{"id":259,"date":"2015-12-09T12:55:31","date_gmt":"2015-12-09T16:55:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blog.uvm.edu\/imorgens-rel195a\/?p=259"},"modified":"2015-12-09T12:55:31","modified_gmt":"2015-12-09T16:55:31","slug":"the-failure-of-the-akp","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.uvm.edu\/imorgens-rel195a\/2015\/12\/09\/the-failure-of-the-akp\/","title":{"rendered":"The Failure of the AKP"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"TurkeyPhoto\"<\/a>

A depiction of Turkish protestors.<\/p><\/div>\n

The question of whether or not religion and democracy can coexist on a secular plane without infringing on the natural rights of the public has been a main source of contention for the modern world. The AK Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-Justice and Development Party) of Turkey that came to power in 2002 seemed to offer a hopeful answer to this question. The party provided a religious alternative for the people of Turkey who felt the strict secularists ideals were no longer working. Yet, the AKP’s Islamic roots inspired fear and anxiety in those who favored strict secularism as they worried that AKP members secretly harbored an Islamic agenda. Regardless of those fears, the AKP operated successfully for a while in Turkey, boosting economy and expanding Turkey’s global influence. It\u00a0was not Islam that caused the Party\u2019s downfall, but corruption. Using the AKP as an example, it\u2019s possible to answer in the affirmative \u2013 that religion and democracy can coexist \u2013 but the world has yet to produce a political system that incorporates both elements, has longevity and remains free of corruption.<\/p>\n

Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Turkey has existed as a secular democratic state with a strong Muslim majority. However, towards the end of the 20th<\/sup> century, many Turkish citizens grew increasingly dissatisfied with their country\u2019s secularist rules. AKP Party member Recep Tayyip Erdogan\u2019s defeat of the notoriously secularist Republican People\u2019s Party (CHP) ushered in a new political era. In his work, “Islamic Secularism,” Dr.\u00a0Charles Kurzman demonstrates the difficulty of distinguishing a clear line between religion and secularization saying, \u201cIn the majority of Muslim societies, there is not a distinct separation between religion and other aspects of people\u2019s lives. Islam is both din wa dunya<\/em><\/a> (religion and the world)\u201d (Kurzman 615). These secular limitations became increasingly problematic and contributed to the growing support of the AKP especially when Turkey started seeing an increase of an openly religious middle class as modernization and urbanization brought more traditional minded people into the cities (Rabasa and Larrabee 7). The growing discontent created as a result of these circumstances lended to the start of a new political era when Recep Tayyip Erdogan of the AKP<\/a> beat the notoriously secularists Republican People\u2019s Party (CHP).<\/p>\n

However, the victory of the AKP sparked never-ending controversy over its intentions. Rather than campaign on behalf of its Islamic roots the AKP presented itself as a party concerned with economic stability and European Union membership (Rabasa and Larrabee 51). It represented what citizens wanted, which according to Dr. Ayla Gol was \u201creform and change, economic growth and political stability and the AKP was seen as the only party to deliver such expectations\u201d (Gol 805). The party denied an Islamic agenda and instead emphasized its ability to exist as a democracy. Rabasa and Larrabee compared the AKP to the \u201cChristian Democrats in Western Europe \u2013 in which religion is a cultural backdrop rather than an active part of the political agenda,\u201d and they described Erdogan as leading \u201ca movement of \u2018Muslim Democrats’\u201d (3). This portrayal of the earlier years of the AKP is quite accurate in demonstrating the party did not launch the Islamic crusade that many secularists feared and speculated, but lessened the strict secular burden on everyday religious life to quell growing public dissatisfaction with how the secular legacy was no longer meeting the political and cultural needs of Turkish citizens.<\/p>\n

A major factor in understanding how religion and democracy can coexist in Turkey is through recognizing the power of the modernized West and the AKP fully comprehended the power play that was at hand. Although its original association as a democracy was to provide a voice for the people it also stemmed from a political tactic to keep not only the West happy but to ensure cooperation from fear mongering secularists. Rabasa and Larrabee describe the AKP\u2019s use of democracy in relation to the global market as strategic move to ensure Turkey\u2019s presence as a formidable player on the world stage.<\/p>\n

“It realized the advantages of speaking the language of democracy-which enables the party to communicate with the West and to reassure those who suspect that it may secretly harbor an Islamist agenda. Erdogan has spoken about \u2018marketing Turkey\u2019 and has defended the idea of globalization. The West, in turn, has emerged as an ally of the AKP” (4).<\/p>\n

However, the need to appease the West in order to achieve recognition on the modern, global scale became problematic over time. With the support of the people Erdogan adopted laws that were in favor “toward European Union norms” which resulted in economic success for sometime “as he pushed privatization and investors from abroad poured money into the country” (Hansen 1). Yet this began the start of the Erdogan’s power hungry and authoritative regime that would eventually lead to the party’s decline that will later be illustrated.<\/p>\n

Regardless of controversy over whether the AKP has had Islamifying intentions from the start, one thing is for certain: the Party has failed to fulfill its promises to citizens. What once stood as symbol for hope and a source of fairer representation for the Turkish people now exists as a corrupt political party heading rapidly toward an era of authoritarianism. Although Erdogan\u2019s political leadership hasn\u2019t quite proven the original fears of the secularists he also hasn\u2019t fulfilled his initial goals. While the public\u2019s desire for economic growth<\/a> was accomplished by the party during its first term, when the economy experienced an average annual GDP growth of 7.2 percent, by 2014, that economic growth had decreased to 2.9 percent (Gorvett 1). Dissatisfaction ensued sparking the 2013 Gezi Park protests that resulted in violence when police used tear gas and pepper spray on protestors and burned their tents. According to New York Times writer, Suzy Hansen, when Erdogan was later asked of his involvement in the police brutality of the protests he responded, “‘I brought the people responsible into my office and yelled at them. I made them cry'” (Hansen 1). Erdogan apathetic nature for the people of Turkey only continued to spiral as power and corruption<\/a> clouded his leadership and he sought to punish those who went against him. Turkey, once a beacon of modernization, was now becoming unrecognizable as “thousands of activists have been detained, their schools or workplaces investigated, their homes raided. Informal emergency medical care, common during street protests, has been criminalized” (Hansen 1). The AKP then began imprisoning journalists for negative press and putting them on trial and as a result Turkey was landed itself as \u201c154th<\/sup> out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom Index in 2014\u201d (Gorvett 1). In contrast to Gol\u2019s description of the original intentions of the AKP in which \u201cthe reformists emphasized the idea of a new and clean (\u2018ak\u201d literally means both white and clean in Turkish) leadership determined to eradicate corruption from the state system,\u201d the current disposition of the AKP is much different and much more corrupt<\/a> (Gol 803). What once existed as a source of Turkish empowerment now acts as a cry for change.<\/p>\n

Yet the question still remains: can Turkey’s government be religious, secular, and democratic? The AKP once stood as a voice for Turkey\u2019s people, but officials have silenced those who disagree with its political methodology. However, full blame should not be placed on the authoritarian direction of Erdogan as the West harnessed Turkish desire to operate on a global scale by using Turkey to bridge the cultural and political gap that is troublesome to begin with. The AKP no longer needed the approval of the people but the consent of the West and Erdogan’s power trip became the new goal as Hansen states, \u201cThe state remains a tool for accumulating disproportionate power, and when threatened, it sacrifices its citizens to save itself\u201d (Hansen 1). Although the AKP is failing and bringing about new problems to discuss it self acted as a starting point for better representation and brought to light the tricky problems religion, democracy, and secularism can embody. In reviewing the history of the AKP one would realize that the real problems never lied within its association to Islam but the authoritarian leadership that was slowly snowballing under the constant distraction of the ongoing religion vs. democracy duel that was taking place. Religion and democracy can coexist in Turkey but no party has assumed the aptitude to see it through.<\/p>\n

Works Cited<\/em><\/p>\n

Anwar, Ghazala, and McKay, Liz. “Veiling.” Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World<\/em>. Ed. Richard C. Martin. Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004. 721-722.<\/p>\n

Hansen, Suzy. \u201cWhose Turkey Is It?\u201d The New York Times Magazine<\/em>. The New York Times, New York. 2014. Web.<\/p>\n

Gol, Ayla. \u201cThe Identity of Turkey: Muslim and Secular\u201d. Third World Quarterly<\/em>. Penglais: Aberystwyth, 2009. Web.<\/p>\n

Gorvett, Jonathan. \u201cTurkey Reins in Its Rulers.\u201d Washington Report on Middle East Affairs Vol. 34. 2015. Web.<\/p>\n

Keyman, E. Fuat and Gumuscu, Sebnem. \u201cDemocracy, Identity and Foreign Policy in Turkey.\u201d Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 2014. Web.<\/p>\n

Kurzman, Charles. \u201cIslamic Secularism.\u201d Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World<\/em>.Ed. Richard C. Martin. Vol 2. New York: Macmillan Reference, USA. 2004. Web.<\/p>\n

Rabasa, Angel, Larrabee, F. Stephen. \u201cThe Rise of Political Islam in Turkey.\u201d The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica CA. 2008. Web.<\/p>\n

Base photo-AFP\/Getty<\/p>\n

Top image-Ozan Kose\/AFP\/Getty Images<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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