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Violence in Guatemala

Posted in Central American Gangs, Guatemala with tags , , , on May 10, 2019 by dsmith41

Emma Lightizer

In the last half of the twentieth century, Guatemala was defined by its 36-year-long civil war and the genocide it committed against indigenous Maya in the 1980s (Martin). Today, violence against women and indigenous people, drug trafficking, gang activity, and weak or corrupt state and local authorities present persistent risks to people’s personal security.

            Drug-trafficking organizations and Central American gangs are not the same thing, but both do exist in Guatemala. Gangs like the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 cause many of the same violent problems in Guatemala as they do in other Central American countries: territory disputes, rape, murder, extortion, and robbery. However, drug-trafficking organizations have a special interest in Guatemala because the country’s position just south of Mexico’s border makes it a crucial pathway for the transit of drugs into the United States (Martínez 46). Traditionally, drug-trafficking work was outsourced to local gang cliques or independent drug traffickers in the country. In recent years, though, Mexican drug-trafficking organizations have built a stronger and more constant physical presence in Guatemala, claiming several towns and cities as their territories (Martínez 163). The introduction of the Zetas, an especially violent Mexican drug-trafficking organization, has greatly reduced citizens’ security in the city of Alta Verapaz as well as the other areas where they operate (Martínez 50).

            Drug-related violence also extends to state and local authorities. For example, in 2013, every police officer present in an entire station was killed in retaliation for the arrest of a drug trafficker’s son (Martínez 145). The “Massacre of Salcajá,” as the event was called, initiated the launch of an investigation, openly called “Operation Dignity,” but it was ineffective in ending the control that narcotraffickers had over the region (Martínez 153). Police and other authorities in Guatemala are often too weak to do much to control drug traffickers, and impunity runs wild as a result.

Instead of getting tangled up with strong organizations, Guatemalan authorities often target weaker, individual drug-traffickers or poor “campesino” farmers they accuse of growing drugs and invading protected forest land (Martínez 64). This gives authorities the advantage of looking like they’re dealing with the problem while simultaneously not risking a firefight with large-scale organizations (Martínez 66). In some localities, this is also the result of corrupt politicians who explicitly work with larger drug-trafficking organizations to secure a monopoly on the trade in their area (Martínez 70). This has meant that many poor and indigenous farmers have been accused of working with drug traffickers and have been kicked off their land and deprived of their livelihoods (Martínez 73).

In addition to these types of violence that affect all Guatemalans, there are particular dangers for women and indigenous people. Guatemala is the country with the third highest rate of femicide globally, and women are also very likely to be victims of rape and domestic violence (Johnson). The impunity that exists for other crimes in Guatemala extends to violence against women, but is perhaps even more intense due to a widespread indifference to the human rights of women. This means that women generally do not receive protection from the state, while they are simultaneously at a higher risk of becoming victims of violence (Johnson). In some cases, local authorities are even complicit or feign ignorance to allow sex trafficking rings to maintain operation. For example, the Barberena ring in southern Guatemala operated for several years while local police officers enjoyed the status of “VIP clients” and took part in the rape and sexual assault of the women held there (Martínez 219).

Indigenous people, and especially Maya, are common targets of kidnapping, assault, and murder (Martin). They are also frequently among those campesinos who are kicked off their land and accused of being narcos. Recent up-ticks in violence against indigenous people, and especially against indigenous activists, have brought about concerns of a return to the cycle of violence that initiated the genocide of Maya people in the 1980s (Martin).

Bibliography:

Johnson, Sarah. “Can Health Workers Stop Thousands of Women Being Killed in Guatemala?” The Guardian. March 07, 2018. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/healthcare-network/2018/mar/07/health-workers-stop-thousand-women-killed-guatemala-femicide.

Martin, Maria. “Killings Of Guatemala’s Indigenous Activists Raise Specter Of Human Rights Crisis.” NPR. January 22, 2019. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/01/22/685505116/killings-of-guatemalas-indigenous-activists-raise-specter-of-human-rights-crisis.

Martínez, Óscar Enrique. A History of Violence: Living and Dying in Central America. London: Verso, 2017.

Further Reading:

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/guatemalas-bloody-battle-with-mexican-drug-cartels-6257571.html

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guatemala-humantrafficking/guatemala-closes-its-eyes-to-rampant-child-sex-trafficking-u-n-idUSKCN0YU29V

https://www.npr.org/2019/01/22/685505116/killings-of-guatemalas-indigenous-activists-raise-specter-of-human-rights-crisis

https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/guatemalas-small-businesses-pot-of-gold/

Violence in El Salvador

Posted in Central American Gangs, El Salvador with tags , on May 10, 2019 by dsmith41

Emma Lightizer

El Salvador has been gripped by violence since its twelve-year civil war that ended in 1992. At the time, thousands of Salvadorans sought asylum in the United States, and some of them ended up forming gangs for mutual protection in Los Angeles. When the United States initiated its policy of deporting foreign nationals found guilty of committing a crime in the United States, gangs like the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 were exported to El Salvador and grew to unprecedented levels of membership and violence. Decades after that initial increase in gang activity, what does violence in El Salvador look like?

            Most violence comes in the form of extortion, rape, and murders (especially of people aligned with rival gangs). Extortion is the main source of income for many cliques (Wolf 78). Gang members feel entitled to demand “rent” from local businesses: regular payments from bus drivers, local shops, restaurants, students, and teachers (Savenije 153). These payments are accompanied with threats of physical violence, robbery, or murder, and if anyone is unable to pay, they are forced out of business or killed (Wolf 78). An inability or unwillingness to pay gangs extortion money leads to hundreds of retaliatory murders and dozens of arson cases, among other violent consequences (Wolf 78). Gang members have no remorse for this method of getting money because “nobody gives us [gang members] work,” (Savenije 153).

Rape of women and children is also common in El Salvador. Gang members often demand sex and use their power over certain territories to force women and girls to comply (UNHCR 9). They sometimes use rape as a bargaining tool, promising not to use other forms of violence if girls are compliant: for example, gang members told one eight-year-old girl that they wouldn’t kill her little brother if she let them rape her, then they killed both children anyway (Martínez 118).

In El Salvador, many types of murders are common; these include retaliatory killings in cases of extortion or refusal to join a gang, the murder of women or girls who refuse to sleep with gang members, and sicariato (murder for hire) (Wolf 85). It is also common for gang members to kidnap and murder wealthier individuals as an additional source of income; they use their credit cards, steal their belongings, or post a ransom for them under the false premise that they are not yet dead (Wolf 82). Murder is also common against ex-gang members who testify in court; for example, El Niño Hollywood was murdered in 2014 after he testified against nineteen fellow gang members for murder (Martínez 139). Although he was supposedly under witness protection by the state, and although his murder occurred within mere meters of the police station, “there was never any search for or investigation of the killers” (Martínez 139). El Niño’s case was not unusual: most murders in El Salvador go uninvestigated, and even when investigations into murders or mass graves do occur, they are often underfunded and therefore unsuccessful.

A large portion of the murders that occur are directed against rival gang members (Wolf 85). Disputes over territory lead to shoot-outs, and murders of rival gang members are sometimes required as initiation rites (Wolf 72). Additionally, gangs sometimes kill “homeboys that couldn’t handle their shit”: that is, they kill fellow gang members who endanger other members through recklessness or who cannot deal with the harshness of gang life (Martínez 99). Even within overfilled jails, rivalries are not controlled and sometimes lead to massacres (Martínez 176). In cases like the Mariona massacre of 2004 or the Apanteos massacre in 2011, rivalries between MS-13, Barrio 18, and civilian prisoners erupt and inmates break down the walls in order to “pull out nails,” or collect payment for debts and exact revenge for past wrongs (Martínez 174). Guards are unable to stop these massacres from happening and often don’t even try to. For example, the warden of Apanteos said of the 2011 massacre that “[w]e can’t be held responsible for what we can’t avoid” (Martínez 169). The lack of resources both inside and outside of jails means that impunity is widespread for crimes committed by Salvadoran gangs.

Bibliography:

“Children on the Run – Full Report.” UNHCR, 2014, www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/ background/56fc266f4/children-on-the-run-full-report.html.

Martínez, Óscar Enrique. A History of Violence: Living and Dying in Central America. London: Verso, 2017.

Savenije, Wim. Maras Y Barras: Pandillas Y Violencia Juvenil En Los Barrios Marginales De Centroamérica. El Salvador: Facultad Latinoamericana De Ciencias Sociales, 2009

Wolf, Sonja. “Mara Salvatrucha: The Most Dangerous Street Gang in the Americas?”. Latin American Politics and Society 54, no. 1 (2012): 65-99. (JSTOR)

Further Reading:

https://www.thenation.com/article/diary-of-not-excavating-a-mass-grave-in-el-salvador/

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/el-salvador-women-gangs-ms-13-trump-violence/554804/

https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/el-salvador/life-under-gang-rule-el-salvador

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-el-salvador-extortion-idUSKCN0Y71QW

Nicaragua – Recent History

Posted in Nicaragua with tags , , , on May 10, 2019 by dsmith41

Emma Lightizer

From 1937 until 1979, Nicaragua was politically and militarily controlled by a U.S.-supported dictatorship led by three members of the Somoza family in turn: Anastasio Somoza García, Luis Somoza Debayle, and Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Although they were not formally the only heads of state during that time, the three of them combined held the Presidency for thirty years and worked through puppet leaders during the other thirteen years of their collective control (Brown).

            The dictatorship became more repressive under the leadership of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. In 1967, his regime carried out a massacre in front of the National Assembly building (Arévalo Alemán). It is estimated that at least 200 people were killed and one thousand wounded out of the thousands who were there peacefully protesting the lack of free elections (Arévalo Alemán). In response to attempts by Sandinista (FSLN) revolutionaries to overthrow the dictatorship, Somoza Debayle ruled under martial law from 1974 onward (Encyclopaedia Britannica). Finally, U.S. President Carter withdrew support for the regime, and in 1979 Somoza Debayle was forced by the Sandinistas and the Conservative party to resign from his position; he was later assassinated in Paraguay (Encyclopaedia Britannica).

            When Somoza lost power, the Sandinistas gained control of the country and Daniel Ortega assumed the presidency. He nationalized many businesses and tried to maintain control over the country through the use of force, and despite Carter’s attempts to court favor, Nicaragua was soon aligned with Cuba and the USSR (Brown). When Reagan became president in the U.S., he stopped the policy of trying to appease the Sandinista government and instead helped fund and train Nicaraguan “Contras,” counter-revolutionaries based in neighboring Honduras that wanted to oust the Sandinista party from power (Brown). As interventionary tactics had lost favor with the general populace in the wake of the Vietnam War, the CIA turned to covert and illegal operations, funneling weapons and aid to the Contras through Iran in what became known as the Iran-Contra Scandal (Brown). Although the operation drew massive protest from the U.S. when it came to light, it was successful in aiding the counter-revolutionary cause, such that by 1989 the Sandinistas had all but lost to the Contras. In 1990, Ortega was beaten in an internationally-observed election, and the Sandinistas officially lost power (Encyclopedia.com).

            From 1990 to 2007, Nicaragua had an uneasy democracy that contended with the huge national debt, the downsizing and conversion of the Sandinista military into a national military, and high unemployment (Encyclopedia.com). On top of this, Nicaragua had to confront the historical legacy of the revolution and counterrevolution, which cost a combined estimate of 65,000 lives between 1978 and 1990 (Lacina, 404-6).

            In 2007, Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista party returned to power through an election (Pérez). Since then, Ortega has worked to solidify Sandinista control over all branches of government by appointing members of his own party to several judicial and legislative positions  (Pérez). He has maintained his position through questionable elections, and many criticize him for undermining Nicaragua’s developing democracy. In 2018, popular protests erupted in response to social security reforms that cost people more while giving them worse benefits (Pérez). Ortega’s government responded violently, working with parapolice forces to kill over 200 protesters (Pérez). In the wake of Ortega’s violent tactics of political control, some people have begun comparing him to Somoza, with bad implications for the future of Nicaraguan democracy.

Bibliography:

“Anastasio Somoza Debayle.” Encyclopædia Britannica. April 21, 2019. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Anastasio-Somoza-Debayle.

Arévalo Alemán, Raúl. “Hoy Se Recuerda La Masacre Del 22 De Enero De 1967 Por La Dictadura De Somoza Debayle.” La Jornada. January 22, 2016. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://lajornadanet.com/diario/archivo/2016/enero/22/4.php.

Lacina, Bethany. PRIO. September 2009. Accessed May 9, 2019. https://www.prio.org/Global/upload/CSCW/Data/PRIObd3.0_documentation.pdf.

“Nicaragua and Iran Timeline.” Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs. Accessed May 9, 2019. https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/timeline-n-i.php.

Pérez, Orlando J. “Can Nicaragua’s Military Prevent a Civil War?” Foreign Policy. July 03, 2018. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/03/can-nicaraguas-military-prevent-a-civil-war/.

“Violeta Barrios De Chamorro.” Encyclopedia of World Biography. 2019. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/nicaragua-history-biographies/violeta-barrios-de-chamorro.

Further Reading:

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/nicaragua-on-the-brink-once-again https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/03/can-nicaraguas-military-prevent-a-civil-war/

https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/timeline-n-i.php

https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/nicaragua-history-biographies/violeta-barrios-de-chamorro

Mano Dura (Firm Hand) policies in Central America

Posted in Central American Gangs, El Salvador, Guatemala with tags , on May 10, 2019 by dsmith41

Emma Lightizer

Gangs have been an issue in El Salvador since before its twelve-year civil war ended in 1992. However, the problem became much more visible and violent after the United States initiated its policy of deporting any foreign nationals found guilty of committing a crime. Thousands of gang members from the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18, both founded in the U.S., were deported to their countries of origin, intensifying the violence and instability already present in Central America during the 1990s.

One set of policies that Central American countries have employed to try to gain control over the gang problem is known as “Mano Dura,” meaning “firm hand” or “iron fist.” In El Salvador, this policy was first put in place by President Francisco Flores in 2003 (Wolf 49). Mano Dura created joint military and police anti-gang squads who made a spectacle out of arrests, hoping to gain public support by looking tough on gangs. The policy also included the Ley Anti Maras, or Anti-Gang Law, which made gang membership itself a crime and allowed the squads to arrest people based on their appearance alone (Wolf 50). The law applied to anyone at least twelve years of age, meaning that many children were arrested for looking like gang members (Wolf 50). However, the Ley Anti Maras was challenged in court, and many judges refused to charge those arrested for alleged gang membership on the grounds that the Ley Anti Maras violated Salvadorans’ constitutional rights. Ninety-five percent of those arrested under the law were released without charges due to lack of evidence (Wolf 51).

There were several claims that Mano Dura wasn’t doing enough, so the policy was rebranded as “Súper Mano Dura” under the next president, Antonio Saca. This version of the law added “Mano Amiga” and “Mano Extendida,” purported policies of rehabilitation and prevention for gang members, but the two new policies were more talk than reality. They were chronically underfunded and poorly organized, and were only there to offer the president some credibility on paper of taking a more complex approach to the gang problem. Official policy continued to ignore the realms of prevention and rehabilitation, instead focusing on harsher punishments against gang members (Wolf 54).

Although Mano Dura is a Salvadoran policy, it has corollaries in other Central American countries. Honduras, for example, launched its “Blue Freedom Plan” the year before Flores’ Mano Dura in El Salvador. Honduras’ plan included several of the same measures as Mano Dura: zero tolerance, the cooperation of police and military forces against gangs, and the use of tattoos and other physical traits as markers of gang membership (García). In Guatemala, indiscriminate arrests of possible gang members were initiated in 2003 under “Plan Sweep.” Even though this and other anti-gang legislation was explicitly rejected by Guatemalan courts, officials continued to arrest suspected gang members under a zero tolerance policy; much like in El Salvador, most of these arrests were overturned due to a lack of evidence (García).

All of these policies have been wildly unsuccessful–and even counterproductive. Since gang members were being targeted based on appearance, they adapted and started being less obvious about their gang membership, hiding tattoos under clothing or foregoing them altogether (Wolf 72). More importantly, the abuses by police under the Mano Dura policies led gang members to be even more distrustful of authorities and therefore more loyal to their gangs and fellow members. The gangs became close-knit in a way that makes rehabilitation a much more formidable challenge than it was before (Wolf 72). Additionally, the few arrests that did successfully lead to imprisonments were counterproductive: now, gangs are run from within prisons by gang members who gained street credit through their arrests. Since the prisons are overcrowded and poorly run, clique leaders are able to work with their gangs and order hits from within the relative safety of the prison: after all, they cannot be arrested again while they are still in prison (Wolf 72). The legacy of Mano Dura-type policies has been one of increased violence, better organization of gangs, and failure of governments to successfully introduce any significant rehabilitation or prevention efforts against gangs.

Bibliography:

García, Carlos. “Tracing the History of Failed Gang Policies in US, Northern Triangle.” InSight Crime. September 20, 2017. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/tracing-the-history-of-failed-gang-policies-in-us-northern-triangle/.

Wolf, Sonja. Mano Dura: The Politics of Gang Control in El Salvador. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017.

Further Reading:

https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/tracing-the-history-of-failed-gang-policies-in-us-northern-triangle/

https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/how-mano-dura-is-strengthening-gangs/

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/06/el-salvador-gangs-police-violence-distrito-italia

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/24136/el-salvador-s-iron-fist-crackdown-on-gangs-a-lethal-policy-with-u-s-origins

Dangers on the Migrant Path

Posted in Migrant Experience with tags , , on May 10, 2019 by dsmith41

Emma Lightizer

Although many people have fled their countries to seek refuge in the United States in recent years, the decision to do so is a serious one that must take into account the dangers of migration itself. It’s important to know what kinds of risks migrants face on their way to the U.S. because it grants a crucial perspective on the severity of what they are fleeing from. Those who choose to leave feel safer taking the risks of migration than continuing to live in their home countries. What are the risks these migrants take–or in other words, what exactly is escape worth to them?

            Whether a migrant travels alone or with help from a professional “coyote” who specializes in smuggling migrants over the border, there are opportunities for abuse at nearly every stage of the undocumented migration process, in addition to the natural, physical dangers inherent in the journey (Shetty). Notable among the dangers are human trafficking, extortion, robbery, kidnap, murder, threats by federal governments or local police officers, and death by exposure in the desert (Shetty). Women and children are particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking, although the trip is a dangerous one no matter the identity of the migrant (Shetty).

            In strictly financial terms, migration is expensive. A reputable coyote will demand at least $7,000 USD per person for a trip to the United States starting from El Salvador; depending on the country of origin, this number may shift a bit (Martínez 248). This sum includes the coyote’s pay as well as bribe money for police, immigration officials, and the gangs and drug-trafficking organizations that control territory along the route (Martínez 249). Failure to pay any of those people the amount they demand can result in kidnap, physical assault, rape, human trafficking, or murder. Sometimes, police work with local criminal organizations; if migrants won’t pay bribe money, then police hand them over to human traffickers or gangs in exchange for a cut of the pay. In some cases, police “officers themselves [are] VIP clients” of sex trafficking rings, and will therefore return migrants who escape back to their abusers (Martínez 219). Since local authorities in many rural areas along the route are so easily corrupted, there is very rarely legal recourse for migrants who are abused by police or by criminal organizations.

A migrant who tries to make the trip without the help of a good coyote runs the risk of not knowing how much money they will need to pay off criminal organizations and cops, and it’s possible that they will run out of money before they are able to get all the way through Central America and Mexico. These people are especially likely to become victims of criminal organizations. People who try to use the help of a particularly cheap coyote are often also at risk: usually, cheap prices will mean that the coyote has either not taken into account the money demanded by criminal organizations on the way or that they do not plan on bringing the migrant to their destination (Martínez 250). In some cases, cheap “coyotes” will even bring migrants to criminal organizations and sell them rather than actually helping them (Martínez 252).

Even beyond all the abuses migrants face at the hands of other people, migration carries other risks that are inherent to the environment of the route itself. Most profoundly, the desert provides a host of dangers for the migrant. Because of extreme temperatures–hot in the day and cold at night–it is common for migrants to die from exposure while trying to cross the desert (Androff and Tavassoli 168). This is especially common for migrants who go alone or are separated from their coyote and get lost in the desert. Attempts by humanitarian groups in the U.S. to leave water in shelter areas for migrants who are crossing the desert have been met with hostility by governments in the region, and those who have left water have been criminally prosecuted for littering (Androff and Tavassoli 168). These prosecutions and related policies stem from generalized xenophobia and the refusal to see migrants as humans.

Bibliography:

Androff, David, and Kyoko Tavassoli. “Deaths in the Desert: The Human Rights Crisis on the U.S.–Mexico Border.” Social Work 57, no. 2 (April 1, 2012): 168.

Martínez, Óscar Enrique. A History of Violence: Living and Dying in Central America. London: Verso, 2017.

Shetty, Salil. “Most Dangerous Journey: What Central American Migrants Face When They Try to Cross the Border.” Amnesty International USA. February 20, 2014. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://www.amnestyusa.org/most-dangerous-journey-what-central-american-migrants-face-when-they-try-to-cross-the-border/.

Further Reading:

https://www.amnestyusa.org/most-dangerous-journey-what-central-american-migrants-face-when-they-try-to-cross-the-border/

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/migrant-caravans-might-become-even-more-common/573964/

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-centralamerica-youth-migrants/central-american-child-migrants-move-in-shadows-at-risk-from-traffickers-u-n-idUSKBN1L10YD

https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/21/mexico-kidnappings-refugees-central-america-immigration

Barrio-18 Overview

Posted in Central American Gangs with tags , , , on April 2, 2019 by dsmith41

Sarah Rousse

            Barrio 18, otherwise known as 18th Street Gang or M-18, is a street gang originating in Los Angeles, gaining prominence in the 1980s and 90s. While the gang began with only Mexican immigrants, they soon started to recruit immigrants from various Latin American countries (Insight Crime). The immigrants had trouble adjusting in America and found surrogate family in the gang, a vital recruitment tactic, as well as safety, drugs and women (Verini 41). The violence and crimes committed by gang members forced a crackdown on gang activity in California in the 1990s.

            In 1996, the state of California increased the number of deportable crimes exponentially. The crimes could be as small as drunk driving or petty theft (Arana 100). Many of the deportees had spent most or all of their life in America and were not welcomed into the communities in their home countries. The struggle to fit in and adjust once deported drove most to continue with they knew, and gangs grew in Central America (The Wire). The result of the deportations was understandably a disaster. The gangs took over weak countries like Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. As soon as they had established their territory, they collected “war taxes” from local officials and businesses (Verini 39). In order to create funding for the gang, they soon turned to robbery, extortion and drug trafficking (Arana 105). Central America quickly became one of the most dangerous places to live in the world.

            Barrio 18 is one of two dominant gangs in Central America. The other, and the gang’s bitter rival, is Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13. The rivalry between the two has proven extremely dangerous for innocent civilians as well as the members themselves. In 2012, Honduras became the murder capital of the world because of the feud (Verini 36). The violence became so unavoidable that the government attempted a ceasefire the same year between Barrio 18 and MS-13 in exchange for relaxed prison conditions (Insight Crime). The two agreed and the murder rate immediately plummeted in the country. However, this did not last as the truce was broken in 2014 and violence spread everywhere again.

            In 2002, Honduras’ president, Ricardo Maduro, implemented “Mano Dura” or Iron Fist policies in regard to the gangs. Mano Dura was a zero-tolerance policy that used mass detentions and extrajudicial killings to deter gang activity (The Wire). A member could receive a sentence of 12 years in prison for mere association, although officials did not need much evidence to convict (Arana 102). Often police officers will check the suspects skin for the signature tattoos of Barrio 18’s members (Discovery). Prisons soon swelled past their limits, which only backfired for the government. The gang was forced into closer corners, allowing them to reorganize (Insight Crime). Prisons had to be separated into sections, Barrio 18 members, MS-13, and unaffiliated in order to keep them from each other’s throats.

            The violence that came with Barrio 18’s deportation into Central America forced many innocent citizens to flee their home country in search of refuge in America. The gang capitalized on this desperation and began their human smuggling business (Arana 104). It is made clear to the refugees that they can pay the smugglers and they will bring them into the United States or they can not pay, and they will not make it alive. The gang is so far spread throughout Central America and the United States that they have no issue finding drug or human smuggling routes (Arana 105). Many blame the U.S. for the violence Latin America now faces at the hands of these gangs. The Wire claims that drugs consumed in America makes cause for trafficking and loose gun laws supply the violence. The mass deportations sent members to places they were not welcome or did not fit in, where banding together with their gangs gave them a sense of belonging.   

Arana, Ana. “How the Street Gangs Took Central America.” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 3 (2005): 98-110. doi:10.2307/20034353.

This source focuses on both MS-13 and Barrio 18 in the 1990s in America and their effect in Central America in the early 2000s. Arana also concentrates on the violence brought about by the gangs but because the source was written in 2005, does not cover recent violence statistics or policies made to deter gang activity.

VERINI, JAMES. “DISPATCH: Prisoners Rule: Welcome to the Deadliest City in the Deadliest Country in the World.” Foreign Policy, no. 196 (2012): 36-40. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41726704.

            In this source, Verini reports on a prison in San Pedro Sula, Honduras. At the time, Honduras was the murder capital of the world, and Verini interviews gang members from both Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18. The piece incorporates the personal stories of members with the history of how the gangs become so prominent in Honduras.

“Barrio 18.” InSight Crime. February 13, 2018. Accessed December 06, 2018. https://www.insightcrime.org/el-salvador-organized-crime-news/barrio-18-profile-2/.

            This source is good for a basic overview of Barrio 18. Insight Crime gives a history of the gang starting with their emergence in Los Angeles to their status now in 2018. It also focuses on the gang’s effect on Central American Violence.

“What Lies Behind Central America’s Gang Violence.” The Wire. Accessed December 06, 2018. https://thewire.in/world/what-lies-behind-central-americas-gang-violence.

UK, Discovery. “Prison Leader Sharky – 18th Street Gang – Inside the Gangsters’ Code.” YouTube. February 26, 2013. Accessed December 06, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2tI9zo9j40Q.

Documentary, Gang. “Gang Documentary – 18th Street Gang.” YouTube. December 07, 2016. Accessed December 06, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=43BJ9eSDJ4s.

Gangs in El Salvador

Posted in Central American Gangs, El Salvador with tags , , , , on April 2, 2019 by dsmith41

Margaux Miller

Central to the formation of gangs like Barrio 18 (or ‘Dieciocho’) and Mara Salvatrucha (or MS-13) is the history of civil war in Central American countries. In the late 20th century, a series of Civil wars erupted across the smattering of small countries in Central America. These wars were largely fought in resistance to layers of social, economic, and political inequality, a legacy of the region’s long relationship with colonialism (Grillo, 188). The conflicts proved to be some of the fiercest and bloodiest ever in the Americas, entailing full scale aerial bombardment, scorched earth tactics, and the laying of mass graves. In El Salvador, the fighting was between the leftist guerilla army Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMNL) and the U.S.-trained and -financed dictatorship, and left nearly 70,000 people dead, including many innocent civilians (Grillo, 196).

The rampant violence and political instability of the years leading up to and during the Civil War – which last from 1980 until 1992 – caused massive swells of immigrants to flee El Salvador to the United States (Grillo, 196). Most of the migrants were forced to live clandestine lives, due to the limited nature of Reagan-era asylum policy that denied most claims to asylum-seekers (Wolf, 71). Migrant experience was also one of marginalization: a majority of migrants lacked access to education or employment, consistent support networks, and access to state services and validation. Conditions of marginalization produced ethnically-specific Salvadoran gangs in Los Angeles, (including Barrio 18 and MS-13), because gang formation offered secure social identities that mainstream society denied to gang members (Wolf, 70). Notably, the formation of gangs by marginalized, ethnic minorities is not a new phenomenon in the U.S.: gangs date back to the early 1800’s (Ibid).

It was in the late 1980’s that tension and violence between Salvadoran gangs in L.A. started to grow particularly intense. The gangs had gone through processes of change: they had formed connections to other Latino mafias through prison sentences; they had swelled their ranks with new recruits; and they had actively hardened their street identities (Grillo, 200-201). L.A. police forces and the U.S. government were desperate to rid the city of seemingly insatiable, violent gang members. Rather than address the systemic issues that produced gang culture in U.S. cities, authorities began to repatriate gang members to their home nations. U.S. authorities were delighted when the Salvadoran government and the FMLN brokered a peace deal in Mexico in 1993: rather than repatriate Salvadorans to war-torn and violent country, they could return them to their homeland under the guise that the young men would be contributors in building the new democratic state (Grillo, 203). Immigration reform in 1996 stipulated that non-citizens who were doing more than a year in prison and/or committed a minor offense could be repatriated, allowing further repatriation. In dealing with “the immigrant problem”, the U.S. authorities send thousands of Americanized Salvadorans with violent street experience to a country still struggling to grasp stability, where the deportees – in coping with their deportation and marginalization – reproduced gang culture within a new and fragile setting. (Douglas, 56).

Salvadoran gangs have since grown and mutated. One of the central forces behind this has been the implementation of mano dura – or hard hand – policy. The policies put hundreds behind bars, but were still largely ineffective at eradicating gangs. the policies prompted MS-13 and Dieciocho (18) to toughen and increase the risk of their entry requirements, increase their militarization and lethality, diversify their leadership hierarchies, and become more covert in communication and style, in order to reduce infiltration and amplify control. The policies also had the “cockroach effect”: fearing arrest, gang affiliates dispersed to nearby neighboring countries, serving to actually spread gang influence. Murder rates rose due to increasingly fierce competition over territory under governmental fire (Farah, 57-9).

Popular perception of gang activity is often wrapped up with that of drug trafficking organizations, and it can be very difficult to piece apart the two entities. Notably, a relationship between the two does exist. Gang influence is so expansive that drug traffickers – who largely exist in criminal organizations institutionally distinct from gangs – were forced to incorporate gang members into the trafficking process. The geographic positioning of Central America also exposes it to drug trafficking: around 90% of cocaine designated for U.S. markets flows through Central America, deeming it an important “transnational shipment route.,” (Farah, 53, 57). In the past decade, gangs have shifted from being primarily protectors of shipments, to holding larger and riskier roles, which has increased their economic input and allowed for accumulation of larger weapons. It should be noted, however, that gangs and cartels are very different in their capacity for crime, even if some of their criminal activities overlap. Trafficking organizations tend to execute longer-term, advanced strategic violence in the defense of criminal enterprise, while street gangs typically use short term, tactical violence (in crimes such as extortion and kidnapping) that lacks logistical sophistication. In short, street gangs tend to be weaker in organization than myth makes them out to be (Wolf, 82-84).

In 2013, a covert truce was brokered by the Salvadoran federal security minister David Munguía Payés in attempts to quell rampant violence between ranking members of Barrio 18 and MS-13. The 2013 truce brokering did contribute to lowering murder rates: officials released ranking gang members who supported demilitarization to lower security prisons, where they were able to spread the message to put down arms in “violence free zones,” (Grillo, 223). Within days the truce was uncovered by independent journalists and released to the public. Just a year after it began, the truce ended due to administrative shifts and deep criticism of the government’s willingness to work with gangsters. Sinces its end, violence has picked back up (Grillo, 224). The truce tactic is especially interesting to think about in relation to mano dura policy, and this comparison begs the question of what successful gang suppression truly could look like.

Further Suggested Reading

“El Salvador Is Trying to Stop Gang Violence. But the Trump Administration Keeps Pushing         Failed “Iron First” Policing,” by Danielle Mackey & Cora Currier (October 2, 2018) https://theintercept.com/2018/10/02/el-salvador-gang-violence-prevention/

            This article, published by a trustworthy source, provides anecdotal evidence about the nature an individual’s gang involvement, an interesting perspective on economic rehabilitation of former gang members, and a look into the tenuous politics of United States-Latin American foreign policy.

“Five myths about MS-13,” by José Miguel Cruz (June 29, 2018)

https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/five-myths/five-myths-about-ms-13/2018/06/29/5860f1c4-7b17-11e8-93cc-6d3beccdd7a3_story.html?utm_term=.7fca84218475

            This piece by the Washington Post is a straight forward, comprehensible attack on popular myths about MS-13. It debunks narratives that have been used and abused in national rhetoric about the “threats” gangs pose to national security, and fills in the vacuum with actual facts.

“Time for a US Apology to El Salvador,” by Raymond Bonner (April 15, 2016)

https://www.thenation.com/article/time-for-a-us-apology-to-el-salvador/

            This article discusses the involvement of the United States in increasing the violence of El Salvador’s Civil War (1980 – 1992). The Salvadoran Civil War was the context that prompted thousands of Salvadorans to flee their homes. The end of the war and the subsequent establishment of democracy in El Salvador acted a justification, despite its fragility, for the United States in repatriating large numbers of Salvadorans convicted of gang violence and other crime.

Central American Gangs and Women

Posted in Central American Gangs, El Salvador, Guatemala with tags , , , , on April 2, 2019 by dsmith41

Sasha Hull

Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, also known as “the Northern Triangle,” could not offer a more perfect environment for gangs and drug violence. The region’s geography, which serves as a land bridge “between the world’s largest cocaine producers in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru and the world’s largest market in the United States,” coupled with its economic instability and weak state power has allowed gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha 13 and Barrio 18 to thrive and promote drug-related violence in the Northern triangle (Farah 53).

Central American women are in every way at the mercy of the physically and psychologically abusive orders and tendencies of gang members. Gender violence in this region has been historically justified; women hold a subordinate status to men in these societies, and violence towards women has little consequence or punishment, thus allowing it to become both perpetuated and tolerated (Stephen 46). In recent years, this violence towards women has been exacerbated due to the escalating presence of gangs in the region. While some of this gender violence stems from drug-related gang activity, much of it is normalized and has been engrained into the daily lives of gang members.

Before examining this violence and its many forms, we must first understand the history of the relationship between women, gang abuse, and violence. War and economic instability in the 1980’s and 90’s caused many individuals, specifically males, to emigrate in order to find better jobs to support their families. This left single mothers and young girls vulnerable to predatory gang members, who oftentimes fled to other men in search of protection, many of whom became abusive. Violence, abuse and intimidation from gangs towards women takes shape in many forms, and in both private and public spheres, making it impossible to escape.

Women who do join gangs often do so in hopes of escaping domestic abuse, only to find themselves abused physically and emotionally by their fellow gang members. Female former gang members report that their initiation processes involved rape by each member of the gang, sexual favors, and even orders to kill or rob members of their communities (Lacey). Physical consequences involve sexually transmitted infection and pregnancy, and psychological damage is incalculable.

Although the majority of women are not members of gangs, they usually become involved by extension of a male family member, or most commonly, a gang member who is pursuing them. There are many accounts of gang members sending death threats or killing the family members of girls who refused to go out with them (Grillo 193). Gang members also harass young women in public which creates a constant “state of insecurity and unease among women” and engrains in them a deep-seated fear of sexual violence (Winton 175).

Single mothers who have left their home due to domestic abuse, or women whose husbands have fled or been killed by gangs are subject to absurdly high extortion fees, ‘la renta,’ and threatened with violence or death if they do not comply with the gangs (Schmidt and Buechler 147). These demands cause much anxiety among mothers who are already financially insecure and trying to support their children. Consequently, many Central American women are forced to either turn to prostitution and sex trafficking to make ends meet, or stay in abusive relationships, relying on their partners for financial stability and protection from gangs (Schmidt and Buechler 147). Violence by gangs, combined with domestic abuse in the home and sharp increases in femicides in the Northern Triangle have led many women to flee. This journey can be extremely dangerous and is often traumatizing. Reports reveal that “80% of women and girls crossing into the US by way of Mexico are raped during their journey,” and many are preyed upon, manipulated, or killed (Lacey).

Abuse, intimidation, and violence—both physical and psychological—stem from deeply engrained ideas about gender roles, machismo, and gang membership. These historically misogynistic values have wreaked havoc on Central American women for decades, and have intensified in recent years due to increased gang activity in the region (Winton 175). Violence at this level is not new; women in the Northern Triangle have suffered from multiple layers and generations of trauma, with gangs only exacerbating the existing problems.

Further Reading:

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/12/central-america-migrants-rape_n_5806972.html

https://www.panoramas.pitt.edu/news-and-politics/violence-against-women-central-american-street-gangs-how-trump’s-immigration

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/el-salvador-women-gangs-ms-13-trump-violence/554804/

Works Cited (MLA)

Farah, Douglas. “CENTRAL AMERICAN GANGS: CHANGING NATURE AND NEW PARTNERS.” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 66, no. 1, 2012, pp. 53–67. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24388251.

Grillo, Ioan. Gangster Warlords: Drug Dollars, Killing Fields, and the New Politics of Latin America. Bloomsbury Press, 2017.

Lacey, Marc. “Abuse Trails Central American Girls into Gangs.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 11 Apr. 2001, www.nytimes.com/2008/04/11/world/americas/11guatemala.html.

Schmidt, Leigh Anne, and Stephanie Buechler. ‘“I Risk Everything Because I Have Already Lost Everything’: Central American Female Migrants Speak Out on the Migrant Trail in Oaxaca, Mexico.” Journal of Latin American Geography, vol. 16, no. 1, Apr. 2017, pp. 139-164., doi: 10.1353/lag.2017.0012.

Stephen, Lynn. “Violencia Transfronteriza de Género y Mujeres Indígenas Refugiadas de Guatemala.” Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionales, no. 117, Dec 2017, pp. 29-50. EBSCOhost, doi: 10.24241/rcai.2017.117.3.29.

Winton, Ailsa. “Youth, Gangs and Violence: Analysing the Social and Spatial Mobility of Young People in Guatemala City.” Childrens Geographies, vol. 3, no. 2, Jan. 2005, pp. 167-184., doi: 10.1080/14733280500161537.

Central American Gangs and Drug Trafficking

Posted in Central American Gangs with tags , , , on April 2, 2019 by dsmith41

Monique Martin

The history of Central American gangs and drug trafficking is a complex one filled with murder and extortion. Often people believe that gangs and cartels are the same, but they are different. Gang members are given inferior jobs and serve as hired muscle for drug cartels. Due to their drug trade involvement being at lower risk, and their lack of ownership of drugs, they do not profit in the same way as cartels. Cartels mainly focus on drugs and in terms of economics gangs are far below them. Gangs mostly earn money through extortion and human trafficking. Moreover, gangs became powerful in Central America through the influence of the United States.

One of the most known Central American gang includes Mara Salvatrucha also referred to as MS-13. They are most known for their crude acts of violence all over Central America and have become one of the scapegoats for the United States to justify their resistants’ in allowing people from Central America into the U.S. MS-13 was founded in the 1980s in Los Angeles, California. By 2004 MS-13 had spread to about “42 states and Central America” (Wolf, 66). Gangs such as MS-13 are usually created as, “[F]irst a group of friends, an alternate “family,” a group for mutual protection” (Grillo, 198). When Hispanic people from El Salvador moved to Los Angeles they went in search of jobs and better lives. However, because of xenophobia and racism, they were isolated in society by the majority forcing them to find an alternative way to gain an income. Politicians have used these gangs to push narratives of narcoterrorism and, “[T]o capitalize on popular fear of terrorists and drug traffickers in order to mobilize support for foreign interventions against leftist regimes” (Scott & Marshall, 23). For years this specific gang has been used against Hispanics to help justify political agendas that garner support in baring Hispanics from immigrating to the U.S.

Young Hispanic males have been profiled as the aggressors of gang violence, but they are also the overwhelming victims of gang violence. People join gangs for protection from rival gangs, and protection from the gang presiding in their neighborhood. Moreover, males are “recruited at a young age including elementary school-aged children” (Farah, 63). Also, gangs are more appealing to impoverished young men. This does not mean a person being impoverished will inevitably join a gang. However, poverty can make gangs appear more appealing. On the other hand, some young men join gangs willingly partly because they have grown up around gang members, so these gang members are their only example of how men behave.  The violence these gang members can exude has been enabled through the access to guns legally purchased in the U.S and smuggled into Central America. Therefore, many politicians in Central America have advocated for the U.S to create stricter gun laws.

Women have also been victims of gang violence predominantly through human trafficking and domestic violence. Many women have been forced to marry gang members who supersede them in age. Women have also suffered sexual abuse by gang members. If a person reports an incident to the authorities, they would be murdered because the police often work with the gangs (Osten, Oct. 29, 2018). Just like men, women are forced into tough situations by gangs to survive.

All around most people who are not a part of gang life are subjected to extortion and if they refuse to pay they will be murdered. The conditions in Central America has caused people to desperately want to flee the country. “Due to the historically large amount of people seeking to leave… MS-13 quickly moved into the human smuggling business…”(Farah, 57). Gangs usually charge people hundreds of dollars to help them cross the border, which many people from poor economic backgrounds cannot afford. Therefore, people have recently traveled in a large caravan to cross the U.S border because when they travel in groups the gangs are less likely to attack them. Moreover, when they travel in groups it is free, so they do not have to pay gang members to help them cross the border. Overall, extortion and gang violence are prime contributors to why many people desperately want to leave Central America.

Bibliography

Farah, Douglas. “Central American Gangs: Changing Nature and New Partners.” Journal of International Affairs 66, no. 1 (2012): 53-67. 

Grillo, I. (2017). Gangster warlords: Drug dollars, killing fields, and the new politics of Latin America. New York: Bloomsbury Press.

Scott, Peter Dale and Jonathan Marshall, Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 23-50 

Wolf, Sonja. “Mara Salvatrucha: The Most Dangerous Street Gang in the Americas?”. Latin American Politics and Society 54, no. 1 (2012): 65-99. 

External Sources

  • Children on the Run in Central America
    • This short documentary pertains to children of Central America and their experience growing up in Central America. It also discusses their journey leaving Central America and their experience in America.

Gangs in Guatemala

Posted in Central American Gangs, Guatemala with tags , , on April 2, 2019 by dsmith41

Emily Ciatto

Currently, Guatemala is the 16th most violent country in the world (Business Insider, 2018). This is significantly due to the extremely high level of gang violence that terrorizes the country. Two street gangs, the Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13 for short, and Barrio 18 account for 95% of total gang members in Guatemala, with a total of 53 other known gangs working in Guatemala City alone (Guatemala Human Rights Commission). In 2012, it was reported that there were 17,000 Barrio members and 5,000 MS-13 members (Council on Foreign Relations, 2018), with likely higher numbers today. Both gangs were originally formed in Los Angeles, United States, and now have almost complete control over Guatemala City, Villa Nueva, Mixco, Amatitlan, and other areas surrounding the capitol.

Guatemala’s horrific Civil War, which lasted 36 years over 1960-1996, left the state incredibly weak and the country accustomed to high levels of violence, which has remained after the war. During this civil war, funding was removed from public education and other services and transferred to military expenditures, making schools underfunded and inaccessible to Guatemalan youth. The combination of the lack of post-war recovery with high levels of poverty fuel the participation of gangs, with boys joining as young as 12 years old (US Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 2018). Since these gangs are mostly made up of 15-24 year olds, the public opinion towards youth in general is negative, leaving them socially barred; this is where we see gangs opening their arms and showing them acceptance and promising a better, more powerful life. By supplying these young, inexperienced individuals with deadly weapons, they become trigger happy and eager to impress their “boss”. Most violence is targeted towards rival gangs over turf wars, as each gang tries to spread their influence and even trafficking routes around the country. These gangs can also participate in robbery, drug dealing, kidnapping, and human trafficking (GHRC). In 2016, it was reported that there were 26-50 homicides per 100,000 individuals (CFR, 2018), mostly caused by gang violence.

In terms of control, there is very minimal action being taken to subdue these gangs and the violence that accompanies them. These high-profile gangs have a stronghold on businesses, communities, transportation systems, and law enforcement, due to extortion. Those who do not pay the extortionists face extreme violence and death as well. Law enforcement is incredibly corrupt, accepting bribes from gangs, allowing them to rule over towns and communities. There is very minimal trust in police forces due to human rights abuses that occurred during the civil war. When action is taken, only about 3% of crimes are prosecuted (CNN). Prisons are overcrowded and are ruled by gangs, recruiting new members from the inside. In 2007, the United Nations created the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala to help investigate and prosecute criminal groups that may have infiltrated state institutions, which gangs have done (CFR, 2018). The country has seen seen other reforms, but few are successful and can actually cause an increase in gang participation. There has been a slight decrease in homicides in the past decade, especially from 2008 where there were over 40 homicides per 100,000 people. Although this seems like a major change, gang violence is still an issue that is driving many families to seek refuge in the United States, joining the caravans that are currently heading through Mexico to the US border. Unfortunately, current U.S. policies are preventing these people from seeking asylum, and President Trump is demanding countries of Central America to stop these caravans from continuing on their long journey.

Additional informative websites:

Brice, Arthur. “Gangs, Drugs Fuel Violence in Guatemala.” CNN, Cable News Network, 9 Sept. 2011, www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/09/09/guatemala.violence/index.html.

  • Here is an overview of the ties between gangs and drug trafficking, along with criminal activity in the country and how it is being handled.

“Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 26 June 2018, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle.

  • This article gives an overview of the Northern Triangle, which consists of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, which are three of the most violent countries in the world due to gang violence.

“Guatemala 2018 Crime & Safety Report.” Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 9 May 2018, www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=24030.

  • This is a really helpful resource for those looking to travel to Guatemala; it explains each type of violence and the presence of gangs and drug trafficking zones.

“Guatemala Human Rights Commission.” Guatemala Human Rights Commission RSS, 2018, www.ghrc-usa.org/.

  • This is a helpful resource to learn more about the history of Guatemala and the actions that are being taken to prosecute human rights violators.

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