Recent Central American History

By Alexandra Smith

CW: Sexual Assault

Two cities on the US-Mexico border, Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez, have experienced massive spikes in homicide rates since the intensification of the drug conflict in Mexico in 2006. These cities are important sites for battles between rival cartels because they are major entry-points into the United States, the world’s largest drug market. The rate of violence in these cities demonstrates the inability of the Mexican police to respond to high levels of violence and the way that violence is geographically oriented around the relationship between Mexican trafficking organizations and American consumers.

In 2018, 2,518 murders occurred in Tijuana, with around 90% estimated to be related to drug trafficking.[1] Violence in Tijuana is connected to competition between the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and the Sinaloa Cartel. Both have local allies: the CJNG are connected to the Tijuana Cartel, while the Sinaloa Cartel works with the local Los Dámaso network.[2] A report by Zeta magazine, which reports on drug trafficking and is not connected to the drug trafficking organization of the same name, shows that the two sides have been engaged in murder and kidnapping campaigns against each other.[3] Baja California, the state where this conflict is occurring, had a homicide rate of 89 per 100,000 residents in 2018, the second highest of any Mexican state.[4]

The Mexican state response to violence in Tijuana has been unimpressive. Between 2010 and 2016, only 4% of killings in the city resulted in a conviction for the crime.[5] Under the new national guard program, violence has only slightly decreased, with a reduction of 321 killings in 2019 compared to the 2018 figure.[6] Proponents of the policy under the presidency of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) say they are fighting impunity with more arrests, but with the number of killings remaining over 2,000 per year in the city.

Ciudad Juarez is another example of a border town with high rates of violence. From 2008 to 2013, a violent conflict between the Sinaloa Cartel and the Juarez Cartel resulted in the deaths of nearly 10,000 people.[7] The conflict began when the Sinaloa Cartel began to infringe upon the Juarez Cartel’s strong ties to the local police in order to begin attempt to take control of the city’s illegal economy.[8] Officials connected to the local cartel were replaced and on the ground level, violent confrontations broke out between different gangs.[9] Eventually, violence fell from the peak of 3,600 homicides in 2010, but murder rates in the city remain high, with 1,440 murders in 2017.[10] As long as Ciudad Juarez remains an entry-point to the American drug market, there will be reasons for drug trafficking organizations to compete for control.

The situation in the border cities also exacerbates the current migrant crisis caused by American immigration and asylum policies. Thanks to the “Remain in Mexico” program, thousands of refugees and migrants from Central America are being housed in camps near Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez.[11] Insight Crime analysis argues that “as criminal groups have fragmented, the smaller competing groups that have emerged have resorted to extreme violence and diversifying their criminal portfolios to also include crimes like extortion and kidnappings. Vulnerable migrants waiting in Mexico without any legitimate protection are the perfect prospects for such groups to prey upon.”[12]

Cartels have even collaborated with Mexican law enforcement to prey on refugees. In one case, Mexican federal police kidnapped a Honduran woman waiting to enter the United States in Ciudad Juarez. They turned her over to a cartel, whose members sexually assaulted her and extorted $5,000 from her mother who lived in the United States.[13] This case demonstrates the ways that US policy endangers people seeking to enter the United States, provides easy targets for drug trafficking organizations, and that the Mexican state security forces cannot be reliably trusted to protect innocent people.

Further Reading:

1. For more information on the conflict between the Sinaloa Federation and the CJNG: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/west-mexico-erupts-in-violence-in-next-generation-cartel-wars/
2. For a report on violence and conflict between Drug Trafficking organizations in Juarez, read the report from Insight Crime: https://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/juarez.pdf  
3. For information on the ways Drug Trafficking Organizations prey on migrants and asylum seekers stopped at the Mexico border: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/migrants-prey-us-remain-mexico-program/

[1] https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/gamechangers-2019-mexico-body-count-amlo/

[2] https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/west-mexico-erupts-in-violence-in-next-generation-cartel-wars/

[3] https://zetatijuana.com/2016/10/ex-federales-en-cartel-jalisco/

[4] https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf

[5] https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-01-07/tijuana-drug-violence

[6] IBID

[7] https://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/juarez.pdf

[8] https://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/juarez.pdf

[9] https://www.insightcrime.org/images/PDFs/2016/juarez.pdf

[10] https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/desde-prision-desatan-el-infierno-en-ciudad-juarez

[11] https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/migrants-prey-us-remain-mexico-program/

[12] Ibid

[13] https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/mexico-police-collude-criminals-kidnap-migrant/

By Alexandra Smith

The “Drug War” framing of conflicts surrounding narcotrafficking suggests two sides in a pitched conflict: the state and drug cartels. However, drug traffickers across the region, and especially in Mexico, have relied on collaboration with state forces at multiple levels to protect their operations. Mexico’s long-time ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), is alleged to have had a close relationship with the dominant Sinaloa Federation during its governance of the country. At a local level, bribery of police officers ensures that traffickers can continue to operate with impunity. With the decline of the PRI, high-level government collaboration with the cartels is less organized and state responses are uneven. 

The PRI and the Sinaloa Federation had a symbiotic relationship during much of the twentieth century. The Sinaloa Federation, which began to coalesce in the 1960s and 70s, is alleged to have gained protection from Mexico’s one-party state and the PRI gained stability in the drug world by propping up a hegemonic cartel.[1] This relationship was challenged by the intervention of the United States’ Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), which pressured the Mexican state to crackdown on traffickers, especially after the murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena in early 1985.[2] Over the next two decades, processes led to the decline of both the PRI and the Sinaloa Federation. Competition between regional drug trafficking groups within the Sinaloa Federation led to its splintering beginning in 1990, though levels of public violence were not particularly high.[3] Beginning in 1989, opposition parties to the PRI, such at the conservative National Action Party (PAN) began to grow, winning elections against the once hegemonic party. The PRI was also forced to address the growing public accusations of their connection to Sinaloa, leading to arrests of both PRI members and officials in 1996.[4]

However, while the declines of the PRI and the Sinaloa Federation meant it was harder for the state and drug traffickers to work together, it did not mean that violence was guaranteed to spike. The PAN victory in 2000 led to a change in policy from the PRI:  the new president Vicente Fox used federal forces to increase arrests of Drug Traffickers.[5] Accusations of alliances between politicians and traffickers continued, though the multi-party system meant that different regional governments could form corrupt pacts with competing organizations.[6] This is most exemplified by an event in 2005, when federal officers got into a “shootout” with city police in Nuevo Laredo.[7] This power vacuum, with competing cartels and no coherent government response, is what allowed violence to get out of control. 

At the local level, police corruption is widespread, making the police force an unreliable source of protection for victims of drug traffickers. Insight Crime argues that “the ease with which corruption spreads inside the police forces and the vast impunity for participating officers means that successive government reforms have shown no concrete results.”[8] In 2017, a survey showed that there were “an average of 1,688 corruption cases registered for every 1,000 active duty police officers.”[9] Police function within the framework of a state which often intentionally collaborates with drug traffickers, but they also have their own reasons to seek bribes or participate in illegal activities. Police “lack adequate training and support, receive dismal salaries, and must work long hours because of understaffing,” all of which give them incentives to supplement their income through relationships with drug traffickers.[10] The result is a lack in faith in police by members of the public, who understand that turning to the police may make them less safe. A 2018 survey showed that “just 6.1 percent of people have confidence in the federal police, while only 4.6 percent are confident in the municipal police.”[11] Mexican civilians have a justified fear of interacting with police officers, and the 2018 survey shows how universal these sentiments are.

Further Reading:

1. For information on the public perception of police in Mexico, read: https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/police-reform-mexico/
2. For information on the impact of state responses to DTOs, including Kingpin strategy: https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/11/el-chapo-trial-mexico-drug-war
3. For accusations of collaboration between government forces and the Sinaloa Federation:  https://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-government-and-the-sinaloa-cartel-2014-1

[1] Angelica Duran Martinez, The Politics of Drug Violence (Oxford University Press, 2018): 93.

[2] Ibid: 93.

[3] Ibid: 95.

[4] Ibid: 98.

[5] Ioan Grillo, Narco Warlords (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2001): 253-4. 

[6] Ibid: 255.

[7] Ibid: 255.

[8] https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/entire-police-forces-continue-arrested-mexico/

[9] https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/entire-police-forces-continue-arrested-mexico/

[10] https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/police-reform-mexico/

[11] https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/police-reform-mexico/

By Alexandra Smith

The conflict between the Mexican state, narcotraffickers, and other non-state actors has led to a crisis which has seen hundreds of thousands of murders and tens of thousands of disappearances since 2006.[1] A variety of cartels operate in Mexico, ranging from well-known organizations operating across state and national borders to small, local groups who inevitably work with larger cartels. These cartels profit off of the drug trade, but they supplement their income through extortion and relationships with corrupt government officials, as well other, often legal, business ventures.

The most prominent cartel operating in Mexico remains the Sinaloa Cartel, based in the mountainous west coast state of the same name. The Sinaloa cartel thrived through a strong relationship with the PRI, the political party which dominated all levels of Mexico’s government since the Mexican revolution until the 90s when they began losing local elections. However, with Mexico’s democratization in 2000, the Sinaloa cartel has lost many of its government connections, allowing other cartels to compete, driving up levels of violence.

One of the Sinaloa cartel’s biggest rivals is currently the Jalisco Cartel – New Generation (CJNG), based in Central Mexico. The CJNG and other small groups “rely on a wider range of criminal activities to offset some of the losses from international drug trafficking” such as kidnapping and extortion.[2] This demonstrates how competition between cartels encourages smaller groups to act out violently, both for profit and to intimidate rival organizations. Another example of the range of activities of Mexican cartels is the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel, a local cartel which operates in Guanajuato, which engages in oil theft and extortion of small business owners.[3] The cartel is an example how local groups still act in violent ways which impact civilians, even outside of the regions most well-known for drug trafficking.

Insight Crime describes a number of well-known cartels, “The Gulf Cartel, the Beltrán Leyva Organization, the Zetas, Familia Michoacana, the Juárez Cartel, the Tijuana Cartel and the Knights Templar” as being in decline.[4] All of these cartels rose from regional to national prominence before eventually declining, some originally as subcontractors to other groups. Familia Michoacana is an example of a drug trafficking group which initially described itself as a community defense organization, but then developed into a narcotrafficking group. These groups owe their decline to a variety reasons, all of them violent: splits in leadership leading to violent confrontations, the rise of vigilantism in the case of La Familia, or the expansion of rival cartels.  

While they have been diversifying their activities in recent years, drug trafficking organizations in Mexico still gain the majority of their incomes from selling drugs to American consumers. The American demand for drugs has been historically unlimited and the price for drugs like cocaine is much higher in the United States than in Colombia or Mexico.[5]

One new source of income for the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG is fentanyl. Fentanyl is often laced into other drugs trafficked by the cartels, such as heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamines as has played a major role in the opioid epidemic.[6] A report by Insight Crime demonstrates that “the fentanyl trade requires vast networks of smaller subcontractors who specialize in importing, producing, and transporting synthetic drugs.” These characteristics are demonstrative of how the drug trade in Mexico functions: multiple groups work together to profit off of trends in American drug consumption.

The business of Mexican drug cartels is constantly shifting due to changes in American drug markets and different state responses to cartel activity. They also have complex relations with each other, sometimes subcontracting work to each other, at other times erupting into violent conflicts to secure markets. These conflicts impact all members of the community, as profit-driven violence entangles bystanders or cartels turn to extortion and kidnapping to supplement their incomes. Many cartels are regional, while some operate at a national or international level, but their interconnectedness cannot be ignored.  

Further Reading:

1. For the latest news regarding Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations, see: https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/mexico/  
2. For a map of where certain trafficking groups operate, see: https://www.stratfor.com/sites/default/files/styles/wv_small/public/mexico-cartel-map-all-011419_0.png?itok=t0WJ1ytI
3. A DEA report on which Mexican cartels sell drugs in American cities: https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/dir06515.pdf
4. For a collection of visualizations of drug trafficking routes through Mexico and the United States: https://www.storybench.org/visualizing-mexicos-drug-cartels-roundup-maps/

[1] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/06/mexico-drug-war-missing-estimate

[2] https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/mexico/   

[3] https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/mexico-oil-thieves-guanajuato-extortion/

[4] https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/mexico/

[5] https://psmag.com/social-justice/drug-cartels-are-too-big-to-fail-or-jail

[6] https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Fentanyl-Report-InSight-Crime-19-02-11.pdf

By Alexandra Smith

The following list is incomplete because it is impossible to fully document the cartels operating in Mexico. The power and structures of cartels are constantly shifting. These cartels are merely the most prominent cartels at the time of writing.

The Sinaloa Cartel is Mexico’s most prominent, powerful, and long-lasting cartel. The Sinaloa cartel is based out of the western Mexican state of the same name, a home to trafficking operations since the early twentieth century due to its long Pacific coastline and mountainous terrain. The cartel dominated the early Mexican drug economy and formed a close relation with the PRI, Mexico’s ruling party during the one-party state period from the Mexican Revolution to 2000. Today, the cartel has reduced political influence due to the rise of multiple parties in the Mexican political system and the emergence of competing cartels. However, it remains incredibly powerful and operates across western Mexico and in cities on the US-Mexico border.[1] The cartel operates in 17 states and up to 50 countries.

The Tijuana Cartel or Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) is a trafficking organization operating on the US-Mexico border and functions as a “tollgate” organization. They profit off of charging taxes to other drug trafficking organizations moving drugs through plazas controlled by the AFO, especially in the border town of Tijuana. The AFO has been involved in an increasingly violent situation in Tijuana, with the Sinaloa Cartel and the CJNG competing for influence at the border crossing since 2015. Different factions within the AFO have emerged and its continued relevance is in flux.[2][3]

The Juarez Cartel is another cartel operating on the US-Mexico border and is involved in violent conflicts with the Sinaloa cartel. The Juarez Cartel originally worked with the Sinaloa Cartel and provided transportation and security for drugs produced elsewhere, including Colombian cocaine. While the Juarez cartel is based in Ciudad Juarez, it operates in twenty-one states. A rivalry with the Sinaloa cartel erupted in the early 2000s, leading Ciudad Juarez to become one of the most dangerous cities in Mexico since 2008.[4] The cartel primarily operates in Tijuana.

La Familia Michoacána and the Knights Templar are two competing cartels operating in the central state of Michoacán. La Familia emerged as an organization which advertised itself as a community defense organization, defending the state from national drug trafficking organizations. However, their actual origin was as a drug trafficking group aligned with the Zetas and they continued to be involved with the methamphetamine trade, among other synthetic drugs. The Knights Templar split from La Familia, also declaring a “commitment to social justice” and evangelical Christianity.[5] The Knights Templar largely won out in the conflict leading to the marginalization of La Familia, but both have been challenged by the vigilante autodefensas.

Los Zetas are one of the most well-known cartels, especially due to their reputation for public displays of violence. Los Zetas were formed by defectors from Mexican special operations and originally worked for the Gulf Cartel on the eastern coast of Mexico. They broke from the Gulf cartel and utilized an approach based on violently seizing territory across Mexico and Guatemala. However, the group has splintered since its rise to fame and no longer exists as a cohesive organization. Its splinters operate in different forms across its previous territories.[6] Today, the Zetas operate in Tamaulipas and the Gulf Coast states.

The Gulf Cartel is another long-lasting organization in Mexico, operating in the northeast of Mexico. The Gulf cartel was once quite powerful during the 1990s and early 2000s, and still exists despite a decline caused in part by the split by the Zetas and arrest of the cartel’s leader.[7] The cartel’s control over border cities like Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, and Reynosa allow it to continue to profit off of trafficking into the United States. The Gulf Cartel operates in Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, and 11 other states across eastern Mexico.

The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) is a rising cartel in Central Mexico, which only emerged in 2010, after a fight over drug trafficking in Jalisco.[8] The CJNG has used extreme violence in their fight with the Zetas, claiming responsibility for a 2011 massacre of 35 in Veracruz, and in 2015, they killed 15 Mexican police officers in Jalisco.[9] The CJNG is believed to have assets of over $20 billion and they operate in 20 states across Mexico, making it one of the most powerful cartels.[10] Insight Crime reports that “according to authorities, the CJNG operates in at least in 22 states: Aguascalientes, Baja California Sur, Baja California, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Puebla, Querétaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, Jalisco, Colima, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Morelos, Nayarit, Guerrero, and Veracruz, plus Mexico City and the State of Mexico.”

Further Reading:

1. For profiles of these groups and other smaller cartels, go to the groups section of the Mexico page on Insight Crime: https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/
2. For a map of where certain trafficking groups operate, see: https://www.stratfor.com/sites/default/files/styles/wv_small/public/mexico-cartel-map-all-011419_0.png?itok=t0WJ1ytI
3. A DEA report on which Mexican cartels sell drugs in American cities: https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/dir06515.pdf
4. For a collection of visualizations of drug trafficking routes through Mexico and the United States: https://www.storybench.org/visualizing-mexicos-drug-cartels-roundup-maps/

[1] https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/sinaloa-cartel-profile/

[2] https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf

[3] https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/tijuana-cartel-profile/

[4] https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/juarez-cartel-profile/

[5]https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf  24.

[6] https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/zetas-profile/

[7] https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/gulf-cartel-profile/

[8] https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/jalisco-cartel-new-generation/

[9] https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/bloody-attack-police-mexico-raises-jalisco-cartel-profile/

[10] https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/jalisco-cartel-new-generation/