Archive for May, 2019

Violence in Guatemala

Posted in Central American Gangs, Guatemala with tags , , , on May 10, 2019 by dsmith41

Emma Lightizer

In the last half of the twentieth century, Guatemala was defined by its 36-year-long civil war and the genocide it committed against indigenous Maya in the 1980s (Martin). Today, violence against women and indigenous people, drug trafficking, gang activity, and weak or corrupt state and local authorities present persistent risks to people’s personal security.

            Drug-trafficking organizations and Central American gangs are not the same thing, but both do exist in Guatemala. Gangs like the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 cause many of the same violent problems in Guatemala as they do in other Central American countries: territory disputes, rape, murder, extortion, and robbery. However, drug-trafficking organizations have a special interest in Guatemala because the country’s position just south of Mexico’s border makes it a crucial pathway for the transit of drugs into the United States (Martínez 46). Traditionally, drug-trafficking work was outsourced to local gang cliques or independent drug traffickers in the country. In recent years, though, Mexican drug-trafficking organizations have built a stronger and more constant physical presence in Guatemala, claiming several towns and cities as their territories (Martínez 163). The introduction of the Zetas, an especially violent Mexican drug-trafficking organization, has greatly reduced citizens’ security in the city of Alta Verapaz as well as the other areas where they operate (Martínez 50).

            Drug-related violence also extends to state and local authorities. For example, in 2013, every police officer present in an entire station was killed in retaliation for the arrest of a drug trafficker’s son (Martínez 145). The “Massacre of Salcajá,” as the event was called, initiated the launch of an investigation, openly called “Operation Dignity,” but it was ineffective in ending the control that narcotraffickers had over the region (Martínez 153). Police and other authorities in Guatemala are often too weak to do much to control drug traffickers, and impunity runs wild as a result.

Instead of getting tangled up with strong organizations, Guatemalan authorities often target weaker, individual drug-traffickers or poor “campesino” farmers they accuse of growing drugs and invading protected forest land (Martínez 64). This gives authorities the advantage of looking like they’re dealing with the problem while simultaneously not risking a firefight with large-scale organizations (Martínez 66). In some localities, this is also the result of corrupt politicians who explicitly work with larger drug-trafficking organizations to secure a monopoly on the trade in their area (Martínez 70). This has meant that many poor and indigenous farmers have been accused of working with drug traffickers and have been kicked off their land and deprived of their livelihoods (Martínez 73).

In addition to these types of violence that affect all Guatemalans, there are particular dangers for women and indigenous people. Guatemala is the country with the third highest rate of femicide globally, and women are also very likely to be victims of rape and domestic violence (Johnson). The impunity that exists for other crimes in Guatemala extends to violence against women, but is perhaps even more intense due to a widespread indifference to the human rights of women. This means that women generally do not receive protection from the state, while they are simultaneously at a higher risk of becoming victims of violence (Johnson). In some cases, local authorities are even complicit or feign ignorance to allow sex trafficking rings to maintain operation. For example, the Barberena ring in southern Guatemala operated for several years while local police officers enjoyed the status of “VIP clients” and took part in the rape and sexual assault of the women held there (Martínez 219).

Indigenous people, and especially Maya, are common targets of kidnapping, assault, and murder (Martin). They are also frequently among those campesinos who are kicked off their land and accused of being narcos. Recent up-ticks in violence against indigenous people, and especially against indigenous activists, have brought about concerns of a return to the cycle of violence that initiated the genocide of Maya people in the 1980s (Martin).

Bibliography:

Johnson, Sarah. “Can Health Workers Stop Thousands of Women Being Killed in Guatemala?” The Guardian. March 07, 2018. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/healthcare-network/2018/mar/07/health-workers-stop-thousand-women-killed-guatemala-femicide.

Martin, Maria. “Killings Of Guatemala’s Indigenous Activists Raise Specter Of Human Rights Crisis.” NPR. January 22, 2019. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/01/22/685505116/killings-of-guatemalas-indigenous-activists-raise-specter-of-human-rights-crisis.

Martínez, Óscar Enrique. A History of Violence: Living and Dying in Central America. London: Verso, 2017.

Further Reading:

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/guatemalas-bloody-battle-with-mexican-drug-cartels-6257571.html

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guatemala-humantrafficking/guatemala-closes-its-eyes-to-rampant-child-sex-trafficking-u-n-idUSKCN0YU29V

https://www.npr.org/2019/01/22/685505116/killings-of-guatemalas-indigenous-activists-raise-specter-of-human-rights-crisis

https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/guatemalas-small-businesses-pot-of-gold/

Violence in El Salvador

Posted in Central American Gangs, El Salvador with tags , on May 10, 2019 by dsmith41

Emma Lightizer

El Salvador has been gripped by violence since its twelve-year civil war that ended in 1992. At the time, thousands of Salvadorans sought asylum in the United States, and some of them ended up forming gangs for mutual protection in Los Angeles. When the United States initiated its policy of deporting foreign nationals found guilty of committing a crime in the United States, gangs like the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 were exported to El Salvador and grew to unprecedented levels of membership and violence. Decades after that initial increase in gang activity, what does violence in El Salvador look like?

            Most violence comes in the form of extortion, rape, and murders (especially of people aligned with rival gangs). Extortion is the main source of income for many cliques (Wolf 78). Gang members feel entitled to demand “rent” from local businesses: regular payments from bus drivers, local shops, restaurants, students, and teachers (Savenije 153). These payments are accompanied with threats of physical violence, robbery, or murder, and if anyone is unable to pay, they are forced out of business or killed (Wolf 78). An inability or unwillingness to pay gangs extortion money leads to hundreds of retaliatory murders and dozens of arson cases, among other violent consequences (Wolf 78). Gang members have no remorse for this method of getting money because “nobody gives us [gang members] work,” (Savenije 153).

Rape of women and children is also common in El Salvador. Gang members often demand sex and use their power over certain territories to force women and girls to comply (UNHCR 9). They sometimes use rape as a bargaining tool, promising not to use other forms of violence if girls are compliant: for example, gang members told one eight-year-old girl that they wouldn’t kill her little brother if she let them rape her, then they killed both children anyway (Martínez 118).

In El Salvador, many types of murders are common; these include retaliatory killings in cases of extortion or refusal to join a gang, the murder of women or girls who refuse to sleep with gang members, and sicariato (murder for hire) (Wolf 85). It is also common for gang members to kidnap and murder wealthier individuals as an additional source of income; they use their credit cards, steal their belongings, or post a ransom for them under the false premise that they are not yet dead (Wolf 82). Murder is also common against ex-gang members who testify in court; for example, El Niño Hollywood was murdered in 2014 after he testified against nineteen fellow gang members for murder (Martínez 139). Although he was supposedly under witness protection by the state, and although his murder occurred within mere meters of the police station, “there was never any search for or investigation of the killers” (Martínez 139). El Niño’s case was not unusual: most murders in El Salvador go uninvestigated, and even when investigations into murders or mass graves do occur, they are often underfunded and therefore unsuccessful.

A large portion of the murders that occur are directed against rival gang members (Wolf 85). Disputes over territory lead to shoot-outs, and murders of rival gang members are sometimes required as initiation rites (Wolf 72). Additionally, gangs sometimes kill “homeboys that couldn’t handle their shit”: that is, they kill fellow gang members who endanger other members through recklessness or who cannot deal with the harshness of gang life (Martínez 99). Even within overfilled jails, rivalries are not controlled and sometimes lead to massacres (Martínez 176). In cases like the Mariona massacre of 2004 or the Apanteos massacre in 2011, rivalries between MS-13, Barrio 18, and civilian prisoners erupt and inmates break down the walls in order to “pull out nails,” or collect payment for debts and exact revenge for past wrongs (Martínez 174). Guards are unable to stop these massacres from happening and often don’t even try to. For example, the warden of Apanteos said of the 2011 massacre that “[w]e can’t be held responsible for what we can’t avoid” (Martínez 169). The lack of resources both inside and outside of jails means that impunity is widespread for crimes committed by Salvadoran gangs.

Bibliography:

“Children on the Run – Full Report.” UNHCR, 2014, www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/ background/56fc266f4/children-on-the-run-full-report.html.

Martínez, Óscar Enrique. A History of Violence: Living and Dying in Central America. London: Verso, 2017.

Savenije, Wim. Maras Y Barras: Pandillas Y Violencia Juvenil En Los Barrios Marginales De Centroamérica. El Salvador: Facultad Latinoamericana De Ciencias Sociales, 2009

Wolf, Sonja. “Mara Salvatrucha: The Most Dangerous Street Gang in the Americas?”. Latin American Politics and Society 54, no. 1 (2012): 65-99. (JSTOR)

Further Reading:

https://www.thenation.com/article/diary-of-not-excavating-a-mass-grave-in-el-salvador/

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/el-salvador-women-gangs-ms-13-trump-violence/554804/

https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/el-salvador/life-under-gang-rule-el-salvador

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-el-salvador-extortion-idUSKCN0Y71QW

Nicaragua – Recent History

Posted in Nicaragua with tags , , , on May 10, 2019 by dsmith41

Emma Lightizer

From 1937 until 1979, Nicaragua was politically and militarily controlled by a U.S.-supported dictatorship led by three members of the Somoza family in turn: Anastasio Somoza García, Luis Somoza Debayle, and Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Although they were not formally the only heads of state during that time, the three of them combined held the Presidency for thirty years and worked through puppet leaders during the other thirteen years of their collective control (Brown).

            The dictatorship became more repressive under the leadership of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. In 1967, his regime carried out a massacre in front of the National Assembly building (Arévalo Alemán). It is estimated that at least 200 people were killed and one thousand wounded out of the thousands who were there peacefully protesting the lack of free elections (Arévalo Alemán). In response to attempts by Sandinista (FSLN) revolutionaries to overthrow the dictatorship, Somoza Debayle ruled under martial law from 1974 onward (Encyclopaedia Britannica). Finally, U.S. President Carter withdrew support for the regime, and in 1979 Somoza Debayle was forced by the Sandinistas and the Conservative party to resign from his position; he was later assassinated in Paraguay (Encyclopaedia Britannica).

            When Somoza lost power, the Sandinistas gained control of the country and Daniel Ortega assumed the presidency. He nationalized many businesses and tried to maintain control over the country through the use of force, and despite Carter’s attempts to court favor, Nicaragua was soon aligned with Cuba and the USSR (Brown). When Reagan became president in the U.S., he stopped the policy of trying to appease the Sandinista government and instead helped fund and train Nicaraguan “Contras,” counter-revolutionaries based in neighboring Honduras that wanted to oust the Sandinista party from power (Brown). As interventionary tactics had lost favor with the general populace in the wake of the Vietnam War, the CIA turned to covert and illegal operations, funneling weapons and aid to the Contras through Iran in what became known as the Iran-Contra Scandal (Brown). Although the operation drew massive protest from the U.S. when it came to light, it was successful in aiding the counter-revolutionary cause, such that by 1989 the Sandinistas had all but lost to the Contras. In 1990, Ortega was beaten in an internationally-observed election, and the Sandinistas officially lost power (Encyclopedia.com).

            From 1990 to 2007, Nicaragua had an uneasy democracy that contended with the huge national debt, the downsizing and conversion of the Sandinista military into a national military, and high unemployment (Encyclopedia.com). On top of this, Nicaragua had to confront the historical legacy of the revolution and counterrevolution, which cost a combined estimate of 65,000 lives between 1978 and 1990 (Lacina, 404-6).

            In 2007, Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista party returned to power through an election (Pérez). Since then, Ortega has worked to solidify Sandinista control over all branches of government by appointing members of his own party to several judicial and legislative positions  (Pérez). He has maintained his position through questionable elections, and many criticize him for undermining Nicaragua’s developing democracy. In 2018, popular protests erupted in response to social security reforms that cost people more while giving them worse benefits (Pérez). Ortega’s government responded violently, working with parapolice forces to kill over 200 protesters (Pérez). In the wake of Ortega’s violent tactics of political control, some people have begun comparing him to Somoza, with bad implications for the future of Nicaraguan democracy.

Bibliography:

“Anastasio Somoza Debayle.” Encyclopædia Britannica. April 21, 2019. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Anastasio-Somoza-Debayle.

Arévalo Alemán, Raúl. “Hoy Se Recuerda La Masacre Del 22 De Enero De 1967 Por La Dictadura De Somoza Debayle.” La Jornada. January 22, 2016. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://lajornadanet.com/diario/archivo/2016/enero/22/4.php.

Lacina, Bethany. PRIO. September 2009. Accessed May 9, 2019. https://www.prio.org/Global/upload/CSCW/Data/PRIObd3.0_documentation.pdf.

“Nicaragua and Iran Timeline.” Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs. Accessed May 9, 2019. https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/timeline-n-i.php.

Pérez, Orlando J. “Can Nicaragua’s Military Prevent a Civil War?” Foreign Policy. July 03, 2018. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/03/can-nicaraguas-military-prevent-a-civil-war/.

“Violeta Barrios De Chamorro.” Encyclopedia of World Biography. 2019. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/nicaragua-history-biographies/violeta-barrios-de-chamorro.

Further Reading:

https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/nicaragua-on-the-brink-once-again https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/03/can-nicaraguas-military-prevent-a-civil-war/

https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/timeline-n-i.php

https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/nicaragua-history-biographies/violeta-barrios-de-chamorro

Mano Dura (Firm Hand) policies in Central America

Posted in Central American Gangs, El Salvador, Guatemala with tags , on May 10, 2019 by dsmith41

Emma Lightizer

Gangs have been an issue in El Salvador since before its twelve-year civil war ended in 1992. However, the problem became much more visible and violent after the United States initiated its policy of deporting any foreign nationals found guilty of committing a crime. Thousands of gang members from the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18, both founded in the U.S., were deported to their countries of origin, intensifying the violence and instability already present in Central America during the 1990s.

One set of policies that Central American countries have employed to try to gain control over the gang problem is known as “Mano Dura,” meaning “firm hand” or “iron fist.” In El Salvador, this policy was first put in place by President Francisco Flores in 2003 (Wolf 49). Mano Dura created joint military and police anti-gang squads who made a spectacle out of arrests, hoping to gain public support by looking tough on gangs. The policy also included the Ley Anti Maras, or Anti-Gang Law, which made gang membership itself a crime and allowed the squads to arrest people based on their appearance alone (Wolf 50). The law applied to anyone at least twelve years of age, meaning that many children were arrested for looking like gang members (Wolf 50). However, the Ley Anti Maras was challenged in court, and many judges refused to charge those arrested for alleged gang membership on the grounds that the Ley Anti Maras violated Salvadorans’ constitutional rights. Ninety-five percent of those arrested under the law were released without charges due to lack of evidence (Wolf 51).

There were several claims that Mano Dura wasn’t doing enough, so the policy was rebranded as “Súper Mano Dura” under the next president, Antonio Saca. This version of the law added “Mano Amiga” and “Mano Extendida,” purported policies of rehabilitation and prevention for gang members, but the two new policies were more talk than reality. They were chronically underfunded and poorly organized, and were only there to offer the president some credibility on paper of taking a more complex approach to the gang problem. Official policy continued to ignore the realms of prevention and rehabilitation, instead focusing on harsher punishments against gang members (Wolf 54).

Although Mano Dura is a Salvadoran policy, it has corollaries in other Central American countries. Honduras, for example, launched its “Blue Freedom Plan” the year before Flores’ Mano Dura in El Salvador. Honduras’ plan included several of the same measures as Mano Dura: zero tolerance, the cooperation of police and military forces against gangs, and the use of tattoos and other physical traits as markers of gang membership (García). In Guatemala, indiscriminate arrests of possible gang members were initiated in 2003 under “Plan Sweep.” Even though this and other anti-gang legislation was explicitly rejected by Guatemalan courts, officials continued to arrest suspected gang members under a zero tolerance policy; much like in El Salvador, most of these arrests were overturned due to a lack of evidence (García).

All of these policies have been wildly unsuccessful–and even counterproductive. Since gang members were being targeted based on appearance, they adapted and started being less obvious about their gang membership, hiding tattoos under clothing or foregoing them altogether (Wolf 72). More importantly, the abuses by police under the Mano Dura policies led gang members to be even more distrustful of authorities and therefore more loyal to their gangs and fellow members. The gangs became close-knit in a way that makes rehabilitation a much more formidable challenge than it was before (Wolf 72). Additionally, the few arrests that did successfully lead to imprisonments were counterproductive: now, gangs are run from within prisons by gang members who gained street credit through their arrests. Since the prisons are overcrowded and poorly run, clique leaders are able to work with their gangs and order hits from within the relative safety of the prison: after all, they cannot be arrested again while they are still in prison (Wolf 72). The legacy of Mano Dura-type policies has been one of increased violence, better organization of gangs, and failure of governments to successfully introduce any significant rehabilitation or prevention efforts against gangs.

Bibliography:

García, Carlos. “Tracing the History of Failed Gang Policies in US, Northern Triangle.” InSight Crime. September 20, 2017. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/tracing-the-history-of-failed-gang-policies-in-us-northern-triangle/.

Wolf, Sonja. Mano Dura: The Politics of Gang Control in El Salvador. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2017.

Further Reading:

https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/tracing-the-history-of-failed-gang-policies-in-us-northern-triangle/

https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/how-mano-dura-is-strengthening-gangs/

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/06/el-salvador-gangs-police-violence-distrito-italia

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/24136/el-salvador-s-iron-fist-crackdown-on-gangs-a-lethal-policy-with-u-s-origins

Dangers on the Migrant Path

Posted in Migrant Experience with tags , , on May 10, 2019 by dsmith41

Emma Lightizer

Although many people have fled their countries to seek refuge in the United States in recent years, the decision to do so is a serious one that must take into account the dangers of migration itself. It’s important to know what kinds of risks migrants face on their way to the U.S. because it grants a crucial perspective on the severity of what they are fleeing from. Those who choose to leave feel safer taking the risks of migration than continuing to live in their home countries. What are the risks these migrants take–or in other words, what exactly is escape worth to them?

            Whether a migrant travels alone or with help from a professional “coyote” who specializes in smuggling migrants over the border, there are opportunities for abuse at nearly every stage of the undocumented migration process, in addition to the natural, physical dangers inherent in the journey (Shetty). Notable among the dangers are human trafficking, extortion, robbery, kidnap, murder, threats by federal governments or local police officers, and death by exposure in the desert (Shetty). Women and children are particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking, although the trip is a dangerous one no matter the identity of the migrant (Shetty).

            In strictly financial terms, migration is expensive. A reputable coyote will demand at least $7,000 USD per person for a trip to the United States starting from El Salvador; depending on the country of origin, this number may shift a bit (Martínez 248). This sum includes the coyote’s pay as well as bribe money for police, immigration officials, and the gangs and drug-trafficking organizations that control territory along the route (Martínez 249). Failure to pay any of those people the amount they demand can result in kidnap, physical assault, rape, human trafficking, or murder. Sometimes, police work with local criminal organizations; if migrants won’t pay bribe money, then police hand them over to human traffickers or gangs in exchange for a cut of the pay. In some cases, police “officers themselves [are] VIP clients” of sex trafficking rings, and will therefore return migrants who escape back to their abusers (Martínez 219). Since local authorities in many rural areas along the route are so easily corrupted, there is very rarely legal recourse for migrants who are abused by police or by criminal organizations.

A migrant who tries to make the trip without the help of a good coyote runs the risk of not knowing how much money they will need to pay off criminal organizations and cops, and it’s possible that they will run out of money before they are able to get all the way through Central America and Mexico. These people are especially likely to become victims of criminal organizations. People who try to use the help of a particularly cheap coyote are often also at risk: usually, cheap prices will mean that the coyote has either not taken into account the money demanded by criminal organizations on the way or that they do not plan on bringing the migrant to their destination (Martínez 250). In some cases, cheap “coyotes” will even bring migrants to criminal organizations and sell them rather than actually helping them (Martínez 252).

Even beyond all the abuses migrants face at the hands of other people, migration carries other risks that are inherent to the environment of the route itself. Most profoundly, the desert provides a host of dangers for the migrant. Because of extreme temperatures–hot in the day and cold at night–it is common for migrants to die from exposure while trying to cross the desert (Androff and Tavassoli 168). This is especially common for migrants who go alone or are separated from their coyote and get lost in the desert. Attempts by humanitarian groups in the U.S. to leave water in shelter areas for migrants who are crossing the desert have been met with hostility by governments in the region, and those who have left water have been criminally prosecuted for littering (Androff and Tavassoli 168). These prosecutions and related policies stem from generalized xenophobia and the refusal to see migrants as humans.

Bibliography:

Androff, David, and Kyoko Tavassoli. “Deaths in the Desert: The Human Rights Crisis on the U.S.–Mexico Border.” Social Work 57, no. 2 (April 1, 2012): 168.

Martínez, Óscar Enrique. A History of Violence: Living and Dying in Central America. London: Verso, 2017.

Shetty, Salil. “Most Dangerous Journey: What Central American Migrants Face When They Try to Cross the Border.” Amnesty International USA. February 20, 2014. Accessed May 10, 2019. https://www.amnestyusa.org/most-dangerous-journey-what-central-american-migrants-face-when-they-try-to-cross-the-border/.

Further Reading:

https://www.amnestyusa.org/most-dangerous-journey-what-central-american-migrants-face-when-they-try-to-cross-the-border/

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/10/migrant-caravans-might-become-even-more-common/573964/

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-centralamerica-youth-migrants/central-american-child-migrants-move-in-shadows-at-risk-from-traffickers-u-n-idUSKBN1L10YD

https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/21/mexico-kidnappings-refugees-central-america-immigration

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