Chronology of Events

1779  Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*
1780  Archibald Arthur elected as Reid's assistant and successor
1781  Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*
1783  Reid elected Fellow of the newly founded Royal Society of Edinburgh
1784  Reid appointed Vice-Rector of Glasgow University by the Rector Edmund Burke
1785  Reid's *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*
      Fourth edition of Reid's *Inquiry*
      Reid reappointed Vice-Rector of Glasgow University by the Rector Edmund Burke
1788  Reid's *Essays on the Active Powers of Man*
      Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*
1789  French Revolution
1790  Reid is founding member and first president of the Glasgow Society of the Sons of Ministers of the Church of Scotland
1791  Reid joins the Glasgow Friends of Liberty and attends Bastille Day dinner
      Medallion of Reid struck by James Tassie
      Reid contributes money to the French National Assembly
      Death of Reid's wife Elizabeth
1794  James Gregory's *Philosophical and Literary Essays*
      Reid publishes "Observations on the dangers of political innovation" in *Glasgow Courier, 18 December*
1795  Adam Smith's *Essays on Philosophical Subjects*
1796  Reid's portrait painted by Raeburn
      Death of Reid, 7 October
1799  Reid's "University of Glasgow" published in John Sinclair's *Statistical Account of Scotland*, vol. 21
1805  Death of Reid's daughter Martha

TERENCE CUNEO AND RENÉ VAN WOUDENBERG

Introduction

History can be a fickle judge. After enjoying enormous popularity in the United States, Great Britain, and France for almost one hundred years after his death, Thomas Reid (1710–96) disappeared from the philosophical canon. Reid's disappearance did not have the consequence that his thought failed to influence subsequent philosophers: One can discern, for example, distinctly Reidian themes and methodology at work in Moorean "ordinary language" philosophy. But it did mean that Reid made no appearance in the story that philosophers in the last century have told—and continue to tell—about the development of early modern philosophy. The basic shape of this story is familiar enough and goes something like this:

Early modern philosophy was animated by two central worries: First, given its dismal history of disagreement and present state of faction, how could philosophy progress in the way and to the degree that the natural sciences had? And, second, how could traditional objects of philosophical inquiry such as free will, the soul, and God be fit into the world as described by the new science? The urgency of both these issues occasioned a crisis in modern philosophy. In their own way, and with varying degrees of success, rationalists such as Descartes and empiricists such as Hume grappled with these issues. But only in the figure of Immanuel Kant do we encounter a sustained and ingenious attempt to blend the rationalist and empiricist ways of addressing these problems.

A theme that emerges from this book is that this story needs to be retold. The story needs to be retold not so much because it is fundamentally misguided, but because it is incomplete. There is, in addition to the Kantian response to the crisis in modern philosophy,
a Reidian response – a response of a different character, but of comparable sophistication and ingenuity.

I

One of the most striking features of Thomas Reid's thought is that the typically modern anxiety about what we might call the "progress" and "location" problems is absent. There is, in Reid's published work, no lamentation about the lack of progress in philosophy. Nor is there complaint about how philosophy compares unfavorably with the new science. On the contrary, in the preface to the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Reid writes that whatever the current prejudices may be against philosophy,

About two hundred years ago, the opinions of men in natural philosophy were as various, and as contradictory, as they are now concerning the powers of the mind. GALILEO, TORRICELLI, KEPLER, BACON and NEWTON, had the same discouragement in their attempts to throw light upon the material system, as we have with regard to the intellectual. If they had been deterred by such prejudices, we should never have reaped the benefit of their discoveries, which do honour to human nature, and will make their names immortal.

The remains of ancient philosophy upon this subject [viz., the powers and operations of the mind], are venerable ruins, carrying the marks of genius and industry, sufficient to inflame, but not to satisfy, our curiosity. In later ages, DES CARTES was the first to point out the road we ought to take in those dark regions. MALEBRANCHE, ARNAULD, LOCKE, BERKELEY, BUFFIER, HUTCHESON, BUTLER, HUME, PRICE, Lord KAMES, have laboured to make discoveries, nor have they laboured in vain. For, however different and contrary their conclusions are, however skeptical some of them, they have all given new light, and cleared the way to those come after them.

We ought never to despair of human genius, but rather to hope, that, in time, it may produce a system of the powers and operations of the human mind, no less certain than those of optics or astronomy. (EIP Preface: 13–14)

This passage is remarkable for both its balanced assessment of philosophy's state and its high estimation of the philosophical tradition. The tradition has given us insight concerning the powers and operations of the mind, by which Reid means both the intellectual and active powers of the mind such as "the powers of memory, of imagination, of taste, of reasoning, of moral perception, the will, the passions, the affections, and all the active powers of the soul" (IHM VII: 218). And there is, says Reid, hope for real progress on these matters – even when so much of recent thought has been "skeptical" in character. In light of this measured optimism, it is natural to raise the question: Why is this characteristically modern theme of philosophy in crisis absent from Reid's thought?

It is not because Reid was ignorant of the history of philosophy or the success of the new science. Reid had a firm grip on the history of philosophy, as is evident in his extensive and detailed discussion of what he calls the "theory of ideas." Moreover, Reid himself was a practicing scientist, and, among all the great eighteenth-century philosophers, Reid is arguably the most learned and expert concerning scientific issues. Nor is the anxiety absent because Reid is dismissive of the new science. On the contrary, Reid repeatedly lauds the accomplishments of Newton and Bacon. Nor, finally, is it absent because Reid insisted on a sharp division between the methods of science and philosophy. Like Hume, Reid explicitly claims that philosophy should (in certain domains, at least) also employ the broadly inductive methods of Baconian science. So, once again: Why this absence of anxiety in Reid's thought about the progress of philosophy?

Part of the answer lies in the fact that Reid took himself to have identified the root of why philosophy had failed to progress as it should. The Reidian diagnosis of what we've called the "progress problem" is conspicuously different from that of his contemporaries. Unlike Hume, Reid does not claim that the failure of philosophy to progress primarily consists in the fact that philosophers have failed to use the "experimental method" of the new science – although Reid emphasizes that it is partly due to this. Nor is his diagnosis the Kantian one, according to which philosophy's failure to progress is explained by the reach of theoretical reason having exceeded its grasp – although there are certainly echoes of Kant in what Reid says. What Reid claims is

that the defects and blemishes in the received philosophy concerning the mind, which have most exposed it to the contempt and ridicule of sensible men, have chiefly been owing to this: That the votaries of this Philosophy, from a natural prejudice in her favour, have endeavored to extend her jurisdiction beyond its just limits, and to call to her bar the dictates of Common
Sense. But these decline this jurisdiction; they disdain the trial of reasoning, and disown its authority; they neither claim its aid, nor dread its attacks.

In this unequal contest betwixt Common Sense and Philosophy, the latter will always come off both with dishonour and loss... Philosophy [if I may be permitted to change the metaphor] has no other root but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out of them, and draws its nourishment from them: severed from this root, its honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots. [IHM Introduction iv: 19]

So, in Reid's view, philosophy's lack of progress should mainly be attributed to its flouting the principles of common sense, by which Reid means (roughly) those propositions that properly functioning adult human beings at worlds like ours explicitly believe or take for granted in their ordinary activities and practices.10 But why has philosophy disregarded the principles of common sense? And what exactly has been the consequence?

Reid's answer to the first question is that modern philosophers have almost universally embraced what he calls "the Cartesian system" [IHM: VII: 208].11 The Cartesian system, as Reid describes it, has two main elements, the first of which is a particular version of what we now call "epistemological foundationalism." For our purposes, we can understand epistemological foundationalism to be a three-part thesis. In the first place, the foundationalist claims that our beliefs have various kinds of epistemic merit such as being warranted, entitled, reliably formed, certain, a case of knowledge, and so forth.12 In the second place, the foundationalist maintains that beliefs that display a given epistemic merit come in two kinds – those that are evidentially based on some other belief that has that merit and those that are not. Finally, the foundationalist specifies the conditions under which a belief has that merit – conditions under which a belief may be "immediately" warranted, entitled, reliably formed, and so forth [i.e., not evidentially based on some other belief that has the merit in question] or "mediately" justified, warranted, entitled, and so forth [i.e., evidentially based on some other belief that has the merit in question]. The dominant trend in modern philosophy, according to Reid, has been to claim that the former sorts of belief are few in number:

There is, no doubt, a beauty in raising a large fabric of knowledge upon a few first principles. The stately fabric of mathematical knowledge, raised upon

the foundation of a few axioms and definitions, charms every beholder. DES CARTES, who was well acquainted with this beauty in the mathematical sciences, seems to have been ambitious to give the same beautiful simplicity to his system of philosophy, and therefore sought only one first principle as the foundation of all our knowledge, at least of contingent truths.

And so far has his authority prevailed, that those who came after him have almost universally followed him in this track. This, therefore, may be considered as the spirit of modern philosophy, to allow of no first principles of contingent truths but this one, that the thoughts and operations of our own minds, of which we are conscious, are self-evidently real and true; but that everything else that is contingent is to be proved by argument. [EIP VI: vii: 516]13

Reid's suggestion is that fundamental to the modern system is the thesis that the only beliefs that are immediately warranted, entitled, reliably formed, or a case of knowledge – Reid can, in various passages, be read as having different epistemic merits in mind14 – are ones that concern "the thoughts and operations of our own minds, of which we are conscious." If an agent's belief concerning some contingent matter of fact other than the conscious thoughts and operations of her mind is warranted, entitled, reliably formed, or a case of knowledge, then it must be "proved by argument" from some belief concerning the conscious thoughts and operations of that agent's mind.

For ease of reference, we can call foundationalism of this kind "classically modern foundationalism."15 The Cartesian system, according to Reid, links foundationalism of this variety with a methodological thesis that Reid calls the "way of analogy," which is a manner "in which men...form their notions and opinions concerning the mind, and...its powers and operations" [IHM VII: 203]. According to Reid, the tendency of those who engage in the way of analogy is to think of the mind in crudely mechanistic terms. Descartes and his followers – by which Reid means nearly all modern philosophers –

have built upon the same foundation [viz., consciousness] and with the same materials. They acknowledge that nature hath given us very simple ideas: These are analogous to the matter of Des Cartes's physical system. They acknowledge likewise a natural power by which ideas are compounded, disjoined, associated, compared: This is analogous to the original quantity of motion in Des Cartes's physical system. From these principles they attempt to explain the phaenomena of the human understanding, just as in the
physical system the phenomena of nature were to be explained by matter and motion. [IHM VII: 212]

Although Reid does not single him out by name in this passage, Hume is perhaps the most egregious example of those who engage in the way of analogy. The Humean mind is the Newtonian universe writ small – a theater in which the “materials” are “particles” of impressions and ideas governed by the quasi-Newtonian laws of contiguity, resemblance, and causality.  

Reid was of the conviction that analogical reasoning of this sort led naturally to what he called “the way of ideas” or the thesis that things which do not now exist in the mind itself, can only be perceived, remembered, or imagined, by means of ideas or images of them in the mind, which are the immediate objects of perception, remembrance, and imagination. This doctrine appears evidently to be borrowed from the old system [i.e., the Aristotelian system], which taught, that the external things make impressions upon the mind, like impressions of the seal upon wax; that it is by means of these impressions that we perceive, remember, or imagine them; and that those impressions must resemble things from which they are taken. When we form our notions of the operations of the mind by analogy, this way of conceiving them seems to be very natural, and offers itself to our thoughts: for as every thing which is felt must make some impression upon the body, we are apt to think, that everything which is understood must make some impression upon the mind. [IHM VII: 216]

The main reason that the espousal of the Cartesian system has made philosophy a “ridiculous figure in the eyes of sensible men” [EIP II.xv: 186], says Reid, is that it issues in epistemological skepticism concerning the external world. The path to skepticism from the first component of the system is fairly direct: “From the single principle of the existence of our own thoughts, very little, if any thing, can be deduced by just reasoning, especially if we suppose that all our other faculties may be fallacious” [EIP VI.vii: 518]. To use one of Reid’s own examples, from the mere belief that a person is having, say, a pain sensation, he cannot justifiably infer the existence of a pin whose sharpness occasioned this sensation. The proposition that there is a sharp pin that is causing this sensation is no more probable than not with respect to his belief that he is having a pain sensation of a certain kind: “Common sense may lead him to think that this pain has a cause; but whether this cause is body or spirit, extended or unextended, figured or not figured, he cannot possibly, from any principles he is supposed to have, form the least conjecture” [IHM V.vi: 65].

One of the reasons that it is extraordinarily difficult to argue from beliefs about the content of our minds to the existence of external reality is that these beliefs are, according to advocates of the Cartesian system such as Hume, supposed to be about images in the mind that imaginistically resemble external reality. According to the Humean way of ideas theorist, we secure a mental grip on external reality by forming beliefs about images in the mind and inferring, on the basis of a resemblance between those images and the external world, entities in the external world that resemble those images. But, as Reid tirelessly urges, we typically form no beliefs about our sensory experiences, and there is no significant resemblance between a sensory experience such as a pain sensation in one’s finger and the sharpness of the instrument that occasioned it. It makes no difference, moreover, if we think of that sensory experience as an awareness of an idea in the mind. There is no imagistic resemblance between an idea of pain in the mind that we are aware of when experiencing pain and the sharpness of the instrument that occasioned that idea, for the idea in question is not itself sharp, extended, and so forth. Accordingly, if what the way of ideas theorist says is true, there is no adequate inference from ideas in the mind to an external reality that resembles it. The “natural issue” of the way of ideas is also skepticism concerning the external world [IHM VII: 210]. To which Reid adds that even if there were objects such as ideas, they would not explain how we get a mental grip on external reality:

We are at a loss to know how we perceive distant objects, how we remember things past, how we imagine things that have no existence. Ideas in the mind seem to account for all these operations: They are all by means of ideas reduced to one operation; to a kind of feeling, or immediate perception of things present, and in contact with the percipient; and feeling is an operation so familiar, that we think it needs no explication, but may serve to explain other operations.

But this feeling, or immediate perception, is as difficult to be comprehended, as the things which we pretend to explain by it. Two things may be in contact without any feeling or perception; there must therefore be in the percipient a power to feel or to perceive. How this power is produced, and how it operates, is quite beyond the reach of our knowledge....
This power of perceiving ideas is as inexplicable as any of the powers explained by it: And the contiguity of the object contributes nothing at all to make it better understood, because there appears no connection between contiguity and perception, but what is grounded on prejudices, drawn from some imagined similitude between mind and body. . . . [EIP II.xiv: 185]

In a move that both prefigures and has inspired major trends in contemporary epistemology and the philosophy of mind, Reid proposes jettisoning the Cartesian system. This means, first of all, repudiating a version of classically modern foundationalism in favor of a version of foundationalism that is (to use John Greco's terminology) "moderate and wide."32 Reid's favored version of foundationalism is moderate because it tells us that a belief can be in excellent epistemic standing—say, be a case of knowledge or certain—without being indubitable or incorrigible.33 And it is "wide" because it says that many of our beliefs about external objects, other minds, events in the past, moral truths, and the like are both [i] not inferred from other propositions and [ii] in excellent epistemic condition. Indeed, according to one reading of Reid's treatment of the "first principles of contingent truths," Reid's view is that it is a first principle of common sense that the particular deliverances of the faculties of perception, memory, consciousness, the moral sense, and so forth are immediately warranted, entitled, reliably formed, and so on.34

To fully divest ourselves of the Cartesian system, however, we must take a further step: We must also reject the way of analogy and its offspring, the way of ideas. Since ideas do not offer us any explanation of how we get a mental grip on reality, it would be better, claims Reid, to stick with our pre-reflective conviction that we apprehend entities of various kinds, but not by way of pictures in the head that imaginistically resemble them.35

II

Hegel once quipped about the Kantian critical method that refusing to engage in philosophical reflection about substantive metaphysical issues until one had first examined the nature and limits of the understanding was akin to "refusing to enter the water until you have learnt to swim."36 Hegel was no Reidian, but his comment in this case is decidedly Reidian in spirit. If philosophy had stumbled

because it embraced the Cartesian system, the way forward, according to Reid, was not to begin with a critique of reason, but to begin in the thick of human experience by paying "due attention" to the use and structure of ordinary language, the principles taken for granted in the "course of human actions in conduct," and the operations of our own minds" [EIP I.v: 56–7].

Of these three planks in his philosophical methodology, Reid himself grants special priority to the last: The "chief and proper source" of knowledge of the mind, says Reid, is accurate reflection upon the operations of our own minds, or introspection (ibid.). Ascribing this sort of authority to introspection is not, of course, likely to appeal to the post-Wittgensteinian philosopher or the contemporary psychologist. But Reid saw no particular reason to be suspicious of introspection. And it should be emphasized that he clearly recognized its limits. In the first place, introspective knowledge needs to be supplemented and guided by our best scientific knowledge of the nature of mind. That adherents to the way of ideas failed to pay close enough attention to the operations of mind, and thereby confounded distinct cognitive acts such as sensation and perception, is one of Reid's main objections to their views. But Reid also stressed that adherents to the way of ideas embraced scientifically suspect physiological hypotheses regarding the mechanisms involved in human perception.37 And it should not be overlooked that Reid's work in the theory of vision and geometry plays a major part in his rejection of the way of ideas.38 As Lorne Falkenstein has argued, Reid's work in the theory of vision and, in particular, his use of the Berkeleyan distinction between visible and real figure are fundamental to his rejection of Berkeley's claim that the objects of vision and touch exist only in the mind as radically different types of sensation.39

Secondly, Reid himself stresses that the introspective method is of limited use. Attending to the operations of our minds is extraordinarily difficult as "[t]he number and quick succession of the operations of the mind make it difficult to give due attention to them" (EIP I.vi: 60). Moreover, we are, among other things, habitually disposed to attend to the objects of the operations of mind and not the operations of mind themselves.36 So, although accurately reflecting on the operations of mind is central to Reid's common sense philosophy, it is not itself a practice easily engaged in by the ordinary person. On the contrary, it requires the exercise of virtues such as
attention, patience, and discernment that Reid suggests may be in short supply among the vulgar.31

It is not surprising, then, that both when criticizing the positions of others and when developing his own positive views, Reid leans heavily on the ways in which ordinary folk use language and the principles of common sense that they take for granted in their ordinary activities and practices. In this respect at least, Reid's philosophical method is one that foreshadows both American pragmatism and the "linguistic turn" in Anglo-American analytic philosophy. It is also, interestingly enough, that aspect of Reid's thought that has attracted the most criticism. To single out what is perhaps the most famous of such criticisms, Kant's invective in the introduction to the Prolegomena accused Reidian common sense of being an "appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed...when no rational justification for one's position can be advanced...when insight and science fail."32

Kant's criticism has been echoed by philosophers of rather different persuasions.33 This is more than a little ironic, for Reid himself would not have denied that there is a sense in which appealing to common sense - to what it "is ridiculous to doubt" - is humiliating for the philosopher:

When I remember distinctly a past event, or see an object before my eyes, this commands my belief no less than an axiom. But when, as a Philosopher, I reflect upon this belief, and want to trace it to its origin, I am not able to resolve it into necessary and self-evident axioms, or conclusions that are necessarily consequent upon them. I seem to want that evidence which I can best comprehend, and which gives perfect satisfaction to an inquisitive mind; yet it is ridiculous to doubt, and I find it is not in my power. An attempt to throw off this belief, is like an attempt to fly, equally ridiculous and impracticable.

To a Philosopher, who has been accustomed to think that the treasure of his knowledge is the acquisition of that reasoning power of which he boasts, it is no doubt humiliating to find, that his reason can lay no claim to the greater part of it. [EIP II.xx: 233]

Reid's response to humiliation of this sort is that it is salutary for the philosopher: The philosopher's humiliation should beget philosophical humility. And philosophical humility or modesty does indeed pervade Reid's views on common sense and ordinary language; Reid is no less aware of the limitations of appeals to ordinary language and common sense than he is of the limits of appeals to introspection. We can, Reid emphasizes, be mistaken about what we take to be principles of common sense and, thus, should be "cautious, that we do not adopt opinions as first principles, which are not entitled to that character" [EIP I.i: 46]. And while philosophy must start from, and be guided by, ordinary language, Reid states that "all languages have their imperfections...and can never be adequate to all the varieties of human thought" since "we can expect, in the structure of languages" only "those distinctions which all mankind in the common business of life have occasion to make" [EIP I.v: 56].

Indeed, as Reid indicates in his discussion of the way in which we talk about the movement of the earth, ordinary language can lead us astray.34 Finally, it should be noted that Reid himself is willing to deviate from ordinary language and what appears to be common sense, when the latter clashes with our best science. Perhaps the best example of this in Reid's own thought lies in his treatment of causality. Reid understood the best science of his day - that is, Newtonian science - to establish that matter was inert. Accordingly, Reid was willing to allow that, even though ordinary language and the beliefs of ordinary folk indicate otherwise, material objects are not causally efficacious: "In compliance with custom, or, perhaps, to gratify the avidity of knowing the causes of things," Reid writes, "we call the laws of nature causes and active powers. So we speak of the powers of gravitation, of magnetism, of electricity" [EAP IV.iii: 607a].35 But "[t]he name of a cause...is properly given to that being only, which, by its active power, produces some change in itself, or in some other being" [EAP IV.ii: 603a]. As the latter passage indicates, by an "active power," Reid means the power of intelligent agents to bring about some change in itself or some other entity. All causation, according to Reid, is agent causation. All causation in nature, then, is ultimately the result of the exercise of God's agent power or the power of agents subordinate to God.36

In summary, then, the Reidian diagnosis of and solution to the progress problem is both revolutionary and modest. It is revolutionary insofar as it identifies a package of commitments - the Cartesian system - that philosophers had heretofore accepted uncritically, and proposes, on account of the unattractive consequences of those
commitments, rejecting them. But it is modest insofar as both the

diagnosis and the solution do not stray far from the principles of

common sense. Philosophizing has to start somewhere, and Reid

saw no reason that we should leave our commonsensical modes

discourse and convictions at the door when entering into the

philosophical workplace. Admittedly, it is sometimes easy to iden-
tify modesty of this sort with lack of sophistication. But such an
identification would be a mistake in Reid's case. Reid's positive

philosophical methodology is complex: It should be viewed as the
interplay between the deliverances of introspection, science, obser-
vations concerning the structure and use of ordinary language, and
the principles of common sense. Reid certainly does ascribe a particu-
lar type of authority to common sense and ordinary language; until
shown otherwise, they are presumed to be reliable guides to reality.

But trade-offs between these different features sometimes need to be
made, and the philosopher must exercise good judgment in making
them.

III

Reid, then, offered a general strategy for addressing the progress prob-
lem – a strategy out of step with both the rationalist and empiricist
thought of his day. Advocating a strategy of this sort, however, was
only a first step toward adequately addressing the progress problem.

A fully adequate response to the problem required exhibiting how
one's favored philosophical methodology could shed light on the is-

sue of how traditional objects of philosophical inquiry could be ac-
 commodated within the world as described by the best science. Reid's
conviction – and here it is instructive to note a parallel with Kant –
was that, among the various entities most in need of accommodation
in the world as described by Newtonian science, human free choice
had special priority: Without our having free will in a robustly lib-
ertarian sense, moral responsibility and, thus, traditional morality
would be illusions. For both Reid and Kant, other traditional is-

sues such as personal identity through time were of secondary im-
portance to this. Ascribing to agents strict identity through time was
an important issue for Reid mainly insofar as it was necessary to un-
derwrite our ordinary practices of holding agents morally responsible
for their actions and character traits.

Although Reid and Kant were agreed on this much, they adopted
different strategies of locating free choice in the Newtonian universe,
for they understood the nature of this universe rather differently.

Kant advertised his project in the Introduction to the Critique of
Pure Reason as one that (among other things) attempted to account
for the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge of necessary truths.
And among the synthetic a priori propositions for which we have to
account, says Kant, are Newton's laws of motion. Although it is
not entirely uncontroversial in what sense Kant held these laws to be
"necessary and universal," the drift of Kant's thought appears to be
that they are "transcendently necessary" or metaphysically neces-
sary at worlds in which human beings have experience. Understood

thus, Kant was a necessitarian about these laws of nature inasmuch
as he held it to be transcendently necessary that, for example, for
any action, there is always an opposite or equal reaction. To this
thesis Kant joined a broadly Leibnizian version of determinism: All
the actions of the self in time are entirely determined by such natu-
ral laws. Of course Kant was perfectly aware that determinism is
incompatible with libertarian freedom, and so he proposed dividing
the world and the self in two: Insofar as we are inhabitants of the phe-
nomenal realm, or the world of appearances, our actions are entirely
determined. Insofar as we are inhabitants of the noumenal realm,
or the world of things-in-themselves, we are free in the libertarian
sense [and must be so for practical purposes].

Viewed thus, Kant's strategy of addressing the location problem
is one of avoidance: Rather than attempt to fit human free will into
the Newtonian universe, his proposal is to place it in a different
realm altogether – a nontemporal, nonspatial "noumenal" realm.

Reid shared Kant's resolve to defend the claim that we have free
will in a robustly libertarian sense, but did not share Kant's concern
that free will of this sort has no place in the Newtonian universe.
Fundamental to our existence, says Reid, is that "[we have, by our
constitution a natural conviction or belief that we act freely] – a
conviction so early, so universal, and so necessary in most of our
rational operations, that it must be the result of our constitution, and
the work of Him that made us" (EAP IV.vi: 616b). Reid continues:

This natural conviction of our acting freely, which is acknowledged by many

who hold the doctrine of necessity, ought to throw the whole burden of proof
upon that side, for, by this, the side of liberty has what lawyers call a *jus quaesitum*, or a right of ancient possession, which ought to stand good till it be overthrown. If it cannot be proved that we always act from necessity, there is no need of arguments on the other side, to convince us that we are free agents. [EAP IV:i: 620a-b]

But then what about those features of the experimental method or the Newtonian universe that might threaten to overturn this native conviction concerning our freedom?

In Section VII of *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Hume argued that we have no conception of active power or the power of free choice because (i) we can see no dependence relation—let alone a necessary dependence relation—between the exercise of this power and its effects, and (ii) we have no idea how the exercise of this power could bring about behavior of certain kinds in the agent who exercised the power. Reid was unimpressed by this complaint:

To this [i.e., Hume's argument] I answer that if a man believed that in heat there was a will to melt ice, he would undoubtedly believe that there is in heat a real efficient\(^4\) power to produce that effect, though he were ignorant how or by what latent process the effect is produced. So we, knowing that certain effects depend on our will, impute to ourselves the power of producing them, though there may be some latent process between the volition and the production which we do not know. So a child may know that a bell is rung by pulling a certain peg, though he does not yet know how that operation is connected with the ringing of the bell, and when he can move that peg he has a perfect conviction that he has power to ring the bell.

Supposing we were unable to give any account how we first got the conception of power, this would be no good reason for denying that we have it. One might as well prove that he had no eyes in his head for this reason[:] that neither he nor any other person could tell how they came there. [OP: 8, 5]

Reid's reply is that every person is convinced that certain events depend on the exercise of his active power, and it matters not a bit whether we can give an account of how the exercise of this power brings about these events. It should be noted that Reid does not leave the matter at this, but goes on to give an account of how we get a mental grip on active power. We do so not by way of being acquainted with some impression or idea, as Hume appeared to suggest we must

if we had such a conception, but by what Reid calls a "relative conception." "Our conception of power is relative to its exertions or effects.... [P]ower... [is] something which has a certain relation to the effect" [EAP I:i: 514a].\(^4\) To put Reid's point in the way we might nowadays couch it, we can get a mental grip on a particular power by way of the apprehensive use of the singular concept or definite description the entity whose exercise brought about such and such effects. Of course in so grasping a power, one must possess the notion of *some thing's bringing about another thing*. In Reid's view, however, there is nothing particularly problematic about acquiring such a concept; acquisition of this concept needn't come about by comparing ideas or hunting for an impression that corresponds to the concept. Rather, as the first passage quoted from the *Active Powers* above indicates, we acquire this concept by way of our "constitution." Given certain kinds of experiential inputs—namely, the "consciousness of our own activity" [EAP I:v: 523b]—we form, by a law of our constitution, the concept of something's causally bringing about something else.\(^4\)

But to say this is not perforce to give an account of how we get a mental grip on the *necessary* connection that is supposed to obtain between cause and effect. Nor is it to address the claim that determinism is constitutive of the Newtonian universe and, thus, prohibits our thinking of human agents in space/time as being free in a robustly libertarian sense. The heart of Reid's response to these worries is expressed in the following passage, in which he claims that the laws of nature are contingent:

A law is a thing conceived in the mind of a rational being, not a thing that has real existence,\(^4\) and, therefore, like a motive, it can neither act nor be acted upon....

The physical laws of nature are the rules according to which the Deity commonly acts in his natural government of the world; and whatever is done according to them, is not done by man, but by God, either immediately, or by instruments under his direction. These laws of nature neither restrain the power of the Author of nature, nor bring him under any obligation to do anything beyond their sphere. He has sometimes acted contrary to them, in the case of miracles, and, perhaps, often acts without regard to them, in the ordinary course of his providence. Neither miraculous events, which are contrary to the physical laws of nature, nor such ordinary acts of the Divine
they are not subject to natural laws – holds also for human actions. In a passage that has striking affinities with Kant, Reid writes that it is a mistake to think of voluntary human actions as falling under laws of nature at all:

But it is to be observed, that the voluntary actions of man can in no case be called natural phenomena, or be considered as regulated by the physical laws of Nature. Our voluntary actions are subjected to moral, but not to physical laws. The moral as well as the physical laws of Nature are enacted by the great Author of Nature, but they are essentially different. The physical laws of nature are the rules by which the Deity himself acts in his government of the world, and, therefore, they are never transgressed. Moral laws are the laws which the supreme Lawgiver he prescribes to his reasonable creatures for their conduct, which, indeed, ought always to be obeyed, but, in fact, are often transgressed...

There are many important branches of human knowledge, to which Sir Isaac Newton’s rules of Philosophizing have no relation, and to which they can with no propriety be applied. Such are Morals, Jurisprudence, Natural Theology, and the abstract Sciences of Mathematicks and Metaphysicks, because in none of the sciences do we investigate the physical laws of Nature. There is therefore no reason to regret that these branches of knowledge have been pursued without regard to them. (PRLS: 183–6)

Reid is one of Newton’s greatest devotees. But, in Reid’s view, embracing the Newtonian system needn’t amount to claiming that its methods should be applied in every domain. The domain of voluntary human action is a domain of causality, to be sure. But it is not a domain of natural causality (although Reid is happy to admit that we are influenced by desires, moods, urges, etc.). The causality at work in the domain of voluntary action is that of human agents exercising their active power – where the exercise of active power is not one that falls under natural laws.50

There is a final implication of Reid’s views about natural laws that is worth remarking on. Earlier it was pointed out that Kant viewed Newton’s laws of motion as being synthetic a priori – “necessary and universal” in a robust sense of these terms. Since Kant could see no way by which we could grasp the necessity of these laws by ordinary inductive means, he proposed that we, in some sense, impart these laws to reality: Apart from our cognitive activity, there are no laws of nature of this sort, and it is we who confer their modal status on
them. Our knowledge of the more particular laws of physics, moreover, is (according to one interpretation of Kant) to be deduced from these necessary general laws.\[^{52}\]

Reid emphatically rejects this understanding of the laws of nature:

The laws of Nature are not capable of demonstrative proof, but must be drawn from the phenomena by just induction, like to that by which we deduce the grammatical rules of a language from the language itself. [...That kind of induction... is the only proof we can have of a law of Nature. This is contrary to the rules of syllogism, and, indeed, is not demonstrative proof, but it is the only proof we can have, and it is such a proof as we rest upon with perfect security in the common affairs of life. (PRLS: 184, 190)

On this issue, as in so many others, Reid claims that when we dig into the deep nature of reality we find, not necessity, but contingency. God has created the world and our constitutions in certain ways, but God needn't have created them in those ways. Reid's proclivity to be impressed by the contingent character of theworkings of nature and the human mind is, of course, one manner in which his thought stands sharply opposed to that in the German transcendental tradition. And it is, at least in part, one of the reasons that Reid would have found no inducement to accept idealism on account of the putative necessity of the laws of nature.

IV

The essays in this volume concern some of the topics on which Reid wrote and lectured that are likely to be of interest to philosophers. Given the wealth of these topics,\[^{52}\] the choice as to which should be treated in such a book is difficult. But the hope is that the essays included here bring out some of the most philosophically important and interesting features of Reid's work.

The opening essay of the volume, Alexander Broadie's "Reid in Context," endeavors to throw light on Reid's thought by situating Reid in three different, albeit overlapping, contexts. The first is the religious, political, and social context. In contrast to a popularized portrayal of Reid, as a man of almost entirely academic interests, Broadie maintains Reid was deeply involved in the life of the Scottish Kirk (in which Reid was a minister) and in political debates such as the abolition of slavery, as well as in multiple literary and philosophical societies. The second context – the context to which Broadie devotes most of his attention – is Reid's intellectual context. Broadie singles out for special attention the marked influence that Reid's teacher at Marischal College, George Turnbull, had on Reid, and the importance of Reid's mature work in logic. The third and final context is the familial one, a context, Broadie suggests, that is perhaps the narrowest, but was nonetheless the most important to Reid.

Paul Wood's contribution, "Thomas Reid and the Culture of Science," attempts to correct the common misperception that Reid's mathematical and scientific endeavors were peripheral to the primary intellectual focus of his career, namely, his reply to Humean skepticism and analysis of the faculties of the human mind. From an early age to the end of his life, Wood argues, Reid was entrenched in debates regarding mathematics, chemistry, astronomy, physics, optics, and biology. Reid's expertise in these areas of science, Wood further contends, had a profound impact on his philosophical work in epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. For example, Reid's attack on the way of ideas owes a deep debt to his work in optics, his account of general conception and natural kinds is plausibly viewed as a direct response to Buffon's *Histoire naturelle*, and his Newtonianism pervades his work on causality and ethics. To which Wood adds that the order of influence did not proceed in one direction: While Reid's expertise in science deeply influenced his philosophical work, his scientific work is also best viewed as set within the context of, and often motivated by, his epistemological, metaphysical, and moral concerns.

Reid is best known as the father of Scottish common sense philosophy. Nevertheless, Reid's doctrine of common sense has proved to be one of the most controversial and elusive features of his thought. Nicholas Wolterstorff contends in his essay, "Reid on Common Sense," that much of the confusion concerning Reid's doctrine of common sense stems from an ambiguity in Reid's own characterization of the view. The ambiguity is that between, the principles of common sense, on the one hand, as the first principles of reasoning and, on the other, as things that we all do and must take for granted in our ordinary activity and practices. These are, Wolterstorff argues, two importantly different ways of understanding the principles of common sense that Reid himself never managed to distinguish sharply. In an engagement with Reid's own texts as well
as recent work on the topic of first principles, Wolterstorff suggests that the latter way of understanding the principles of common sense makes the best sense of Reid’s position and that, thus understood, Reid’s doctrine of common sense is of considerable importance and originality.

In both the Inquiry and Essays on the Intellectual Powers, Reid devotes a great deal of attention to the topic of perception. While it is fairly clear why Reid thinks that the mental representationalist views of his predecessors and contemporaries are flawed, there is a live controversy as to the nature of Reid’s own views concerning perception. Most are agreed that Reid is a direct realist of some sort about perception. But the character of Reid’s realism is unclear. In “Reid’s Theory of Perception,” James Van Cleve canvasses some of the reasons that Reid rejected rival views of perception, considers recent interpretations of Reid’s view on perception, and distinguishes between three types of direct realism – what he terms “epistemological direct realism,” “perceptual direct realism,” and “presentational direct realism.” Van Cleve argues that Reid is a direct realist in each sense. The claim that Reid is a presentational direct realist about perception (roughly, that he embraced the view that we have acquaintance with external objects in perception) is a controversial one. Against philosophers such as William Alston and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Van Cleve contends that this is the most compelling interpretation of Reid’s view.

In various places, Reid appears to claim that sufficient for replying to the skeptical arguments of Berkeley, Hume, and others is rejecting the theory of ideas that plays such a crucial role in these arguments. In “Reid’s Reply to the Skeptic,” John Greco argues that, Reid’s official claim to the contrary, Reid’s rejection of the way of ideas is only one component of his reply to the skeptic. There are, in addition to this rejection, three other important ingredients in Reid’s reply. First among these is Reid’s own positive theory of perception, according to which the beliefs formed in perception are noninferential. Second is Reid’s theory of evidence, which Greco describes as a moderate and broad version of epistemological foundationalism. Third, and final, is a methodological thesis that tells us that we ought to begin our theorizing by trusting all of our cognitive faculties until we have reason to believe otherwise. According to Greco, these four components of Reid’s reply jointly constitute a powerful and perhaps decisive response to the skeptic.

While Reid rarely missed the opportunity to polemicize against Hume, Hume himself wrote very little about Reid’s work. What he did write, however, indicates that he thought that Reid had resurrected the doctrine of innate ideas. In his essay, “Nativism and the Nature of Thought in Reid’s Account of Our Knowledge of the External World,” Lorne Falkenstein addresses the questions of in what sense Reid was a nativist who believed in innate thoughts, and what kind of philosophical work Reid’s nativism does in his account of our knowledge of the external world. Falkenstein distinguishes several different ways in which a thought can be innate and contends that Reid’s nativism should be distinguished from the kind that Locke attacked and Kant defended: it is at once more empiricist than Kant’s position and more rationalist than Locke’s or Hume’s empiricist views. In its broadest outlines, Reid’s moderate nativism is one according to which we are innately constituted directly to perceive objects as they are, provided that our sensory organs are stimulated in certain ways. According to Falkenstein, Reid’s nativism, along with his work in non-Euclidean geometry and the theory of vision, plays a crucial role in Reid’s rejection of Berkeleyan idealism and Humean skepticism – a rejection that is an important alternative to Kant’s own response to these views.

René van Woudenberg’s piece, “Reid on Memory and the Identity of Persons,” explores Reid’s views concerning the topics of memory and the identity of persons through time, and the way in which Reid saw these two subjects as being connected. In contrast to Locke and Hume, Reid denies that the objects of memory are ideas, claiming instead that they are actual events and states of affairs. When all goes well – or so Reid argues – the remembrance of these objects elicits true memory beliefs. Reid also rejected two influential views concerning personal identity through time, namely, the Lockean claim that a person’s identity through time is constituted by that person’s memory of past actions and events, and the Humean view that persons are simply bundles of impressions and ideas. In response to Locke, Reid says that memory plays the merely evidential role of furnishing evidence that an agent is the self-same person who did or experienced something at a previous time. In response to Hume, Reid
claims that common sense dictates that persons are metaphysical simples and thus have perfect identity through time. Van Woudenberg examines Reid's rationale for making these claims and contends that it consists in Reid's commitment to certain principles of common sense, traditional theism, and the best science of his day.

The central topic of C. A. J. Coady's essay, "Reid and the Social Operations of Mind," is the philosophical import of the distinction that Reid makes between the "social" and "solitary" operations of mind. Initially put, the distinction is between those operations of the mind that require reference to other intelligent beings and those that do not. Reid's contention is that philosophers such as Hume have all but ignored the social operations of mind, and have thereby been forced to conclude that the obligations generated by promising and justice are the "creation of artifice." According to the essay, Reid's account of the social operations of mind, Coady argues, allows Reid to develop an account of speech acts such as promising, entreating, and commanding according to which these acts are (in a sense Coady explains) natural phenomena. As such, the obligations that the performance of these speech acts generates are not grounded in convention. Thus understood, Coady suggests, Reid's views anticipate important aspects of contemporary speech act theory as well as theories of wide content in the philosophy of mind. The essay closes by considering the centrality of testimony to Reid's thought, and some of the puzzles of what Reid says on this issue.

Reid's Essays on the Active Powers of Man is dedicated to the topic of human freedom, and his work on this topic is widely regarded as one of his most enduring contributions to philosophy. In "Thomas Reid's Theory of Freedom and Responsibility," William Rowe offers an interpretation of Reid's agent causation account of human freedom and defends it against various objections. According to Rowe, it is Reid's position that an agent is free with respect to some action if she had the power to will that action or not to will that action. Contrary to what some philosophers have claimed, it is not Reid's view that in order for an agent to act freely she must have had the power to will the opposite of what she willed, or that she must have had the power to do otherwise, had she so willed otherwise. Rowe then canvases six objections to Reid's view – objections that claim that Reid's position entails an infinite regress of volitions, that it is subject to so-called Frankfurt-style counterexamples, that it is insufficiently robust to ground moral responsibility, and so forth. The upshot of Rowe's discussion is that, while not immune to doubt, Reid's position is sufficiently rich in resources to reply adequately to all of these objections.

Although Reid's views on freedom have attracted a fair amount of attention from philosophers, other features of his moral philosophy have been relatively neglected. Terence Cuneo's contribution to this volume, "Reid's Moral Philosophy," examines Reid's realist position in ethics. Cuneo argues that Reid raised important challenges to the moral antirealist positions of his day and that, contrary to some who portray Reid's view as unrelentingly rationalist in character, his realist position in ethics is best viewed as a synthesis of various rationalist and sentimentalist strains of thought. Reid's moral ontology and account of moral thought and discourse is broadly rationalist in character: While rejecting the rationalist claim that moral facts consist in relations of "fittingness," Reid contends that there are moral facts that exist independent of convention or of our responding to nonmoral reality, and that a central function of moral discourse is to assert propositions that correspond to these facts. Reid's account of moral motivation and moral epistemology, however, owes a more obvious debt to the sentimentals: We are ordinarily motivated to act morally, but by a multitude of different "principles," and not simply by reason. Moreover, we grasp moral reality by a "moral sense" – although Reid insists that a "sense" is a power of judgment, and not just a capacity to feel certain ways.

That Reid was one among only a few eighteenth-century philosophers who had a philosophy of art is the central claim of Peter Kivy's essay "Reid's Philosophy of Art." Reid, argues Kivy, was far ahead of his time inasmuch as he came very close to espousing an "expression theory" of the fine arts such as was later developed more fully by thinkers such as Collingwood and Dewey. Kivy lays down three criteria for what counts as a philosophy of art. First, it must have a firmly established concept of the fine arts; second, it must have an adequate analysis of what "art-relevant" features each of the major fine arts possesses; third, it must have a definition of art or an argument to the effect that such a definition is impossible. Kivy contends that Reid's theory satisfies all three criteria. Reid possessed a concept of the fine arts and included among them disciplines such as the visual arts, literature, landscape gardening, and,
uncharacteristically for his day, instrumental music. He further claimed that the beauty of music, literature, and the visual arts consists, ultimately, in the expression of the artist’s sublime or beautiful states of mind. In claiming this, Kivy suggests that Reid provides an account of the art-relevant features of (what we would call) the major fine arts, an account according to which the most important art-relevant features are their expressive properties—properties such as anger and sadness. Finally, and most controversially, Kivy maintains that by offering this account of the art-relevant features, Reid thereby offers us an expression theory of art: What makes it the case that something is a work of art, in Reid’s view, is that it is appropriately expressive in character.

Those familiar with recent work in analytic philosophy of religion know that Reid’s thought has played an important role in the formulation and defense of what is sometimes called “Reformed Epistemology.” In an essay that draws mostly on unpublished lectures, Dale Tuggy investigates Reid’s philosophy of religion. Describing Reid as perhaps the last great Newtonian theist, Tuggy explores four features of Reid’s philosophy of religion: his natural theology, his epistemology of religious belief, his account of the attributes of God, and his response to the problem of evil. Among other things, Tuggy argues that Reid develops an interesting version of the teleological argument, that his own epistemology of religion does not fit neatly with what some Reformed epistemologists have claimed, and that his treatment of the problem of evil exhibits an interesting blend of a keen sense of the limits of reason with a resolute nonfideism.

Reid, Tuggy claims, may not have developed a full-blown philosophy of religion. But what Reid does say on this issue is a welcome perspective.

An unfortunate lacuna in Reid scholarship is that there is no general study of the influence of Reid or the commonsense school in the United States and Europe. Benjamin W. Redekop’s essay, “Reid’s Influence in Britain, Germany, France, and America,” is an effort to remedy this situation. In a historical survey of figures ranging from Dugald Stewart and Victor Cousin to C. S. Peirce, Redekop argues that the influence of Reid’s thought in Britain, France, and America was, from the time of the publication of the Inquiry to the late nineteenth century, nothing short of enormous. Redekop contends that the popularity of Reid’s work in the United States, Britain, and France can mostly be attributed to the fact that it promised to furnish a scientifically respectable position friendly to theism and resistant to the skeptical “acids of modernity.” He further argues that the more tepid response to Reid in the Germanies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a function of the overtly rationalist tenor of German thought and the lack of a social “commons.”

V

This book has been from its conception a collaborative project. As Reid himself notes, collaborative efforts generate obligations and responsibilities of various sorts. Indeed, Reid says that among the first principles of morals is the following:

No man is born for himself only. Every man, therefore, ought to consider himself as a member of the common society of mankind, and of those subordinate societies to which he belongs, such as family, friends, neighbourhood, country, and to do as much good as he can, and as little hurt to the societies of which he is a part. (EAP V: 638a-b)

As editors of this volume, we gratefully acknowledge that among the subordinate societies of which we are members is that of Reid scholars. In many ways, this book is the product of this society, and we offer our thanks for the advice and direction provided by those who have labored in the Reid vineyards far longer than we—especially Alexander Broadie, Knud Haakonsen, J-C. Smith, James Van Cleve, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Paul Wood. (Wood was kind enough to provide references to The Correspondence of Thomas Reid prior to its publication and Broadie and Wood gracious enough to provide a dateline of important events in Reid’s life and context.) We should also like to thank a group of younger Reid scholars for their help, in particular, Rebecca Copenhafer, James Harris, and Gideon Yaffe. Finally, we express our gratitude to the National Endowment of the Humanities, The Reid Society, The Reid Project at the University of Aberdeen, the Vrije Universiteit, The Netherlands, and Seattle Pacific University for the various kinds of support they provided. Our hope is that this book will do as much good as possible, and as little hurt to the society of Reid scholars and the wider philosophical community as a whole.
1. Central elements of the story can be discerned in the introduction to Copleston 1985, Vol. IV.

2. In his earliest book, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, Reid does comment on the “low state” of mental philosophy, but immediately adds that “however lame and imperfect the system [of the philosophers] may be, they have opened the way to future discoveries … and put us in the right road…” (IHM Introduction iii: 16, 18).

3. What Reid says about philosophy has its counterpart in what Immanuel Kant writes about “metaphysics” in the preface to the Critique of Pure Reason:

   “There was a time when metaphysics was called the queen of all the sciences, and if the will be taken for the deed, it deserved this title of honor, on account of the preeminent importance of its object. Now, in accordance with the fashion of the age, the queen proves despised on all sides, and the matron, outcast and forsaken, mourns like Hecuba: Modo maxima rerum, tot genertis natisque potens, – nunc tibor exul, inops…. [Greatest of all by race and birth, I now am cast out, powerless] (Ovid, Metamorphoses 13: 5018–10)

   [Metaphysics… is rather a battlefield, and indeed one that appears to be especially determined for testing one’s powers in mock combat; on this battlefield no combatant has ever gained the least bit of ground, nor has any been able to base any lasting possession on his victory. Hence there is no doubt that up to now the procedure of metaphysics has been a mere groping. (Kant 1998: 99, 109)

4. That is, the capacity of “discerning and relishing the beauties of Nature, and whatever is excellent in the fine arts” (EIP VIII: 573).

5. That Reid viewed skepticism as having great heuristic value is made clear in his abstract of the Inquiry sent to Hugh Blair on July 4, 1762: “Ever since the treatise of human Nature was published I respected Mr Hume as the greatest Metaphysician of the Age, and have learned more from his writings and manners of that kind than from all others put together” (“The Hume-Reid Exchange” in IHM: 257).

6. This is to echo Knud Haakonsen’s comments in his introduction to Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man [EIP Editor’s Introduction: xiii]. For Reid’s own comments on the value of the history of philosophy, see EIP I: 57. Reid’s interpretation of the way of ideas, it should be noted, has been challenged. See, for example, Yolton 1984.

7. The extent of Reid’s involvement and expertise in the natural sciences has been a main theme of Paul Wood’s work on Reid. See, for example, his contribution to this volume, his introduction to PRLS, and Wood 1984.

8. See EIP Liii: 53. Section III will ask in what respects Reid thinks that the methodology is limited.

9. See, especially, EIP VI.viii: 534–6, in which Reid identifies as one of the idola tribus “the misapplication of our noblest intellectual power to purposes for which it is incompetent.”

10. For more on the matter, see the essay by Wolterstorff in this volume. See also Wolterstorff 2001, Chap. IX, in which Wolterstorff highlights the similarities between Reidian common sense and what Wittgenstein calls our “shared world picture” in On Certainty.

11. See, also, EIP VI.vii: 525.

12. This is to indulge in a bit of anachronism: Descartes, Locke, Hume, and many other moderns did not view knowledge as a species of belief. (Interestingly, Reid is an outlier on this issue; see EIP VI.i: 411.) Nevertheless, Descartes and company can be said to be foundationalists of a sort with respect to knowledge, where knowledge is understood to be a nondonexastic direct awareness of reality.

13. See, also, IIM VII: 210–11. “First principles,” as Reid uses the term, can be used to pick out propositions or states of believing. The present interpretation assumes that Reid is using it to pick out the latter phenomenon here.

14. As Alston 1985 notes, Reid’s first principles appear to be principles of “veracity” or reliability. Elsewhere, however, Reid clearly has something more akin to entitlement or epistemic permissibility in mind. See, for example, Reid’s discussion of Hume in EIP VII.iv: 568.

15. The term, as well as this characterization of the view, is borrowed from Wolterstorff 2001, Chap. VIII.

16. See Broadie 2000a: 61ff for more on this theme. Incidentally, Reid is adamant that Hume is a Cartesian of sorts, albeit of the skeptical variety. Hume, says Reid, “yields the antecedent of DES CARTES’s enthymeme cogito, but denies the conclusion ergo sum, the mind being, according to him, nothing but that train of impressions and ideas of which we are conscious” (EIP VI.vii: 517–18).


18. See PRLS: 179–80 for a crisp statement of the argument, as well as Greco’s essay in this volume.

19. Assuming, that is, that Hume is not a phenomenalist or an idealist.

20. It should be noted, however, that this thesis concerning resemblance is not representative of all those thinkers whom Reid lumped under the Cartesian system. Descartes and Locke, for example, held more qualified versions of the view.

21. E.g., IIM V.ii: 56 and VI.xxi: 176.
22. See Greco's essay in this volume and de Bary 2001.
23. As Dale Tuggy points out in his essay in this volume, Reid worked with a concept of certainty more liberal than that of his contemporaries and predecessors. Says Reid, "many things are certain for which we have only the kind of evidence which Philosophers call probable" (EIP VII.iii: 562).
24. See Van Cleve 1999. Van Cleve maintains that only on such a "particularist" reading can Reid's foundationalism be viewed as being "wide" in character.
25. Although Reid is commonly interpreted as being a direct realist about perception (see, e.g., Copenhaver 2000), there is a lively controversy about the sense in which this is true. The issue is addressed in Van Cleve's essay in this volume.
27. This is brought out in Paul Wood's introduction to PRLS: 22-5.
28. See IHM VI in particular. For more on this subject, see the essay by Falkenstein in this volume and Daniels 1989.
29. See Falkenstein 2000b as well as his contribution to this volume.
30. See Reid's discussion "Of the Difficulty of attending to the Operations of our own Minds" [EIP I.vi].
31. Says Reid concerning the operations of the mind: "The habit of attending to them is necessary to make them distinct and steady; and this habit requires an exertion of mind to which many of our animal principles are unfriendly. The love of truth calls for it, but its still voice is often drowned by the louder call of some passion, or we are hindered from listening to it by laziness and desultoriness. Thus, men often remain through life ignorant of things which they needed but to open their eyes to see, and which they would have seen if their attention had been turned to them" [EAP V.ii: 641a].
33. See MacIntyre 1966: 177, for example. In fairness to MacIntyre, Reid is given a much more sympathetic treatment in MacIntyre 1988.
34. See EIP II.xxii: 246.
35. See also EAP IV.iii and OP: 6, in which Reid speculates that our propensity to attribute causal powers to things has its roots in the animism of our ancestors. Reid says of the way our causal language has evolved: "By such changes, in the meaning of words, the language of every civilized nation resembles old furniture new-modeled, in which many things are put to uses for which they were not originally intended, and for which they are not perfectly fitted" [EAP IV.iii: 606a].
36. Tuggy 2000 provides an extensive discussion of Reid's views on causality.
37. J. B. Schneewind points out that Reid and Kant shared a further conviction about the character of morality: Both thinkers believed that morality is best thought of in terms of self-governance. In this respect, Schneewind contends, Reid and Kant stood out from among all their eighteenth-century cohorts. See Schneewind 1998: 6.
38. See, e.g., EIP III.v: 267.
40. For a detailed examination of Kant's views on this issue, see Friedman 1992.
41. This is to interpret Kant as a "two-world" theorist. Those who wish to interpret Kant as a "dual standpoint" theorist can translate what is said here and what follows accordingly.
42. It is important to note that, in contrast to contemporary philosophical usage, Reid uses "efficient" power as a synonym for "active" or "agent" power.
43. Reid's views concerning relative conceptions appear to have undergone revision from the time he wrote Essays on the Intellectual Powers to the time he wrote Essays on the Active Powers. In the former work, Reid writes [in a more Berkeleyan vein] that "a relative notion . . . must be obscure, because it gives us no conception of what the things is, but of what relation it bears to something else" [EIP II.xvii: 202]. In the Active Powers, by contrast, Reid says: "From these instances, it appears that our relative conceptions of things are not always less distinct, nor less fit materials for accurate reasoning, than those that are direct; and that the contrary may happen in a remarkable degree" [EAP I: 514a]. One wonders whether having seen the work that a relative conception must do in his scheme, Reid was forced to revise his views on this issue.
   Interestingly, both Edward Craig and Galen Strawson, who interpret Hume as a realist about causal connections, have claimed that Hume himself appeals to the idea of a relative notion in his discussion of causal connections. (See Craig 1987: 124 and Strawson 1989: Chap. 12.) For a reply that Hume did not do so, see Blackburn 1993.
44. See EIP VI.v: 479-80 for a more extensive discussion of this issue.
45. Reid thought of things that have "real" existence as being individuals in space/time. See EIP IV.ii: 323. For discussion of this issue, see Yaffe forthcoming, Chaps. 5 and 6.
46. See also PRLS: 183, 185, 221.
47. See Blackburn 1993: 99--100.
48. The implicit assumption here is that the laws of nature are not under our control.
49. Reid writes in his lecture notes on Natural Law and Natural Rights: "Physical laws apply not only to irrational natures, but also to rational
ones. Examples in our bodies and, in the mind, the association of ideas and passions; instincts; appetites" [PE: 189]. Moreover, what Reid says in this passage should not be seen as being incompatible with the claim that there are laws describing human behavior of the sort that historians and social scientists traffic in.

30. For more on Reid’s agent causation view of freedom, see the essay by Rowe in this volume.


32. Reid wrote and lectured on topics ranging from art, botany, epistemology, ethics, geometry, law, logic, metaphysics, natural theology, philosophy of mind, and politics to zoology. The eclectic nature of Reid’s interests is understandable in light of the fact that, as a regent for thirteen years at Kings College, Aberdeen, and later as the Chair of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow, Reid was required to teach, what is by today’s standards, a staggeringly wide range of subjects. But it should also be added that Reid was an inherently curious man, concerned with the latest work in philosophy and science until his death at the age of eighty-four.

33. See the Hume-Reid correspondence in IHM: 256.

34. THN: 517.


36. Redekop’s essay is a portion of a larger work in progress on this topic.

37. Seattle Pacific University, in particular, provided a Faculty Research Grant in the fall of 2002 that supported work on this project during its latter stages.

38. We thank Alexander Broadie, Lorne Falkenstein, James Harris, Steve Layman, Luke Reinsma, Paul Wood, and Nicholas Wolterstorff for their comments on previous drafts of this introduction.

I. REID’S MANY CONTEXTS

In this chapter Thomas Reid (1710–1796) will be placed in context, with the aim of providing a perspective from which his thoughts can be better understood. Attention will therefore be focused primarily on the swirl of ideas, philosophical, theological, and scientific, to which he was exposed.

Intimately related to that swirl of ideas is the part played throughout Reid’s life by the Kirk, Scotland’s national church. His father, Lewis Reid (1676–1762), was a minister of the Kirk. Reid himself studied its theology at Marischal College, Aberdeen (1726–31), acted as a clerk of presbytery in the parish of Kincardine O’Neil (1732–33), and was parish minister (1737–51) in the parish of New Machar in Kincardineshire. Also, on several occasions he represented his university, first King’s College, Aberdeen, and then Glasgow University, at the annual meeting of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, the Kirk’s parliament. Late in life he was also a founding member of the Glasgow Society of the Sons of Ministers of the Church of Scotland. Reid’s views on religion and on the place of the Kirk in society were fully consistent with those of the Moderate party in the Kirk. And what may be termed his “religious demeanor” was likewise on the side of moderation, as is indicated by his description of the people of Glasgow who have a “gloomy, Ent<he>usiasatical Cast” [C: 38], and are “fanatical in their Religion,” though he continues in mitigation of their demeanor: “The Clergy encourage this fanaticism too much and find it the only way to popularity. I often hear a Gospel here which you know nothing about, for you neither hear it from the pulpit nor will you find it in the Bible” [C: 40].