Archive for the Uncategorized Category

We are all tuteishi (or, on not being posthuman)

Posted in Uncategorized on June 17, 2020 by Adrian J Ivakhiv

Published simultaneously at Immanence

A social media conversation prompted me to dig up something I had written in my notebook years ago after reading Serhii Plokhy’s masterful book on “premodern identities” in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Which in turn prompted me to realize that coronavirus provides an answer to the question I had just finished writing an article about — what it means to be “posthuman” (and why I find that term inadequate).

The question is “who are we?” The answers that have been provided over the centuries fall into three general categories:

  • “We are X” (name your ethnic/national/cultural identity),
  • “We are human” (the modern/modernist answer), or
  • “We are something else (but not X and not exactly just human)” (e.g., animals, Devo, spirits in a material world, cyborgs, posthuman, becoming this or that, blah blah blah).

Here’s my contribution to answering that question.

Read more »

Yermolenko: Ukraine as ‘Tabula Rasa’

Posted in Uncategorized on June 5, 2020 by Adrian J Ivakhiv

New Eastern Europe has published a very interesting interview with philosopher Volodymyr Yermolenko.

A few snippets:

Some countries are ruled by military juntas, Russia is ruled by the KGB and Ukraine, I believe, is in fact ruled by a corrupt conglomerate made up of the judiciary, prosecution and the police. The army in Ukraine has been very weak for a long time and we did not really have intelligence services, so the police and judiciary took advantage of this power void and took over the country. These institutions are successfully reproducing through family ties and thanks to universities such as Odesa Law Academy run by Serhiy Kivalov (former chief of the State Election Commission under President Kuchma and head of the High Council of Justice under President Yanukovych). Unfortunately, reforms aimed at increasing the independence of judiciary encouraged by European institutions have only lead to strengthening of this judiciary and prosecution mafia. These changes were designed in accordance with models supported by the Council of Europe and based on Montesquieu’s idea that a judiciary can only be just if it is independent. However, in Ukraine the independence of the judiciary has simply meant that this corrupt system continues without challenge. As a result we are now in a deep crisis and it is hard to say what we can do about it.

[. . .]

Read more »

Ukrainian politics as Reality-FB

Posted in Uncategorized on April 22, 2019 by Adrian J Ivakhiv

A few days I ago I posted about how Ukraine’s election of comedian Ze as its president will put them at the forefront of the trend for “politics as reality-TV,” and how that may not be entirely a bad thing. (For one thing, it’s democracy at work; for another, Ze’s hologrammatic persona will become real and Ukrainians will then be able to respond to reality instead of to an empty signifier of ‘change’; for a third, it would make, and has now made, Ukraine the second country in the world with both a Jewish president and a Jewish prime minister, which incidentally would disprove all those Russian propaganda memes about Ukraine’s “fascism” and “anti-Semitism” for anyone who still needs to have them disproven.)

I missed one crucial element then: the extent to which Ukrainian politics had already been Facebookized, i.e., to which social media have spun Ukrainians into polar extremes, both of which seem to have fallen off one or another edge of consensus reality. Ukrainians have long been polarized, which has accounted for their revolutions and political oscillations, but the pro-western cultural nationalists and the left-liberal progressives (among the intellectuals I connect with) have usually had significant overlap between them. Now they seem to have departed into separate realities. (And that’s not to speak of larger cultural divides.)

(I could offer a couple of dozen posts and comments from friends to display these divergences in pretty stark terms. Reading them is difficult, because I know and respect some of these people. They are at least my “friends.”)

That social media would be so powerful among the population at large no longer surprises me (see Brazil, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Brexit, Trump). That it’s so powerful among intellectuals still does. This development deserves a new term: not politics not as reality-TV but politics as “reality-FB.”

More for us media scholars to keep up with, I guess. Happy Earth Day, Україна.

Four theses on Ukrainian politics

Posted in Uncategorized on April 16, 2019 by Adrian J Ivakhiv

1. Ukraine is on the verge of overtaking all rivals in the race to equate politics with reality-TV. (The leading presidential contender is a comedian and entertainer who played president on a TV show.) Whether they cross over that verge will be decided in a runoff election on April 21.

2. Ukrainians are more savvy than most about their politicians. The majority of Ukrainians are well aware that oligarchic interests control most political parties and media outlets. They know who these oligarchs are, and they have at least a vague idea of how they became oligarchs. (Being young and forward-looking party insiders, they cleverly positioned themselves to carve out the spoils of industry and commerce among themselves in the transition from Soviet Ukraine to independent Ukraine.) This compares favorably to a country like the United States, where partisans on one side or the other have a vague idea that George Soros or the Koch Brothers might be responsible for something or other, but have only the vaguest fantasy of how the ultra-rich got that way or of how they continue to dominate politics. This means that Ukrainians are more sophisticated consumers of their own political systems than most, and that, in principle, they could eliminate oligarchy more easily than could the citizens of most countries.

As Vlad Davidzon writes in The Tablet,

The Ukrainian people have been conditioned into political cynicism—or let’s call it sophistication—by a Byzantine political system of ever-shifting alliances ruled by parties led by oligarchs and charismatic characters. Characters who are made for television. They have similarly been trained by the many hours they spend watching oligarch owned television shows to know exactly which politician belongs to which oligarch. Even the most ordinary television viewers seems to intuitively grasp the literary stratagem that the smirking Kolomoyski is exploring with his television show about a show about a political novice entering politics through a television show funded by a caricature of an evil Jewish-Ukrainian oligarch [editor’s note: Kolomoisky, and Zelenskyi, are Jewish-Ukrainians.]

The entire phenomenon is like a television show about a television show about a television show which suddenly transforms into freakish reality. Except for the fact that the auto-fictional demarcation line between fact and fiction is glaringly obvious to everyone.

3. For a political system dominated by oligarchic interests, Ukraine’s is surprisingly pluralistic. Leading politicians know how to play the oligarchs against each other. Ukraine has in fact made more progress, in the last five years, at reforming its oligarchic and dysfunctional tendencies than have most countries. If its president is its oligarch-in-chief, the fact that his own wealth has diminished over his reign (by nearly half) is a positive sign. (He is down to 11th position among wealthiest Ukrainians.) If he is replaced by the comedian-in-chief (backed by oligarch number 2, who lives in exile in Israel), there appears little chance that that individual would bring all the rival oligarchic interests together into a loving community. Since rival oligarchs own rival media chains, a certain measure of pluralism is built into the system.

4. As with all oligarchic or plutocratic “democracies,” this pluralism is restricted to issues that don’t threaten the overriding interests of the oligarchic class. The question, for Ukrainian reformers and radicals, is not how to challenge authority per se (as it is, say, in Russia) so much as it is how to find the cracks between authorities so as to create spaces where democratic reforms and rule of law can take root and grow. This makes Ukraine more akin to the US, Canada, western European countries, or India than to Russia, China, or the more centralized authoritarian states.

I guess all of that is why I’m not fretting too much over the upcoming presidential runoff election. I have good friends who are fretting, for cultural or geopolitical reasons (due to the presence of seemingly pro-Russian voices in the circles around him, or to a distrust of that oligarch number 2, or for a certain lightness in his treatment of topics they take seriously — he is, after all, a comedian). But I don’t see this election through those lenses, and haven’t seen in Zelenskyi the kind of reflexive authoritarianism that worries me in some other candidates. A certain balancing out has to occur in a pluralistic nation, and as long as there are checks and balances to prevent consolidation of authority, there are more important things to fight for than the presidency. There may even be gains to be made with a shifting of the prospects for reform.

Social democrats all?

Posted in Uncategorized with tags , , , , on January 29, 2019 by Adrian J Ivakhiv

Reading about how almost all Ukrainian presidential candidates are social democrats (in their rhetoric), I came across some nifty political hat collections. Which of them fits best?

On those Ukrainian politicians, political sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko explains this phenomenon (and disavows them all) in his interview with Jacobin.

“These people are sick…”

Posted in Uncategorized with tags , , , , , , , , on November 15, 2017 by Adrian J Ivakhiv

The border war in eastern Ukraine is, it turns out, also about art. Or so this video (below) suggests.

It was made in Donetsk, eastern Ukraine, after its military occupation by the separatist “Donetsk People’s Republic” a few years ago. The first interviewee is Leonid Baranov, head of a special committee that lodged itself on the premises of Donetsk’s Izolyatsia Art Center after its takeover by pro-Russian separatist fighters. The building housing the non-profit art center had previously been an insulating materials factory.

Baranov decries the art of the center and vigorously defends the DPR’s occupation of it: Read more »

Fugitive radioactivity

Posted in Uncategorized on November 12, 2017 by Adrian J Ivakhiv

Cross-posted from Immanence

The Washington Post reports that “Ruthenium-106, named after Russia” has been wafting all across Europe.

Two quick observations here.

Read more »

Plot thickening agents…

Posted in Uncategorized on May 26, 2017 by Adrian J Ivakhiv

Inside Russia’s social media war on America (Time)

The Great British Brexit Robbery (Guardian)

Trump, Putin, and the New Cold War (The New Yorker)

The information war is real, and we’re losing it (Seattle Times)

Russian “infowar” & the U. S. elections

Posted in Uncategorized with tags , , , , , , , , on December 13, 2016 by Adrian J Ivakhiv

As the story of the Russian state’s influence on the recent U.S. elections continues to unfold, here are some web sites that document various dimensions of it, and of Russian media strategies more generally. These are mostly critical analyses, which may carry their own biases. Those seeking defenses of Russian state media, or critiques of U. S. media, of the CIA, and so on, should look elsewhere, as that’s not what this page is about. This list will grow, so check back periodically if you’d like to stay up to date.

Read more »

Rise of the global alt-right

Posted in Uncategorized with tags , , , , , , on November 16, 2016 by Adrian J Ivakhiv

With Donald Trump in power, this web site just might get a new lease on life — reincarnated as a place for examining the rise of what has been called the “global alt-right,” with its network of connections between Putinists (like Alexander Dugin, Konstantin Rykov, and Igor Panarin), Trumpists (like Steve Bannon, Richard Spencer, and Alex Jones, among others), and those filling a similar niche around the world.

The Trump campaign’s connections with Russia, of course, go well beyond such hazy connections as these. Ukrainian fears of these connections are legion. As Natalia Humeniuk puts it,

Read more »

Skip to toolbar