The Woodrow Wilson Center’s Kamil Galeev has been doing some wonderful Twitter threads, analyzing such topics as Russian information warfare, Putin’s rise to power and his claims about Ukraine’s “nazism,” a sociological portrait of his elite, why Russia will lose this war, and much more.
Here is the best entry point to them.
Please remember the following facts:
1. The war in Ukraine is not a two-way conflict. Ukrainians — citizens and residents of Ukraine — are victims of an unprovoked invasion. Russian efforts to blame Ukraine, NATO, the US, and “the West” are strategies of war intended to sideline the victims and place Russian neo-imperial interests at the center of world attention. Ukraine’s very existence as an independent, sovereign, democratic, and European state is a threat to Putin’s autocratic, neo-imperial vision of Russian power. In every conversation about this war, Ukrainian voices need to be heard loudly and clearly.
2. Russian neo-imperialism is a threat to the world. Even if Russia’s military is not the strongest in the world, its nuclear arsenal is the largest, and its informational and hybrid war techniques are well honed and powerful. Their goals include weakening, if not destroying, the liberal democratic world, the world of sovereign democratic states the US and “West” at least pretend to champion. We have seen the results of this hybrid and informational warfare in the domestic politics of most western countries. They aren’t incidental; they are part of a global struggle over the fate of democracy.
3. Democracy is at stake. It goes without saying that US and other western nations have not been historically innocent in their relations with the rest of the world. Oligarchs’ wealth corrupts politics everywhere. Democracy requires constant maintenance, vigilance, and action, including action against the power of oligarchic interests to shape the conditions for life on earth. To do that effectively requires global cooperation on multiple fronts. The most urgent current battleground is Ukraine. If Ukraine falls to a kleptocratic, authoritarian, and neo-imperialist petro-state, the further spread of oligarchy, authoritarianism, and militarism will be virtually guaranteed. It is time for Putinism to fall, so that the world can work together on the urgent problems that face us.
Actions you can take
1. Call your political representatives: Urge them to support sanctions against Russia and Russians who support its government, and to support a No-Fly Zone over Ukrainian skies. (There are ways to do this that avoid direct NATO involvement.)
2. Call and speak to any friends or colleagues you may have in Russia. Russians’ support and acquiescence is what allows their government to conduct this assault. Russian state media is not allowing discussion of the reality of the war (indeed, describing it as a “war” or “invasion” is banned). Independent media have been closed down and the internet is being actively squelched. If you have any personal, professional, or organizational connections with people in Russia, now is the time to use them to share what we know is happening in Ukraine and to urge them to stand up against the invasion.
3. Reject Russian propaganda narratives. They are untrue and intended to obscure the truth. Plenty of analysis has been conducted to show how Russian state media supports its own interests by creating an alternate reality for its audiences. Domestically, this is intended to prop up the regime and its goals; externally, it is intended to confuse, obfuscate, and sow distrust in our own democratic institutions. Thankfully, our own media institutions still have the capacity to report and assess events judiciously; that capacity should be supported.
4. Donate to humanitarian as well as civil and military aid organizations. Please see the “Support Ukraine” page for a list of ways you can support Ukrainians affected by the Russian invasion.
UKR-TAZ stands in solidarity with the citizens of Ukraine, who are fighting for their right to live in a sovereign and democratic nation. It condemns the Russian invasion as a morally abhorrent act, and joins with all of those who are committed to ending this violation of civil norms and international law.
For a list of things you can do to support Ukraine and Ukrainians at this time, please see SUPPORT UKRAINE.
When the world’s pre-eminent Marxist economic geographer, David Harvey, chimes in on an important current topic, many listen. (Some estimate Harvey to be the world’s pre-eminent living geographer, period.) His work from the 1970s to the 1990s was deeply insightful and is still considered required reading, even as it elicited rounds of critique (from feminists, postcolonialists, humanistic geographers, and others) that are still read alongside it.
To his critics, Harvey has always overemphasized the “relations of production” at the expense of cultural questions, and his “Remarks on Recent Events in the [sic] Ukraine” from a few days ago should surprise no one. Its assessment of post cold war geopolitics is partially accurate but one-sided, and a little oblivious to the multipolar disorder of the twenty-first century world. For any scholar familiar with Ukraine or (actual) Ukrainians, Harvey’s “view from space” (the kind of “god’s-eye view” that Donna Haraway had critiqued many years ago) appears somewhat clueless on the ground.
Political economist Derek Hall has written an astute rebuttal titled “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: A Response to David Harvey.” I recommend it to anyone struggling to reconcile an analysis of capitalist geopolitics with the current situation.
Among the pieces Hall cites is Ukrainian socialist Taras Bilous’s “A Letter to the Western Left from Kyiv,” which trenchantly critiques the “campism” of many western leftists, whose hyperfocus on “NATO expansion” not only blinds them to the reasons why so many post-Soviet and East European countries clamored for NATO accession after the fall of the USSR, but is generally inadequate to understanding the entangled complexities of today’s world.
The invasion of Ukraine and Ukrainians’ resistance to it presents about as clear a struggle between evil — in the form of a neo-imperialist and in many ways fascist Russian state — and the kind of spirited humanity that political activists of any stripe should recognize as worthy and admirable, or in other words, good. And its human costs are tragic.
Media scholar Svitlana Matviyenko is sharing on-the-ground reports from Ukraine. (Matviyenko is co-author of Cyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism.) Her second dispatch covers cyberwar efforts on both sides, nuclear risks, and living in the midst of military mobilization and bombardment. A couple of excerpts:
Read the rest of this entry »Kyïv* has had its share of battles and even demolitions — by Suzdal prince Andrei Bogolubsky in 1169, Batu Khan’s Mongols in 1240, Crimean Khan Mengli in 1482, protracted wars between the Ukrainian Peoples’ Republic (Central Rada), the Bolsheviks, and a series of others between 1917 and 1922, and the Nazi occupation in 1941-3. Each time it has recovered, rebuilt, and thrived.
It is, to my mind, one of the most beautiful cities in the world — beautiful in its topography, its potential, and more recently its spirit. Whatever happens tonight and in coming days, it will rebuild again.
Fascism, as defined by those who study it, typically includes three key elements: a perception of deep historical grievance and/or a belief that the modern world is in some way irredeemably decadent; a desire for vengeance and/or national, collective, and/or historical ‘rebirth’ (‘palingenesis’ is the scholarly word for that); and submission of individual will to collective will, often though not always embodied in a cult of the leader or ruler. Modern fascism, as we saw last century, is also industrialized and technological; it mass produces its victims.
The first two elements have become more and more obvious in Putinist Russia. Putin has built on a deep sense of historical grievance, and his desire to rebuild Russia in all its former “glory” has been often articulated, not least in his speeches this past week. Up until yesterday, however, Putin’s fascism (like Trump’s) has been debated, but generally not admitted.
Fascism’s presence, since the end of the second world war, has seemed mostly individual — with lone killers committing mass murder in Oslo, Christchurch, El Paso, and elsewhere — or small-scale and cellular, with neo-Nazis found everywhere, from the US to Germany, France, Ukraine, and beyond, but nowhere near attaining power. (Whether ISIS and its kin in the Muslim world qualify as forms of fascism has also been debated, without clear resolution.)
Putin’s decision to use the second largest military in the world to achieve his palingenetic goals in ways that threaten millions of people has, I believe, changed the landscape of contemporary fascism. Many fascists and ultra-rightists have looked to Putin as a potential savior of the world against liberalism, globalism, and western “decadence.” The war in Ukraine can now be seen as Putin’s decisive response. That he claims he is “denazifying” Ukraine is, of course, completely consistent with fascism’s predilection for the “big lie.”
We now see the face of 21st century fascism: deeply aggrieved, cold and calculating, and starkly technological. This is our new world.
Yale historian and political commentator Timothy Snyder writes: “Repeatedly asking ‘What is Putin thinking?’ leaves us mesmerized by shadows. Remembering how a tyrant must think breaks the spell.” Many in the media have been asking the first question. (Fiona Hill’s response, from a couple of days ago, was quite lucid.) Snyder answers that a tyrant must think with two companions: death and fear. Death relates to the “odd essay” (that’s an understatement) Putin wrote last year, in which he imagines a millennial reunification of Russia and Ukraine; fear, to his vulnerabilities. The implications are here.
Snyder’s Substack blog has been alternating between writing about American politics (alongside the Olympics and other things) and about Ukraine. His recent posts “How to think about war in Ukraine“, “Putin has an exit from the conflict“, and “Ukraine and Russia: is there a simple solution?” are well worth reading.
Meanwhile, elsewhere on Substack, Columbia historian Adam Tooze provides some economically and geopolitically astute analyses of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in “Putin’s challenge to western hegemony” (Jan. 12), “War in sight? Russia-Ukraine scenarios” (Jan. 14), “Strategy of tension – Updated on the economic fallout of Russia-Ukraine crisis” (Jan. 31), and “Permanent crisis or black earth agro-giant: Alternative futures for Ukraine” (Feb. 12). The latter, with its note of optimism on Ukraine’s agricultural potential, will seem especially poignant if the invasion proceeds as planned.
The two historians come at things from entirely different directions. That’s a good thing.
The Five Books blog has published an insightful interview with eminent Harvard historian Serhii Plokhy, in which Plokhy discusses not only his choice of five excellent books for understanding the current Russo-Ukrainian crisis, but also his thoughts on the country and its people. You can read it here: https://fivebooks.com/best-books/russia-ukraine-serhii-plokhy/
There are some deeply insightful nuggets in this interview with Peter Pomerantsev, who is among the best analysts of contemporary information warfare. Pomerantsev describes twenty-first century conflict as radically different from the form the U.S. and western countries are used to. Conflict now is multifaceted, mixing informational with political and economic strategies to create a murky terrain where the lines between war and peace are blurred.
“The Russian and the Chinese governments,” he says, “do it all the time. They’re doing army stuff, they’re doing their troll farms, they’re doing their TV channels, and they’re thinking about different audiences. So already,” with western governments calling him out for his planned invasion, “Putin is pivoting: ‘The West have cried foul. They said it’s war. We never said it was war.’”
“Putin likes to be in the murk. He likes to be in this ambiguous space where you can’t really tell what’s going on. And that makes it very hard for NATO and allies to get their act together.” That they are succeeding more than Putin might have predicted is a good thing, but insufficient. They may hope for an “off ramp” for Putin, but “It’s not about an off ramp. It’s an Escher staircase. It’s going to go round and round and escalating and de-escalating and on and on and on and on.”
Perhaps most importantly, Pomerantsev raises the real questions we ought to be answering collectively: “what is public diplomacy for the 21st century? What is our long term dialogue that we’re trying to have with the Russian people about Russia’s role in the world? What is our communication to specific audiences in Ukraine to explain what we’re doing? All that needs to be happening. It really means having a kind of communication statecraft policy and institutional capacity for the 21st century.”
Read “Ukraine, Russia, and the 21st Century Permanent Information War.“