Muslim Youth: Struggle for Identity and Purpose in America

Posted on April 30, 2018 by ahaji1

  by Aden Haji

This is an image that depicts the youth of the quadrant slam poetry group, Muslim Girls Making Change formed in Burlington, Vermont. Although these young women are only in their teens, they are making great strides to promote awareness of Islamophobia as well as sharing the truth of the peace in Islam through their lyrical rhythms.

In modern America, Muslim youth are making a huge impact in the world today.They are changing societal perceptions of Islam, giving light to Islam’s connection to modernity, and promoting peace within Islam. It is important to explore how modern Muslim-American youth are defining what it means to be a Muslim in today’s generation, because it gives a perspective of the religion of Islam through the lenses of Muslim youth.

The majority of these youth are facing dual identity struggles as they are expected to stay conservative in this ever-changing American society. It is common for most Muslim youth  to experience role confusion because many of their parents expect them to stick to their traditional Muslim beliefs and practices. It is important to note that they are going through the same adolescent changes as any other youth would go through in America. In the book, Young Muslim America,  Muna Ali expresesses:“Unlike their parents, these offspring of immigrants or converts now in the second, third, and fourth generations were born into both Islam and American culture. They have experienced America’s educational system and weekend Islamic schools, minority status, and American popular culture (Ali 44).” In her quote, Muna Ali captures the transitions that modern youth Muslim are going through in regards to generational changes in school and popular culture.

From my own personal experience, I can testify to the dual-cultural identity that Muslim youth possess. My dual-identity is embodied through the contrast of my experiences as a UVM student and my experiences as a student studying Islam at weekend schools. In my classes at UVM, I examine and study contemporary world issues, scientific innovations, and modern literature; while in my weekend Islamic school, I focus my study on interpretations and recitations of the  Quran. This contrast has a direct impact on my parents views on my academic schooling, as they worry that my secular education may disconnect me from my personal beliefs and religion. .

Typically, Muslim youth are expected to follow Islamic practices while at home, such as praying and using Islamic invocations. One example of this interaction in the household is outlined in Keeping it Halal by John O’Brien. O’Brien illustrates the ethnographic approach to understanding the lives of Muslim teenagers in America. One of the experiences the author described was being invited to a male teenager’s  Islamic household and witnessing the practice of saying “Bismillah” (In the name of Allah) before and after the family eats (O’Brien 9). As a Muslim, I thought this experience was interesting because the invocation is emphasized mainly at home but rarely outside the household; however, youth have the power to choose when to use it  depending on how strongly they link to the religion. It was interesting to witness the cultural changes that occur outside the homes of Muslim boys who were the focus of the O’Brien’s text. The characters were still involved in dating and keeping up with hip-hop culture that is frowned upon to their parents. This is a great example of how the youth are changing societal perceptions of Islam because they are engaging in activities outside of the religion’s norms. As a result, they are incorporating new, contemporary ideas into their definition of a modern Muslim.

One significant example in which Muslim  youth in America are reforming the definition of a modern Islam and tackling islamophobia is through poetry. I have decided to use an image of the Muslim Girls Making Change based in Burlington, Vermont because I am aware of their powerful work and dedication to spreading Muslim identity and teaching the community about the struggles Muslim women go through slam poetry. The poetry slam quartet Muslim Girls Making Change has one mission: to address Islamophobia in the United States. The team, comprised of Kiran Waqar, Balkisa Abdikadir, Hawa Adam, and Lena Ginawi, met at Young Writers Project, a non-profit in Vermont, and recently performed together at the Brave New Voices Poetry Festival. (Huffington post)

Modern Muslim youth are the future of Islam. It is important to understand their experiences, new ideas, and beliefs of the religion. They are spreading peace and changing the Islamophobia epidemic.

 

Annotated Bibliography

Ali, Muna. Young Muslim America: Faith, Community, and Belonging. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Aydin, Cemil. The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017.

Image: Huffington Post Image: Muslim Girls Making Change , Harriet Staff ( 2016) https://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2016/07/huffington-post-profiles-poetry-slam-group-muslim-girls-making-change

Javed Majeed, “Modernity,” Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Ed. Richard C. Martin. Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004. 456-458. Gale Virtual Reference Library.

O’Brien, John. Keeping it Halal: The Everyday Lives of Muslim American Teenage Boys. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017.

“Mapping Islamophobia.” Visualizing Islamophobia and Its Effects. Accessed March 09, 2018. http://mappingislamophobia.org/maps/.

Multicultural Youth Voices of Vermont- Somali Bantu Youth Panel (Focusing on Somali Bantu Identity and Muslim Identity in Vermont). https://www.sevendaysvt.com/vermont/in-vermont-a-somali-bantu-youth-finds-his-voice/Content?oid=5166612

Salili, Farideh, and R. Hoosain. Growing Up Between Two Cultures: Problems and Issues of Muslim Children. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2014.

 

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Islam and Modern Turkey

Posted on April 30, 2018 by Eliana Fox

In his discussion of the impacts of modernity on religion, John Wilson aptly states that the changes observed in religions’ response to modernity “by no means run in one direction only”[1]. This is certainly the case for manifestations of Islam amongst the political elite in the republic of Turkey, which, since the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 has responded  in multiple ways to modernity. Islam amongst many of Turkey’s powerful elite during the country’s foundation began with a response of self-accommodation to modernity, has changed how it responded to modernity multiple times throughout the last century, and is currently at a point of reasserting more conservative, traditional values. The multiplicities of these religious responses to modernity since 1918 are seen through Turkey’s politics, which have attempted to strike a balance between Islam, secularization and democracy. Despite the religious beliefs of people in power, and how those beliefs are reflected in Turkey’s politics, it is important to note that these positions are not representative of the beliefs of all Turkish Muslims.

The fall of the Ottoman Empire occurred during a time of ambiguous global Muslim leadership and paradoxical ideological movements. Characterized by pan-Islamic sentiment, increased nationalism, and a desire for modernization, the period of Turkey’s foundation was a time in which a noticeable shift in Islam’s response to modernity occurred[2]. Initially, Islam amongst the elite in the newly founded state of Turkey responded to modernity by “self-consciously accommodating religious traditions to modern society”[3]. In other words, people in power moved away from old Islamic traditions of the Ottoman Empire and began accommodating Islamic traditions to increasing Turkish nationalist sentiment. The leaders of the newly founded country were cognizant of Islam’s societal importance and conditions of Pan-Islamism, and consequently incorporated a Turkish-oriented form of Islam into the country’s foundational framework.[4]  This religious response of self-accommodation to increased nationalism during Turkey’s foundation is an example of one of five “explicit religious responses to social change as represented in modern society”[5]. This self-accommodation response is shown through powerful Muslim actors in Turkey embracing economic and cultural models of globalization, as well as the ways in which the state included Islam during the foundation of its constitution during the 1920s.  One primary example of this self-accommodation is that the drafters of the original constitution of Turkey included Islam, but deliberately changed the ways that it would be practiced, such as translating the Quran from Arabic into Turkish[6]. This policy action during the country’s foundation reflected not only the Republican elite’s passion for modernization, but also an attempt to formulate a new, modernist version of Islam. This effort to incorporate Islam into the new country’s political system through conscious accommodation to “modern” standards showed how pan-Islamists, nationalists, and modernists cooperated with one another during this time.

Following the country’s foundation, Turkish political leaders such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the policies that he enacted during the 1920s and 1930s were increasingly secular. The implementation of policies such as replacing the Ottoman Turkish alphabet with Latin, not only disconnected Turkey from other Muslim-majority societies in favor of Western societies, but also reflected a different religious response to modernity[7]. Atatürk’s policy decisions reflected his attempts to completely reject the old Islamic traditions of the Ottoman Empire rather than to accommodate Islamic traditions to Turkish nationalism the way the country’s founders did. This response fits into Wilson’s fifth form of religious responses to modernity, which states that the generation of wholly new traditions as an attempt to reject old traditions is one way that religion responds to modernity[8]. In this case, Atatürk’s secularism and the policies it produced are the “wholly new” traditions that rejected and replaced ideals from the previously Islamic Ottoman Empire. Atatürk’s secular policies indicate a second shift of Islam’s response to modernity in Turkey, from a response of self-accommodation to one of complete newness of traditions. The ripple effects of Atatürk’s secularism continued throughout the mid-1900s, with policies such as the banning of Sufi orders and veiling of women in public.[9] Again, these policies reflected the abandonment of “traditional” Muslim values, and instead favored strong secularism and modernism as the country’s new values.

 

In response to the secularism that was implemented on the greater Muslim majority society, many Turkish politicians in the late 1900s enacted different responses to modernity in attempts to maintain their political agency. Throughout the late 20th century, several politicians in Turkey played what Ayla Göl has aptly termed “the Islamic card”, a method of using Islam to gain political agency and influence[10]. At the beginning of the 21st century, the AKP played the Islamic card with an “ambivalent” attitude of acknowledging Islam’s sociological significance, while maintaining pro-West attitudes[11]. This ambivalence shows that the AKP were not only using Islam to gain political agency, but it also indicates a shift back towards the self-accommodation response that occurred during the early twentieth century.  This return to self-accommodation from a previous position of implementing the “wholly new” of the mid-1900s is representative of a third shift in Islam’s response to modernity.

Recently, the response of those in power has shifted towards a reaffirmation of more traditional values, another one of Wilson’s five religious responses to modernity[12]. Now, the religious response to modernity amongst people in power in Turkey has changed from conscious accommodation to a reassertion of traditional values, representing the fourth shift in Turkey’s history to a third type religious response to modernity. Turkey has shifted towards more conservative values as the current president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and his political party, the AKP, have consolidated power.  Although this response shift may have been driven by a desire to maintain political power rather than an ideological shift amongst Turkey’s political leaders, their reaction to citizens presumed religious leanings had political and subsequent societal implications. This kind of response is shown through the increased presence of Islam in the everyday lives of Turkish people. In 2017 for example, Turkey introduced a new curriculum for its schools which cut out topics such as evolution, a subject which is rejected by certain groups of very conservative Muslims [13]. This policy change by the AKP is a clear example of returning to more traditional values, similar to some of the Islamic values of the Ottoman Empire.

President Erdoğan’s religious beliefs and the subsequent policies that have come about do not represent the beliefs of all Turkish Muslims. While it seems that Turkey, like the rest of the world, is becoming more conservative in its politics, it is important to remember that this shift towards conservatism is not caused by religion or clashes between religion and modernity, but rather by power and who has it.

End Notes

[1] Wilson, John F. “Modernity.” Encyclopedia of Religion, edited by Lindsay Jones, 2nd ed., vol. 9, Macmillan Reference USA, 2005, 6110

[2] Aydin, Cemil. The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History, Harvard University Press, 2017

[3] Wilson, 6110

[4] Editors, Maydan. “Islam and Islamism in Turkey: A Conversation with İsmail Kara.” Maydan. (December 05, 2017). https://www.themaydan.com/2017/10/islam-islamism-turkey-conversation-ismail-kara/.

[5] Wilson, 6110

[6] Yilmaz, Ihsan. “State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey.” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (July 19, 2005): 385-411

[7] Aydin, 144

[8] Wilson, 6110

[9] Aydin 200

[10] Göl, Ayla. “The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and secular.” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2009): 802

[11] Göl, 802

[12] Wilson, 6111

[13] Bilefsky, Dan. “In Turkey, Darwin is Crowded Out by Religion.” New York Times. (Sep 19, 2017)

Bibliography

Aydin, Cemil. The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History, Harvard University Press, (2017): 99-226

Bilefsky, Dan. “In Turkey, Darwin is Crowded Out by Religion.” New York Times. (Sep 19, 2017)

Bucar, Elizabeth. “Tesettür in Istanbul.” In Pious Fashion: How Muslim Women Dress, 122-70. Harvard University Press, (2017)

Editors, Maydan. “Islam and Islamism in Turkey: A Conversation with İsmail Kara.” Maydan. (December 05, 2017)

Göl, Ayla. “The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and secular.” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2009): 795-811

Günay, Reha. Facade of AKM. 1979. The Performance of Modernity: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, 1946-1977, SALT, Istanbul. In Google Arts & Culture. Accessed February 19, 2018.

Kissane, Bill. “Atatürk and After: Three Perspectives on Political Change in Turkey.” The Review of Politics 76, no. 2 (2014): 293–307.

Wilson, John F. “Modernity.” Encyclopedia of Religion, edited by Lindsay Jones, 2nd ed., vol. 9, Macmillan Reference USA, (2005)

Yilmaz, Ihsan. “State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey.” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (July 19, 2005): 385-411

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The Challenge of Representing Muslims in American Film and Television

Posted on April 30, 2018 by kcapaldi

by Kira Capaldi

The problem of representation in American media is a loaded one in all manner of discourse, from the social and political to the intellectual and artistic. In such an environment, those who work in media are necessarily deliberate in their techniques for including characters of certain backgrounds and identities. In this post, we will focus on the difficulties of including fair (that is to say, well rounded and fully human) portrayals of Muslim characters in popular American films and TV, specifically post 9/11. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, many films and television series included storylines with sympathetic Muslim characters and anti-bigotry messages, such as in one episode of 7th Heaven when the Camden family’s neighborhood overcomes their Islamophobia to welcome their new Muslim neighbors (Asultany, 3). The anti-bigotry plotlines did not last as the sole sympathetic mode of representation, but the effort to include good Muslim characters is something that many American directors, filmmakers, and producers have sustained ever since.

We can see this effort and desire as a step forward toward a more accepting, open-minded society, but we may notice some problematic aspects in these newer, positive representations when we look closer. Furthermore, many of the root causes of these problematic aspects are long established historical and socialized perspectives and priorities that are incredibly difficult to escape from. Yet if they can be identified, they can certainly be overcome.

In Arabs and Muslims in the Media: Race and Representation after 9/11, Evelyn Asultany examines the ways in which American creators (from hereon we’ll use creators to refer to those who make fictional films and TV for entertainment purposes) use what she refers to as “simplified complex representations.” This is a “representational mode that has become standard since 9/11” and “seeks to balance a negative representation with a positive one,” (14). On the surface, this allows recourse for creators to defend themselves if accused of vilifying a minority religious and/or racial population.

We should remember that the film and television industries are industries and the main goal is to make money, which means creators prioritize appealing to wide audiences. For example, the anti-bigoty, pro-diversity plotlines immediately following 9/11 were soon joined and mostly overcome by films and television dramas that featured American heroes up against stereotypical Arab and/or Middle Eastern Muslim villains (Alalawi, 58). There was and still is a large audience for such a set up. That said, the progressive efforts of the last six decades have brought us to a place where creators must walk a fine line to appeal to both those who despise PC culture and those who desire more positive representations of minorities (Asultany, 12). Thus, the usefulness of simplified complex representations. Walking a fine identity politics line is perhaps an art that hinders the truly fair portrayals of Muslim characters on American screens.

It may be unclear until further in the paper, but observations of the previous paragraph lead in to our discussion about the implications and fallacies of the simplified complex representations. Asultany regards simplified complex representations as “strategies used by television [or film] producers, writers, and directors to give the impression that the representations they are producing are complex,” (21). However, these impressions, while on the surface may seem complex, “do not effectively challenge the stereotypical representations of Arabs and Muslims,” (27). One of the main reasons for this is that films and shows featuring important Muslim characters almost always deal with terrorism, bigotry or religion as a theme – in some cases, like Degrassi, a hijabi character appears for a single episode and the plot revolves around someone tearing off her hijab. Consequently, Muslim characters are usually positioned in relation to a certain set of topics – good or bad, their roles are still narrow. In addition, the set of topics they are usually positioned in relation to are ones that exaggerate, and therefore strengthen the perception of, otherness and difference.

Asultany breaks down various techniques that creators use to create the impression of complex Muslim characters and explains how they fail to truly be anything more than impressions. She does an excellent job of demonstrating how many techniques and good Muslim typologies (such as the patriot and the innocent victim) reinforce stereotypes and false beliefs concerning race and religion in modern American society. For our purposes, let us note that portrayals of foreign countries continue to be exoticized and generalized, there is a lack of understandable, legitimate motivations behind the actions of “evil” (usually Arab) Muslims, and in contrast, the actions of the U.S. government and people are portrayed as legitimate and justifiable (even when these actions include firing into a crowd as in Rules of Engagement or torture as in 24). When we consider these things and the way that individual Muslim characters are othered in film and television, it strikes us that these representational habits reflect deeply embedded colonial and cultural tendencies that will be difficult to escape from because of their seeming naturalness.

Among these are the tendencies to imagine the existence of a Muslim World and a Western World and to perceive Muslims in racialized ways (connecting Islam with Arab-ness). Popular also is the belief that these imagined worlds necessarily clash, are natural enemies. In The Idea of the Muslim World, Cemil Aydin explores the historical rise of the perceived Muslim World and the suspicion with which it is regarded by many in the West. He connects its rise to the gradual decline of the well-balanced imperial system and the scientific construction of hierarchical divisions concerning race, religion, and culture that began to gain ground in the second half of the 19th century. Aydin writes, “Imperial universalism resisted the logic of racial separation and hierarchy, yet imperial elites became invested in the discourse of innate difference. To do so was not only expedient – difference and solidarity were useful tools in domestic and foreign policy, in securing legitimacy and building alliances – but also in keeping with new liberal values that would sacrifice the old system of empires in the name of humanity and civilization,” (40). For the first half of the 19th century, it was an expectation (albeit one that remained unmet) that empires treat each other and their Muslim and Christian subjects equally (Aydin, 38). It was after the theorization and subsequent identification of presumably innate differences between Muslims and Christians, races, and cultures that the idea of a Muslim World came into being.

We are not going to delve any deeper into the exact historical happenings that lead to the Muslim World forming as a shared fantasy but let us acknowledge that the discourse of innate difference divided. It also operated as a useful tool for the “European colonial project,” which asserted “control over not only material but also symbolic, cultural, and religious resources,” (Chidester, 1855). In a religious studies essay, Colonialism and Postcolonialism, David Chidester reveals how colonizers studied and effected the religious beliefs of the colonized. For the European colonizers “the primary categories of the study of religion – ‘religion’ and ‘religions’ – emerged as potent signs of identity and difference,” (1855).

The potency of these signs wasn’t limited to only religious identity and difference but became associated with racial and cultural identities and differences as well. Thus, being a certain religion or race indicated that one belonged to this or that culture or religion. This is a part of the racialization of Muslims (or of any group, really) and it is an irony that a discourse of division inspired (and inspires) so much generalization of large swathes of people.  The assumption that Muslims from all over the world shared political and cultural values became a scary thought for the British Empire, considering the huge number of Muslims worldwide even at that time. When Muslims attempted to soothe European anxieties about them, the attempts often further “fostered European paranoia about the clash of Islam and the West,” (Aydin, 69). Muslims were seen by many Europeans as being racially and culturally inferior but also incredibly threatening, a force to be reckoned with. They were a threat to the European way of life. The threat they posed was racial and religious but at the core it was cultural.

Modern day American films and television shows unfortunately perpetuate these types of concern, even when the representations of Muslims are meant to be good. In Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of War, Viet Thanh Nguyen discusses the moral danger of failing to recognize the human (the good, benevolence) and the inhuman (the bad, cruelty) in every person. He writes, “…an ethics of recognition says the other is both human and inhuman, as are we. When we recognize our capacity to do harm, we can reconcile with others who we feel have hurt us,” (73). If we were to apply this to film, we would see that Nguyen is advocating for every character to have full subjectivity. A character with full subjectivity would have a full range of emotion and a full range of motives as well. Furthermore, they wouldn’t be tied to only one aspect of their identity – like, per say, their race or religion.

Scene from Argo.

Nguyen, however, writes this in a chapter of his book in which he criticizes the tendency of films about Vietnam to either deny humanity to the Vietnamese and deny inhumanity to American soldiers or vice versa. For a true way forward to be invited from a film about a conflict, both sides of the conflict must be shown as human and inhuman – full subjects (Nguyen, 73). Many films and television shows that include Muslim characters struggle with this, especially ones that are based on true stories. American films that feature Muslim countries or characters and are based on true stories often disregard important history or contexts around the event portrayed. A good example would be Argo in which a CIA team sneaks into Tehran to rescue six Americans during the 1979 American Hostage Crisis. In reality, the Iranian activists that attacked the U.S. embassy held legitimate grievances against the U.S., but none of these grievances were thoroughly explored in the film. Instead, the activists (and those who support them) in the film seemingly act out of random and unwarranted hatred.

By ignoring the context of this event, the creators of Argo do not portray the rage of the activists as legitimate nor does it question the legitimacy of the American characters’ actions in Iran. When we do not know why a Muslim character does something objectionable it can reinforce the stereotype of them being inherently and unreasonably “violent and extremist” (Alalawi, 59). In films where this happens, the hero is often an American government agent or soldier of some sort and it is patriotic in nature. If the hero does something immoral – tortures a suspect, for example – his action is legitimized and considered necessary.

These straightforward good vs. bad films, in which the good is American and the bad is Islamic, encourage patriotism by invoking the latent assumption of American culture’s superiority over what is generalized as being Muslim culture. This clearly ties back to what we have previously discussed about the concern of an inevitable clash of civilizations in which one of the civilizations is clearly superior to the other, but the other is still a formidable enough threat to be concerning. This is only one obvious example of how perceptions formed in the past continue to influence us today – even if we don’t identify them as historical or socialized influences – and manifest in films and television. Many other examples can be offered, but we will stop at this one.

On an ending note, as Jack G. Shaheen acknowledges with relief, “Hollywood is not a monolithic place; it’s a diverse community with lots of people and politics running in different directions.” Problematic representations of Muslims are not necessarily intentional, especially when they are meant to be good characters. To find a way to represent Muslims fairly, we need to examine how perceptions from and justifications for past actions influence our experience of the present, especially when it comes to people we think of as other, even when they are our fellow human beings. It’s not an easy thing, but it can be done. The positive representations of Muslims in film and television today are flawed, but they are a step forward. We can keep moving.

 

Bibliography

Alalawi, Noura. “How Does Hollywood Movies Portray Muslims and Arabs After 9/11? ‘Content Analysis of The Kingdom and Rendition Movies.’” Cross-Cultural Communication, Vol. 11, No. 11, 2015. 57-62. CSCanada.net. 8 March 2018.

Alsultany, Evelyn. Arabs and Muslims in the media: race and representation after 9/11. New York: New York University Press, 2012.

Aydin, Cemil. The idea of the Muslim world: a global intellectual history. Cambridge (Mass.):Harvard University Press, 2017.

Chidester, David “Colonialism and Postcolonialism.” Encyclopedia of Religion. Ed. Lindsay Jones. 2nd ed. Vol. 3. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005. 1853-1860. Gale Virtual Reference Library.

Hero of Argo in a crowd of Iranians. Digital image. Jacked-In. January 14, 2014. Accessed April 27, 2018. http://jasoncollin.org/2013/01/14/argo-2012-movie-review/.

Nguyen, Viet Thanh, and Viet Thanh Nguyen. “On the Inhumanities.” In Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of War, 71-97. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017.

Shaheen, G. Jack. Guilty: Hollywood’s Verdict On Muslims Post 9/11. New York: Olive Branch Press, Dec 28, 2012.

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Boko Haram’s British Roots

Posted on April 30, 2018 by awilli28

by Ava Williams

Jacob Silberberg. Muslim men take a break from scavenging through the rubbish in the Olusosun dump to pray. The Olusosun dump is Nigeria’s largest rubbish dump comprising over 100 acres of waste and is believed to be the largest in Africa. 2009.

In the early 2000s, an anti-western, Muslim organization originated in Nigeria. Formally known as Boko Haram, the terrorist organization establishes themselves against the west through their ideals and the name’s English meaning, ‘western education is a sin.’ Boko Haram has declared total Jihad in Nigeria and intends to Islamize the entire nation (Omotosho 140). Prompted by the high levels of poverty and instability within Nigeria, Boko Haram has evolved from a diverse opposition group to a terrorist organization that enacts violence throughout the state. Boko Haram targets both Muslim and Christian citizens, each of which represents about 50% of the Nigerian population, with a small percentage practicing traditional religion.  The Muslim tradition has existed in Nigeria since the 9th century, while Christianity was introduced centuries later by missionaries. Yet, Boko Haram did not primarily originate from the countries religious divide. British imperialism within Nigeria created the conditions necessary for the existence of Boko Haram, and the terrorist group will only continue to spread unless concrete actions are taken to counteract the societal issues that are rooted in western modernization.

Britain’s Modernization of Nigeria: 

British relations with Nigeria began in the late 18th century through increasing trade in the African continent. English traders were interested in Nigeria’s slave trade, natural resources, and the country’s’ geographically competitive location. According to Scholar Edwin G. Carle Jr., relations between the two states catalyzed around 1850 when English administrators were sent to suppress the slave trade and make the West African Coast a safe and profitable place for business and trade (79). Through increased relations, the British identified Nigeria to be a profitable territory and annexed Lagos in 1861. Scholar Emmanuel Ojo’s explains that, “Nigeria is a British creation fashioned out between 1861 and 1914. The 1861 annexation of Lagos gave Britain a firm foothold in Nigeria; and, between that year and 1903, virtually every Nigerian nation capitulated to British imperial rule”(67).  Britain overtook the autonomy of the diverse Nigerian kingdoms and subjected them to a new, western government.

While Britain had control in Nigeria, they worked to implement modernization policies to make the country more economically efficient. According to scholar John Wilson, modernization is the “cultural and social attitudes or programs dedicated to supporting what is perceived as modern. Modernism entails a kind of explicit and self-conscious commitment to the modern in intellectual and cultural spheres”(6108). In terms of British modernization, the leadership sought to sow western institutions and worldviews into the Nigerian society. The British viewed themselves as the bearers of a superior society and were intent on imposing their ideology on foreign cultures. Scholar Chuku Umezurike identified the period of imperial conquest and modernization in Nigeria to have taken place between 1800 and 1945. He wrote, “The character of imperial conquest and subsequent colonization for the period consolidated comprador development through the maintenance-dissolution effects produced on peasant production relations. Thus, there has been a conjunctive exploitation of the political economy by imperial capital, traditional chiefs and mercantile middlemen”(Umezurike 37). England enacted their imperial conquest through giving Nigeria a trustee status and chartering the Royal Niger Company.

Britain sought to control in Nigeria by giving the country trustee status under British law. Charle wrote, “ This made them eligible for purchase by all British investors, including those institutions whose choice of investments was closely restricted by law. The money thus borrowed as spent by the colonial government on railroads, harbors and other public utilities”(80). Trustee status allowed Nigerians to enter the world market with the protection of British institutions. The money earned from the new trade allowed for the creation of infrastructure intended to modernize Nigerian society.

Further, Britain controlled trade through the Royal Niger Company, which the crown chartered until 1900. Charle wrote, “The company, renamed the Royal Niger Company, was granted a royal charter [in 1886] which entrusted it with governmental authority complete with full military and police powers throughout a vast section of inland Nigeria”(85). The company ordered traders to only use specific trading stations, forced native chiefs to sign away their lands and caused corruption and crime to percolate the trading process (Charle 85). Through controlling trade and having military support for their actions, the company dictated the trading processes by removing trading power from local actors and following British trading aims. British policy caused an acceleration of cultural change, and Nigerian economic gains were all accompanied by even larger gains to western entities.

The Negative British Legacy: 

Although Nigeria sought to adapt to the modernization policies pushed by the British, the legacy of the British is negative. After gaining flag independence in 1960, Nigeria regressed into a military rule for around thirty years before becoming democratized again in 1999 (Akanle 33 ). This democracy has been dominated by a single party since 1999, though the nation is said to have a multi-party-political system(Akanle 33).

Many scholars argue that Nigeria is suffering in a non-functioning democracy. Umezurike wrote, “Historically, the forces of globalization, including in particular mercantilism and British colonialism, created the political and economic structures which have over the years been undermining the forces of democracy in the country”(37). The modernization policies implemented by Britain did not allow for sustainable growth for Nigerians. Most local actors were not given ownership or agency under the British, causing an unequal distribution of wealth within the country. This unequal distribution of wealth has persisted to modern days. Although Nigeria has oil-rich lands, a geographically desirable location, and the second largest economy in Africa, approximately 51 million of the 186 million citizens are unemployed, and the country has a reported poverty burden of more than 70 percent (Ojo 88). Further, the economy grew an estimated 7.6 percent between 2003 and 2010, while poverty has remained constant, even increasing in several states (Akanle 34).

The political legacy of the British has rooted corruption within the Nigerian government. Malpractice by colonial officials and the Royal Niger Company allowed for bribery and embezzlement to saturate the economy and politics (Charle 85). Corruption aided economic divisions and caused an elite group of Nigerian citizens to become successful economically. Currently, economic disparities are exacerbated by the corrupt government. Scholar Olayinka Akanle stated, “The rich and influential have hijacked political processes and machineries and now make policies against popular intentions only for the benefits of the few. The poor, who are in the majority, are consequently left in limbo”(43). The elite use their influence to take power from everyday citizens in order to gain economically. Ojo wrote, “Even with about 51 million unemployed Nigerians public office holders embezzle billions of dollars annually that could be channeled into industrial and economically productive ventures”(88). Corruption and embezzlement in the upper echelons of society have adverse effects on everyday citizens.

The British left a socially fractured country through their unification of the Northern and Southern protectorates of Nigeria. Referred to as amalgamation, the fusing of the territories aimed to increase the competitive economy within Nigeria, increase infrastructure, and align the developmental levels of the north and south (Ojo 69). A unified Nigeria served to make British modernization practices easier and increase economic profits. Yet, the amalgamation pushed diverse humans into a unified country, and with no policy to socially unify the north and south territories, Nigeria remained separated with an emphasis on religious difference. A feeling of distrust between Muslims and Christians stems from the amalgamation’s unification of the Muslim-majority north and Christian-majority south, who both had unique cultures, practices, and worldviews.

The religious distrust has created a power struggle; Muslims and Christians work to dominate one another. Scholar Mashood Omotosho wrote, “When military rule ended in 1999, democratic politics provided a perfect platform for corrupt and cynical politicians to play on religious rears to gain votes”(137). Politicians used existing divisions in the country to further their agendas and become elected, which contributing immensely to the problem of religious conflict in Nigeria (Omotosho 137). Although the Federal government spends millions of dollars on ‘unity campaigns’ (Ojo 71), politicians continue to exacerbate religious divisions. For example, some northern state governors are attempting to adopt the Islamic Sharia as the penal and criminal codes in their states (Omotosho 138). This is further highlighted in the anti-Sharia crisis in Kaduna in 2000, religious rioting in Bauchi state in 2001 and 2004, rioting following a Danish cartoon depicting the Prophet in 2006, and the onslaught of Boko Haram.  

The Rise of Boko Haram: 

The turmoil left in the wake of Nigerian modernization created the situation necessary for terrorist organization Boko Haram to take residence within the country. Founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, the group was a reaction against western modernization and had the intent to eradicate western influence in the country. Eventually, Yusuf declared total jihad in Nigeria with the threat to Islamize the whole country (Omotosho 140). The group has been enacting violence throughout the country since 2002, causing mass casualties and missing persons. For example, Ojo wrote, “Nigeria has become a country flowing daily with the blood of her citizens: about 75 people were bombed to death in a highly crowded motor park in Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory, on 14 April 2014 and on the following day about 230 college girls were abducted from their dormitories in Chibok, Borno State by members of the sect” (87). Additionally, in 2015, Boko Haram militants killed about thirty people and wounded around one hundred-forty-five others during an attack on a market in northern Cameroon, and other attacks have occurred to present day (Suleiman 22). Furthermore, Boko Haram had given Bay’ah, or pledge of allegiance, to ISIS and announced itself as the Islamic State’s West African province.

The violence has caused mass disruptions to the civil society; Every sphere of social, economic, and medical life in northeastern Nigeria is almost completely paralyzed(Ojo 86). The resiliency of Boko Haram can be attributed to domestic issues arising from political corruption, poverty, and illiteracy. These issues allowed civil unrest to transform into a large-scale terrorist organization. The conditions present in Nigeria were created by the West, and Boko Haram wishes to expel its influence from society. This means Boko Haram will only continue to spread to nearby countries unless concrete actions are taken to counteract the issues within Nigerian society that are rooted in British modernization (Omotosho 147).

British influence within Nigeria gave the country short-term economic gains but created long-lasting economic, religious, and political issues that hinder the country from effectively governing. The British acted with a lens of modernizing a non-western other, but they failed to establish institutions that were not fraught with their own self-interest. Modernization efforts created economic disparities that have led to political corruption, mass poverty, and religious friction. Boko Haram established itself within Nigeria in response to the history of Western influence within the county and the residual effects they left. Without an effective policy to expel the past effects of British imperialism in the country, Nigeria citizens may never be able to counter the dark path the country has taken.

Sources:

Akanle, Olayinka. “The Development Exceptionality of Nigeria: The Context of Political and Social Currents.” Africa Today, vol. 59, no. 3, 2013, pp. 31–48. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/africatoday.59.3.31.

Charle, Edwin G. “English Colonial Policy and the Economy of Nigeria.” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 26, no. 1, 1967, pp. 79–92. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3485317.

Ojo, Emmanuel Oladipo. “Nigeria, 1914-2014: From Creation to Cremation?” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, vol. 23, 2014, pp. 67–91. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24768942.

Omotosho, Mashood. “Managing Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: The Inter-Religious Mediation Peace Strategy.” Africa Development / Afrique Et Développement, vol. 39, no. 2, 2014, pp. 133–151. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/afrdevafrdev.39.2.133.

Suleiman, Muhammad L. “Countering Boko Haram.” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, vol. 7, no. 8, 2015, pp. 22–27. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/26351382.

Umezurike, Chuku. “Globalisation, Economic Reforms and Democracy in Nigeria.” Africa Development / Afrique Et Développement, vol. 37, no. 2, 2012, pp. 25–61. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/afrdevafrdev.37.2.25.

Wilson, John, “Modernity,” Encyclopedia of Religion. Ed. Lindsay Jones. 2nd ed. Vol. 9. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005. 6108-6112. Gale Virtual Reference Library.

 

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Apologetic Masculinities

Posted on April 30, 2018 by Evan Smith

There is no doubt that modernity has played an integral role in the rapid development of cultural norms in Muslim-majority societies following the eighteenth-century (Wilson 2005, 6111). In this specific milieu, modernity can be defined as a response to the European political and normative hegemony over Muslim territory during the modern era (Majeed 2004, 456). Faisal Devji notes that this response was unique because “[t]he closeness of [Muslim modernist] thinking to European thought, together with its inability to engage with and integrate [European thought] intellectually, made Muslim modernism essentially apologetic” (2007, 62). As a result of this “apologetic modernity,” Devji argues that “[M]uslim debates over modernity generally took the form of defining a relationship, whether of acceptance, rejection or compromise” (2007, 61). In the more specifically religious context, responses to modernity fall into this same apologetic category in which some sort of relationship is defined, but with unequal levels of engagement (Wilson 2005, 6110-6111). This apologetic view can assist in the understanding of the multifaceted religious responses to modernity, in particular for this blog post, the Islamic response to the proliferation of new modern norms of masculinity in Muslim societies.

Like modernity, masculinity is a problematic and difficult term. As the scholars, Scott Kugle and Stephen Hunt write, “[m]asculinity is not self-evident and self-sustaining.” (2012, 256). Instead, masculinity is a fluid and “negotiable” norm, which changes to match the circumstances of its environment (Maleeha 2014, 135). Because of its fluidity as well as its dependency on its environment, it is appropriate to draw upon the work of the sociologist, Raewyn Connell, who posited that the view of a singular prevailing masculinity is mistaken; instead there are multiple masculinities (Aslam 2014, 136; De Sondy 2015, 8-9). This is an important distinction to make because the idea of a singular masculinity suggests that gender construction does not change depending on the time period or society in which it operates in (De Sondy 2015, 8). Masculinities, then, can be defined as the varying and dynamic social constructions of an ideal man, how he is expected to act, and what role he is expected to play in society.

Ata’i and Zadah 1721. http://art.thewalters.org/detail/38025/five-poems-quintet-2/

The modern context is important to understand in order to determine how the definitions of masculinity have been recently challenged (De Sondy 2015, 1). In Muslim societies, definitions of masculinity are heavily shaped by the religious environment of Islam (Aslam 2014, 138), and this religious environment has been challenged by modernism (Wilson 2005, 6108). The threat to religious traditions and the conventional traditions of Islamic masculinity by modern norms has resulted in an influential neo-traditional religious response. This response is Islamism, a pluralistic religious ideology advocating for strict adherence to Islamic traditions (Kugle and Hunt 2012, 264). Islamism represents a component of the Muslim apologetic response to modernity, as Islamists often reject modern norms and participate in intellectual exercises such as scriptural exegesis in order to justify their beliefs but are unable or unwilling to equally engage with the “West” (De Sondy 2015, 52). The prominence of Islamist thinkers like Sayyid Abu’l A’la Mawdudi (1903-1979) and Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926-present) have greatly influenced the debate over the ideal Islamic masculinity and have shaped the views of many impressionable Muslim men through well-articulated apologetics (De Sondy 2015, 17-18; Kugle and Hunt 2012, 256).

Sayyid Abu’l A’la Mawdudi was a British-Indian and later Pakistani Islamist ideologue whose notions of ideal Islamic masculinity were founded in the modern context. His primary work on the topic of Islamic masculinity was Purdah (1939) (De Sondy 2015, 17). Despite the fact that the work focuses on the role of women in society and not men, the scholar, Amanullah De Sondy argues that Purdah provides ample resources to determine Mawdudi’s vision of the ideal Muslim man (2015, 17). In it, Mawdudi articulates his belief in the divinely ordained superiority of men over women, and how observing this so-believed divine truth is “indeed [a form of] submission to God – the heart of masculine commitment to Islam” (De Sondy 2015, 40). In addition, Mawdudi articulated the family as a “political mechanism,” where marriage represents the supposed dualistic roles of men and women in society (De Sondy 2015, 35, 39). The superiority of men, he argued, would offset “womanly deficiencies” with “masculine competencies” and assert the natural roles of men as breadwinners and leaders, instead of homemakers (De Sondy 2015, 41, 48, 50).

This view of masculinity is obviously problematic. For one, Mawdudi’s sexist biological justification for the superiority of men over women — and thus the different roles men and women should play — ignores the observed fact that women can operate in society if given the opportunity to and perform just as well as men. Secondly, Mawdudi seemingly ignores men who do not or cannot fit into these roles. Mawdudi is therefore suggesting that men who do not fit into these roles are not good Muslims. As a consequence, Mawdudi’s ideas can alienate Muslim men and pressure them into a view of masculinity they may not be able to or want to fit into.

Yusuf al-Qaradawi is a contemporary example of an Islamist who argues in favor of a specific ideal of Islamic masculinity, but he does so in a different way from Mawdudi. In an analysis of Qaradawi’s talk show on the tv-station Al Jazeera Arabic, Kugle and Hunt argue that Qaradawi presents a view of masculinity that excludes homosexual men, and this exclusion is representative of “an agenda to reinforce perceived threats to Muslim masculinity” (2012, 256, 259). Kugle and Hunt finds that Qaradawi views homosexuality as a “perversion” and a sin that ought to be “cured” as if it were a disease, and whose prevalence in Muslim societies has been exacerbated by so-believed decadent “Western” norms, i.e. modern norms (2012, 266-268). Further, Qaradawi argues that homosexuality is incompatible with Islam; that you cannot be gay and a true Muslim (Kugle and Hunt 2012, 269). This is a very problematic idea for the Muslim community. Homosexuality is inseparable from masculinity, as often societal norms around masculinity suggest that to be masculine is to be heterosexual (Kugle and Hunt 2012, 269). For Qaradawi’s vision of an ideal Islamic masculinity, being heterosexual, both in thought and in practice, is a prerequisite. To exclude someone from a religious identity because of their sexual preferences and or practices can be very harmful, especially when religion plays such a large role as in Muslim societies. This apologetic rejection of homosexuals and homosexuality is a key component of Qaradawi’s idealized discourse.

Both Qaradawi and Mawdudi are unwittingly participating in apologetic exercises by forming a relationship of rejection with modern norms of masculinity. Neither Mawdudi nor Qaradawi would be able to construct their masculinities without the methodological basis of rejection. Their apologetics would not function without the modern and thus, Western normative framework, and their efforts to promote their unique versions of a self-sustaining and hegemonic Islamic masculinity, have only succeeded in adding to the existing compendium of masculinities. This is the unintended consequence of the apologetic response.

Consider this eighteenth-century manuscript from the Turkish artist, ‘Ata’i. The image titled, A King Looking at a Picture of His Son and His Tutor, who Fell in Love with Him, depicts some sort of close, perhaps sexual, homosocial relationship between two men. It is unclear what the figure to the left thinks of this relationship, but he points at the couple, drawing the viewer’s eye to them. The fact that there were possible homosocial romantic relationships represented in the pre-modern era is significant as it suggests that there has always been a debate over masculinity in Muslim societies; it is not just a modern phenomenon. It is apparent that modernism and the apologetic Islamic response to modernism has only made this debate louder. Even with the intensification of the debate, however, norms of masculinities will continue to be diverse and dynamic. Masculinity is an ever-evolving definition, dependent on its context to have meaning. In the modern era, the response of apologetic Islamism only adds to this dynamism.

Bibliography

Aslam, Maleeha. “Islamism and Masculinity: Case Study Pakistan.” Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung 39, no. 3 (149) (2014): 135-49. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24146118.

‘Ata’i, ‘Ata’ullah bin Yahá and Khayr Allah Khayri Jawush Zadah. A King Looking at a Picture of His Son and His Tutor, who Fell in Love with Him, 1721. Ink and pigments on laid paper, 21 x 15.5 cm. Baltimore: The Walters Art Museum. Accessed March 31, 2018. http://art.thewalters.org/detail/84860/a-king-looking-at-a-picture-of-his-son-and-his-tutor-who-fell-in-love-with-him/.

De Sondy, Amanullah. The Crisis of Islamic Masculinities. London: Bloosmbury, 2015.

Devji, Faisal. “Apologetic Modernity.” Modern Intellectual History 4, no. 1 (2007): 61–76. doi: 10.1017/S1479244306001041.

Kugle, Scott and Stephen Hunt. “Masculinity, Homosexuality and the Defense of Islam: A Case Study of Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s Media Fatwa.” Religion and Gender. 2, no. 2 (2012): 254–279. doi: 10.18352/rg.7215.

Majeed, Javeed. “Modernity.” Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World. Ed. Richard C. Martin. Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004. 456-458. Gale Virtual Reference Library.

Wilson, John F. “Modernity.” Encyclopedia of Religion. Ed. Lindsay Jones. 2nd ed. Vol. 9. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005. 6108-6112. Gale Virtual Reference Library.

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Tackling Muslim Fashion Within a Secular State

Posted on April 30, 2018 by Carolynn van Arsdale

The typical American student, let’s call him Ryan, who might pay attention in his Social Studies class, would probably define Secularism as, ‘the separation of church and state.’ However, Secularism is not simply the act of separating two spheres, which emphasizes how it is not a black or white topic. This principle is dependent on its motivations, location, and actors involved. While this is a principle often thought of as a staple of Modernity in the current global community, there are several examples of nation states employing this principle who also jeopardize other prominent modern ideals such as freedom and equality (Hancock 167).

A clear example of this can be seen in the contested Muslim Fashions within Secular nation states, and can help to answer the foggy gray area of how Secularism plays a role in the attainment of Modernity. I am going to display for you the debates surrounding Muslim Fashion in both France and Turkey, because each is founded upon Secularism. We shall see how the Secular practices of these states hinder the attainment of Modernity, rather than allow the achievement of it.

Let’s first explain the background of the Islamic Veil before applying it to these individual cases of political struggle. Historically, most often when discussing Western states, the Islamic Veil has been considered ‘antithetical’ to Modernity, and has been inflated by the non-Muslim obsession with its use among Muslim Women (Bucar 1). This can demonstrate why in both Turkey and France, the limiting of religious dress such as the Veil is restricted to secure Secular ideals. The Veil has been tied to Islamic Fundamentalism, because Orientalist actions as well as rhetoric have managed to socially construct the way in which the Veil is treated. We can thank Western Feminism, Secularism, and the hegemonic style of Christianity for this (Bucar 10).

This has also been done to the entirety of Islam, which is homogenized when such sentiments use “the Muslim World,” to address all Muslims, who all have a varying degree of identities, which is contrary to what Ryan (our high school student) might have thought before reading this (Aydin 2). To go further, the Veil has symbolically become entangled with concerns over the influence of political Islam, the stability of developing democracies, and the role of religious freedom in religiously plural societies (Bucar 14). With all of this in mind, let us dissect individual case studies of Muslim Fashion within the Secular realm. When speaking of Muslim Fashion, we must remember that this is not only defined as clothing, but the look of one’s style choices holistically, which includes hair, makeup, etc.

Let’s start with France, which is known as being an indivisible, democratic, and Secular social republic that does not keep track of statistics regarding the population’s races, religions, or other ethnic origins (Honicker 138-139). While it may not be noted whether or not a citizen might be a practicing Muslim, it can be argued that the Muslim population in France has been singled out as being other. Laïcité, which is the French word for ‘Secular,’ is a strong principle employed by the state, and can be considered the most profound reason for why Muslims feel singled out within their own country (Honicker 143).

With a long history, it is fair to note that there is still debate concerning the meaning of Laïcité, but it predominantly resembles the neutrality of public space, and the unity of the community (Honicker 141). This means that religion is only to be done in the private, not the public realm, which points to the debate of Muslim Fashion in public spaces.

Muslim Fashion such as the Veil can also be understood by a means of analyzing France’s history as a colonial power. The Veil symbolized dominance in their colonies, which shows that women were essentially pieces of property in an exchange for hegemonic global power (Honicker 142). Traces of this colonial understanding can be seen in the French climate of today, in how the Veil is viewed as both oppressive and counter to French ideals. Within the past thirty years, there have been a series of laws centered around whether it is acceptable both socially and legally to Veil in public spaces, because it is understood as keeping the people of France from “coming together” (Honicker 140). However, this method only brings those together who are dressing in a Secular fashion, and hurts the notion that France cares about equality.

Now that we have an understanding of the French version of Secularism, we can compare this older state to a newer one. Turkey, which was established in the early 20th Century and has modeled many of its values off of the French, has its own term known as Laiklik. This is similar to Laïcité, but has both cultural and historical differences surrounding its prominence. In its short history, Turkey has had issues with Islamic Veiling, but this hasn’t stopped middle to upper class women in the country from dressing how they please.

For instance, Tesettür is a newer type of pious fashion that is very popular in Istanbul, which features headscarves and other articles of modest clothing that are often quite beautiful, and almost always designer brand (Bucar 128). While these women are free to veil in certain spaces, there have been a series of restrictions on how one can veil and where in the past, such as when the Turkish National Security Council and the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) issued a ban on headscarves in 1981 at Turkish colleges and universities (Bucar 127).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who was the first President of the Republic of Turkey, branded a principle of his own called Kemalism (Bucar 126). His ideology promoted western and modern institutions in order to make the country better for the long term. This managed to bring upon the notion that the Islamic Veil was a threat to this newly progressive and emerging state (Bucar 127).

It’s all too common in the world that even though privately, a woman is allowed to dress how she pleases, societal standards are still a large factor in how women feel they must dress. Regardless of the type of fashion, it’s clear that female bodies are policed, not just in the ‘Muslim World.’ Ryan, I hope you are paying attention.

Women in Istanbul for example are free to Veil today, but there is an understanding of what is and isn’t appropriate. For instance, the pinning of the veil in Turkey was considered to be a political statement in the 1980s for how pious it was, and it is now socially unacceptable, and even women who Veil agree (Bucar 137). Also, if one does not dress in Tesettür properly, meaning in a Eurocentric and aesthetically pleasing way, the outfit itself can be seen as politically destabilizing (Bucar 150).

This Turkish climate displays how the government regulates and administers religious expression, and in this way polices what can be worn in the public sphere. The public ridicule as well as the government intervention of Muslim Fashion displays inadvertent Orientalism used by Turks against their fellow citizens, which can speak volumes as to how ‘modern’ these Secular practices truly are (Bucar 153).

These are two cases that depict how strong Secular values can prohibit the freedom of the individual. There is a strong correlation between the female body and the geopolitical agenda of a nation state, which has been a historical trend often left out of the conversation of Modernity. It is important to question whether the actions that both of these countries have taken display how a government is overreaching its boundary of entering the private sphere of its citizens (Hancock 166).

In both countries, public schools were being targeted as the battleground for Islamic Fundamentalism. In France specifically, students who dressed according to their faith were singled out, and suffered the consequences of being kicked out or forced to transfer to another school (Hancock 171). In Turkey, current President Erdogan forced his own daughters to attend school in the United States, and a possible reason could be that they both Veil (Hancock 165). Clearly, I could go further to demonstrate not only the politicization of women’s bodies, but also how their visibility is deemed as directly reflective of whether or not a state has achieved Modernity.

Ryan, if you are still following me by now, I hope you learned more about Secularism than what is written in the U.S. Constitution. One could attempt to argue against me by noting that the masculine control over female bodies could have nothing to do with Modernity, and could simply be a means of just marginalizing immigrant and minority populations (Hancock 174). It’s obvious, at least in my eyes, that there is a direct link between Muslim Fashion and efforts upon a nation state to become more modern.

While these countries are following Secular practices in order to better the common good, these actions seem entirely counterproductive to the wellbeing of the citizenry. Undoubtedly, Secularism does not have an automatic seat at the table when it comes to the realm of Modernity, as can be seen through our discussion above of Muslim Fashions in both France and Turkey. Right Ryan?

Bibliography

Abbas. Veiling Paris. 2004. FRANCE. Paris. January-February. Thousand Muslims… http://library.artstor.org/asset/AMAGNUMIG_10311553063. Web. 19 Feb 2018.

Aydin, Cemil. “Introduction: What is the Muslim World?” The Idea of the Muslim World; A Global Intellectual History, Harvard University Press, 2017, pp. 2.

Bucar, Elizabeth. The Islamic Veil; A Beginner’s Guide. One World Publications, 2012, pp. 1-48.

Bucar, Elizabeth. Pious Fashion. Harvard University Press, 2017, pp. 122-170.

Göl, Ayla. “The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and Secular.” Third World Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 4. Routledge, 2009, pp. 794-811.

Hancock, Claire. “Spatialities of the Secular: Geographies of the Veil in France and Turkey.” The European Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 15, no. 3, 2008, pp. 165, ProQuest, https://search.proquest.com/docview/212165116?accountid=14679.

Honicker, Nancy. “The “Headscarf Affairs”: French Universalism Put to the Test.” Journal of Research in Gender Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 2011, pp. 138-146, ProQuest, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1282570977?accountid=14679.

 

 

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Islam in Prisons

Posted on April 30, 2018 by gbetienn

by Guillaume Etienne

In the United States, we have learned to cherish our sense of freedom, independence, and the prospect that if you work hard – you can achieve anything. This mentality, unfortunately, doesn’t reign true for all – in fact, it only reigns true under increasingly limited circumstances (typically… if you’re white, male, and have socio-economic stability). That being said, as one of the most powerful countries in the world and supposed aficionados of the ideas of justice and due process – we seem to be very fearful of a malign other that could show up at any time to overturn our system of ‘values’ or defile us in some way. This is especially true when it comes to the American perception of Muslims and Islam, which all-too-frequently is subject to rhetoric which promotes and prolongs a damaging stereotype of ‘all Muslims are radical’, or ‘lol, a religion of peace’.

Some may argue that we’re just a country with a keen interest on keeping our citizen safe from the dangers of crime. However, when you think of different countries with reputations of being “safe”, we’ll use Canada for the sake of example, their rates of incarceration pale in comparison to that of the United States. Using information gathered in 2011 by The Sentencing Project, we can see that the U.S. incarcerates 716 out of every 100,000 people. That doesn’t sound like a particularly large number until you realize that Canada’s ratio is 114 per 100,000. India only incarcerates 32 out of every 100,000 people. These numbers certainly raise some questions: Who are we locking up? What crimes seem to be so prevalent in the U.S. that we could have numbers like this?

Again, using data collected by The Sentencing Project, it becomes evident that we’ve got something going on with racial disparities in the criminal justice system. When it comes to the likelihood of ending up in prison, the numbers are as follows;

 

The photo above does an excellent job of providing a visual portrayal of the rather shocking disparities that we have in this country. The point of this is to try and bring a link between the oppression of a social group and the oppression of a religion to the surface. The complexities and some of the history of the relationship between Islam, African American communities, and the eventual rise of Islamic conversions in the American prison system most notably after the Civil Rights Movement, is a difficult path to follow.

Certainly, the surveillance of black communities has morphed from the blatant style of the 1960’s into the systemic racism that we have today, often referred to as “The New Jim Crowe” as coined by Michelle Alexander. The surveillance of Muslim communities, I argue, is in a position of suspicion and oppression less mature and systemic than that of African American communities in America today. It was as a result of the attacks on September 11th, 2001 that an already troubled American opinion of Muslims was tipped over the edge: “On August 23, in the third week of Ramadan, the Associated Press (AP) first reported on the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) program surveilling Muslim communities. Although countless stories of police spying had previously circulated within Muslim communities in the United States, and more than a handful of documented cases of surveillance had been established, the AP revealed secret NYPD documents that outlined a regional program, the NYPD Demographics Unit, designed to “put American citizens under surveillance and scrutinized where they ate, prayed, and worked solely because of their ethnicity”” (Ali 80).

Digging deeper into the interesting religious phenomenon of increasing numbers of African American men who convert to Islam while incarcerated – the thing I found the most thought-provoking was that that both Muslims and African Americans are oppressed groups – and whether this link can explain the recent popularity of Islamic conversion in prison. Cecil Aydin, in his book “The Idea of the Muslim World”, makes reference to a Black Protestant from West Africa named Edward Blyden who wrote “Mohammedanism and the Negro Race” (1875) stating that the use of the word Mohammedanism in that context “denotes a racial category, akin to “Negro.” What is more, in Blyden’s telling, the futures of Muslims and black-skinned people all over the world are distinct from those of the white Christian race” (Aydin 38). This provides a clear example of what it means to racialize Islam.

I won’t attempt to provide an explicit answer for why this connection exists, only to provide some context around the subject matter. There is a link between being an African American – a group which has experienced oppression since the start of the United States, and a Muslim – a group which is currently facing ostracization and labeling that causes real impacts in contemporary issues. The racialization of Islam has certainly played a role in the way we perceive this fast-growing religion in prisons, and it will have ramifications for our society in the future. America been discriminatory against Blacks and Muslims, without question. But, is this the reason for the surge in Islamic conversions in prison?

Works Cited:

Leonard Freed. USA. New Orleans, Louisiana. 1963. City prison.. 1963.

http://library.artstor.org.ezproxy.uvm.edu/asset/AMAGNUMIG_10311538559. Web. 8 Mar 2018.

Ammar, Nawal H. Muslims in US prisons: people, policy, practice. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2015.

Aydin, Cemil. The idea of the Muslim world: a global intellectual history. Harvard University Press, 2017.

Hamm, Mark S. Spectacular few: prisoner radicalization and the evolving terrorist threat. New York Univ. Press, 2013.

Morgenstein Fuerst, Ilyse. Indian Muslim minorities and the 1857 Rebellion: religion, rebels, and jihad. I.B.Tauris, 2017.

Kwate, and Goodman. “An Empirical Analysis of White Privilege, Social Position and Health.” Social Science &Amp; Medicine, vol. 116, 2014, pp. 150–160.

Ali, Arshad Imitaz. “Citizens under Suspicion: Responsive Research with Community under Surveillance.” Anthropology &Amp; Education Quarterly, vol. 47, no. 1, 2016, pp. 78–95.

Alexander, Michelle. The New Jim Crow [Electronic Resource] : Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness / Michelle Alexander. Revised edition / with a new foreword by Cornel West.. ed., 2012.

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Modern Muslim Reformers: Comparing Malala Yousafzai and Maajid Nawaz

Posted on April 30, 2018 by gmartell

by Gaetano Martell0

The subject of Islam’s role in the world is dense and rife with misinformation. It is not uncommon to see media portrayals and depictions of Muslims that use stereotypes to define them and promote a monolithic view of Islam as a whole. The specific area which this piece will focus on is the way in which this affects Muslim reform in particular, and how people tend to view this in the west. But first, a discussion is needed on what exactly it is that people, particularly Westerners, think needs reforming.

via ArtStor

Political discussions both on the left and on the right usually involve some sort of talk about the so-called Muslim World (Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World, ch. 1). Among educated Western intellectuals, there is much talk about what the west should “do” with the Muslim world, and the debate tends to be split along the lines of how open we should be to it. Often in media, one can find many conversations about how particular barbaric practices are common within the Muslim world; typically the conservative figures will speak in condemnation of it, and the liberal figures will defend the cultural context in which they do it, but the fundamental question of the debate is itself misinformed.

Probably the most famous example of this tactic is Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, a work which paints extremely broad strokes across the world along religious lines and which pays very little attention to nuance. The idea promoted here is that Islam is flawed in its essential form, so much so that its members will somehow manifest that essential flaw and thus cause the destruction of the world, without the intervention of the west (Huntington, Clash of Civilizations).

This viewpoint is is obviously heavily elitist, but it nonetheless bleeds into the way Western intellectuals see reform in what they call the Muslim world. Another typical trend within these circles is the call for the need of some vague reform by some entity somewhere (preferably western) tackling the vague problem of, for example, the way women are treated somewhere in the Middle East. To say that there are problems that need reform is true, but it is very often unspecified and does not take into account the places which have made such reforms or are already doing so.

Since this piece is criticizing people for not being specific, it is time we got specific. Two examples of Muslim reformers who took it upon themselves to try and solve particular problems are Malala Yousafzai and Maajid Nawaz. I picked those two because of how vastly different they are from each other and how effective they are in their respective fields.

Malala Yousafzai has become known around the world as a symbol for standing up for the right of women and children to be educated in Pakistan, for which she was famously shot by the Pakistani Taliban. This started when the Taliban had issued an edict banning such parties from schools, which inspired her to become an activist. She has since started a school in Lebanon for Syrian refugees.

Yousafzai has received criticism by quite a large set of parties, including the criticism that she is conforming to Western norms by advocating for education within her demographic. It would be important, then, to note that education for such people in Pakistan is not a new thing, and that the desire to abolish it is quite particular to the Taliban. This is demonstrated by reference to Pakistan’s former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, a woman who was very well-educated and qualified to do her job, and who Yousafzai has credited as an inspiration.

For Yousafzai, the idea of reform for education has less to do with religion than with power structures within her country. It could be easy to misinterpret her reform through Western eyes as a reform against Islam, but for her, education has always been normal and sought after among her social class in the majority-Muslim country she lives in. Free and compulsory education is guaranteed in the Pakistani constitution. Rather than the simplistic claim that Islam has a problem with educating women and children, a closer look at the situation will show that there is a conflict between Pakistani Muslims about the issue of educating women and children, and many people fall on both sides.

Maajid Nawaz is a former extremist and has since been acting against extremism through his work as an author and radio host, as well as his counter-terrorism think tank. In the past, he joined an extreme fundamentalist Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir, for which he was imprisoned in Egypt for five years. During his imprisonment, he studied and changed his views, and has since been advocating for secular Islam as well as ideological reform for extremists.

Nawaz serves in more intellectual circles in his area of reform, because, while he did not preach violence during his time as an extremist, he did preach an ideology that he believes gave way for extremists to act violently. Currently, what he is fighting for is for less fundamentalist interpretations of Islamic texts to prevail within his own community. An apt comparison more familiar to Western readers would be between some conservative fundamentalist evangelical Christians, such as Jerry Falwell, who interpret the bible in condemnation of homosexuals and who give a lower status to women, and more liberal Christians whose interpretations contradict that reading of the text. Nawaz is after a similar sort of reform.

Both figures here represent different forms of what D.V. Kumar calls “engaging with modernity”. Where a common western conception of modernity would probably be antithetical to the Pakistani Taliban’s view on education, the reality is that this was an entirely new thing, and that for Yousafzai, engaging with modernity meant standing up to modernity in support of her country’s already existing legal commitment to education. For Nawaz, who has spent a long time on both sides of the extremist debate, the new wave of religious extremism is also a form of modernity which he wants to resist in favor of a more secular version of Islam (Kumar, Engaging with Modernity).

It should be noted that Nawaz’ views can come under criticism from some intellectuals for conforming too heavily to Western values. In Faisal Devji’s piece “Apologetic Modernity”, Devji criticizes a view similar to Nawaz’s as expressed by Fazlur Rahman.

“Rahman, himself a celebrated exponent of Islamic modernism, traces its origins to the period of European dominance in the nineteenth century and to the emergence throughout the Muslim world of efforts at grappling with the fact of Europe’s intellectual and political hegemony. It is in this context, Rahman thinks, that these efforts coalesced in a movement he calls Islamic modernism, which he defines in terms of its partialities and unsystematic character: a movement consisting on the one hand in a defense of Muslim beliefs and practices against European criticism, and on the other in an attack on these same beliefs and practices in the terms of European criticism” (Devji, Apologetic Modernity, p. 63).

Though this can be considered a problem for Nawaz, as it was a problem for Sayyid Ahmad Khan, it shows exactly the problem with the idea of the Muslim world; that there is profound disagreement among its members, and thus it is not a unified front against Western values as people like Huntington would suppose.

Nawaz and Yousafzai are quite different from one another. Yousafzai is far younger, and is a practicing Muslim, while Nawaz, as was mentioned, considers himself a secular Muslim. Yousafzai is Pakistani, Nawaz is English (though he has Pakistani heritage), and their reform is in entirely different fields. This is all to point out that these two are individuals with separate motivations and who work in different parts of the world for different reasons, but both in their own ways are Muslim reformers. This is a great example of why painting a broad stroke and calling it “Islam” is harmful, as it erases the varied nuances that make individuals and communities and which color particular situations.

Works Cited

Aydin, Cemil. The idea of the Muslim world: a global intellectual history. Harvard University Press, 2017.

Devji, Faisal. “Apologetic Modernity.” An Intellectual History for India, pp. 52–67.,doi:10.1017/upo9788175968721.005.

Hesford, Wendy S. “Introduction: Facing Malala Yousafzai, Facing Ourselves.” JAC.

Huntington, Samuel P., et al. The Clash of Civilizations? : the Debate. Foreign Affairs, 2010.

Kumar, D.V. “Engaging with Modernity: Need for a Critical Negotiation.” Sociological Bulletin, Aug. 2008.

Nawaz, Maajid. Radical: My Journey out of Islamist Extremism. Lyons Press, An Imprint of Rowman & Littlefield Press, 2016.

Thomas Dworzak. OSLO. October 2014. Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Malala Yousafzai and Kailash Satyarthi. http://library.artstor.org.ezproxy.uvm.edu/asset/AWSS35953_35953_37890060. Web. 20 Feb 2018.

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The Need for Equality Addressed: Muslim Women in India

Posted on April 27, 2018 by megale

by Maddy Gale

What it means to be a Muslim in India has always been culturally and politically separate from the notion of the modern “Muslim World.” The “Muslim World” is a proposed geopolitical term used to homogenize and categorize all Muslims as being part of a unified whole (Aydin).The Revolution of 1857 serves as a historical example of the disparity in treatment between Indian Muslims and Indian Hindus under British colonial regime, the two largest religious groups in the nation state. This landmark event asserted a social and political struggle between India’s primary ruling agenda and the Muslims of India, and to the majority of the opposing side who saw the Rebellion as jihad, stigmas were formed that still have their part in societal discourse today (Morgenstein Fuerst, 4). Indian Muslims were now considered the minority religion, and treated as such by the Indian government. Muslims, as a “minority,” were advised by Indian Prime Minister Nehru to depend on the goodwill of the “majority” community rather than demanding their due (Suneetha, 41). The “majority” urged Muslims to refrain from rocking the boat while they continued to treat them as less than, a pseudo separate-but-equal system imposed by the Indian government. Muslim identity was seen not only as hateful and alien, but to be dominated and ruled and made politically impotent (Engineer, 1038). This meant the culturally ingrained idea of Indian-Muslim identity had its effect on all facets of the culture, including Muslim Family Law; women’s rights became increasingly central to the notion of Muslim Identity. This consciousness aligns itself with Islamic modernity, a movement to reconcile Islamic faith with modern values such as nationalism, democracy, rights, rationality, science, equality, and progress. In other words, contemporary ways of being are only considered modern when they align themselves with European intellectual tradition, making European ways of life synonymous with modernity (Seedat, 29). Through comparative statistics, personal narratives and historical research, it is obvious that the combination of Muslim personal law and Indian legal systems make being a Muslim woman in India a marginalized and potentially oppressed position to hold.

Before examining the Muslim woman in India, we need to begin with seeing the modern Muslim woman as a diversified and heterogenous being. In the age of oppression, consciousness of the gender gap and the fight for equality, feminist activists have amplified their voices. Recent history has shown an upsurge in the notion of a need for “Islamic Feminism,” a term coined by scholars in the 1990’s with rising concern coming in more recent years from the West for the well-being of their Eastern sisters. The concept of feminism has strong associations with political modernity and consequently, the West, which needs to be addressed in order to examine the status of the Muslim woman in India (Seedat, 30). Islamic feminism seeks to both reclaim religion and undermine patriarchal distortions (Vatuk, 491). It is important to understand the need for equality in India as separate from the larger movement portrayed by the Western media, but not completely unrelated; the common thread throughout this fight against oppression is that in each instance, political forces construct a modest and pious notion of womanhood, outside of the woman’s opinion (Desai & Temsah, 2313). Although women in India do not need to engage with an authoritarian Islamic state, there is still political oppression to be faced (Vatuk, 491). The need for Islamic feminism is a political and social issue that goes beyond the secular movement in the West and finds some of its roots in the quest for basic human rights among women in India.

Muslim family law has traditionally been seen as dominantly patriarchal and strict, sometimes at the expense of the female spouse. The image below depicts the case of a Muslim woman in Assam, India being charged as guilty for her husband’s crimes. Shortly after this, her husband divorced her, severing all ties from his wife and leaving her solely guilty for the crime he committed.

The model nikahnama is the pre-nuptial Islamic marriage contract by which post-nuptial actions become legal under Islamic personal law. Traditional nikahnama addresses certain stipulations of marriage such as mahr, or dowry, and a woman’s right to talaq, or divorce. In the case of Mohammed Khan v. Shah Bano in 1985, Bano divorced her husband and received maintenance, or alimony, from him as ruled by the Indian Parliament and later the Supreme Court.  Following the Shah Bano case, the court urged Muslim personal law to make changes to these systems as to prevent cases like these from reaching the higher courts of law. This sparked a larger upsurge of need to reform within activist groups who wanted to work side by side with the ulema to uphold Sharia while simultaneously codifying fundamental marriage rights for women.

In the attempt to amend the traditional nikahnama, various activist groups of Muslim women insisted on reform and brought their subsequent changes to the Muslim Personal Law Board. Women were arguing for basic human rights on the platform of legal reform, which should be noted as essential to this issue. Muslim women’s rights had become politicized rather than humanized. The women’s groups’ nikahnama stipulated the following: the husband should not inflict physical harm or wrongfully confine the wife; he should not indulge in any other inhuman behaviour; leave the wife in her natal home for an extended period; use abusive language; accept dowry; and not utter triple talaq or talaq in isolation (Suneetha, 43). Like Hindu women, Muslim women also demanded legal redress for polygamy, child marriage, purdah and denial of property rights. However, the consolidation of “communal” identities predicated on the radical difference between Hindus and Muslims and their politicisation in the context of Indians’ investment in questions of franchise and self-government (Tejani 2008) meant that the Muslim political leadership and ulema assumed an active role in bringing legislative reforms for women (Suneetha, 41). But this reclamation of autonomy simultaneously created an idea of Hindu Right being the protector of Muslim women. “Unified law” can be seen as a result of representatives of Hindu orthodoxy who are ready to use Muslim women’s interests to bolster their quest for hegemonic Hindu power (Desai & Temsah, 2412).The disparity among treatment of Muslim women and Hindu women is apparent: in the case of marriage and family, Muslim women wanted to have equal rights to Hindu women. Yet specific religious law made this difficult, as both religious subjects within India were constructed drastically different.

Out of this came two new law boards, The Muslim Women Personal Law Board and the Shia Personal Law Board, both of which released their new nikahnamas in 2006 and 2008. Protection of khula, divorce initiated by the woman, was a major addition to the Shia Personal Law Boards nikahnama. All of these reforms display a need for interpersonal modernization in Islamic family law that is reflective of the modernization in the Muslim world. Muslim women were and continue to be able to enter the both Hindu and male-dominant terrain of the “religious community” and disrupt the stereotype of Muslim women as victims of India’s community patriarchy. (Suneetha, 46). This would seem to be an early indication of modernity permeating Islam in India with positive outgrowth, but statistics show us that this reclamation of power has not been entirely fruitful.  

As scholars beg the question of whether or not traditional Islam is compatible with modernization and progress, we cannot dismiss indicators that Muslim women in India are still subject to antiquated and unequal standards. The question of prevalence of sexual violence within Indian Muslim marriages must be asked in order to grasp the need for such social reform. When looking at the pervasiveness of sexual violence in India, it is important to note socio-economic, cultural, educational, regional, and more importantly, religious differences between those data is collected from. In a study conducted in 2014, Indian women from varying backgrounds were asked whether or not they had been victims of sexual violence. The estimates in this study were based on a definition of violence that included non-consensual forced sex but no other important types of wife abuse, such as emotional or economic abuse (Raushan, 180). The rate of sexual violence against Hindu women is 9.24%, whereas the rate of sexual violence amongst Muslim women is 12.67%. (Raushan, 170). It is important to know that this is one study and not entirely indicative of Muslim men as a whole, but it is safe to deduce that the ways in which Muslims are treated in India may have play in how marriages and families are conducted, alongside the historical disparity between Hindus and Muslims. Is the issue inherent to many Muslim marriages or to the protection of Muslim women in a Hindu-dominated country? Furthermore, what does this tell about the product of colonialism and its links to modernity? In another study, research showed that 55% of Hindu women in India attend family outings with their spouse, whereas only 43% of Muslim women do (Desai & Temsah, 2318). The same study reports that where 19% of Hindu women face harassment in their neighborhood, 26% of Muslim women do. (Desai & Temsah, 2324). There is a marked difference in the treatment of women in India based on their religion in social, industrial and political realms of the pan-Indian world.

The need for organizations like the AIMPLB and movements like Islamic Feminism is apparent here; many Muslim women need practical access to teachings of women’s rights that incorporate Islamic texts and religious inclusion (Vatuk, 495). This need for representation and access must be separate from marginalizing opinions as to the piety or devoutness of Muslim women, choice to veil and political affiliation and instead read as a call for equity and justice. In India, political forces will soon have to realize that the best way to treat the Muslim identity is to seek accommodation and a spirit of cooperation and democratic pluralism that aligns itself with modernity (Engineer, 1038). In order to right the wrongs of the colonial regime, equality despite religious majority or minority must be the law of the land, with Muslim Women being the catalyst for reconstruction.

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Modern Turkey: Islams Stifled

Posted on April 17, 2018 by ncava

Turkey is a bridge between Europe and Asia, but bridges are only necessary to patch divides and tears (Göl, 796), which are very prominent in Turkish society, as is made apparent by the difference between that which the Turkish people are able to present publicly and that which they actually feel. In addition, incredibly high, unjust incarceration rates and police brutality keep the citizens quiet, which has a huge impact on the growth of Islam in the modern age. Turkish Muslims are forced to live their lives under an oppressive umbrella in which their beliefs are mutated. In this blog, I seek to examine the divide within Turkey and its effects on the people and the formation of their modern Islamic practices.

To an American, the idea of Turkey as constitutionally secular country comprised of 99% Muslims (International Religious Freedom Report for 2014: Turkey, 2) that seeks to bridge Europe and Asia is confusing to say the least. The haze through which Americans see Islam is so great that an ongoing argument I have with a friend is based on the strangeness of a Muslim present at a recent Democratic debate. This friend does not regard his view as problematic or closed minded, which shocks me—especially as a religion major—but in the past, I have seen and heard a substantial number of arguments on the subject that conclusively proves many Americans don’t understand Islam at all. A study conducted in 2014 by the Pew Research Center showed that 82% of Republicans are “very concerned” about the rising tide of Islamic extremism in the world, compared to the still high 51% of democrats. While extremists have had a large global presence recently with DAESH, this fear is understandable, yet significant in a country where there is very little violence comparatively. If the idea of a Muslim who lives a normal life and participates in society is seen as contradictory and foreign, then Turkey is the pinnacle conglomeration of many of these confusing ideas.

That said, as Americans we have the freedom to argue about these topics and research an endless amount of questions that interest us. The internet is a spewing fountain of varying viewpoints from around the world that can produce hours of reading for curious minds. Recently in Turkey the freedom of speech, belief, and access to the internet has been restricted in multiple instances (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014: Turkey), causing both uproar and fear throughout the country and the world. In the 14 years after the purging of Turkish prisons in 2000, the total number of convicts and detainees has gone from 49,512 to 154,197, including a 34,967 jump between 2005 and 2007, and a 13,105 jump between 2009 and 2010 (Penal Policies and Institutions in Turkey: Structural Problems and Potential Solutions, Table 5). The enforcement of an Anti-Terror Law has given the government rationale to arrest countless innocents under the guise of protecting the state from the, “weakening or destroying or seizing [of] the authority of the State… [and] fundamental rights and freedoms… by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat” (Anti-Terror Law, Article 1:1). “Prosecutors use a broad definition of terrorism and threats … [to prosecute] hundreds of political prisoners across the political spectrum, including journalists, political party officials, and academics” (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014: Turkey, 19).

As a student, I would not be able to write this blog post if I feared legal repercussions for criticizing aspects of society I knew were wrong. In Turkey, self-censorship has become common (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014: Turkey, 1), which ultimately closes the door for discussion within the country between the people, who experience the greatest effect. Because “the law still does not distinguish between persons who incited violence, those who are alleged to have supported the use of violence but did not use it themselves, and those who rejected violence but sympathized with some or all of the philosophical goals of various political movements” (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014: Turkey, 19), the difference between critically evaluating the state and causing people physical harm is negligible in the eyes of the law. With this in mind, it is easy to imagine how heavy the air must be as intelligent Turks stifle their qualms and ignore their “religious, political, and cultural viewpoints” (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014: Turkey, 2) for the sake of being able to live their lives.
The forced silence in Turkey not only punishes candid speech, but prevents pursuit of valuable concepts through use of fear. Through this “control of religion by the state… the repression of Islam and suppression of Muslim identity” (Göl, 804), the Turkish government has shaped modern Turkish Islam. While being Muslim in a secular state is very much possible, Turkey’s secularization has proved more detrimental than beneficial. The quelling of “Muslim ‘public selves … as ‘reactionary’ for [their] potential subversion of the system” (Göl, 804) would be understandable if civilian actions were truly dangerous and ‘reactionary,’ but objectively examining ones state of personal and collective freedoms mainly stands to produce means of improvement. Without freedom to scrutinize the social sphere there is no room for healthy growth. The suppression of any public Islamic colloquium both intensifies and narrows religious ideas, which are especially interesting to analyze through the lens of John F. Wilson.

When Wilson’s schema of religious responses to modernity is applied to the Turkish case, the responses are warped. The “advocacy of new religious ideas” (Wilson, 6110) becomes isolated and uninformed; the “self-conscious accommodation of religious traditions to modern society” (Wilson, 6110) cowers ever increasingly as that society scorns its fluid existence; and “the determined attempt to preserve continuing tradition” (Wilson, 6110) is all but extinguished as the environment is purged of its oxygen. The fundamentalist stance is heightened, yet somewhat stripped of its power, as the other adaptions begin to appear extreme as well. Wilson’s final reaction is the generation of wholly new traditions, which indubitably exist in Turkey, but they have grown up malnourished in the darkness. The denial of chances to practice openly and evaluate necessary changes has made modern Turkish Islam significantly stinted in a struggle that is incredibly muffled by the State. Tactics of violence and fear are effective ways to ensure subjugation, especially when they are unspecified and widely enforced.

Modern Turkish Islam has been forced to exist like a tree growing through a crosshatched fence, distorted as it forces its way through painful cookie-cutter gaps leading to the coveted shore beyond.

turkey

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