Margaux Miller
Central to the formation of gangs like Barrio 18 (or ‘Dieciocho’) and Mara Salvatrucha (or MS-13) is the history of civil war in Central American countries. In the late 20th century, a series of Civil wars erupted across the smattering of small countries in Central America. These wars were largely fought in resistance to layers of social, economic, and political inequality, a legacy of the region’s long relationship with colonialism (Grillo, 188). The conflicts proved to be some of the fiercest and bloodiest ever in the Americas, entailing full scale aerial bombardment, scorched earth tactics, and the laying of mass graves. In El Salvador, the fighting was between the leftist guerilla army Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMNL) and the U.S.-trained and -financed dictatorship, and left nearly 70,000 people dead, including many innocent civilians (Grillo, 196).
The rampant violence and political instability of the years leading up to and during the Civil War – which last from 1980 until 1992 – caused massive swells of immigrants to flee El Salvador to the United States (Grillo, 196). Most of the migrants were forced to live clandestine lives, due to the limited nature of Reagan-era asylum policy that denied most claims to asylum-seekers (Wolf, 71). Migrant experience was also one of marginalization: a majority of migrants lacked access to education or employment, consistent support networks, and access to state services and validation. Conditions of marginalization produced ethnically-specific Salvadoran gangs in Los Angeles, (including Barrio 18 and MS-13), because gang formation offered secure social identities that mainstream society denied to gang members (Wolf, 70). Notably, the formation of gangs by marginalized, ethnic minorities is not a new phenomenon in the U.S.: gangs date back to the early 1800’s (Ibid).
It was in the late 1980’s that tension and violence between Salvadoran gangs in L.A. started to grow particularly intense. The gangs had gone through processes of change: they had formed connections to other Latino mafias through prison sentences; they had swelled their ranks with new recruits; and they had actively hardened their street identities (Grillo, 200-201). L.A. police forces and the U.S. government were desperate to rid the city of seemingly insatiable, violent gang members. Rather than address the systemic issues that produced gang culture in U.S. cities, authorities began to repatriate gang members to their home nations. U.S. authorities were delighted when the Salvadoran government and the FMLN brokered a peace deal in Mexico in 1993: rather than repatriate Salvadorans to war-torn and violent country, they could return them to their homeland under the guise that the young men would be contributors in building the new democratic state (Grillo, 203). Immigration reform in 1996 stipulated that non-citizens who were doing more than a year in prison and/or committed a minor offense could be repatriated, allowing further repatriation. In dealing with “the immigrant problem”, the U.S. authorities send thousands of Americanized Salvadorans with violent street experience to a country still struggling to grasp stability, where the deportees – in coping with their deportation and marginalization – reproduced gang culture within a new and fragile setting. (Douglas, 56).
Salvadoran gangs have since grown and mutated. One of the central forces behind this has been the implementation of mano dura – or hard hand – policy. The policies put hundreds behind bars, but were still largely ineffective at eradicating gangs. the policies prompted MS-13 and Dieciocho (18) to toughen and increase the risk of their entry requirements, increase their militarization and lethality, diversify their leadership hierarchies, and become more covert in communication and style, in order to reduce infiltration and amplify control. The policies also had the “cockroach effect”: fearing arrest, gang affiliates dispersed to nearby neighboring countries, serving to actually spread gang influence. Murder rates rose due to increasingly fierce competition over territory under governmental fire (Farah, 57-9).
Popular perception of gang activity is often wrapped up with that of drug trafficking organizations, and it can be very difficult to piece apart the two entities. Notably, a relationship between the two does exist. Gang influence is so expansive that drug traffickers – who largely exist in criminal organizations institutionally distinct from gangs – were forced to incorporate gang members into the trafficking process. The geographic positioning of Central America also exposes it to drug trafficking: around 90% of cocaine designated for U.S. markets flows through Central America, deeming it an important “transnational shipment route.,” (Farah, 53, 57). In the past decade, gangs have shifted from being primarily protectors of shipments, to holding larger and riskier roles, which has increased their economic input and allowed for accumulation of larger weapons. It should be noted, however, that gangs and cartels are very different in their capacity for crime, even if some of their criminal activities overlap. Trafficking organizations tend to execute longer-term, advanced strategic violence in the defense of criminal enterprise, while street gangs typically use short term, tactical violence (in crimes such as extortion and kidnapping) that lacks logistical sophistication. In short, street gangs tend to be weaker in organization than myth makes them out to be (Wolf, 82-84).
In 2013, a covert truce was brokered by the Salvadoran federal security minister David Munguía Payés in attempts to quell rampant violence between ranking members of Barrio 18 and MS-13. The 2013 truce brokering did contribute to lowering murder rates: officials released ranking gang members who supported demilitarization to lower security prisons, where they were able to spread the message to put down arms in “violence free zones,” (Grillo, 223). Within days the truce was uncovered by independent journalists and released to the public. Just a year after it began, the truce ended due to administrative shifts and deep criticism of the government’s willingness to work with gangsters. Sinces its end, violence has picked back up (Grillo, 224). The truce tactic is especially interesting to think about in relation to mano dura policy, and this comparison begs the question of what successful gang suppression truly could look like.
Further Suggested Reading
“El Salvador Is Trying to Stop Gang Violence. But the Trump Administration Keeps Pushing Failed “Iron First” Policing,” by Danielle Mackey & Cora Currier (October 2, 2018) https://theintercept.com/2018/10/02/el-salvador-gang-violence-prevention/
This article, published by a trustworthy source, provides anecdotal evidence about the nature an individual’s gang involvement, an interesting perspective on economic rehabilitation of former gang members, and a look into the tenuous politics of United States-Latin American foreign policy.
“Five myths about MS-13,” by José Miguel Cruz (June 29, 2018)
This piece by the Washington Post is a straight forward, comprehensible attack on popular myths about MS-13. It debunks narratives that have been used and abused in national rhetoric about the “threats” gangs pose to national security, and fills in the vacuum with actual facts.
“Time for a US Apology to El Salvador,” by Raymond Bonner (April 15, 2016)
https://www.thenation.com/article/time-for-a-us-apology-to-el-salvador/
This article discusses the involvement of the United States in increasing the violence of El Salvador’s Civil War (1980 – 1992). The Salvadoran Civil War was the context that prompted thousands of Salvadorans to flee their homes. The end of the war and the subsequent establishment of democracy in El Salvador acted a justification, despite its fragility, for the United States in repatriating large numbers of Salvadorans convicted of gang violence and other crime.