ISLAM+MODERNITY

Turkish Modernity and Gender

Posted on December 9, 2015 by rnfriedl

Turkish modernity is neither religious nor secular. Pinar Ilkkaracan’s work is an example of the actualization of this complicated dichotomy shown through the actions of both the Turkish government and its citizens. Pinar Ilkkaracan is one of Turkey’s leading activists for women’s rights. She has helped found several NGOS including WWHR: Women for Women’s Human Rights. Her committees and research have spurred reforms in Turkey. Ilkkaracan reported in a paper for the Institute of Development Studies that progress was slow due to the structure of both the current and previous government since

“the rights granted to women by Kemalists aimed to destroy links to the Ottoman Empire and to strike at the foundations of the religious hegemony rather than at establishing actual gender equality…thus, the Republican ideology also instrumentalized women, this time as the protectors of secularism, just as the conservatives before them held women as emblematic protectors of conservative family values and the social order” (Ilkkaracan, “Reforming the Penal Code in Turkey”).

The activist committee ran into a lot of frustrations in their attempts for legal reform. One of the many penal codes the committee failed to change in 2005 was a “a legal loophole that limits the scope of the article to only a certain type of honor killing, such as family assembly verdicts, or as if it only exists in certain regions where certain customs prevail,” though 35 amendments were made in the previous year to other penal codes (Ilkkaracan). In 2010, Turkish officials amended part of the Constitution but ultimately made little change and created further evidence for the non-transparency and conservative nature of the government.

Previously, in 2007, protest meetings exemplified this tension, when the ideologies of traditional Islam and secular Islam came together in the form of protests against the low representation of women’s rights within the government. While some argued that the protests that went on did not best represent the people, especially those led by women’s NGOs, the support of civilians for the protests raised awareness for the issues and diverse identities present in Turkish society. Furthermore, even while secularism was seen to be in contrast to Islam, Muslim demonstrators carried flags of Ataturk. The Justice and Development Party, a socially conservative political party, came into power in 2002 using the tensions over the legality of a mandatory headscarf to gain support.

While the Justice and Development Party, or the AK Party, could be accused of using fundamentalist ideologies to gain power and suppress minorities, the party actually rose to power in the aftermath of the spread of secularism. The previous structure “beginning with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, forcibly secularized many Muslim societies, subjugating religious authority to increasingly intrusive lay supervision and stripping it of institutions it previously monopolized, such as courts and schools. At the same time, experiential secularism spread in the daily practices of Muslims” (Martin, “Islamic Secularism”). Even while secularism was taking hold in Turkish ideologies, there was still a tension against the secular modernity of the West.

In September of 2014, “hundreds of women marched in front of the parliament chanting ‘our bodies and sexuality belong to ourselves’.” This motivated the government to withdraw the offending penal code, part of which recriminalized adultery, which was an unprecedented move. However, there were many roadblocks before there was progress. In the NGO report to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, of which Ilkkaracan and her NGO were a part, it reports that “in the period from 2004 to 2009, Turkey did not formulate or enforce the legal amendments necessary toward eliminating discrimination, and thus failed to meet the commitments set forth by the Committee; many demands by women’s groups for the recognition of women’s legal rights and the prevention of gender discrimination encountered resistance from the political authorities”(Ilkaracan).

‘Our bodies and sexuality belong to ourselves!’ (Photo © Filmmor Women’s Cooperative)

One of the main differences between Turkey and Euro-American contexts, is that “there is not a distinct separation between religion and other aspects of people’s lives. Islam is both din wa dunya (religion and the world). The basic conflict here is not necessarily between religion and the world, as was the case in Christian experience; rather, it is between the forces of tradition and the forces of modernity” (Monshipouri, “Secularization”).
For activists like Ilkkaracan, the headscarf debate was one of the biggest ways in which women’s rights influenced politics. Secularists were very anti-headscarf because they were afraid that the mandatory headscarf was “going to open the door to punishing Islamic crimes — like apostasy or adultery” (Friedland, “Islam, Gender, and Democracy in Turkey”). These issues over secular versus religious law also brought into question identities and what it means to be a Muslim for many Turks.

Nazife Sisman, another activist, has been able to reconcile questions over women’s rights using secularist ideologies and religious arguments. For example, she believes in feminism but with religious regulation because “secular feminism denies the most important hierarchy, not between men and women, but between God and humans… The Creator gave women and men different natural “duties”: respectively to give birth and raise children and to protect and support those women. A man’s economic “burden,” she says, is a “compensation for not giving birth.” It would be unjust if women could not count on that male support” (Friedland). Arguments like Sisman’s have been used by women to justify the employment prioritization of men over women, though most feminists of this mindset still believe in the reduction of violence against women that “doubled from 2008 to 2012, according to the parliamentary Human Rights Commission. The country is also wracked by startling rates of child brides — nearly 7,000 girls were married between the ages of 13 and 17 over the past decade” (Jones, “Turkish Activists Say Their Country is Sliding Backward on Women’s Rights). Ilkkaracan is less concerned with reconciling religious and secular ideologies and focuses more on the fact that “Turkey was rated 120 out of 136 countries in terms of gender gaps in education, health, politics and economics by the World Economic Forum”(Jones).

Ilkkaracan often struggles with the government concentrating on “how they can make the laws more in line with their conservative ideology” instead of “of concentrating on protecting women who suffer from domestic violence”(Jones). In 2010, Ilkkaracan sat with dozens of other representatives from feminist organizations and heard current President Erdogan declare that he did not believe in gender equality. However, this did not deter her. Since then, she has continued to do work especially with women’s shelters and victims of domestic violence who are “less likely to receive state subsidies or financial support and benefit if she does not wear a headscarf,” despite the AK party’s official policy. Illkaracan hopes to continue to work in the four areas she sees the women’s movements concentrating: “women’s labour force participation – which is the lowest among OECD countries, political representation – which is in a pitiful state (The NGO KA-DER pushed for a quota of 30% during the 2007 and 2011 elections but the increase was minimal), violence against women, and the reform of the Turkish constitution to ensure gender equality”(Ilkkaracan, “The Turkish Model”).

The consistent changes and actions by the AK Party have helped redefine the position of Islamic women in Turkish modernity. Whether through social matters, such as a headscarf, or legal matters, such as protection from domestic violence, the ideologies surrounding gender in Turkey are changing. NGOs, such as the one founded by Ilkkaracan, are responsible for these changes due to persistent petitions, marches, and research. However, the tensions between the secular and religious perspectives in Turkish society and government are still very prevalent in these issues and can both create change and cause problems for reformers like Ilkkaracan.

Bibliography

Friedland, Roger. “Islam, Gender and Democracy in Turkey.” The Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-friedland/islam-gender-and-democrac_b_1155048.html

Jones, Sophia. “Turkish Activists Say Their Country Is Sliding Backward On Women’s Rights.” The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 18 Apr. 2014. Web. 14 Oct. 2015.

Monshipouri, Mahmood. “Secularization.” Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Ed. Richard C. Martin. Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004. 615-616.

Ilkkaracan, Pinar. “Reforming the Penal Code in Turkey: The Campaign for the Reform of the Turkish Penal Code from a Gender Perspective.” Women’s Human Rights– New Ways Association, Sept. 2007. Web. Oct. 2015.

Ilkkaracan, Pinar. “The “Turkish Model” : For Whom?” OpenDemocracy.
50.50, Nov. 2011. Web. 14 Oct. 2015

“Islamic Secularism” Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Ed. Richard C. Martin. Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004. 614-615

The Executive Committee for NGO Forum on CEDAW – Turkey Women’s Platform on the Turkish Penal Code. Shadow NGO Report on Turkey’s Sixth Periodic Report to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. Rep. no. 6. Women’s Human Rights – New Ways Association, July 2010. Web. Oct. 2015

Posted in Student Post | Tagged AKP, modernity, Turkey, Turkish secularism, women's rights | Leave a comment

Veiling in Turkey

Posted on December 9, 2015 by jlevine8

cover-pages-of-turkish-magazine-ala

What defines someone? Well, that question is very difficult because there are many things that define someone. People have unique personalities that can be expressed through what they wear—since others cannot look inside our brains, we rely on our external appearance to convey a message to the public. Through social media and the news, various cultural groups are depicted in multiple ways; ways that are not always positive. For example, the word “Islam” is associated with a lot of negative connotations. Words such as “extremist”, “conservative”, or “sexist” may come to mind. One cause of these misconceptions is the media. Although some of these words apply to certain Islamic extremists, they do not apply to every Muslim of the world. In countries where most citizens are Muslim, there is a balancing act between honoring traditional Islamic values and keeping up with the constantly changing/advancing world. This balancing act can be approached in multiple ways. For example, change occurs in every aspect of someone’s life from their clothes to their ideologies and values. In the scope of Islam and modernity, Islam has made itself known in an area that is well-versed in European countries as well as the United States – the fashion industry.

Turkey is a country undergoing modernity, in an unusual way; it is able to maintain important Islamic values while giving women the option to express their individuality through fashion. A marker of Islam and women is the veil—the veil is a representation of modesty as well as a means to express one’s religion. Ala is a high-fashion magazine in Turkey that caters to Islamic women’s fashion—in Monique Jaques’ photo-journal article regarding Islamic fashion, it is referred to as “Vogue of the veiled” by the press. By being associated with a renowned fashion magazine, it is seen that Ala successfully achieved its goal of creating fashion that both honors and praises Islam. Brands such as Hermes and Louis Vuitton produce scarves that are used as a hijab thus showing that highly respected, and known around the globe, are not abiding to commonly held stereotypes about veiling. For example, there is a notion that veiling prevents a woman from freely expressing herself. Additionally, these commonly held stereotypes about veiling are dissolved—in Anwar Ghazala and Liz McKay’s article, Veiling, they state that “when in public, women are asked to draw their jilbab (cloaks) over them so they may be identified as respectable women and not be harmed (33:59)” (Ghazala and McKay, Pg. 721). Some general thoughts about veiling are that veils prevent a woman from expressing herself, but these thoughts are refuted by the above quote—the veil’s purpose is to be an aspect of a woman’s external expression of herself and a depiction of how she wishes to be perceived. The phrase, “…women are asked…”, it can be inferred that women are not required to veil, it almost seems like a polite request. Even though veiling can be a choice, it is not always a choice – in the film, Persepolis, when Iran was under an oppressive government, the girls in Marjane’s (the main character) school were forced to veil.

Not only is the fashion world evolving in Turkey, but so is Islamic thought. An article by Russell Powell discusses the views of influential individuals— “…new approaches to Islamic law in Turkey have been developed by Diyanet, Ozturk, Gulen, and others. All three approaches discussed in this article incorporate elements of modernism” (Powell, Pg. 487). This quote shows that the idea of modernism is not ignored, and that there is a desire to hold onto Islamic values such as traditional fique. All in all, it is up to the Turkish people to decide what direction the nation will go in terms of reevaluating Islamic law as well as how they express themselves externally. The fact that there is a magazine specifically geared towards Islamic high-fashion proves that Turkey is combining Islam’s value of modesty with the freedom to express oneself through clothing. By veiling fashionably, women are proudly expressing their religion as well as themselves.

Bibliography:

Amini, Ayatullah Ibrahim. Rights and Duties of Women in Islam. Qum: Ansariyan, 2011.
Anwar, Ghazala, and Liz McKay. “Veiling.” Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Ed. Richard C. Martin. Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004. 721-722.
Dorroll, Philip. “‘The Turkish Understanding Of Religion’: Rethinking Tradition And Modernity In Contemporary Turkish Islamic Thought.” Journal Of The American Academy Of Religion 82.4 (2014): 1033-1069. ATLA Religion Database. Web. 11 Oct. 2015.
Ayla Göl, “The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and Secular,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2009), pp. 795-810
Jacques, Monique. “Photo Essay: Istanbul’s Islamic Fashion.” 18 Mar. 2014. Web. 1 Oct. 2015. <http://www.newsweek.com/photo-essay-istanbuls-islamic-fashion-232257>.
Emelie A. Olson, “Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: “The Headscarf Dispute” Anthropological Quarterly. Vol. 58, No. 4, Self & Society in the Middle East (Oct.,1985), pp. 161-171.
Powell, Russell. “Evolving Views Of Islamic Law In Turkey.”Journal Of Law And Religion 28.2 (2012): 467-487. ATLA Religion Database. Web. 11 Oct. 2015.

Posted in Student Post | Tagged fashion, Persepolis, Turkey, veiling, Visual Representations | Leave a comment

21st Century Orientalism in Iran and the United States

Posted on December 9, 2015 by skwolfe

Seeing the movie Persepolis in the sixth grade was one of the first truly globalizing moments of my life. Up until that point Iran, and the entire Middle East really, was in my narrow perception simply a land of conflict and intense religiosity. Being conditioned by both considerable privilege and the media of a post 9/11 world I built definitions of “American” and “Arab/Muslim” that were simplistic and wrong. Persepolis was my first glimpse at a non-western perspective of the west, Iran, and Islam, and they started to seem a lot more like us. What was particularly disturbing however, was the picture of us, the U.S., that was revealed. This wasn’t the champion of democracy I’d been shown before, this was my first glimpse of the United States as an aggressive imperial power. Years later, viewing this film as a primary source in comparison with other scholarly lectures and articles such as those of Hamid Algar and Soroush, the unfortunate truth somes into sharply focus; the west, and the US in particular, has abused the Iranian people and has profited from their oppression, both politically and economically.

In 1953 the CIA in cooperation with the British, orchestrated a coup against the democratically elected Mossadeq government in order to protect western oil interests from nationalization as well as reinstate the Shah who was sympathetic to western interests. Both goals were accomplished, with Mohammad Reza Shah in control of the country and 40% of Iran’s oil consortium going to the U.S. The CIA and the Israeli Mossad went on to help train and support the Shah’s secret police, the SAVAK as well as other brutal and violent organizations meant to suppress the descent and political agency of the Iranian people. It’s clear that in the case of Iran the common and self assumed identity of the west as the bastion of liberty and democracy breaks down. The United States and other imperial powers actively supported a tyrant and attempted to deny the self determination of a nation. In particular I found in Hamid Algar’s lecture “Iran and Shi’ism” an apt summation of the situation:

“We may say that had it not been for the continued interference in Iranian affairs first by Russia then by Great Britain, and most recently by the United States and Israel, Iran today, instead of looking back on a quarter century of struggle and a year of revolution in which at least fifty thousand people were slaughtered, might well have been able to look back on more than half a century of constitutional and parliamentary rule” (Algar, 25)

With the return to power of Mohammad Reza Shah, the United States alienated the Iranian people and condemned them to decades of inept, oppressive, and often violent rule. This subversion of democracy seems distinctly “un-American”. To the critical eye it is undeniable that “The deeply-held American values of freedom, self determination, and human rights of others have become subordinated to national interests” (Sheikhneshin, 93). And yet to this day, the question of whether or not Iran can be trusted is central to many of our foreign policy debates – particularly following the recent Nuclear Deal pioneered by Secretary of State John Kerry. American politicians and media alike continue to cast an oppressive theocratic Iran in contrast to an enlightened and liberated west. In 2002, President Bush even went so far as to include Iran in an “Axis of Evil”, rhetoric that continues to color American perceptions of Iran to this day. This, is orientalism in practice on a national scale.

In retrospect, my experience with Persepolis was a realization that my definitions of American and Iranian, West and East, secular and religious, all existed as stark opponents of one another – and as such these definitions were wildly insufficient. Using difference as the primary method of defining one’s identity can quickly and easily lead to fear of the different and ignores the possibility of complexity and cultural exchange. This fear, as Soroush puts it, is caused by “…the lack of a strong cultural digestive system and also the misconception that each culture is an indivisible monolith, accepting one part of which equals accepting the whole” (Soroush, 164). Both Iran and the US take part in this misconception, with chants of “death to America” on one hand, and threats of sanctions and bombs on the other.

And so the question remains: why is this orientalism so effective, and how does it effect our perceptions? In short, the orient occident comparison serves national interests and helps to support nationalist ideas. As Edward Said states in the introduction to his book Orientalism, “The relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony…” (Said 5). In the case of Iran and the U.S. this relationship was characterized at first by an outright dominance and more recently by a cultural and ideological contrast. This dynamic of assumed dominance, while upset by the 1979 revolution remains to this day. When a leading republican candidate for the presidency seriously propose shutting down mosques and issuing special ID’s to muslim citizens (whether as a vote-getter or as serious policy) it is more crucial than ever that we forestall such blindness and hatred by expanding our perspectives.

Sources:

Graham, Robert. Iran, the Illusion of Power. New York: St. Marin’s Press, 1978.
Hamid Algar, “Iran and Shi`ism,” in Roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, four lectures by Hamid Algar (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2001 [rev. ed.]), 13- 46.
Keddi, Nikki Ragozin. Roots of Revolution. An Interpretive History of Modern Iran. New Haven: Yale U. P., 1981.
Persepolis. Directed by Marjane Satrapi and Vincent Paronnaud. France: The Kennedy/Marshall Company, 2007. Film.
Said, Edward W. “Introduction.” Orientalism. New York: Pantheon, 1978. 1-28. Print.
John Obert Voll, “European Domination and Islamic Response,” in Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1994)
Sheikhneshin, Arsalan Ghorbani. 2009. “Iran and the US: Current Situation and Future Prospects”. Journal of International and Area Studies 16 (1). Institute of International Affairs, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University: 93–113. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43107186.
Weiss, Cathy M. “Why Iran Must Remain a US Enemy.” – Al Jazeera English. N.p., 10 May 2015. Web. 30 Sept. 2015.
“Text of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address.” Washington Post. January 29, 2002. Accessed November 3, 2015.
Cassidy, John. “Donald Trump and America’s Muslims – The New Yorker.”The New Yorker. The New Yorker, 19 Nov. 2015. Web. 04 Dec. 2015.
. Merica, Dan, and Jason Hanna. “In Declassified Document, CIA Acknowledges Role in 1953 Iran Coup – CNNPolitics.com.” CNN. Cable News Network, 19 Aug. 2013. Web. 04 Dec. 2015.

Posted in Student Post | Tagged Imperialism, Iran, Islam, modernity, Persepolis, Politics, Power, USA | Leave a comment

The Politics of Culture in Iran

Posted on December 9, 2015 by Grace Sullivan

How have Persian tradition, Islamic religion, and Western thought influenced and shaped the contemporary political sphere of Iran?

The political history of Iran is complex, tumultuous, and has left many political scientists scratching their heads. Both the establishment and the structure of the current regime illustrate a plethora of political paradoxes: the people elect some important government officials, but it is clearly an authoritarian regime; the regime is known for the brutal punishment of its critics, but its networks of underground resistance movements are thriving (Milani 1); it’s a theocracy, but the notion of secularism has been discussed and propagated amongst intellectuals over the course of the last 150 years (Rahnema 34). We can attempt to make sense of such inconsistencies by analyzing both the unique historical context in which they have developed and the numerous ways in which Iranians have reacted to their shared history.

Iran: The cat that wanted to be alone.

Iranian history has been marked by the collision of nationalist Persian traditions, Islamic proliferation, and Western hegemony as is argued by ‘Abdolkarim Soroush. In his writings he is prescriptive in the ways he believes Iranians should interact with this collision. Soroush warns against the dangers of accepting or rejecting any of these three cultural forces in their totality– namely the development of extremist ideologies. He argues for individual construction of cultural identity by adopting valuable aspects of each culture while rejecting their drawbacks (Soroush 169). This sort of cultural construction and transcendence of boundaries encourages a political attitude that we have seen evolving in Iran from the 1990s developing into the Green movement beginning in 2009 (Mahdavi 94). The Green movement and similar campaigns can be considered as both a reaction to the three extremist socio-political tendencies discussed by Soroush as well as a faction of the pro-revolutionaries in the post-revolutionary era.

Prior to the revolution, the pro-revolutionaries had one goal: overthrowing the brutal Shah who seized power from a democratically elected leader in a coup sponsored by Western powers, particularly the US and England (Algar 28). Seeing that this is such a broad goal it easy to imagine that many people with many different ideologies were taking part in the revolution to achieve it. We can also see how dislike for the Shah could both encourage and discourage the incorporation of Western ideology into Iranian culture. The coup can be seen as an attack on Western values such as democratic elections, or it can be seen as an attack by Western nations leading to the demonization of the West. Considering these things one can understand how the revolutionaries united in defeating the Shah fragmented into several different groups with conflicting ideologies in the post-revolutionary era.

If we examine the structure of the post-revolutionary government it is evident that its founders were attempting to establish a political system that would satisfy, at least superficially, the variety of revolutionaries’ political wills. The ultimate authority of the Ayatollah is demonstrative of the ultimate authority of Islam, while election of certain public officials such as the president is demonstrative of the people’s call for democratic governance. Both of these seemingly contradictory features illustrate exactly how carefully the post-revolutionary government was crafted.

I argue that the construction of the current regime and its resulting politics is a direct reflection of revolutionary and post-revolutionary citizens’ interactions with Islam, Western ideas, and Persian history. Whether intentional or not by accepting, rejecting, or blending any of these three cultural realities the Iranian citizen is making a political statement and shaping the politics of the country. For example those who reject Western thought and Persian customs entirely increase the power of the authoritarian regime by propagating their belief that Islam is incongruent with Western values and Persian history. At the same time those who engage with either Western or Persian culture are often seen as criticizing the politics of the regime and questioning the ultimate authority of Islam and the Ayatollah even when it is accidental. For example naming your child a traditionally Persian name can be read as a call for embracing Persian culture and return to the pre-Islamic era. It can also be read more simply as a rejection of the regime’s incredible control of personal freedom. If read in the second way we can see this sort of action as a call for secularism. It is not a rejection of Islam, but rather a rejection of an authoritarian state ruled exclusively in accordance with Islam. An increasing number of Iranians have adopted this view calling for “secularity” by restructuring the current regime and increasing democratic representation. Secularity is in quotation marks in order to emphasize the different conceptions of the incredibly abstract concept of secularism (Rahnema 34). For example many of the people involved in the Green movement discussed earlier support the idea of secularism and democracy; however many of these people are also relying on the majority Muslim population in Iran to elect leaders that promote Islamic values and create policies that reflect those values (Rahnema 44). This conception of a warped secularism is yet just another example of the many different ways Iranian’s interact with their multi-faceted culture to shape the politics of their country.

In conclusion, I believe that the contemporary political sphere of Iran has developed from and continues to be shaped by a collision and interaction between Persian tradition, Islamic religion, and Western thought. Furthermore, I would argue that the increasing synthesis of individual cultural identity we see within the Green movement and amongst activists like Soroush, will lead to another great shift in political power towards a more representative democracy while preserving the Persian and Islamic histories of Iran.

Bibliography

Algar, Hamid. “Iran and Shi’ism.” Roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran: Four Lectures. Oneonta: Islamic Publications International, 2001. 13-26. Print.

Foody, Kathleen. “Interiorizing Islam: Religious Experience and State Oversight in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” J Am Acad Relig Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 2015, 599-623.

Mahdavi, M. “Post-Islamist Trends in Postrevolutionary Iran.”Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 31, no. 1 (2011): 94-109.

Milani, Abbas. “Iran’s Paradoxical Regime.” Journal of Democracy:Volume 26, Number 2, 2015, 52-60.

Rahnema, S. “Retreat and Return of the Secular in Iran.” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 2011, 34-45.

Soroush, Abdolkarim. trans. Ahmad Sadri and Mahmoud Sadri. “The Three Cultures.” In Reason, Freedom, & Democracy in Islam Essential Writings of ʻAbdolkarim Soroush, 156-170. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Illington, Leslie. The Cat that Wanted to be Alone. Leslie Illington Cartoons. In the News & On this Day. Punch Magazine

Posted in Student Post | Tagged Iran, Islam, modernity, Persia, Politics, Power, secularism, theocracy | Leave a comment

Turkish Veiling: Religious Tradition or form of Political Resistance?

Posted on December 9, 2015 by Sage Wilmot

Veiling in an Islamic context usually refers to the covering of the hair, neck, chest area, face, or some combination thereof. In Turkey it has both religious significance and symbolism as political resistance and fashion accessory. These layered meanings contribute to its complex and often contradictory nature in the Turkish public realm. Turkish women who choose to veil often have to negotiate the religious meaning of the veil with its public symbolism.

The Western-constructed dichotomy of the Orient and the Occident has contributed to creation of a Muslim Other, constructions of definitions for what qualifies as modern, and the importance of individual emancipation, which is relevant to liberal definitions of feminism. This has created misunderstanding and stigma around the practice of covering (Sandikci and Ger 18). In a country like Turkey, which is predominantly Muslim but is strictly secular politically, this has resulted in an apologetic modernity that seeks to control any political effect Islam might have by regulating religion completely through their government (Olson 163).

It would be a mistake to say that veiling has deviated from its original religious meaning in Turkey, as Sahar Amer suggests, the norm of veiling within Islam has always been there is no norm (14). However, “veiling is part of being visibly Muslim” (Gokariksel and Secor 179), which means choosing to wear a headscarf in a secular context where it is banned is inevitably political. There is no direct prescription of the veil in the Qur’an, therefore its meaning is highly interpretive. This is why it is problematic to generalize what it means for all followers of Islam, so I will focus on its multilayered meaning in Turkish context today.

Turkish nationalism was heavily influenced by European modernisms in an apologetic manner. Unlike other secular countries, Turkey’s developed as a “’laicism’ in which religious practice and institutions are regulated and administered by the ‘state’” (Olson 163). This means that the government doesn’t necessarily try to cleanse itself of all religion in the public sector, but instead attempts to corral its influence into a less political framework and regulate it completely (Olson 164). If, as Amer suggests, “unveiling Muslim women and uncovering their heads became the single clearest indicator of modernity in Muslim-majority societies…” (4), then it seems logical that a country like Turkey would ban veiling from its public sectors in an attempt to secularize themselves in a European-influenced style.

Much to secularists’ chagrin, veiling by middle and upper class women started to become popular in urban areas in the 1980’s (Sandikci and Ger 16). Emelie Olson argues that “the majority of Turkish women, especially peasant women, had never been veiled” (165), her point blatantly contradicts any argument a secularist might make about current veiling practice being about Turkish tradition (rather than religious tradition) in an attempt to water down the political statement. So if it is not based on historical tradition, what is the significance in the rise of veiling in Turkey? Many women claimed to consider veiling after observing the government’s harsh treatment of those who chose to cover in schools (Sandikci and Ger 22), this indicates a presence of a dichotomy between secularism and Islam in play. Their choice to cover directly challenged previously held stigmas of what it meant for a woman to veil, because “emphasis on individual interpretation and choice reflects their empowerment and nontraditional status: they are not (Orientalist) subjects who are forcefully covered” (Sandikci and Ger 26). This resistance through choosing to be submissive to the veil is an interesting mix of Islamic religious ideals with modernity.

Turkish women are also faced with the oppositional meaning of the veil as both a practice of female modesty and control of nefis (the ego or psyche) and its emergence as a fashion trend for upper-class Muslim women at the turn of the 21st century (Gokariksel and Secor 182). It is an example of women trying to maintain the religious meaning of the veil while enjoying its visual appeal through the navigation of religious ideals with fashionable ascetics. Their struggle to control nefis through the veil is complicated by its popularity as a consumerist accessory.

A young Turkish woman wearing a headscarf in public

Fashionable women who choose to cover often tie their headscarf in a way where the label is visible so that others will know the brand, which contradicts the veil as a practice that avoids being overly concerned about appearance and attention (Gokariksel and Secor 185). However the veil is still associated with female modesty, and when confronted with women who cover but wear more revealing clothing like mini-skirts, other veiled women argue they “should either take off the scarf or cover [their] legs” (Gokariksel and Secor 189). They are not arguing that all females should dress modestly, but rather that females should be dressing consistently, and not appropriating the headscarf into more skin-bearing outfits. This could mean that women are more conscious of the way veiling appears in the Turkish public eyes. The practice could be seen as contradicting the veil’s purpose of modesty and attracting less attention, and if it is understood that wearing the veil develops these ideals, what does it mean if veiling has shifted to a more self-conscious and publically visible symbol?

From the examples of fashion and political resistance it is clear how veiling represents one of the many frictions modernity and secularism create for certain Muslim practices. If Muslim practices continue to appear so visibly in the public’s eye what will this mean for the future of ideals like modesty? Will Muslim women continue to negotiate the tradition within the tensions of modernity and secularism, or will they interiorize and individualize the practice instead?

Bibliography:

Amer, Sahar. What is Veiling? Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014.

Gökarıksel, Banu and Anna Secor, “The Veil, Desire, and the Gaze: Turning the Inside Out,” Signs, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Autumn 2014), pp. 177-200.

Göl, Ayla. “The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and Secular,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2009), pp. 795-810.

Kyle. “Turkish Fashion Muslim Beautiful Women.” Free Travel Talk. Last modified March 3, 2010. http://www.freetraveltalks.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/TurkishfashionMuslimbeautifulwomen8.jpg

Mahmood, Saba. “Agency, Performativity, and the Feminist Subject.” In Bodily Citations: Religion and Judith Butler, edited by Ellen T. Armour and Susan M. St. Ville, 177-210. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

Olson, Emelie A., “Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: “The Headscarf Dispute” Anthropological Quarterly. Vol. 58, No. 4, Self & Society in the Middle East (Oct., 1985), pp. 161-171

Sandikci, Özlem and Güliz Ger, “Veiling in Style: How Does a Stigmatized Practice Become Fashionable?” Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 37, No. 1 (June 2010), pp. 15-36.

Posted in Student Post | Tagged Identity, Islam, modernity, Representation, secularism, Turkey, veiling | Leave a comment

Saving The Bharat Mata: What was at stake for her children?

Posted on December 4, 2015 by Marissa McFadden

Can you pinpoint the moments in history that make you who you are? The moments that have created your identity? For Muslims, as well as other religious communities in India such as Hindus and Sikhs, one of these defining and shaping moments is the Partition/Independence of India of 1947. It is a moment both definitional of, and resultant from, a first colonial, and then imperial, British imperial influence.

Nehru and Jinnah are depicted as sawing through Mother India, with Gandhi and the British as spectators.

It is too bold to suggest that the entirety of Muslim identities in South Asia changed with Partition. For this reason, I am specifically investigating Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the All-India Muslim league. Particularly, the imaginations of religious identities of the post-Partition/post-Independent Muslim community, as depicted in the cartoon, “Sawing Through a Woman”, displayed to the right. It was published in July 1947 just one month before Partition/Independence took place. Using this image, the question that I aim to investigate is: how did the imagination of the Partition/Independence of India, based on the political cartoon “Sawing Through a Woman”, differ from the reality of what Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League imagined for post-Partition/Independence Pakistani Muslims? Arguably, Jinnah and other Muslims alike imagined a different, more united and perhaps less violent, reality from what actually came to be. I am claiming that what was at stake here, was the identities of the millions of people who had to adjust to a new, and very different, geopolitical framework in light of Partition.

As a political cartoon, “Sawing through a woman” provides great insight into Partition/Independence imaginations. Jawaharlal Nehru, the man dressed predominantly in white, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, dressed in all black, are depicted as sawing the box that contains the Bharat Mata or Mother India (better known as the embodied feminine, nationalistic, representation of India). Mohandas Gandhi and a British representative are depicted stereotypically, in the background.

In order to understand Partition/Independence, it is necessary to think about these political actors as well as the political spheres that set the stage. In short, by 1947, tensions are high between British imperial forces and the Indian people, and the British are looking to leave India quickly and quietly. At the same time, there is the major question in Indian politics of how to protect the Muslim minority (Metcalf, 207). Jinnah is among the first to suggest that Hindu and Muslim people should be politically separate. However, both Nehru and the Indian National Congress had a vision of sociocultural and industrial change with technology, education, and the eradication of caste (Naim, 150). They had two completely different visions. Additionally, if we pay attention to the British actor in the image, he speaks widely to tensions that were present in India, and the uncertainty that would come after Independence/Partition. As a result, Indians believed Partition/Independence was viewed as the only way to save the Mother from the damages that had been done in light of British colonization and imperial influence.

Thinking about this idea of the “Mother”, the only feminine body that you see is Mother India’s head on the side of the box that is labeled as Hindustan. She is central to the cartoon, just as she was central to Partition/Independence. Based on this depiction of the Mother, I think it can be said that identities, deconstructions, and formations in light of Partition/Independence, would occur not because of the event itself, but in the act of saving the Mother. I think that for Hindus, perhaps, this meant remaining by her side, and for Muslims, this meant leaving her so that they could see what they achieve without her; as they were now free from a political system and society where Muslims were not represented properly. In order to do so, Muslims would have to both embrace their identity as distinctive from Hindus, and perhaps pick and choose what to take or leave as a formerly Indian and newly Pakistani people. Therefore, the only way to save the Mother would be, to cut her in the process.

Thinking about Jinnah and what he imagined for the Pakistani community, it is essential to think about his Fourteen Points, an important idea that preceded his Two Nation Theory. When Jinnah thought of the idea of Pakistan he did so with the notion that it would be a place where Muslims would be united through society, culture, trade, and politics; despite the fact that the nation-state itself was divided geographically by India (Ahmed, 145). This idea was first laid out in March of 1940 during the All India Muslim League’s session in Lahore where Jinnah famously stated that Muslims and Hindus “were irreconcilably opposed monolithic religious communities.” At the end of the conference, the Lahore Resolution was established, which stated, “the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the North-Western and North-Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign (Khan, 37).”

A depiction of India ( yellow) and Pakistan (green) after Partition. The orange represents borders of India and Pakistan that remain in flux.

Because these groupings lay in the northwest and northeast of India, realistically, the country was “sawed” into three segments. The political cartoon does not depict the topographic reality of what India and East and West Pakistan would look like after Partition/Independence. Rather, it imagines that Pakistan would be a whole country despite the landmass, that is India, between them. As far as political actors’ imaginations go, it would appear that the woman in the box could not avoid being harmed as she is sawed in half. But, as the famous trick goes, this is not the case and she goes unscathed.

However, the reality is that Partition/Independence was a violent event. In thinking about the ways in which Mother India was sawn in half in the cartoon, there is a violent element to the cartoon that asks, what does it mean to cut up your mother? In her book Goddess and the Nation: Mapping Mother India, Sumathi Ramaswamy questions the ways in which maps, as they are drawn and re-drawn, foster the sentiment of intimate belonging that is so crucial to the imagined community of the nation? And further, how does the citizen, who stands removed from the new territorial space, come to see it as his “homeland”, in which he belongs? And finally, how can the young citizen feel moved to give up his life for this map (Ramaswamy, 175)? Referencing partition, Ramaswamy attributes this to the idea of the geo-body of the nation and the ways in which it “pictorially converts the citizen-subject from being a detached observer of the carto-graphed image of India into its worshipful patriot, so that its territory is not just the lines and contours on a map but a mother and a motherland worth dying for (Ramaswamy, 176).” Perhaps, this is the very reason for the mass violence that erupted in light of Partition/Independence. And so, I am inclined to question the role of accompanying violence in shaping post-Partition/Independence identities.

Thinking about the mass violence that came with Partition/Independence’s call to deconstruct and recreate identities, it would be worthwhile to think about the creation of a nation-state, and independence from the British (as imperial oppressors) as apologetic. Throughout his piece Apologetic Modernity, Faisal Devji claims that there is intimacy between modernity and colonialism (Devji, 64). As a result, Partition/Independence is both the literal and figurative space where Muslims became their own historical actors with morals, ideas, etc. In the case of Partition/Independence, when the Mother was cut, they created their own modernity, and effectively, their own new identity, which was suddenly separate from Hindu Indians, but nonetheless, derived from some of that very same identity.

I have found that modernity for post-Partition/Independence Muslims came to be defined as the space around which contemporary understandings of what late-colonial Muslims thought Islam was, and its place in a new world. And so, in thinking about how Partition/Independence shaped the identities of the late-imperial era, it is important to think about both the intimate, and personal agencies that were involved; as well as the ways in which they were simultaneously in and out of control.

Bibliography

Ahmed, Akbar S. Jinnah, Pakistan, and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin. Routledge, London (1997), 258pp.
Devji, “Apologetic Modernity,” in Modern Intellectual History, 4, 1(2007), pp. 61-
76.Dhulipala, Venkat, Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India. New York: Cambridge University Press, (2015). 554 pp.
Khan, Yasmin (2007). The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan. Yale University Press.
Metcalf Barbara D. and Metcalf, Thomas R., A Concise History of Modern India, third edition. Cambridge University Press (2012), pp 203-264.
Naim, C.M., Iqbal, Jinnah, and Pakistan: The Vision and the Reality. Syracuse University Press (1979), pp. 150.
Philips, C.H., The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives 1935-147. George Allen&Unwin Ltd (1969), 553pp.
Prasad, Bimal, Pathway to India’s Partition: the Foundations of Muslim Nationalism, vo1 1. Rajikamal Electric Press (1999), 319pp.
Ramaswamy, Sumathi, The Goddess and The Nation: Mapping Mother India. Duke University Press: Durham and London (2010), 379 pp.
Unknown Author “Sawing through a woman”, Pioneer July 8, 1947) image.
“Partition of India 1947” image. Accessed November 02, 2015 at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/partition1947_01.shtml

Posted in Student Post | Tagged Agency, Bharat Mata, Cartography, Colonialism, Gandhi, Great Britain, Hinduism, Identity, Imperialism, Independence, India, Islam, Jinnah, Mother India, Nehru, Pakistan, Parition, Partition/Independence, Politics, Power, Religion, Representation, South Asia, Two Nation Theory, Visual Representations | Leave a comment

Lived Subjectivity and Veiling in Turkey

Posted on December 4, 2015 by Amelia Royce

The veil is the most visible symbol of Islam and as such has been subject to much debate. In the following post, I attempt to move away from the problematic discourse of “veiling controversies”― which suggest a good and a bad, or a right and a wrong― and instead explore the nuances of veiling practice and performance.

Discussion around the topic of veiling has historically been dichotomous; the practice is depicted as either oppressive or liberating, religious or fashionable, modern or backwards. In the context of contemporary Turkey, this polarity is often articulated in terms of “Turkish ‘nationalism’ versus Muslim identity [or] secularism (laicism) versus an ‘Islamic society’” (Olson 1985, 166). The creation of these poles ignores the ways in which religious, aesthetic, and national identity interact and thus positions the veil as a “symbolic object rather than part of a woman’s lived subjectivity” (Gökariksel and Secor 2014, 180). These overlapping and intersecting identities inform both the public and private self as a veiled woman.

The intersectionality of religious and aesthetic identities is especially interesting with the rise of fashionable Islamic dress and the subsequent commodification of headscarves. There has been a relatively recent shift from drab and uniform religious headwear to more personalized and stylized pieces (Sandikci and Ger 2014). Many women identify their primary reason for adopting a covered lifestyle as religious (Ünal 2012). However, the increasing presence of covered fashion models and trending fabrics and prints would suggest that the motivation is not entirely modesty. The implied demand of the contemporary veiled woman is that she be both “modest and beautiful” as “the aesthetic of veiling fashion is also an ethic” (Gökariksel and Secor 2014, 189). The headscarf then appears as a public manifestation of personal morality as well as personal style. Style and morality, in the context of contemporary fashionable veils, work in conjunction with one another rather than in opposition.

Tumblr user Daniya poses with her “squad” in an array of fashionable headscarves. Daniya’s blog displays her interest in stylish covering, Drake lyrics, cool dads, and conspiracy theories.

In part due to the commodification and aestheticization of the veil, a veiled woman might amass a collection of various scarves in different fabrics and prints and with different sentimental significance. This collection serves as a representation of the self, taking on an individuality rather than existing solely as a product (Ünal 2012). The veil is the centerpiece of any given outfit and as such is integral to expressing and projecting the private self in public spaces. Different headscarves may have been received as gifts, worn to special events, or passed down through friend groups or families. In this way, the a collection of headscarves comes to serve as a visual delineation of a particular woman’s history or her “network of social relationships” (Ünal 2012, 318). This understanding goes a long way towards moving away from the idea of headscarves as a static symbol and positioning them instead as dynamic in their representation.

The recent resurgence of veiling in Turkey among young and educated women has created a “new position” that subverts and challenges the Western idea― adopted by Turkish national modernity― of veiling as backwards and old-fashioned (Sandikci and Ger 2014, 19). This is largely because veiling is a practice “laden with stigmatization” and often perceived as threatening in the West (Sandikci and Ger 2014, 16). Here, religious and aesthetic identities enter into the political sphere. The veil is the most obvious sartorial signifier of Islam and as such, some women describe the aestheticization of veiling as a form of “visual da’wah” or invitation (Ünal 2012, 311). The beautiful scarf, pinned perfectly and paired with just the right outfit, is thought to be capable of representing Islam as friendly, approachable, and pleasing. This is deemed especially important in spaces that may be hostile towards the practice of veiling or toward Islam as a whole (Ünal 2012). The existence of the veil as a very public symbol makes part of its function performative, even if silent.

Jessie Duff, war analyst and white Christian woman, explains the “threat” of the Middle East to Muslim journalist Noor Tagouri in the context of the Syrian refugee crisis.

In the context of contemporary Turkey, the veil is often read as an overt threat to secularity. Turkish secularity, modeled after French laicism, attempts to create a public space completely devoid of religion. The “threat” of the veil underscores the belief that Islam is incompatible with modernization. Additionally, it paints the modern woman as entirely different from the veiled woman. “That this two value model is an oversimplification is immediately obvious,” argues Emilie Olson, “Muslim identity- or at least the Islamic cultural heritage- is an inseparable part of Turkish nationalism” (Olson 1985, 166). Though this may be an obviously reductive point of view to Olson, Turkish laws regulating public dress and appearance would suggest that this “ideological conflict” carries real political weight (Olson 1985, 166).

Mary Lou O’Neil posits that dress codes serve to “undermine the relationship thought to exist between personal belief and appearance” and in doing so attempt to maintain power and create the “model public citizen” (O’Neil 2010, 66). In contemporary Turkey, the “model public citizen” is a “modern” one, which is here synonymous with Western. Religion, particularly Islam, is seen as being entirely at odds with Turkey’s modernizing and Westernizing agenda. It follows that “the real issue is not clothing, but thought” (O’Neil 2010, 77). The regulations serve to reinforce and reproduce existing dichotomies and thus invalidate intersectionalities. Turkish dress codes aimed towards Westernization also seek to push citizens towards one side of this particular dichotomy― toward Turkish nationalism rather than Islam. The aesthetic of veiling does not only connote a religious morality in this situation, but a national one, reflecting the devotion (or lack thereof) of the wearer to the state. For many Muslim Turkish women, however, national and religious identities are not contradictory, instead they exist together and inform one another.

Veiling as a practice and as a performance has both private and public resonances. Though a woman’s choice to cover might be rooted in faith, her religious identity will then inevitably interact with consumer culture, specific demands of morality and modesty, her significance in certain spaces, her personal style or story, and her nationality, Turkish or otherwise. Though the veiled subject might be intimately aware of these intersectionalities, the particular visibility and performativity of the veil imposes on her certain other, and perhaps less nuanced, identities as a function of the state, the market, or the church.

Bibliography

“FOX 5 ‘Unfiltered’: Syrian Refugee Crisis.” FOX 5 News. November 18, 2015. Accessed November 22, 2015.

Gökariksel, Banu, and Anna Secor. 2014. “The Veil, Desire, and the Gaze: Turning the Inside Out.” Signs: Journal Of Women In Culture & Society 40, no. 1: 177-200. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 2, 2015).

Kuran, Ibrahim. 2010. “New Normalcy and Shifting Meanings of the Practice of Veiling in Turkey.” Journal Of Alternative Perspectives In The Social Sciences 2, no. 1: 364-379. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 2, 2015).

mumbye (November 26, 2:23 a.m.), “BIG RINGS” Yeezy Taught Me, (December 1), (http://mumbye.tumblr.com/post/133982019246/i-got-a-really-big-team-and-they-need-some-really).

Neshat, Shirin. Women of Allah. Digital image. The Metropolitan Museum of Art. Web. 1 Oct. 2015. 1997.129.8

Olson, Emelie A.. 1985. “Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: “the Headscarf Dispute””. Anthropological Quarterly 58 (4). The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research: 161–71. doi:10.2307/3318146.

O’Neil, Mary Lou. 2010. “You Are What You Wear: Clothing/Appearance Laws and the Construction of the Public Citizen in Turkey.” Fashion Theory: The Journal Of Dress, Body & Culture 14, no. 1: 65-81. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 2, 2015).

SANDIKCI, ÖZLEM, and GÜLIZ GER. 2014. “Veiling in Style: How Does a Stigmatized Practice Become Fashionable?.” Journal Of Consumer Research S207-S228. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 2, 2015).

Ünal, R. Arzu, and Annelie Moors. 2012. “formats, fabrics, and fashions: muslim headscarves revisited.” Material Religion 8, no. 3: 308-329. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost(accessed November 2, 2015).

Posted in Student Post | Tagged gender, hijab, Islam, nationalism, secularism, Turkey, Turkish secularism, veiling | Leave a comment

Turkey: (How) Has the Secular Changed?

Posted on December 4, 2015 by Cristina MacKinnon

As scholars of religion, when we think of “secularism,” we think of an institution, state, or body that is overtly non-religious. When we hear that term ascribed to something, we are expecting the exact opposite of what we have come to know as “religion.” But what if this idea of secularism has shifted and become antiquated? The Republic of Turkey serves as an example of a nation that has adopted a proclaimed secular nature since the first president Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s devoutly secular reimagination of the Ottoman Empire in the mid-1920s. Today, while ninety percent of Turkey’s inhabitants identify as Muslim and many of its leading politicians are Islamist, the nation would seem to a Westerner’s perspective to be quite un-secular. Rather than blindly accepting this cursory assumption, we will explore the ways in which the work of “the secular” is actually just as legitimate in the country with all its religious intertwining, albeit, slightly shifted from its original imaginings.

First, in order to see how the notion of secularism has shifted, it is necessary to understand the uniqueness of an “Islamic secularism.” In an encyclopedia article on the term, Charles Kurzman defines it as a “movement that seeks to limit the scope of [Islamic] authority (Kurzman 2004: 614-615).” The concept spread throughout the 19th century as a reaction to excessively powerful regimes that derived their power from religion; many saw a theocratic government to be problematic and began to understand an authoritative, political Muslim rule as an archaic fixture that had no place in modern civilization. The question of whether or not Islam is inherently modern is one that pervades Islamic studies, but here we will understand modernism as a form of society in Turkey, at least at its inception (Kumar 2008: 240-254). In accordance with this view, Atatürk’s philosophy of Kemalism encouraged nationalism, embraced democracy, and disestablished Islam as a “precondition of the country’s modernity (Kerslake, Oktem, Robins 2010: 1-14).” Despite intentional efforts to modernize the nation, many tensions between Turkey’s political, cultural, and religious identities have been coming to the forefront.

Protests in Ankara, 2012.
(Bektas 2012)

In 2012 on Republic Day in Ankara, the annual celebration of the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, an incident between pro-secular protesters and police forces occurred. Citizens in opposition to the Islamist government took to the streets despite an official prohibition on their march. The image of these riots illustrates the tension between opposing forces of secularism and religion that play out in a hyper-militarized, political way. The protesters’ response was a result of the recent return to a religious, and specifically Islamist, presence in the national government. The past few Prime Ministers of the country, Ahmet Davutoglu, Recep Tayyip Erdogan (now, President), and Abdullah Gul have all been associated with the Justice and Development Party (AKP). This conservative political party was formed out of Islamist thought, though it officially recognizes its ideology as one of conservative democracy. Tibi defines political Islam succinctly: “an ideology [that] stands in the context of the oscillation in Islam between culture and politics, and is related to the politicization of Islamic cultural concepts and symbols (Tibi 2001: 2).” Opponents of political Islam find these politicians in power to be increasingly authoritarian (as evidenced by their use of weaponry to subdue riotous groups) and excessively weary of coups or uprisings (Vela 2012).

How founded are these fears? Is Turkey truly abandoning its secular tradition? According to Aya Göl, the issue is far more complex. Islam in Turkey is not only a religion, but a “historical political marker (Göl 2009 :807),” the identification with which signifies a collective community. Instead of focusing on the classification of the Republic of Turkey, we must realize that “the AKP and the secular establishment have an opportunity to prove that one can be both Muslim and secular within a democratic system (Göl 2009: 807-808).” While we can easily ascribe these two disparate modes of modernization onto the country, Adil Özdemir and Kenneth Frank remind us of the inherent complexity of the lived experiences of Turkish Muslims. Our Western terms are only convenient, at best, and ultimately discredit the experiences of practicing Muslims, non-practicing Muslims, nominal Muslims, devout Muslims, et al (Ozdemir 2000: 26).

Although Atatürk’s vision of a secular Turkey has certainly shifted over time due to “the power and challenge of global European and American technical cultures (Özdemir 2000: 12),” it cannot be discredited or proven wrong. Perhaps, instead of focusing on the legitimacy of Turkey’s secularism, we might be better off critiquing the Western preconceptions that pose the secular and religion definitively at odds with each other. As we can see, while politics and religion further intermingle in Turkey, we need to steer away from the inclination to see this phenomenon as un-secular; both the secular and Islam are integral parts of the nation’s identity that cannot be forced apart.

Works Cited

Bektas, Umit. Photograph. The New York Times. 29 Oct 2012: A4. Nytimes.com. Web. 01 Oct 2015.

Göl, Aya. “The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and Secular,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2009), pp. 795-810. Web.

Kerslake, Celia, Kerem Öktem, Philip Robins. “Ataturk and Kemalism throughout the Twentieth Century.” Introduction. Turkey’s Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. pp. 1-14. Web.

Kumar, D.V., “Engaging with Modernity: Need for a Critical Negotiation,” Sociological Bulletin, Vol. 57, No. 2 (May-August 2008), pp. 240-254. Web.

Kurzman, Charles, “Islamic Secularism” Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Ed. Richard C. Martin. Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004. pp. 614-615. Print.

Özdemir, Adil and Kenneth Frank. “The Present Juncture in the Spiritual Journey of Muslims in Turkey” in Visible Islam in Modern Turkey. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 2000.

Tibi, Bassam. Islam between Culture and Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2001. Print.

Vela, Justin. “As Turkey Changes, So Does Its View of the Founding National Hero, Atatürk.” The Atlantic. 27 Jun 2012. Theatlantic.com. Web. 01 Oct 2015.

Posted in Student Post | Tagged Ataturk, secular, secularism, study of religion, Turkey, Turkish secularism | Leave a comment

Iran or Persia?

Posted on December 4, 2015 by W. F. Goldschmidt

Towards the beginning of the semester, I was tasked with developing an investigatory question concerning Iran that I would pursue throughout the course of the semester. Unfortunately, the only thing that I felt I reliably knew about Iran was that it used to be called Persia. This, additionally, had been a recent revelation discovered only through readings in this very class. So, I proposed to investigate the shift in nomenclature from Persia to Iran.

My investigations quickly led me to the 1935 request of Reza Shah to have his nation called its native name, Iran, rather than the name imposed on it by ancient Greece, Persia. Additionally, it seemed that Persia is again an acceptable referent for the nation. Despite my relatively quick success, I felt unsatisfied. Though I had found a single historic moment that can be pointed at to explain ‘why we call it Iran,’ I was unsatisfied. Why had Reza Shah requested such a name change? Was the claim that this is its native name historically accurate, or was it fabricated in the relatively recent past?

So my investigations continued. Eventually, I tracked down several Iranian scholars noted for their conception/presentation of the Iranian identity: Abdolkarim Soroush, Hamid Algar, Marjane Satrapi, and Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi. After reading these four scholars, I no longer was concerned with the shift in nomenclature from Persia to Iran, especially considering some of the comments about Persia currently being an applicable referent. My interest turned to the relationship between the obviously different perspectives of the authors and Soroush’s proposition of three cultural identities operative in Iran at the beginning of the 21st century. The latter three authors fit into Soroush’s categories of operative cultures, demonstrating the similarities and differences between the three.

Soroush, in his element lecturing at Sharif University, attempts to identify the cultural identities operative in Iran in the post-revolution era.

Islamic, European, and Persian(a.k.a. nationalistic) cultures have been identified as being operative in Iran at the turn of the millennium. Hamid Algar presents a history of the ulama, or Islamic elite of Iran (among other things pertinent to Islam, but less so to my question of relations of identity), focusing on historically significant leaders thereof. His depiction of the influence of Ali Shari’ati and Ayatollah Khomeini in the shaping of modern Iran preferences the perspective and dominance of the Islamic culture operative in Iran during their times.

In open opposition to the Islamic dominance in Iran, Marjane Satrapi expresses the influence of European culture on the creation of her identity through her graphic novel series and animated film Persepolis. Through this autobiography of Satrapi, we learn that she grew up going to the French school, speaking French, listening to British Heavy Metal, and eventually living in Italy. In a 2006 interview by Robert Root about the autobiographical nature of the story, Satrapi’s constantly refers to European though, ultimately expressed by: “You know, in the history of the human being there was one time when human beings were really intelligent. That was in ancient Greece”(Root 153). This resounding statement of the superiority of European cultural ways demonstrates how it has become engrained as a feature of some Iranians’ identities.

Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi resorts to Persian roots rather than Islamic or European influences. He argues in several pieces that pre-Islamic Persian culture is still operative in modern Iran. His claim that Orientalism “develop[ed] into a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’”(Orientalism’s Genesis Amnesia 20), argues that the European construct of Orientalism, in its totalitarian appropriation, crafted the idea of ‘The Orient’ as a single ontological entity. This reduction of diverse populations eventually worked to shape conceptions of that population in both the minds of the progenitors of the construct as well as some those it seeks to define.

Despite the simplistic European depiction of countries such as Iran, Tavakoli-Targhi believes that the ancient Persian culture still creates real change, noting that “Arabic words were purged, ‘authentic’ Persian terms forged, and neologism and lexicography were constituted as endeavors for ‘national reawakening’”(Refashioning Iran 77). That Persian concepts are still operative demonstrates that European constructs of thought do not have a complete foothold in Iran. Similar to his critique of William James as being a cultural plagiarist (Orientalism’s Genesis Amnesia 23), Tavakoli-Targhi points out that Persian culture has always been operative, and only European influence and misunderstanding ever lead people to a different conclusion.

Through my investigations into the shift in nomenclature from Persia to Iran, I have come to find that, while the words refer to the same general parcel of land, along with the people and cultures thriving thereon, there truly is a difference between them. Iran seems to represent the polity and the idea constructed by ‘Western’ media (Satrapi 152), while Persia represents the culture indigenous to the geographic area (Orientalism’s Genesis Amnesia). Additionally, I’ve come to find increasing diversity of factors influencing the construction of an Iranian identity, in varying degrees, at varying times. European influence has had a real affect in the area, but not to the extent that it believes it has, as even Satrapi could be a result of more Persian influences than European ones.

Legal Stuff

Cambridge History of Iran [notably volume 7]

Hamid Algar, “Islam as Ideology: the thought of Ali Shari`ati,” pp. 85-117.

Hamid Algar, “Iran and Shi`ism,” in Roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, four lectures by Hamid Algar (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2001 [rev.ed.]), 13‐46.

Tavakoli-Targhi, Mohamad. “Refashioning Iran: Language and Culture During the Constitutional Revolution,”Iranian Studies 23:1-4 (1992), 77-101. (accessed on JStor)

Tavakoli-Targhi, Mohamad. “Orientalism’s Genesis Amnesia.” http://mtavakoli.com/books/RefashioningIran-Chapter2-Orientalism’sGenisisAmnesia.pdf

Soroush, excerpts from Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush, trans. Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri (OUP: 2000).

Image: {{Information |Description= AbdolKarim Soroush lecturing in Sharif University |Source= |Date= October, 2006 |Author= Hessam M.Armandehi |Permission= Dual License, CC-by-sa, GFDL |other_versions= }}

Posted in Student Post | Tagged Iran, modernity, Persia, Soroush | Leave a comment

Deconstructing Boundaries of Power

Posted on December 4, 2015 by Isabel Handanos

0056521-IMPERIALISM-CARTOON-1882-The-Devilfish-in-Egyptian-Waters-An-American-cartoon-from-1882-depicting-John-Bull-England-as-the-octopus-of-imperialism-grabbing-land-on-every-continent

‘The Devilfish in Egyptian Waters.’ An American cartoon from 1882 depicting John Bull (England) as the octopus of imperialism grabbing land on every continent.

power | ˈpou(-ə)r
noun
: the capacity or ability to direct or influence the behavior of others or the course of events

“Power is the ability not just to tell the story of another person, but to make it the definitive story of that person.” —Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie

Popular conceptions of power often invoke images of force and coercion, tending to emphasize the physical—that is to say, the more visible—sense of the word. One is more likely to think of the military power of a political dictator forcing a people into submission rather than the subtle power of social forces acting upon individuals in society. However, forces that more closely resemble the latter can be just as potent as any display of physical might used to coerce or compel. At times, their operation in societies proves more effective because of their covert nature, allowing them to enact harm through the subconscious manipulation of individuals rather than the conspicuous use of force. This is precisely how the acclaimed Nigerian novelist and nonfiction writer, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, conceives of power. According to her, power is expressed through the ability to create single, definitive narratives about groups of people, and to have those narratives accepted and reproduced to the point where they become the only lens through which a society views them.

I would like to expound on this concept by assuming the position that definitive narratives about groups of people are deliberately created over time through lengthy processes of definition, social acceptance, and the gradual amnesia of their creation. Further, I would like to examine how these are embedded within historical narratives, and how they serve to propagate single conceptions of people by lending an artificial credibility generated through problematic notions of historical accuracy. Using this, I will attempt to provide an analysis of the ways in which Indian Muslims were depicted within the British colonial context and what implications this has for how people view Islam and Muslims today.

Historians often conceptualize their discipline as the objective reconstruction of the past, as if their job consisted of uncovering or rendering visible historical events, much like an archaeologist unearths ancient artifacts. This has caused many to place the same kind of trust in the accuracy of historical narratives as they do in the writings of the scientific disciplines, viewing them as based on facts and demonstrable governing principles. However, the controversial historian and literary critic, Hayden White, challenges this assumption by arguing that the construction and interpretation of history more closely resembles the field of literature than that of the physical or social sciences. According to White, history is created through a process of emplotment, by which he means “the encodation of the facts contained in [a] chronicle as components of specific kinds of plot structures” (White 7). Historical narratives are, therefore, created through the active process of selecting and prioritizing some historical facts over others in order to create a story that fits into a preconceived plot structure in order to assign meaning. The individual parts alone cannot constitute a comprehensible account of history; they require a format (or genre) that the historian chooses depending on how he or she interprets the facts as well as the message being conveyed. History, therefore, is not an unmediated and neutral context for interpretation, but rather is comprised of deliberately selected historical truths combined in a way to convey a particular message to their audience. This message serves a purpose and must therefore be critically examined in order to discern who it benefits and at what costs.

The illusion of historical factuality proves detrimental when it creates a single narrative of
a people that becomes the only way others are able to conceive of them. Much of the success of imperialist projects depends on the formulation of single representations of colonized peoples, as these allow for their dehumanization and subsequent subjugation. This is operative in the way Muslims in India were portrayed during the British Raj.

To illustrate this point, I would like to turn to a particularly influential book by Sir William Wilson Hunter called The Indian Musalmans: Are they bound in conscience to rebel against the Queen? The title alone is quite provocative, and seems to suggest that there is something inherently conflictual about being a Muslim under British rule. Indeed, Hunter comes to the conclusion that Islam demands rebellion against foreign occupation, and that Indian Muslims are therefore compelled by their religion to wage jihad against the Raj. He writes, “Somehow or other, every Musalmán seems to have found himself called on to declare his faith; to state, in the face of his co-religionists, whether he will or will not contribute to the Traitor’s Camp on our Frontier; and to elect, once and for all, whether he shall play the part of a devoted follower of Islám, or of a peacable subject of the Queen” (Hunter 14). According to Hunter, Muslim religious identity is incompatible with British national identity, which is problematic when one considers the fact that Hunter raises no objections to Christian- or Hindu- identified British subjects. This implies that Hunter believes the problem stems from something uniquely violent within Islam.

Additionally, Hunter promulgates an insider/outsider dichotomy through his use of the possessive “our” in juxtaposition with his use of “they” and “them” when referring to Indian Muslims. His use of language produces a misleading narrative in which all of Islam is pitted against “the West,” and the story of Indian Muslims, therefore, becomes one of rebellion against an entire cultural entity.

As I watch the news today, I cannot help but hear Hunter’s voice echoing through the rhetorical speech of prominent right-wing politicians. Ben Carson, for example, claimed in a CNN interview that “if you accept all the tenets of Islam…you would have a very difficult time abiding under the Constitution of the United States.” Does this not sound strikingly similar to Hunter’s claim that one cannot simultaneously be a British subject and a Muslim? And what about Marco Rubio’s comment about ISIS/ISIL/Daesh: “They literally want to overthrow our society and replace it with their radical, Sunni Islamic view of the future. This is not a grievance-based conflict. This is a clash of civilizations.” Is he not resorting to the same polarizing dichotomy that Hunter promotes in his book: Islam vs. “the West”?

The single story is alive and well in today’s society. Though the writings of a long-dead 19th century British historian may seem irrelevant as today’s geopolitical and cultural landscape differs wildly from what it was then, it is hard to look at contemporary political rhetoric and not see the same story lines being reiterated. Perhaps the most important thing we can do to guard against the power of this rhetoric is to break down the barriers created by the single story, and allow for more nuanced representations of Muslims and Islam in the mainstream media. In this way, we can counter the divisive forces it promotes and restore a sense of shared humanity between people.