{"id":390,"date":"2018-04-30T10:43:33","date_gmt":"2018-04-30T14:43:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blog.uvm.edu\/imorgens-rel195a\/?p=390"},"modified":"2018-04-30T10:43:33","modified_gmt":"2018-04-30T14:43:33","slug":"islam-and-modern-turkey","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.uvm.edu\/imorgens-rel195a\/2018\/04\/30\/islam-and-modern-turkey\/","title":{"rendered":"Islam and Modern Turkey"},"content":{"rendered":"

In his discussion of the impacts of modernity on religion, John Wilson aptly states that the changes observed in religions\u2019 response to modernity \u201cby no means run in one direction only\u201d[1]<\/a>. This is certainly the case for manifestations of Islam amongst the political elite in the republic of Turkey, which, since the fall of the Ottoman Empire<\/a> in 1918 has responded\u00a0 in multiple ways to modernity. Islam amongst many of Turkey\u2019s powerful elite during the country\u2019s foundation began with a response of self-accommodation to modernity, has changed how it responded to modernity multiple times throughout the last century, and is currently at a point of reasserting more conservative, traditional values. The multiplicities of these religious responses to modernity since 1918 are seen through Turkey\u2019s politics, which have attempted to strike a balance between Islam, secularization and democracy. Despite the religious beliefs of people in power, and how those beliefs are reflected in Turkey\u2019s politics, it is important to note that these positions are not representative of the beliefs of all Turkish Muslims.<\/p>\n

The fall of the Ottoman Empire occurred during a time of ambiguous global Muslim leadership and paradoxical ideological movements. Characterized by pan-Islamic sentiment, increased nationalism, and a desire for modernization, the period of Turkey\u2019s foundation was a time in which a noticeable shift in Islam\u2019s response to modernity occurred[2]<\/a>. Initially, Islam amongst the elite in the newly founded state of Turkey responded to modernity by \u201cself-consciously accommodating religious traditions to modern society\u201d[3]<\/a>. In other words, people in power moved away from old Islamic traditions of the Ottoman Empire and began accommodating Islamic traditions to increasing Turkish nationalist sentiment. The leaders of the newly founded country were cognizant of Islam\u2019s societal importance and conditions of Pan-Islamism, and consequently incorporated a Turkish-oriented form of Islam into the country\u2019s foundational framework.[4]<\/a>\u00a0 This religious response of self-accommodation to increased nationalism during Turkey\u2019s foundation is an example of one of five \u201cexplicit religious responses to social change as represented in modern society\u201d[5]<\/a>. This self-accommodation response is shown through powerful Muslim actors in Turkey embracing economic and cultural models of globalization, as well as the ways in which the state included Islam during the foundation of its constitution during the 1920s. \u00a0One primary example of this self-accommodation is that the drafters of the original constitution of Turkey included Islam, but deliberately changed the ways that it would be practiced, such as translating the Quran from Arabic into Turkish[6]<\/a>. This policy action during the country\u2019s foundation reflected not only the Republican elite\u2019s passion for modernization, but also an attempt to formulate a new, modernist version of Islam. This effort to incorporate Islam into the new country\u2019s political system through conscious accommodation to \u201cmodern\u201d standards showed how pan-Islamists, nationalists, and modernists cooperated with one another during this time.<\/p>\n

Following the country\u2019s foundation, Turkish political leaders such as Mustafa Kemal Atat\u00fcrk<\/a> and the policies that he enacted during the 1920s and 1930s were increasingly secular. The implementation of policies such as replacing the Ottoman Turkish alphabet with Latin, not only disconnected Turkey from other Muslim-majority societies in favor of Western societies, but also reflected a different religious response to modernity[7]<\/a>. Atat\u00fcrk\u2019s policy decisions reflected his attempts to completely reject the old Islamic traditions of the Ottoman Empire rather than to accommodate Islamic traditions to Turkish nationalism the way the country\u2019s founders did. This response fits into Wilson\u2019s fifth form of religious responses to modernity, which states that the generation of wholly new traditions as an attempt to reject old traditions is one way that religion responds to modernity[8]<\/a>. In this case, Atat\u00fcrk\u2019s secularism and the policies it produced are the \u201cwholly new\u201d traditions that rejected and replaced ideals from the previously Islamic Ottoman Empire. Atat\u00fcrk\u2019s secular policies indicate a second shift of Islam\u2019s response to modernity in Turkey, from a response of self-accommodation to one of complete newness of traditions. The ripple effects of Atat\u00fcrk\u2019s secularism continued throughout the mid-1900s<\/a>, with policies such as the banning of Sufi orders and veiling of women in public.[9]<\/a> Again, these policies reflected the abandonment of \u201ctraditional\u201d Muslim values, and instead favored strong secularism and modernism as the country\u2019s new values.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

In response to the secularism that was implemented on the greater Muslim majority society, many Turkish politicians in the late 1900s enacted different responses to modernity in attempts to maintain their political agency. Throughout the late 20th<\/sup> century, several politicians in Turkey played what Ayla G\u00f6l has aptly termed \u201cthe Islamic card<\/a>\u201d, a method of using Islam to gain political agency and influence[10]<\/a>. At the beginning of the 21st<\/sup> century, the AKP played the Islamic card with an \u201cambivalent\u201d attitude of acknowledging Islam\u2019s sociological significance, while maintaining pro-West attitudes[11]<\/a>. This ambivalence shows that the AKP were not only using Islam to gain political agency, but it also indicates a shift back towards the self-accommodation response that occurred during the early twentieth century.\u00a0 This return to self-accommodation from a previous position of implementing the \u201cwholly new\u201d of the mid-1900s is representative of a third shift in Islam\u2019s response to modernity.<\/p>\n

Recently, the response of those in power has shifted towards a reaffirmation of more traditional values, another one of Wilson\u2019s five religious responses to modernity[12]<\/a>. Now, the religious response to modernity amongst people in power in Turkey has changed from conscious accommodation to a reassertion of traditional values, representing the fourth shift in Turkey\u2019s history to a third type religious response to modernity. Turkey has shifted towards more conservative values as the current president, Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan<\/a>, and his political party, the AKP<\/a>, have consolidated power. \u00a0Although this response shift may have been driven by a desire to maintain political power rather than an ideological shift amongst Turkey\u2019s political leaders, their reaction to citizens presumed religious leanings had political and subsequent societal implications. This kind of response is shown through the increased presence of Islam in the everyday lives of Turkish people. In 2017 for example, Turkey introduced a new curriculum for its schools<\/a> which cut out topics such as evolution, a subject which is rejected by certain groups of very conservative Muslims [13]<\/a>. This policy change by the AKP is a clear example of returning to more traditional values, similar to some of the Islamic values of the Ottoman Empire.<\/p>\n

President Erdo\u011fan\u2019s religious beliefs and the subsequent policies that have come about do not represent the beliefs of all Turkish Muslims. While it seems that Turkey, like the rest of the world, is becoming more conservative in its politics, it is important to remember that this shift towards conservatism is not caused by religion or clashes between religion and modernity, but rather by power and who has it.<\/p>\n

\n

End Notes<\/u><\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Wilson, John F. “Modernity.” Encyclopedia of Religion, edited by Lindsay Jones, 2nd ed., vol. 9, Macmillan Reference USA, 2005, 6110<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Aydin, Cemil. The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History, Harvard University Press, 2017<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Wilson, 6110<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Editors, Maydan. “Islam and Islamism in Turkey: A Conversation with \u0130smail Kara.” Maydan. (December 05, 2017). https:\/\/www.themaydan.com\/2017\/10\/islam-islamism-turkey-conversation-ismail-kara\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Wilson, 6110<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Yilmaz, Ihsan. “State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey.” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (July 19, 2005): 385-411<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> Aydin, 144<\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> Wilson, 6110<\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> Aydin 200<\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> G\u00f6l, Ayla. “The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and secular.” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2009): 802<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> G\u00f6l, 802<\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> Wilson, 6111<\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> Bilefsky, Dan. “In Turkey, Darwin is Crowded Out by Religion.” New York Times. (Sep 19, 2017)<\/p>\n

\n

Bibliography<\/u><\/p>\n

Aydin, Cemil. The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History, Harvard University Press, (2017): 99-226<\/p>\n

Bilefsky, Dan. “In Turkey, Darwin is Crowded Out by Religion.” New York Times. (Sep 19, 2017)<\/p>\n

Bucar, Elizabeth. “Tesett\u00fcr in Istanbul.” In Pious Fashion: How Muslim Women Dress, 122-70. Harvard University Press, (2017)<\/p>\n

Editors, Maydan. “Islam and Islamism in Turkey: A Conversation with \u0130smail Kara.” Maydan. (December 05, 2017)<\/p>\n

G\u00f6l, Ayla. “The Identity of Turkey: Muslim and secular.” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2009): 795-811<\/p>\n

G\u00fcnay, Reha. Facade of AKM. 1979. The Performance of Modernity: Atat\u00fcrk K\u00fclt\u00fcr Merkezi, 1946-1977, SALT, Istanbul. In Google Arts & Culture<\/em>. Accessed February 19, 2018.<\/p>\n

Kissane, Bill. \u201cAtat\u00fcrk and After: Three Perspectives on Political Change in Turkey.\u201d The Review of Politics 76, no. 2 (2014): 293\u2013307.<\/p>\n

Wilson, John F. “Modernity.” Encyclopedia of Religion, edited by Lindsay Jones, 2nd ed., vol. 9, Macmillan Reference USA, (2005)<\/p>\n

Yilmaz, Ihsan. “State, Law, Civil Society and Islam in Contemporary Turkey.” The Muslim World 95, no. 3 (July 19, 2005): 385-411<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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