popular international platforms such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, forcing users to rely on domestic alternatives like Baidu, Weibo, and WeChat.
“Content Filtering: The firewall uses sophisticated algorithms to detect and block content that is deemed sensitive or inappropriate, including topics related to human rights, political dissent, and historical events like the Tiananmen Square incident.
“Slow Connections: Even when websites are not blocked, connections to servers outside China are often intentionally slowed down, making them difficult to use.
“Impact on Internet Users: The Great Firewall significantly shapes the online experience for Chinese citizens, creating a unique digital ecosystem that is heavily regulated. While it restricts access to foreign information, it also fosters the growth of local tech companies, which dominate the Chinese digital landscape.
“Bypassing the Great Firewall: Despite the restrictions, many Chinese internet users employ VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) and other methods to bypass the Great Firewall and access blocked content. While the use of VPNs is technically illegal, enforcement against foreign travelers is generally rare, allowing them to access the unrestricted internet.
“In summary, the Great Firewall of China is a powerful tool for internet regulation, reflecting the government’s desire to control information flow and maintain social stability. Its impact is profound, affecting not only the availability of information but also the development of the internet within China.”
I have to agree with Bing China that The Great Firewall deters people in China from accessing “unwanted” web sites, but doesn’t stop them completely. At first this is a drag for visitors: for those of us used to using Google or one of the other main search engines as their default (and that includes Duckduckgo et al), in whatever browser you use (Chrome, Safari, Opera, Firefox, et al.), you feel locked out almost entirely. So you develop workarounds.
That Bing China tells us all of this is helpful. It even refers to the “Tiananmen Square incident” (the euphemism “incident” being its workaround for what western sources accurately call a “massacre“). Comparing the level of detail you get from Wikipedia’s entry on the topic, however, gives us a sense of what is missed from behind the Great Firewall. (And I can’t speak to what level of information is available in Chinese, as I don’t read the language.)
The lesson for the rest of us, I think, is this: It is possible to avoid western online surveillance capitalism, but the Chinese form of the alternative, an alternative The Internet Society astutely labels a “national intranet,” is unsatisfactory. I support the idea of regulation and management of the internet to democratically accountable public ends. That applies to artificial intelligence as well — in fact, working toward global regulations and public accountability on artificial intelligence is one of the most important things we ought to be working on right now. That AI technologies are ramping up the production of fossil fuels is only one piece of a bigger problem, which defangs all global efforts to rein in climate change (as COP 30 is showing). And unfortunately, it seems that the only place where there are serious and somewhat successful efforts to take on these tasks of digital governance is Europe, and not without challenges.
The world is still catching up to the workings of digital capitalism, and experiments in national (e.g., Chinese) or supranational (e.g., EU-level) regulation are warranted. Let’s learn from them and pursue global standards the only way we can: through policy proposals, lobbying, and communicating the idea that we really do need a global revolution in the means of information. It’s the one thing that might save us from the disastrous trajectory we’re still dead set on.
