Archive for Guatemala

Violence in Guatemala

Posted in Central American Gangs with tags , , , , on May 10, 2019 by dsmith41

Emma Lightizer

In the last half of the twentieth century, Guatemala was defined by its 36-year-long civil war and the genocide it committed against indigenous Maya in the 1980s (Martin). Today, violence against women and indigenous people, drug trafficking, gang activity, and weak or corrupt state and local authorities present persistent risks to people’s personal security.

            Drug-trafficking organizations and Central American gangs are not the same thing, but both do exist in Guatemala. Gangs like the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 cause many of the same violent problems in Guatemala as they do in other Central American countries: territory disputes, rape, murder, extortion, and robbery. However, drug-trafficking organizations have a special interest in Guatemala because the country’s position just south of Mexico’s border makes it a crucial pathway for the transit of drugs into the United States (Martínez 46). Traditionally, drug-trafficking work was outsourced to local gang cliques or independent drug traffickers in the country. In recent years, though, Mexican drug-trafficking organizations have built a stronger and more constant physical presence in Guatemala, claiming several towns and cities as their territories (Martínez 163). The introduction of the Zetas, an especially violent Mexican drug-trafficking organization, has greatly reduced citizens’ security in the city of Alta Verapaz as well as the other areas where they operate (Martínez 50).

            Drug-related violence also extends to state and local authorities. For example, in 2013, every police officer present in an entire station was killed in retaliation for the arrest of a drug trafficker’s son (Martínez 145). The “Massacre of Salcajá,” as the event was called, initiated the launch of an investigation, openly called “Operation Dignity,” but it was ineffective in ending the control that narcotraffickers had over the region (Martínez 153). Police and other authorities in Guatemala are often too weak to do much to control drug traffickers, and impunity runs wild as a result.

Instead of getting tangled up with strong organizations, Guatemalan authorities often target weaker, individual drug-traffickers or poor “campesino” farmers they accuse of growing drugs and invading protected forest land (Martínez 64). This gives authorities the advantage of looking like they’re dealing with the problem while simultaneously not risking a firefight with large-scale organizations (Martínez 66). In some localities, this is also the result of corrupt politicians who explicitly work with larger drug-trafficking organizations to secure a monopoly on the trade in their area (Martínez 70). This has meant that many poor and indigenous farmers have been accused of working with drug traffickers and have been kicked off their land and deprived of their livelihoods (Martínez 73).

In addition to these types of violence that affect all Guatemalans, there are particular dangers for women and indigenous people. Guatemala is the country with the third highest rate of femicide globally, and women are also very likely to be victims of rape and domestic violence (Johnson). The impunity that exists for other crimes in Guatemala extends to violence against women, but is perhaps even more intense due to a widespread indifference to the human rights of women. This means that women generally do not receive protection from the state, while they are simultaneously at a higher risk of becoming victims of violence (Johnson). In some cases, local authorities are even complicit or feign ignorance to allow sex trafficking rings to maintain operation. For example, the Barberena ring in southern Guatemala operated for several years while local police officers enjoyed the status of “VIP clients” and took part in the rape and sexual assault of the women held there (Martínez 219).

Indigenous people, and especially Maya, are common targets of kidnapping, assault, and murder (Martin). They are also frequently among those campesinos who are kicked off their land and accused of being narcos. Recent up-ticks in violence against indigenous people, and especially against indigenous activists, have brought about concerns of a return to the cycle of violence that initiated the genocide of Maya people in the 1980s (Martin).

Bibliography:

Johnson, Sarah. “Can Health Workers Stop Thousands of Women Being Killed in Guatemala?” The Guardian. March 07, 2018. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/healthcare-network/2018/mar/07/health-workers-stop-thousand-women-killed-guatemala-femicide.

Martin, Maria. “Killings Of Guatemala’s Indigenous Activists Raise Specter Of Human Rights Crisis.” NPR. January 22, 2019. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/01/22/685505116/killings-of-guatemalas-indigenous-activists-raise-specter-of-human-rights-crisis.

Martínez, Óscar Enrique. A History of Violence: Living and Dying in Central America. London: Verso, 2017.

Further Reading:

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/guatemalas-bloody-battle-with-mexican-drug-cartels-6257571.html

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guatemala-humantrafficking/guatemala-closes-its-eyes-to-rampant-child-sex-trafficking-u-n-idUSKCN0YU29V

https://www.npr.org/2019/01/22/685505116/killings-of-guatemalas-indigenous-activists-raise-specter-of-human-rights-crisis

https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/guatemalas-small-businesses-pot-of-gold/

Mano Dura (Firm Hand) policies in Central America

Posted in Central American Gangs, El Salvador with tags , , on May 10, 2019 by dsmith41

Emma Lightizer

Gangs have been an issue in El Salvador since before its twelve-year civil war ended in 1992. However, the problem became much more visible and violent after the United States initiated its policy of deporting any foreign nationals found guilty of committing a crime. Thousands of gang members from the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18, both founded in the U.S., were deported to their countries of origin, intensifying the violence and instability already present in Central America during the 1990s.

One set of policies that Central American countries have employed to try to gain control over the gang problem is known as “Mano Dura,” meaning “firm hand” or “iron fist.” In El Salvador, this policy was first put in place by President Francisco Flores in 2003 (Wolf 49). Mano Dura created joint military and police anti-gang squads who made a spectacle out of arrests, hoping to gain public support by looking tough on gangs. The policy also included the Ley Anti Maras, or Anti-Gang Law, which made gang membership itself a crime and allowed the squads to arrest people based on their appearance alone (Wolf 50). The law applied to anyone at least twelve years of age, meaning that many children were arrested for looking like gang members (Wolf 50). However, the Ley Anti Maras was challenged in court, and many judges refused to charge those arrested for alleged gang membership on the grounds that the Ley Anti Maras violated Salvadorans’ constitutional rights. Ninety-five percent of those arrested under the law were released without charges due to lack of evidence (Wolf 51).

There were several claims that Mano Dura wasn’t doing enough, so the policy was rebranded as “Súper Mano Dura” under the next president, Antonio Saca. This version of the law added “Mano Amiga” and “Mano Extendida,” purported policies of rehabilitation and prevention for gang members, but the two new policies were more talk than reality. They were chronically underfunded and poorly organized, and were only there to offer the president some credibility on paper of taking a more complex approach to the gang problem. Official policy continued to ignore the realms of prevention and rehabilitation, instead focusing on harsher punishments against gang members (Wolf 54).

Although Mano Dura is a Salvadoran policy, it has corollaries in other Central American countries. Honduras, for example, launched its “Blue Freedom Plan” the year before Flores’ Mano Dura in El Salvador. Honduras’ plan included several of the same measures as Mano Dura: zero tolerance, the cooperation of police and military forces against gangs, and the use of tattoos and other physical traits as markers of gang membership (García). In Guatemala, indiscriminate arrests of possible gang members were initiated in 2003 under “Plan Sweep.” Even though this and other anti-gang legislation was explicitly rejected by Guatemalan courts, officials continued to arrest suspected gang members under a zero tolerance policy; much like in El Salvador, most of these arrests were overturned due to a lack of evidence (García).

All of these policies have been wildly unsuccessful–and even counterproductive. Since gang members were being targeted based on appearance, they adapted and started being less obvious about their gang membership, hiding tattoos under clothing or foregoing them altogether (Wolf 72). More importantly, the abuses by police under the Mano Dura policies led gang members to be even more distrustful of authorities and therefore more loyal to their gangs and fellow members. The gangs became close-knit in a way that makes rehabilitation a much more formidable challenge than it was before (Wolf 72). Additionally, the few arrests that did successfully lead to imprisonments were counterproductive: now, gangs are run from within prisons by gang members who gained street credit through their arrests. Since the prisons are overcrowded and poorly run, clique leaders are able to work with their gangs and order hits from within the relative safety of the prison: after all, they cannot be arrested again while they are still in prison (Wolf 72). The legacy of Mano Dura-type policies has been one of increased violence, better organization of gangs, and failure of governments to successfully introduce any significant rehabilitation or prevention efforts against gangs.

Bibliography:

García, Carlos. “Tracing the History of Failed Gang Policies in US, Northern Triangle.” InSight Crime. September 20, 2017. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/tracing-the-history-of-failed-gang-policies-in-us-northern-triangle/.

Wolf, Sonja. Mano Dura: The Politics of Gang Control in El Salvador. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017.

Further Reading:

https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/tracing-the-history-of-failed-gang-policies-in-us-northern-triangle/

https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/how-mano-dura-is-strengthening-gangs/

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/06/el-salvador-gangs-police-violence-distrito-italia

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/24136/el-salvador-s-iron-fist-crackdown-on-gangs-a-lethal-policy-with-u-s-origins

U.S. Intervention in Latin America 1970-Present

Posted in US-Latin America Relations with tags , , , , , , on April 16, 2019 by dsmith41

David Smith

There have been two phases of United States intervention in Latin America since 1970. The older, first phase is the Cold War in which the United States funded Latin military governments and their wars against communist insurgencies. The second phase is the War on Drugs through which the United States has pressured Latin American states into prohibitionist politics, helping to organize and fund anti-drug efforts across the Western Hemisphere. These two contexts are related to each other, they overlap and interact with each other in complex ways, but the justifications for why the United States has stayed so intimately involved in the domestic affairs of Latin America have changed over time, and it is important to understand the magnitude of impact the US has had on its neighbors to the South.

Cold War interventions in Central America date back to the CIA-sponsored coup in Guatemala in 1954. After what was regarded by the CIA as a massive success, they tried a similar approach with Cuba in 1961 with the Bay of Pigs invasion, this time with disastrous results. The Cuban situation was massively embarrassing, and it became necessary for the US to increase their commitment to fighting communism across the region. In the 1970s, the United States was very involved in aiding Central American militaries in their fight against communism. The United States supplied Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua with direct military aid to help in their dirty wars. The friendly regimes in Honduras and Panama were used as bases of operations to carry out U.S. assistance to these places. The regimes to which the U.S. supplied weapons, training, and financial aid were known to be abusers of human rights, but Cold War hawks in the United States regarded this as a necessary evil in the international war on communism. The Carter administration tried to change course by denying aid to gross human rights violators, but the successful Sandinista Revolution in 1979 and the subsequent election of Ronald Reagan changed this approach.

The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua was a watershed event, arguably as or more important to modern Central American history as was the Cuban Revolution. The communist insurgencies that existed in Guatemala and El Salvador turned into brutal Civil Wars, and the Reagan administration responded by providing billions in dollars of aid to the governments and paramilitaries fighting these communists. Though the Cold War ended in 1989, the legacy of the wars the United States fought in the name of anti-communism have had far-reaching impacts into today.

In the 1970’s, the United States had begun to get serious about the War on Drugs. In particular, the United States was targeting Mexico and the Sinaloa region that was supplying the marijuana that had fueled the counter-culture revolution. However, as the US targeted Mexico, production shifted to Colombia. The United States then became involved in fighting wars against the newly formed Colombian cartels and continued implementing crop eradication programs that disproportionately harmed poorer indigenous people. In Colombia, we see an acute intersection between the Cold War and the War on drugs. As the United States and the Colombian government fought the communist FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), they also fought the drug cartels who were pumping tons and tons of drugs into the United States. When the United States and Colombia finally defeated Pablo Escobar and the Medellin cartel, the FARC took over coca-growing operations and made alliances with Mexican cartels, namely the Sinaloa cartel, who now controlled the trade.

The United States has continued to fight the War on Drugs at home and abroad. From discouraging coca production in the Andes to prosecuting corruption in Central America to helping the Mexican government fight a vicious war against the cartels to criminalizing the consumption and distribution of drugs here at home, the United States has remained invested in an expensive and ineffective multi-front war. The War on Drugs is not the only modern example of United States intervention. In 2009, the US was involved in the Honduran coup in which the Honduran military, who has enjoyed a close relationship with Washington over the years, ousted a democratically elected president. Most recently, US Ambassador John Bolton has been considering intervening militarily in Venezuela. The examples that have been discussed have largely been instances where the United States has directly intervened with military and financial aid, but it is also worth considering that the United States has used a variety of political and financial organizations to influence domestic and foreign policies of Latin American governments. A third phase, in addition to the Cold War and the War on Drugs, could be understood as a neo-liberal phase in which the United States ensured loans to governments who would pass more US-friendly laws. Suffice it to say that though the United States does does not completely dominate the hemisphere as they have at different points in history, the US remains embedded in Latin American economies and politics.

Sources:

Stephen Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012

Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. policy towards Latin America, Harvard University Press, 2003.

Further Reading:

  1. For a brief history and timeline of US intervention in Latin America, see https://www.apnews.com/2ded14659982426c9b2552827734be83
  2. For more information on the CIA-sponsored coup and the subsequent Civil War on Guatemala, see https://blog.uvm.edu/sosten-centralamerica/2019/03/23/guatemala-recent-history-present/
  3. For more information about the evolution of the drug trade and the war on drugs in Latin America, see https://blog.uvm.edu/sosten-centralamerica/2019/04/11/overview-of-the-drug-trade-1970s-present/
  4. To read more about the United States’ role in the 2009 Honduran coup and subsequent militarization and repression, see https://theintercept.com/2017/08/29/honduras-coup-us-defense-departmetnt-center-hemispheric-defense-studies-chds/
  5. To read briefly about John Bolton’s policy towards Venezuela, see https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/01/28/john-bolton-notepad-troops-colombia-venezuela-military-intervention/2705957002/

Gangs in Central America

Posted in Central American Gangs, El Salvador with tags , , , , on April 2, 2019 by dsmith41

Isabelle Schecter

Central American gangs are primarily associated with the “Northern Triangle” countries: El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. In the United States, the most prominent gangs associated with these countries are the 18th Street Gang and Mara Salvatrucha. The 18th Street gang has roots going back to a few years after WWII. goes by various names such as Barrio 18, Calle 18, or M18 (Grillo 202, Farah 54). The number 18 derives from their place of origin near the 18th street area of Los Angeles. This faction of a traditionally Mexican street gang let non-Mexicans join, so many Hondurans, Guatemalans and Salvadorans took this opportunity. Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13 is thought to have began in the late seventies/early eighties among Salvadorans in L.A. (Grillo 198, 200).

           The 18th Street Gang and MS-13 both originated in the U.S. among Latin American immigrants but shifted to Central America beginning in the early 1990s. According to historians Scott and Marshall, the U.S. government popularized the rhetoric of “narcoterrorism” referring broadly to illicit and dangerous acts associated with Latin American transnational criminal organizations. This included but was not limited to: drug trafficking, extortion, resistance to law enforcement, and unmitigated violence (Scott and Marshall 23). By popularizing prejudice, the government created a racially divided environment in the U.S., leading various non-White ethnic groups to search for solidarity and community by forming groups with one another (Grillo 197-198). This is not to say that being non-White or searching for this type of solidarity is a determining factor in joining a gang, however it did play a role in the Central American context. Racist rhetoric stalled the integration of non-White migrants into U.S. society, thus leaving foreign ethnic groups more vulnerable to isolation and, in this case, gangs. Gang initiators lure youths in by providing food, shelter, and a network to vulnerable and ostracized members of society (Grillo 232).

           After the 1992 L.A. riots, prosecutors charged young Latino gang members as adults though they were minors. Thus, hundreds were sent to prison on felony charges. In 1996, a new immigration law was passed which mandated that noncitizens serving felony sentences longer than a year were to be deported to their countries of origin. These deportations repatriated tens of thousands of young Guatemalan, Honduran and Salvadoran gang members. Many had lived in the U.S. for the majority of their lifetime and had little to no connections in their countries of origin. These repatriates, whether gang members or not, often had trouble getting a job, and in some cases did not speak the language. Joining a gang provided a social framework, an income (through means such as drug trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping), as well as protection. At the time, Central America was recovering from years of warfare, so the police forces were underdeveloped and the judiciary systems were dysfunctional. These factors allowed for a further expansion of the 18th Street and MS-13 gangs, particularly in rural areas where the central government was weak (Farah 55-56).

           After the gangs gained traction in Central America, violence tremendously increased. This violence was and currently remains a key reason why people flee to the U.S. (Grillo 203). Border policy is strict, so many Central Americans are sent back to their countries when trying to escape gangs and succumb to the typical pressures of joining. As a result, gangs grow, crime increases, death tolls rise, and more migrants try to flee. The LA Times recently reported that many school districts are reluctant to allow these children in, fearing they are already connected with gangs. This leaves them home alone, lacking a network, and thus even more likely to turn to a gang for social support (Demick). The Mara Salvatrucha requires immigrants to report to the local gang affiliate in the U.S. after they arrive. Many do not have immigration papers, thus are scared to go to the police and have a hard time finding a source of income (Grillo 203, 230).

Suggestions for further reading:

Ioan Grillo, Gangster Warlords (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016).

Gerardo Lopez, “I was an MS-13 gang member. Here’s how I got out.” TedXMileHigh, accessed 9 Dec 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6qkSMkiGWdg

Hannah Dreier, “The Runaways,” This American Life, Podcast, published 21 September 2018, https://www.thisamericanlife.org/657/the-runaways

Bibliography

Demick, Barbara. “Trump heads to Long Island, using brutal MS-13 murders to justify deportations,” Los Angeles Times, July 28, 2017, https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ms13-trump-20170727-story.html

Farah, Douglas. “Central American Gangs: Changing Nature and New Partners,” Journal of International Affairs 66, no. 1: 53-67.

Grillo, Ioan. Gangster Warlords (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016).

Scott, Peter Dale and Marshall, Jonathan. “The CIA and Right-Wing Narcoterrorism in Latin America,” in Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America (Berkely: University of California Press, 1998), 53-67.

Central American Gangs and Women

Posted in Central American Gangs, El Salvador with tags , , , , , on April 2, 2019 by dsmith41

Sasha Hull

Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, also known as “the Northern Triangle,” could not offer a more perfect environment for gangs and drug violence. The region’s geography, which serves as a land bridge “between the world’s largest cocaine producers in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru and the world’s largest market in the United States,” coupled with its economic instability and weak state power has allowed gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha 13 and Barrio 18 to thrive and promote drug-related violence in the Northern triangle (Farah 53).

Central American women are in every way at the mercy of the physically and psychologically abusive orders and tendencies of gang members. Gender violence in this region has been historically justified; women hold a subordinate status to men in these societies, and violence towards women has little consequence or punishment, thus allowing it to become both perpetuated and tolerated (Stephen 46). In recent years, this violence towards women has been exacerbated due to the escalating presence of gangs in the region. While some of this gender violence stems from drug-related gang activity, much of it is normalized and has been engrained into the daily lives of gang members.

Before examining this violence and its many forms, we must first understand the history of the relationship between women, gang abuse, and violence. War and economic instability in the 1980’s and 90’s caused many individuals, specifically males, to emigrate in order to find better jobs to support their families. This left single mothers and young girls vulnerable to predatory gang members, who oftentimes fled to other men in search of protection, many of whom became abusive. Violence, abuse and intimidation from gangs towards women takes shape in many forms, and in both private and public spheres, making it impossible to escape.

Women who do join gangs often do so in hopes of escaping domestic abuse, only to find themselves abused physically and emotionally by their fellow gang members. Female former gang members report that their initiation processes involved rape by each member of the gang, sexual favors, and even orders to kill or rob members of their communities (Lacey). Physical consequences involve sexually transmitted infection and pregnancy, and psychological damage is incalculable.

Although the majority of women are not members of gangs, they usually become involved by extension of a male family member, or most commonly, a gang member who is pursuing them. There are many accounts of gang members sending death threats or killing the family members of girls who refused to go out with them (Grillo 193). Gang members also harass young women in public which creates a constant “state of insecurity and unease among women” and engrains in them a deep-seated fear of sexual violence (Winton 175).

Single mothers who have left their home due to domestic abuse, or women whose husbands have fled or been killed by gangs are subject to absurdly high extortion fees, ‘la renta,’ and threatened with violence or death if they do not comply with the gangs (Schmidt and Buechler 147). These demands cause much anxiety among mothers who are already financially insecure and trying to support their children. Consequently, many Central American women are forced to either turn to prostitution and sex trafficking to make ends meet, or stay in abusive relationships, relying on their partners for financial stability and protection from gangs (Schmidt and Buechler 147). Violence by gangs, combined with domestic abuse in the home and sharp increases in femicides in the Northern Triangle have led many women to flee. This journey can be extremely dangerous and is often traumatizing. Reports reveal that “80% of women and girls crossing into the US by way of Mexico are raped during their journey,” and many are preyed upon, manipulated, or killed (Lacey).

Abuse, intimidation, and violence—both physical and psychological—stem from deeply engrained ideas about gender roles, machismo, and gang membership. These historically misogynistic values have wreaked havoc on Central American women for decades, and have intensified in recent years due to increased gang activity in the region (Winton 175). Violence at this level is not new; women in the Northern Triangle have suffered from multiple layers and generations of trauma, with gangs only exacerbating the existing problems.

Further Reading:

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/12/central-america-migrants-rape_n_5806972.html

https://www.panoramas.pitt.edu/news-and-politics/violence-against-women-central-american-street-gangs-how-trump’s-immigration

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/el-salvador-women-gangs-ms-13-trump-violence/554804/

Works Cited (MLA)

Farah, Douglas. “CENTRAL AMERICAN GANGS: CHANGING NATURE AND NEW PARTNERS.” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 66, no. 1, 2012, pp. 53–67. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24388251.

Grillo, Ioan. Gangster Warlords: Drug Dollars, Killing Fields, and the New Politics of Latin America. Bloomsbury Press, 2017.

Lacey, Marc. “Abuse Trails Central American Girls into Gangs.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 11 Apr. 2001, www.nytimes.com/2008/04/11/world/americas/11guatemala.html.

Schmidt, Leigh Anne, and Stephanie Buechler. ‘“I Risk Everything Because I Have Already Lost Everything’: Central American Female Migrants Speak Out on the Migrant Trail in Oaxaca, Mexico.” Journal of Latin American Geography, vol. 16, no. 1, Apr. 2017, pp. 139-164., doi: 10.1353/lag.2017.0012.

Stephen, Lynn. “Violencia Transfronteriza de Género y Mujeres Indígenas Refugiadas de Guatemala.” Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionales, no. 117, Dec 2017, pp. 29-50. EBSCOhost, doi: 10.24241/rcai.2017.117.3.29.

Winton, Ailsa. “Youth, Gangs and Violence: Analysing the Social and Spatial Mobility of Young People in Guatemala City.” Childrens Geographies, vol. 3, no. 2, Jan. 2005, pp. 167-184., doi: 10.1080/14733280500161537.

Gangs in Guatemala

Posted in Central American Gangs with tags , , , on April 2, 2019 by dsmith41

Emily Ciatto

Currently, Guatemala is the 16th most violent country in the world (Business Insider, 2018). This is significantly due to the extremely high level of gang violence that terrorizes the country. Two street gangs, the Mara Salvatrucha, or MS-13 for short, and Barrio 18 account for 95% of total gang members in Guatemala, with a total of 53 other known gangs working in Guatemala City alone (Guatemala Human Rights Commission). In 2012, it was reported that there were 17,000 Barrio members and 5,000 MS-13 members (Council on Foreign Relations, 2018), with likely higher numbers today. Both gangs were originally formed in Los Angeles, United States, and now have almost complete control over Guatemala City, Villa Nueva, Mixco, Amatitlan, and other areas surrounding the capitol.

Guatemala’s horrific Civil War, which lasted 36 years over 1960-1996, left the state incredibly weak and the country accustomed to high levels of violence, which has remained after the war. During this civil war, funding was removed from public education and other services and transferred to military expenditures, making schools underfunded and inaccessible to Guatemalan youth. The combination of the lack of post-war recovery with high levels of poverty fuel the participation of gangs, with boys joining as young as 12 years old (US Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 2018). Since these gangs are mostly made up of 15-24 year olds, the public opinion towards youth in general is negative, leaving them socially barred; this is where we see gangs opening their arms and showing them acceptance and promising a better, more powerful life. By supplying these young, inexperienced individuals with deadly weapons, they become trigger happy and eager to impress their “boss”. Most violence is targeted towards rival gangs over turf wars, as each gang tries to spread their influence and even trafficking routes around the country. These gangs can also participate in robbery, drug dealing, kidnapping, and human trafficking (GHRC). In 2016, it was reported that there were 26-50 homicides per 100,000 individuals (CFR, 2018), mostly caused by gang violence.

In terms of control, there is very minimal action being taken to subdue these gangs and the violence that accompanies them. These high-profile gangs have a stronghold on businesses, communities, transportation systems, and law enforcement, due to extortion. Those who do not pay the extortionists face extreme violence and death as well. Law enforcement is incredibly corrupt, accepting bribes from gangs, allowing them to rule over towns and communities. There is very minimal trust in police forces due to human rights abuses that occurred during the civil war. When action is taken, only about 3% of crimes are prosecuted (CNN). Prisons are overcrowded and are ruled by gangs, recruiting new members from the inside. In 2007, the United Nations created the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala to help investigate and prosecute criminal groups that may have infiltrated state institutions, which gangs have done (CFR, 2018). The country has seen seen other reforms, but few are successful and can actually cause an increase in gang participation. There has been a slight decrease in homicides in the past decade, especially from 2008 where there were over 40 homicides per 100,000 people. Although this seems like a major change, gang violence is still an issue that is driving many families to seek refuge in the United States, joining the caravans that are currently heading through Mexico to the US border. Unfortunately, current U.S. policies are preventing these people from seeking asylum, and President Trump is demanding countries of Central America to stop these caravans from continuing on their long journey.

Additional informative websites:

Brice, Arthur. “Gangs, Drugs Fuel Violence in Guatemala.” CNN, Cable News Network, 9 Sept. 2011, www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/09/09/guatemala.violence/index.html.

  • Here is an overview of the ties between gangs and drug trafficking, along with criminal activity in the country and how it is being handled.

“Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 26 June 2018, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle.

  • This article gives an overview of the Northern Triangle, which consists of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, which are three of the most violent countries in the world due to gang violence.

“Guatemala 2018 Crime & Safety Report.” Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 9 May 2018, www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=24030.

  • This is a really helpful resource for those looking to travel to Guatemala; it explains each type of violence and the presence of gangs and drug trafficking zones.

“Guatemala Human Rights Commission.” Guatemala Human Rights Commission RSS, 2018, www.ghrc-usa.org/.

  • This is a helpful resource to learn more about the history of Guatemala and the actions that are being taken to prosecute human rights violators.

Guatemala: Recent History-Present and Civil War

Posted in Uncategorized with tags , , , on March 23, 2019 by dsmith41

David Smith

To understand Guatemala’s Civil War, the defining moment in modern Guatemalan history, that officially began in 1960 and ended 36 years later, it is necessary to first explore the economic and social conditions of the country with an indigenous Maya majority. Dating back to Spanish Colonial times, Guatemala’s governments have been racist, elitist, militaristic, and corrupt. Access to land and resources, the lifeblood of the Maya people, has been historically restricted, and the landowners who controlled the agricultural economy have consistently used coercive methods to extract extremely cheap migrant labor from indigenous and mixed-race (ladino) people. In the 20th century, United Fruit Company, now Chiquita, employed what was essentially a monopoly over Guatemala’s economy, acquiring 40% of the arable land in the country through a series of contracts that they signed with dictator Jorge Ubico. In October of 1944, Guatemala’s government changed when the people elected Jose Arevalo, ushering in the “Ten Years of Springtime,” a brief era in which democratic reform in the country blossomed. Arevalo enacted a series of reform that provided basic social services to poor people across the country, but the glaring obstacle to a truly independent Guatemala was United Fruit Company’s concentration of land and their dominance of the economy. Arevalo’s democratically elected predecessor, Colonel Jacobo Arbenz, decided to confront the foreign influence over the nation’s economy by nationalizing the land and re-distributing it, principally to the indigenous Maya.

Arbenz’ move, while perhaps justified, was certainly radical to the United States. What was perhaps even more radical was that Arbenz had legalized the Communist party in Guatemala, and while Arbenz was not himself a Communist, the members of the PGT (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo) were active in the government, especially on the issue of land reform. In an Eisenhower administration that was engaged in militant anti-communism around the world, the United States saw the seizure of land, the re-distribution of land, and the existence of an active Communist party as a serious threat to regional security. In 1954, in an operation named PBSUCESS, the CIA planned and executed a coup against Jacobo Arbenz by supporting Colonel Castillo Armas in the first Cold War conflict in the Western hemisphere. In a daring and, perhaps, arrogant display, the United States asserted control over the domestic affairs of Guatemala, ensuring the restoration of United Fruit Company’s landholdings and providing military and economic assistance to a military regime that supported US interests. The consequences of the 1954 coup against Jacobo Arbenz, executed nearly flawlessly from a US perspective, would reverberate around not only Guatemala for the next four decades, but around the entire Western Hemisphere for the duration of the Cold War. The events of 1954 played a direct role in the Cuban Revolution five years later, including that a young Ernesto “Che” Guevara, who was in Guatemala City and an ally of Arbenz when the United States executed the coup, was profoundly impacted by the experience.

The vast majority of the people in Guatemala were opposed to the United States influence in their country, but any outward expression of opposition to the new military regime was met with secret police death squads. Castillo Armas unleashed a repression that murdered thousands of communists, teachers, students, and others who they perceived to be a threat to stability. The armed resistance to the government began in 1959, when some members of the military became angry that the United States had used Guatemala as a launching point for their Bay of Pigs invasion. They launched a coup that failed, but the seeds of revolution had been sown. Members of this attempted coup fled the cities and retreated into the countryside to form the origins of guerilla factions, like the FAR (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes), who were determined to lead a communist revolution.

The communists failed miserably in their mission during the 1960s. Superior government forces who had been trained by the United States routed the communists, including a visit from the Green Berets that nearly decimated the communists into non-existence. After their failures, some leaders decided to change strategies. Whereas before the communists had tried to re-create the foco strategy of the Cuban Revolution of the island nation just across the Gulf of Mexico, some of the leaders now believed that they needed more of a prolonged people’s war, similar to the likes of the successful North Vietnamese movement. In Guatemala, the “people” are indigenous, so the communist guerilla Mario Payeras started creating alliances with indigenous people in the remote Western Highlands. Payeras’ band of guerillas, known as the EGP (Ejercito de Guerillas Pobres), built a coalition with the largest indigenous peasant organization in Guatemala, the CUC (Comite de Unidad Campesina). As the road to widespread war became more and more inevitable, the communist guerillas believed they had the support of hundreds of thousands of peasants by 1980.

What followed is one of the saddest chapters in the spiral of violence that encompassed the entire Western Hemisphere through the second half of the 20th century. A difficult question that Guatemalans and historians have to confront is how and why this Civil War, a common experience among Latin American countries at the time, turned to genocide. There are no easy answers. When the communists launched their offensives against the military, the government responded with a scorched-earth campaign that is responsible for the slaughter of 200,000 Mayan people. The government would sweep through the village and murder anyone who was there, regardless of their involvement (or lack thereof) in the guerilla movement. Unarmed women, children, and men were raped, terrorized, tortured, and murdered, their bodies desecrated by soldiers who were often recruited from the same types of communities they were razing. The Reagan regime funded the military’s efforts, afraid of another Nicaragua in Central America.

Following the genocide, the guerilla movement was essentially over. After the Cold War, the military regime was forced to negotiate a peace process and conclude the Civil War. Their crimes against humanity were investigated by the United Nations. Their report details the genocidal terror unleashed upon the Maya people.

Following the peace process, Guatemala dismantled 2/3 of its military. The soldiers who had belonged to one of the most highly trained and organized militaries in the Western hemisphere were largely granted immunity, allowing them to participate in private and public life within Guatemala. Some of these soldiers formed criminal organizations that provided intelligence gathering and hit squads for people willing to pay. Many former officers in the military became high-ranking politicians, ascending to the presidency and the Interior Minister in some cases (Insight Crime investigation). In addition to these criminal organizations who are highly connected to corruption in Guatemala’s government, there has also been the development of a serious gang problem in the country. Thus, a highly complex picture of crime, corruption, impunity, and violence in Guatemala arises. Alliances among criminal organizations can quickly disintegrate, people with enough money and power can bribe judges and dismantle investigations, and  in order for anything to be done, international organizations attempting to bring some semblance of justice to the country must work with government officials who are often profoundly corrupt.

International and domestic attempts have been made to hold high-ranking members of the military accountable for the genocide they ordered and carried out. These efforts have produced mixed results. One such example was the trial of General Efrain Rios Montt. In 2013, a court in Guatemala City convicted Rios Montt of genocide and other crimes against humanity, but, three days later, the Guatemalan Supreme Court nullified the decision on a technicality. Before the re-trial, Rios Montt died. Some military officers and criminals responsible for extraordinary violence have been found guilty, but the reality is that most of the former members of the military and the members of the criminal organizations that exist today live with impunity from their crimes, though it remains a violent, tumultuous, and uncertain impunity.

What is overwhelmingly tragic about the circumstances in Guatemala is the vulnerability of indigenous and mixed-race women and children. Indigenous Maya have faced violent oppression from racist governments for centuries. Now, heavily-armed gangs and criminal organizations control the territories in which these people live and exert a reign of terror over these communities. Over time, these people have responded to this oppression in a variety of ways. Sometimes, they protest non-violently, sometimes they take up arms against those persecuting them, sometimes they co-exist with their enemies and carve out whatever opportunities they can find, and sometimes they flee the violence, seeking a better set of circumstances than those in their home country.

Source: Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America and the Cold War. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Menchú, Rigoberta. I, Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Woman in Guatemala. Edited and Introduced by Elisabeth Burgos-Debray. Translated by Ann Wright. London, UK: Verso, 2009.

Further Reading:

https://thepanoptic.co.uk/2016/11/19/american-intervention-guatemala/

This article offers a detailed description of the Guatemalan Civil war, its origins, and its impact. Beginning with an analysis of the economic and racial conditions that preceded the Civil War in Guatemala, it describes the Arevalo and Arbenz administrations and the land reforms they pursued. The article then offers an account of the CIA-sponsored coup in 1954 and the Civil War that was started in 1960. Finally, the conflict between the government and the indigenous communities that resulted in a genocide is explained. This article focuses on the role of US Intervention and claims the responsibility for the genocide lays in the United States government and the military regime of Guatemala.

https://www.insightcrime.org/guatemala-organized-crime-news/guatemala/

Insight Crime is a fantastic resource for learning more about organized crime in Central America. This Guatemala profile reflects on the history of the Civil War, and connects this history to the modern circumstances in Guatemala. It explains the rise of drug smugglers, or transportistas, and how they established drug transportation networks with the support of corrupt military and police. As the country exited Civil War, it explains that the military and police stayed heavily involved in organized crime, and it also explain the growth of gangs, such as MS-13 and Barrio 18. This profile also seeks to explain the relationship between Mexican cartels and the organized crime networks in Guatemala. Additionally, the profile explores the judicial system and the prison systems in the largest Central American nation. Insight Crime has also conducted numerous investigations about Central American corruption and criminal organizations that offer a clearer picture of organized crime across the region.

https://www.usip.org/publications/1997/02/truth-commission-guatemala

This is to read more about the conclusions of the UN Truth Commission that found evidence of the genocide, find the report here. This also has some information about the prosecutions of war crimes over the last 2 decades.

https://www.thenation.com/article/border-patrol-guatemala-dictatorship/

To read about direct United States intervention in Guatemala and to learn about how Washington trained army commanders that ordered a genocide, see this source.

https://www.thenation.com/article/guatemala-refugee-crisis-jakelin-caal-maquin/

To read a heartbreaking account of what is happening at the border in the Trump administration, and to read about the intersections of race, gender, and age that produce particularly vulnerable migrants, read this source.

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