

CHAPTER 10

REASON AND THE PASSIONS

TERENCE CUNEO

THE great moral philosophers of early modernity come to us pre-packaged. Rather often we're told that philosophers such as Clarke, Price, and Reid are rationalists, while thinkers such as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume are sentimentalists.¹ The distinction between these two schools, we're further told, consists in this: for the rationalists, reason is the basis of morality. According to the rationalists, morality is (in some sense) both grounded in and grasped by reason. For the sentimentalists, by contrast, affect is the ground of morality. According to the sentimentalists, morality has little to do with reason, as it is (in some sense) both grounded in and discerned by sentiment.

It is natural to be suspicious of categorizations such as these; they tend to lack nuance, blocking from view what particular thinkers who allegedly belong to one or another school actually say. The categorization before us is no exception. After all, a close reading of the relevant texts reveals that sometimes those pegged as rationalists emphasize the role of affect more than we would imagine (as in the case of Reid), while those categorized as sentimentalists have more robust conceptions of reason than sometimes advertised (as with Shaftesbury).

But if the rationalist/sentimentalist distinction threatens to obfuscate certain issues, it also promises to illuminate others. For one thing, it allows us to see that, for the philosophers of early modernity, reason and passion are two of the most fundamental categories in which they did their thinking about morality. More precisely, they are two of the most fundamental categories in which they did their thinking about *metaethical* issues, such as those that concern the nature of moral truth and judgment. Moreover, the distinction helps us to see what problems these philosophers were worried about. In the rationalists, for example, one senses a great deal of anxiety about whether certain trends in moral philosophy, such as the rise of ethical egoism, would destroy virtue because they challenged the objectivity of morality. The rationalists saw no way to meet this challenge apart from arguing that morality has its source in reason; to deviate from morality,

¹ See, for example, MacIntyre (1966) and Rawls (2000).

according to the rationalists, is to be irrational. Like the rationalists, the sentimentalists, were also concerned about the corrosive effects of the so-called selfish-school. For the sentimentalists, however, the primary challenge was not to vindicate the objectivity of morality but to explain how we could arrive at "moral distinctions" that were capable of gripping us and moving us to genuinely virtuous action. And they believed that reason was of no help in this regard; only sentiment could do the job.

When employed with care, then, the rationalist/sentimentalist distinction can help us to discern both the shape and fundamental concerns of early modern moral philosophy, especially among the so-called British moralists. My aim in this chapter is to offer a snapshot of the debate between the sentimentalists and rationalists by exploring the thought of two towering figures of the Scottish Enlightenment: Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Reid. Hutcheson and Reid are not often read side-by-side. But I think that doing so will bring their views into sharper relief, and will allow us to gain a better perspective on Hume's distinctive contribution to eighteenth-century British moral philosophy.

The snapshot of the British moralists I shall offer, then, is somewhat unusual inasmuch as it engages two relatively neglected figures who are rarely brought into conversation. It is, however, atypical in another respect. Recent work on the British moralists has tended to read the history of moral philosophy as one in which its main figures were inexorably moving toward a naturalistic, secularized view of the moral domain, finding its culmination in Kant's ethics.² In this literature, Reid is typically ignored while Hutcheson is read as a proto-naturalist. I propose, by contrast, to approach our topic differently. I intend to give Reid a fair hearing and wish to take the religious context in which both Hutcheson and Reid worked with full seriousness, reading Hutcheson as a theist who has important things to say about the relation between God and morality. When we do so, an interpretation of Hutcheson emerges that is considerably different from that offered by recent commentators. Indeed, one of my suggestions shall be that Reid himself failed to appreciate the importance of the theistic dimensions of Hutcheson's thought.

10.1 HUTCHESON

Hutcheson devoted nearly all his energies as a moral philosopher to developing a two-front polemic—the first being one in which he engages ethical egoists such as Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Mandeville, the second being one in which he attacks rationalists such as Clarke, Cudworth, and Wollaston. We can do no better, I think, than to enter Hutcheson's thought by having the main elements of these two lines of attack before us, beginning with the attack on egoism.

² Proponents of this reading include Darwall (1995), Korsgaard (1996), Rawls (2000) and, somewhat differently, Gill (2006) and Schneewind (1998).

Against Egoism

The cornerstone of egoist theories, according to Hutcheson, is the claim that what ultimately motivates (and rationally justifies) action of any sort is self-interest. If the egoists are right, then, what ultimately motivates apparently benevolent or just action is identical with what ultimately motivates vicious action: namely, a concern for one's own welfare. Like Butler, Hutcheson found this implication deeply troubling; were the view accepted, Hutcheson worried, one could not expect ordinary agents clearly to discern the difference between vice and virtue. For there is a sense, Hutcheson claimed, in which the egoists have *transformed* vice into virtue. In Hutcheson's view, however, this was not an implication of a philosophical theory that we otherwise have powerful reasons to accept. Rather, Hutcheson maintained that in addition to being morally pernicious, egoism is philosophically inadequate. Three types of considerations militate against accepting it.

In the first place, Hutcheson claimed that egoism is descriptively false. This, Hutcheson suggests, we can see by way of thought experiments of the following sort. Suppose, for example, God were to say:

You are about to perish shortly. You will experience no pain or fear. Your mind will not survive your body. . . . Nor will you afterwards experience any joy or sorrow over the fate of others, since, once you have become nothing you will experience nothing. Under these conditions, would everything of human concern be altogether alien and indifferent to you? . . . Who would not at the moment of death desire for everyone dear to him the same things, and pray for them with as much fervor and firmness as he would on any other occasion, although in this case all consideration of advantage to himself is eliminated? There are, therefore, in man benevolent affections, which are immediately often exclusively directed towards the happiness of others. (Hutcheson 1993: 140)

The force of the counterexample is clear: if egoism were correct, it should yield the result that in cases in which one knows that one will receive no benefit from acting in a certain way (and one is deliberating sensibly), then one will not engage in that action. But, Hutcheson urges, it is evident that there are cases in which one knows that one will not benefit from acting in a particular way and yet one does so nonetheless—not out of self-destructive perversity or irrational impulses, it should be added, but out of affection for friends and loved ones. The best explanation of this is that we often are motivated by our non-derivative concern for others. So, egoism should be rejected.

Hutcheson was aware that there are various types of response to counterexamples of this sort. One such response maintains that cases of this sort assume that we can by introspection accurately discern that what actually motivates us is not self-interest but benevolence. But about such reports, the response continues, we may be mistaken. Although it may seem as if some of us care non-derivatively about the weal and woe of our friends and loved ones, it is ultimately self-interest that drives us to act in the ways that we do.

Hutcheson finds this response implausible, appealing to a second type of consideration to further his case. "The Affections," says Hutcheson, "which are of most Importance in Morals . . . are Love and Hatred" (Hutcheson 2008: 102). And of these two affections, it is love or benevolence that is more fundamental. But, Hutcheson continues, we are by and large competent with the concept of benevolence. We can tell the difference between it, on the one hand, and the notion *being in one's self-interest*, on the other. Accordingly, for most ordinary persons, there is no plausibility to the suggestion that they inadvertently identify or confuse them:

As to the Love of Benevolence, the very Name excludes Self-Interest. We never call that Man benevolent, who is in fact useful to others, but at the same time only intends his own Interest, without any ||desire of, or delight in,|| the good of others. If there be any ||Benevolence|| at all, it must be disinterested; for the most useful Action imaginable, loses all appearance of Benevolence, as soon as we discern that it only flowed from Self-Love or Interest. (Hutcheson 2008: 103)

Hutcheson's verdict is that there is no plausibility to the suggestion that we inadvertently confuse benevolence with self-advantage. And, so, the egoist must choose. He must either deny that we understand our own ideas about love and advantage or abandon his theory.

To these empirical and conceptual considerations, Hutcheson adds a third, theological one. Assume, Hutcheson claims, that the Deity is essentially benevolent, looking out for the welfare of the creation and (ultimately) making "the Virtuous happy" (Hutcheson 2008: 109). Assume, furthermore, that God is self-sufficient; God receives no advantage for rewarding the virtuous. A dilemma looms: suppose, on the one hand, egoism is a thesis about all rational creatures. Then it would imply atheism, for the Deity would never act simply to secure the well-being of his creatures or reward the virtuous. Suppose, on the other, that egoism is not a thesis about all rational creatures, since the Deity is genuinely benevolent. It is a claim only about human beings. About this claim, Hutcheson asks: "Where is the impossibility of some small degree of this publick Love in ||his|| Creatures? And why must they be suppos'd incapable of acting but from Self-Love?" (Hutcheson 2008: 109).

Fleshed out somewhat, Hutcheson's thought is that if God were benevolent, it would be wholly unsurprising that the creatures fashioned in God's image and likeness should also share this quality. There is no conceptual or empirical barrier to both creator and creature sharing a benevolent disposition. To the contrary, the available theological data points the other way. And, thus, two unattractive alternatives face the egoist: either accept atheism—something that none of Hutcheson's opponents own up to—or admit that the view conflicts with claims at the heart of orthodox theism.

The Attack on Rationalism

Nothing exercised Hutcheson more than the threat that egoism posed to virtue, and he poured most of his energy into attacking it. Indeed, I've offered only the starkest outline

of his rather elaborate attack.³ Still, as I indicated earlier, Hutcheson was not alone in strenuously opposing the view. The rationalists did so as well. Remarkably, however, Hutcheson took his attack on egoism to be incompatible with rationalism. How so?

Let us suppose, Hutcheson claims, that practical reason is to be understood instrumentally; it is simply that faculty by which we devise how we can achieve what we desire “with the smallest pain or toil to the agent”—where desire is to be understood as being self-interested (Hutcheson 1971: 209). If this account of practical reason is correct, then the attack on egoism establishes that moral judgments are not the output of practical reason. For, once again, according to Hutcheson, at least some moral judgments ultimately concern not the satisfaction of desire but the weal and woe of others. Hutcheson, furthermore, takes it to be obvious that moral judgments are not the deliverance of theoretical reason—this being a faculty that merely traffics in truths that have no immediate practical import, such as those of logic and mathematics (see Hutcheson 1971: 209). The upshot, in Hutcheson’s eyes, is evident: morality is largely autonomous from reason. The moral domain neither needs nor is capable of some deeper justification from outside it, such as the domain of rationality. Any justification of its credentials must be a moral justification, one that is internal to the domain itself.

The Moral Sense

But if moral judgments are not the deliverances of reason, what then produces them? Hutcheson’s answer is to place the issue in a wider context. Note, he says, that many of our judgments are not the output of reason. Our perceptual judgments concerning the external world, our judgments about our own pain and pleasure, and our aesthetic judgments are not the products of reason. Rather, they are the products of various “senses” or determinations “of our minds to receive Ideas independently of our Will” (Hutcheson 2002: 17). Moral judgments are no different in this respect. They are also the product not of reason but of a sense, in this case, the *moral* sense. Although Hutcheson himself describes this sense in different ways, it is probably best to think of it as a faculty that has two basic functions. In the first place, it is that faculty by which we form moral ideas or concepts and in such a way that does not involve any sort of reasoning or calculation. Second, by the moral sense we “approve every kind Affection either in ourselves or others, and all publickly useful Actions which we imagined flow from such Affection, without our having a view to our private Happiness, in our Approbation of these Actions” (Hutcheson 2002: 136). It should probably be added that by “publickly useful” affections and actions Hutcheson means *benevolent* affections and actions. In Hutcheson’s view, nothing “was ever approv’d by us, but upon some Apprehension . . . that it was” benevolent (Hutcheson 2008: 137).

³ See Gill (2006: ch. 11) for more of the details.

It will be helpful to unpack what Hutcheson says a bit more. When explicating his account of the moral sense, Hutcheson repeatedly draws attention to the fact that its deliverances include states of approbation. When initially reading these sections, it is natural to think of such states as having cognitive content, perhaps including some judgment to the effect that its objects are worthy of approval. But this is not what Hutcheson says. Rather, he claims that states of approbation are simply states of pleasure—albeit of a sort which is different from that which accompanies the experience of “natural goods,” such as enjoying a “commodious Habitation” (Hutcheson 2008: 89). Hutcheson, it should be added, does not identify such states with moral judgments. Nor does he say that they are mere accompaniments to such judgments. Rather—although here I venture onto more controversial interpretive territory—he suggests that states of pleasure function as interfaces between us and moral reality; they play an indicatory or semiotic function (see Kail 2007, ch. 9). To be sure, states of approbation do not play this indicatory role by somehow resembling the property of benevolence. Still, Hutcheson suggests, they manage to indicate its instances, evoking in us love for and esteem of their possessors. In this regard, Hutcheson says, states of approbation are similar to states of bodily pain and the states of pleasure that accompany aesthetic experience:

The Author of Nature has determin’d us to receive, by our external Senses, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas of Objects, according as they are useful or hurtful to our Bodys; and to receive from uniform Objects the Pleasures of Beauty and Harmony, to excite us to the Pursuit of Knowledge, and to reward us for it . . . ||in the same manner|| he has given us a Moral Sense, to direct our Actions, and to give us still nobler Pleasures; so that while we are only intending the Good of others, we undesignedly promote our own greatest private Good. (Hutcheson 2008: 99)

What surfaces in this passage is that “ideas”—Hutcheson here uses this term to refer to sensations of various sorts (see Hutcheson 2008: 19)—have a fundamentally practical role. Their function is both to signify states of the world and to move us to action. The pleasures that accompany aesthetic experience, for example, indicate uniformity among diversity thereby moving us to the pursuit of knowledge. The pleasures of approbation indicate benevolence and move us to promote the good of others (and, inadvertently, ourselves).

We now have before us what is, for our purposes, a more or less full sketch of the Hutchesonian moral sense. In its main lines, it tells us this: the moral sense is an indigenous sense possessed by all normal human beings, whose deliverances include both states of approbation, on the one hand, and love and esteem, on the other. States of approbation are *sui generis* states of pleasure that non-inferentially evoke in us states of love and esteem. While different, states of both kinds bear a special relation to the property of benevolence. States of approbation function as signs for benevolence, indicating its presence. Love and esteem, by contrast, do not indicate benevolence but are rather appropriate affective responses to it. Neither state, however, is such that an agent’s pursuit of it hinges on his assuming that being in it is to his advantage. Rather, in one sense of the term, states of both sorts are altruistic. They move us to benevolent action.

Let me now pick up a matter to which I alluded in the introduction. Earlier I said that recent interpreters of Hutcheson wish to read him as an empirical naturalist. According to Stephen Darwall, for example, this means that central to Hutcheson's project is "the desire to account for normativity in fully natural terms, without reliance on supernatural posits" (Darwall 1994: 15). In his fine book, *The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics*, Michael Gill offers an interpretation of Hutcheson that has certain affinities with Darwall's. In Gill's view, Hutcheson did not embrace a thoroughly naturalistic moral view. Rather, he constructed a kind of "halfway house between theological and secular ethics" (Gill 2006: 205). Unlike Hume, Hutcheson is willing to say that belief in God is a great support of virtue. But like Hume, Hutcheson holds that "the foundation of morality is simply a brute fact about human nature" (Gill 2006: 172). Human nature, in turn, is not to be understood along Butlerian lines; it is not a teleological system that works in accordance with divine design (Gill 2006: 177). Nor is there "a moral standard that is independent of human nature" against which the latter can be assessed (Gill 2006: 172).

How well does such an interpretation of Hutcheson sit with that offered so far? Let me pursue the matter by engaging more extensively with Gill's reading of Hutcheson. We have already seen that, according to Gill, Hutcheson's view is, in certain central respects, a precursor to Hume's thoroughly secularized account of morality. Indeed, in some respects, Gill claims that Hutcheson's view is more radical than Hume's. For, according to Gill, Hutcheson is a subjectivist. Hutcheson, if Gill is correct, believes that:

morality for each person is determined by how that person's moral sense responds to things. He believes that it's possible that different people can have moral senses that respond to the same thing in different ways. And so he believes that it's possible that what's moral for one person will not be moral for another. Now Hutcheson also believes that it turns out that what's moral for one person is also moral for all others, but this coincidence is a contingent fact. (Gill 2006: 297, n.2)

Under Gill's reading, Hutcheson faces two problems, variants of which were raised in his public correspondence with the rationalist Gilbert Burnet.⁴ In the first place, Hutcheson's view is vulnerable to the charge that morality is deeply contingent. Had we been constituted differently, it is possible that we would approve of not benevolence but selfishness or even malevolence. However, suppose that, as Hutcheson suggests, moral features are mind-dependent in a way akin to secondary qualities: things are worthy of approbation because we are disposed to approve of them and worthy of disapprobation because we are disposed to disapprove of them. It follows that, in the counterfactual situation just described, selfishness or malevolence would be approbation-worthy. But this

⁴ Burnet actually runs together two different objections. According to the first, Hutcheson's moral sense view cannot explain knowledge of necessary moral truths. According to the second, it cannot account for there being such truths. For present purposes, I focus on the second objection. In my presentation of Hutcheson's response, I will assume that some counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are not trivially true but false.

flies in the face of stubborn intuitions that even if we approved of selfishness or malevolence, they would still be worthy of disapprobation. Call this the *contingency challenge*.

In the second place, according to this reading, Hutcheson cannot guarantee that the outputs of the various senses will be in harmony. They may come into conflict—as when the desire for aesthetic enjoyment conflicts with moral duty. This, Gill indicates, is simply an implication of thinking of morality as being the product of sense: "Hutcheson's insistence that morality is based in a sense puts morality on a normative par with other senses in the same way that your auditory and visual senses are on a normative par with each other" (Gill 2006: 176). This, however, conflicts with deeply held convictions that there is something authoritative about morality. On the face of it, in the case in which aesthetic enjoyment and moral duty conflict, moral duty should win. Call this the *authority challenge*.

What does Hutcheson say in response to these charges? According to Gill, Hutcheson doesn't take up the first challenge "so much as refuse to accept it" (Gill 2006: 171). Rather than attempt to respond to the worry, Hutcheson expresses his confidence that much in the same way that we will continue to enjoy beautiful music upon learning that our sense of beauty is deeply contingent, so also learning that morality is deeply contingent "will not enervate our commitment to morality" (Gill 2006: 170). As for the second challenge, according to Gill, Hutcheson emphasizes that although conflict between the deliverances of the senses is possible, it is rare. And when it does occur, it is (as a matter of contingent fact) always the product of false beliefs or "unnatural affections."

I believe that Gill has misread Hutcheson. Hutcheson is neither a subjectivist nor does he offer the answers to the contingency and authority challenges that Gill attributes to him. Let us begin with the contingency challenge. According to this challenge, Hutcheson is unable to vindicate the deep conviction that the content of morality does not depend upon the contingent operations of the moral sense. In a lengthy passage at the end of the *Inquiry*, Hutcheson addresses this challenge explicitly:

If it be here enquir'd "Could not the Deity have given us a different or contrary determination of Mind, viz., to approve Actions upon another Foundation than Benevolence?" ||It is certain, there is|| nothing in this surpassing the natural Power of the Deity. But as in the first Treatise [An Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, &c.], we resolv'd the Constitution of our present Sense of Beauty into the divine Goodness, so with much more obvious Reason may we ascribe the present Constitution of our moral Sense to his Goodness. For if the Deity be really benevolent, ||or delights in|| the Happiness of others, he could not rationally act otherwise, or give us a moral Sense upon another Foundation, without counteracting his own benevolent Intentions....

Hutcheson continues, claiming that:

Such a Being we cannot conceive indigent, and must conclude happy, and in the best State possible.... The best State of rational Agents, and their greatest and most worthy Happiness, we are necessarily led to imagine must consist in universal

efficacious Benevolence: and hence we conclude the Deity benevolent in the most universal impartial manner. Nor can we well imagine what else deserves the Name of Perfection ||but|| Benevolence... at least we can have no ||other valuable|| Conception of it. (Hutcheson 2008: 197–8)

In some respects, this passage is less lucid than one might like, but the most natural interpretation, I believe, is this. Were we to abstract from the totality of God's properties, considering for the moment only God's power, then we should conclude that God has it within God's power to create us in such a way that we approve actions "upon another Foundation than Benevolence." But we mustn't forget that God is also benevolent, indeed, essentially so. This, says Hutcheson, is an implication of the fact that God is essentially happy and perfect. "The best State of rational Agents, and their greatest and most worthy Happiness, we are necessarily led to imagine must consist in universal efficacious Benevolence." Once, however, we bring divine benevolence into the picture and consider God's power in light of God's essential benevolence, we see that God "could not... give us a moral Sense upon another Foundation."

These passages are fascinating for several reasons. In the first place, they clearly imply that Hutcheson is no subjectivist. Hutcheson's theistic commitments preclude this. Moreover, they also imply that Hutcheson has a clear answer to the contingency challenge. Morality is not contingent at all. As a matter of fact, these passages clearly imply that, in Hutcheson's view, there are necessary moral truths—those having to do with divine benevolence. These moral truths, in turn, account for the fact that, when functioning properly, the moral sense must approve of benevolence. For, says Hutcheson, it is divine benevolence that ultimately accounts for the fact that we have a moral sense that operates in the fashion that it does. Finally, this passage implies that Hutcheson's sentimentalism is less thoroughgoing than many have assumed. If a central feature of rationalism is a commitment to the existence of necessary moral truths—such as ones that concern divine benevolence and the types of response it merits—then there is more than a little rationalism present in Hutcheson's sentimentalism. Yet another case in which the standard typologies mislead!

Let us now turn to the authority challenge, keeping Hutcheson's theistic sentimentalism in mind. Given Hutcheson's theistic commitments, one would expect that the deliverances of the moral sense would enjoy a special type of normative authority. And indeed this is what Hutcheson says. In his inaugural address upon assuming the chair of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow—delivered a mere two years after the publication of his *Illustrations on the Moral Sense*—Hutcheson writes this:

It is of course true that our nature is fallen, weak, and corrupted in many respects. But who does not easily perceive the order natural to the human mind? Who is ignorant of which parts are by nature fit to rule, no matter how much they be deflected from fulfilling that role? ... [W]e discern without any doubt that this conscience and sense of virtue... is destined by nature to govern, and the bodily appetites are born to serve. ... [the moral sense] is seen to be fit to rule by its very nature and it is in fact... the ruling principle, to which... everything was subjected and rightly so. But the true

structure of our nature and the true condition of our nature that God instituted cannot indeed be restored until conscience, reinstated on her throne, shows her dominion over the bodily appetites. (Hutcheson 1993: 142, 131–2)

The parallels with Butler are unmistakable. Hume did not misread Hutcheson when he claimed to find an objectionable type of teleology in Hutcheson's views.⁵ In passages such as this, it is plain to see. Indeed, given Hutcheson's theistic commitments, it is difficult to see how it could be absent.

The reading of Hutcheson I have just offered is heterodox.⁶ Those who advocate interpretations of Hutcheson similar to that offered by Darwall and Gill will not be sympathetic to it. And it should be admitted that the interpretation I have offered raises some difficult questions. One set of questions poses challenges to a reading such as mine. For example, in his attack on rationalism, doesn't Hutcheson reject the existence of necessary moral truths that are independent of human nature? How, then, could it be alleged that Hutcheson accepts their existence? Another set of questions, however, raises challenges for an interpretation such as Darwall's and Gill's. I have quoted passages in which Hutcheson's theistic commitments appear to play an important explanatory role in his broadly sentimentalist view. Both Darwall and Gill are, of course, well aware of these passages. Why, then, do they maintain that Hutcheson's theism functions as a "fifth wheel?" (Darwall 1994: 15)

My reply to both sets of questions shall have to be brief. In response to the first set, I take the interpretation I've offered to be perfectly consistent with Hutcheson's attack on rationalism. For as I understand it, in this attack, Hutcheson denies three things: first, that it is reason that grasps moral truths; second, that there is a moral standard that exists independently of moral sense; and, third, that it makes sense to evaluate the moral sense using moral predicates such as good, bad, right and wrong. These claims, I maintain, are compatible with the interpretation of Hutcheson on offer.

To begin with, there is nothing incompatible about claiming both that the deity is essentially benevolent and that we would not have known anything of it (or the responses it merits) had we not been endowed with a moral sense. Being disposed to have, and having, affective states may be a necessary condition of grasping moral truths

⁵ See Hume's letter of 1739 reprinted in Greig (1932). When Gill quotes this (2006: 180), he does so thus: "You seem [now] to embrace Dr Butler's Opinion in his Sermons... that our moral Sense has an Authority distinct from its Force and Durableness... But this is nothing but an Instinct or Principle..." Gill inserts a "now" in brackets, indicating that in Hume's view, Hutcheson's position had shifted. However, I can discern no indication on Hume's part that this is what he intends to convey. Nor can I detect any indications on Hutcheson's part that, on this matter, his view had shifted. In fairness, I should acknowledge that Gill wishes to treat Hutcheson's views in their "Dublin phase," before he took up his Chair in Glasgow. He indicates that there is evidence that Hutcheson's views underwent some fundamental shifts during the Glasgow period, presumably becoming more Butlerian with time (Gill 2006: 290, n.1). But it seems to me that even a quick reading of Hutcheson's work in the Dublin phase reveals the extent to which Hutcheson's views resembled Butler. See, for example, Hutcheson (2002: 8).

⁶ Although, not entirely so. Both Norton (1982) and Kail (2007) emphasize the teleological dimensions of Hutcheson's thought.

of any sort. In fact, I take this to be Hutcheson's view (see Hutcheson 2002: sect. 1). Moreover, it is crucial to see that Hutcheson nowhere denies that there are necessary moral truths independent of human nature. Rather, he denies that "there must be some Standard of moral Good antecedent to any Sense" (Hutcheson 2002: 147). But to deny this is perfectly compatible with claiming that there are necessary moral truths that depend on a divine moral sense that is itself essential to the deity. Once again, this seems to me Hutcheson's position (see Hutcheson 2002: 153). Finally, when attacking rationalism, Hutcheson does say that no one "can apply moral Attributes to the very faculty of perceiving Moral Qualities" (Hutcheson 2002: 149). It should be recalled, though, that elsewhere he is willing to ascribe various normative features to the moral sense. He says, for example, that it is authoritative and can be perverted (Hutcheson 2008: 198). In light of this, Hutcheson's reluctance to predicate moral features of the moral sense should not be taken to imply that it is the sort of thing that cannot operate well or badly or that it can exhibit moral features in a derivative way, say, because it reliably delivers the right verdicts.

The issue of why philosophers such as Darwall and Gill treat Hutcheson's theism as a "fifth wheel" is more delicate. However, if I had to offer a diagnosis of the matter, I would suggest that they treat Hutcheson's theism in this way mostly because they underestimate the degree to which Hutcheson's understanding of the moral sense is teleological. I am not suggesting that either Darwall or Gill is unaware of the teleological dimensions of Hutcheson's thought. Of course they are; both philosophers, moreover, have things to say about it. Still, I believe they underplay its importance. When Darwall, for example, presents his case for a naturalistic interpretation of Hutcheson, he directs us to what Hutcheson writes about moral goodness at the outset of the *Inquiry*. Hutcheson says the "Word Moral Goodness ||in this Treatise,|| denotes our Idea of some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation" (Hutcheson 2008: 85). This passage looks as if it lends itself to a reading according to which moral goodness is simply a natural property. Under a naturalistic reading, in the passage just quoted, Hutcheson is claiming that goodness is "our idea of that quality which simply causes approbation." I have argued, however, that this is a mistaken interpretation. Hutcheson should instead be read to say that goodness is our idea of that quality which procures approbation in a properly functioning moral sense, one operating according to the design of the Author of our nature. If this is right, Hutcheson's view may be a version of naturalism. But it is a version of teleological naturalism. The design we find in nature is, moreover, the work of a divine hand.

I have claimed that Hutcheson's teleological account of the moral sense is the key to understanding his response to both the contingency and authority challenges. The non-contingent nature of morality is secured by the fact that God has designed our moral sense in such a way that it must (when functioning well) approve of benevolence. Given God's essential benevolence, God could not have designed it any other way. Moreover, according to what I have claimed, the authority of morality is a function of the fact that the human constitution is designed in such a way that conscience is authoritative. One might wonder whether one could excise these appeals to design and proper function

and preserve most of what Hutcheson says. I do not know. The question is not of special interest given my aims. For my aim has been to investigate what Hutcheson actually claimed. And what he did claim, if I am right, makes extensive and essential appeals to teleological notions that are themselves understood in terms of certain theistic commitments.

The appeal to teleological notions of this sort, I shall argue, is a point of contact between Hutcheson and Reid. Before I move to that topic, however, let me close this section by calling attention to how the interpretation I've offered of Hutcheson intersects with Hume's views.

Hutcheson and Hume

There is an influential reading of Hume—call it the "old Hume"—according to which Hume is a noncognitivist about moral judgments, maintaining that moral judgments do not purport to represent moral reality. Some have read Hutcheson to say the same.⁷ If the reading of Hutcheson I have offered is correct, however, there are sharp differences between Hutcheson and the old Hume. For Hutcheson, I have claimed, is not a noncognitivist. Among other things, he believed in robust necessary moral truths that we could know.

Recent years have, however, witnessed the emergence of a very different interpretation of Hume. According to this interpretation—call it the "new Hume"—Hume is not a noncognitivist. To the contrary, his views are very close to those which I have attributed to Hutcheson. Perhaps the most striking similarity is that, like Hutcheson, Hume holds that moral sentiments have an epistemic role to play, as they are that which provide epistemic access to moral reality. Hume, under this interpretation, maintains that we feel a person's virtue or vice in a way similar to the way we feel the warmth of the sun on a hot day or see the redness of a ripe tomato, as the sentiments or feelings in question function as signs or indicators of virtue and vice.⁸ Moreover, under this reading of Hume, we do not infer that a person is virtuous upon having experienced an "agreeable" sensation. Rather, given that we have the right concepts and background beliefs, sensations of these types immediately evoke moral judgments of the appropriate sort—these judgments being such that they in turn move us to action. In short, the new Hume adopts from Hutcheson not only the notion of the moral sense, but also Hutcheson's basic account of how it operates.

Are there important differences between their views? Yes, perhaps the most obvious are these: Hutcheson, under the interpretation I have offered, does not believe that all

⁷ Blackburn (1984) and Bricke (1996) read Hume as a noncognitivist. Frankena (1955) reads Hutcheson as one. This reading of Hume, arguably, originates with Reid.

⁸ See Cohon (2008: ch. 4). She dubs Hume's position "the moral sensing view." Prominent defenders of the "new Hume" are Cohon (2008), Fate Norton (1982), and Kail (2007). Kemp Smith (1941), arguably, is the first to have interpreted Hume along these lines.

moral qualities “are creations of the human mind.”⁹ Hume, under the present interpretation, does. Moreover, Hutcheson defends an explicitly teleological account of the moral sense that appeals to divine design. Hume does not. In this regard, as I noted earlier, there is an important gulf between the two thinkers.

10.2 REID

Reid is probably best known not for his work in ethics, but for his attack on a particular account of thought and perception—what he called “the way of ideas.” As Reid interpreted the history of philosophy, figures ranging from Plato to Hume had unreflectively accepted the claim “that we do not perceive external objects immediately, and that the immediate objects of perception must be some image present to the mind” (Reid 2002: II.vii, 105). The acceptance of this claim, Reid further argued, has issued in all manner of philosophical calamity, most importantly a thoroughgoing skepticism about our knowledge of the external world. For, Reid claimed, not only does the positing of ideas fail to explain anything about the workings of perception, we also have no reason to believe that, even if the mind were populated with such ideas, we can adequately infer the existence of an external world that resembles them. If the way of ideas were true, we would be forever trapped in a house of images, never able to reach the world around us.

Those familiar with Reid’s attack know, however, that it does not consist simply in an attempt to dismantle Lockean-style accounts of thought and perception. It also endeavors to furnish an alternate account of perception, one according to which ideas play no explanatory role whatsoever. Stated in its starkest form, Reid’s alternate account runs thus.

Consider a case of ordinary tactile perception, such as when one perceives that the table before one is hard by touching it. In cases such as these, how do we perceive the table’s hardness? According to Reid, in such cases, it is pressure sensations—which, Reid stresses, largely go unnoticed and unnamed—that immediately produce in us a “conception and belief” of the table that it is hard. As such, Reid says, the best explanation of how we perceive things such as a table’s hardness is that the “Author of our Nature” has designed us in such a way that, when all goes well, feelings of a certain range function as signs or indicators of it. God, Reid emphasizes, could have easily fashioned us in such a way that the perceptual process worked differently. For all we reasonably believe, God could have constructed us in such a way that signs of an entirely different sort, such as noises or smells of a certain range, would have indicated a table’s hardness. Be that as it may, Reid stresses that, according to this alternate account of perception, pressure sensations are not ideas in the way that Locke or Hume thought of them. For pressure

⁹ Kemp Smith (1941: 198). See, also, Cohon (2008: 115). Kail, I might add, does not read Hume in this way.

sensations do not function as intermediaries of which we are aware that imaginatively represent the table’s hardness and from which we infer its existence.

Reid and Hutcheson on the moral sense

The similarities between what Hutcheson says about moral judgment and what Reid says about our perception of the external world are striking. In order to explain judgments of these sorts, both Hutcheson and Reid appeal not to reason but to an indigenous sense with which we come hardwired. Both thinkers maintain that (in the ordinary case) inference plays no role in the production of such judgments—feelings being such as to evoke them immediately. Both, moreover, offer thoroughly teleological accounts of perception, which appeal to the divine design plan. And, finally, both champion semi-otic accounts of perceptual judgment formation. According to the relevant design plans, sensations or feelings of various kinds play the role of being signs for or indicators of qualities of things in the world.

At one point, Reid himself highlights the similarities between the two senses. After having noted that he wishes to co-opt Hutcheson’s language of a moral sense, which yields states of moral approbation and disapprobation, Reid writes:

there is this analogy between it [the moral sense] and the external senses, That, as by them we have not only the original conceptions of the various qualities of bodies, but the original judgments that this body has such a quality that such another; so by our moral faculty, we have both the original conceptions of right and wrong in conduct, of merit and demerit, and the original judgments that this conduct is right, that is wrong; that this character has worth, that, demerit. (Reid 2010: III.iii.vi, 176)

Having noted this similarity, however, Reid goes on to claim that there is also an important disanalogy between the judgments produced by external sense, on the one hand, and moral judgment, on the other: in the former case, when all goes well, feelings elicit judgments about the external world. In the latter case, the order of explanation is reversed: “In the approbation of a good action . . . there is feeling indeed, but there is also esteem of the agent; and both the feeling and the esteem depend upon the judgment we form of his conduct,” not vice versa (Reid 2010: V.vii, 349). By stressing that states of approbation are not mere feelings but include full-blooded moral judgments, Reid takes himself to have corrected a deficiency in Hutcheson’s view. For while Hutcheson nowhere denies that the outputs of the moral sense include the acceptance of moral propositions neither does he affirm this. Rather, what Hutcheson tells us is that states of approbation are feelings of pleasure and that they yield “love” for the benevolent. But Hutcheson, Reid points out, says next to nothing about this latter state, never specifying whether it includes moral propositional content. By explicitly specifying that the outputs of the moral sense have moral propositional content—indeed, a wide range of such contents—Reid takes himself to have identified more accurately the character of its outputs.

Both Hutcheson and Reid, then, maintain that we come equipped with a moral sense that bears certain resemblances to external sense. To be sure, there are differences of both substance and emphasis between Hutcheson's and Reid's accounts. But it is tempting not to make much of them. Reid, one might think, simply makes explicit what is implicit in Hutcheson's view and offers a somewhat different account of the genesis of moral judgment. What we have here are variations on a common theme.

If we take Reid's own assessment seriously, however, this is not so. Reid repeatedly emphasizes that his account of the moral sense differs from the sentimentalists, indicating that the differences between his and Hutcheson's account consist not in points of detail but run deep. Given the extensive similarities between their two views, however, why would Reid say this?

Why Reid Rejects Hutcheson's View

In several places, Reid indicates that he rejects Hutcheson's position because it is vulnerable to what I earlier called the contingency challenge. The contingency challenge, recall, says that, according to views such as Hutcheson's, moral properties existentially depend on the operations of the moral sense. Since the moral sense might have operated differently—say, by approving of what we now consider to be malevolent actions—moral reality is deeply contingent: had we been constituted differently, for example, actions that express wanton disregard for the welfare of others would have been approbation-worthy. But this seems false. Even if we had been constituted differently, actions that express wanton disregard for the welfare of others would not be approbation-worthy (see Reid 2010: V.vii, 362).

To this point in our discussion, I have not explicitly addressed the issue of whether, according to Hutcheson, (a significant range of) moral properties existentially depend on the moral sense in the way that this objection claims. The issue is vexed, as the secondary literature on Hutcheson attests.¹⁰ Still, we needn't resolve that issue to see that Reid's worries about Hutcheson's view are not well-founded. For if what we said earlier is correct, in Hutcheson's view, there are at least some moral properties that do not depend on the operation of our moral sense, namely, those that concern God's goodness.¹¹ More importantly, given God's essential benevolence, we know that the contingency challenge fails to apply to Hutcheson's position. For, once again, Hutcheson holds that God could not have created us in such a way that (when all goes to plan) we fail to approve of the benevolent. If so, there is no incompatibility between saying that a substantial range of moral properties existentially depend on the operations of the moral sense and that relativism about morality is false.

¹⁰ See Gill (2006), Kail (2001, 2007), and Kivy (2003) for discussion of the issue.

¹¹ These properties may, of course, depend on the operation of *God's* moral sense. In fact, in one place, Hutcheson indicates as much. See Hutcheson (2002: 153).

If this is right, Reid no less than Burnet before him failed to appreciate both the theistic dimensions of Hutcheson's view and why they make his position invulnerable to the contingency challenge. Reid, however, offers a second reason for rejecting Hutcheson's view, which is expressed in passages such as the following. Were affection "not to be grounded on real worth," says Reid:

It must be the effect of constitution, or of some habit of casual association. A fond mother may see a beauty in her darling child, or a fond author in his work, to which the rest of the world are blind. In such cases, the affection... as it were, bribes the judgment, to make the object worthy of that affection... When affection is not carried away by some natural or acquired bias, it naturally is, and ought to be led by the judgment. (Reid 2002: VIII.iv, 624)

And again:

It is an old observation, that affection follows opinion; and it is undoubtedly true in many cases... But it is not less true, that opinion sometimes follows affection, not that it ought, but that it actually does so, by giving a false bias to our judgment. We are apt to be partial to our friends, and still more to ourselves. (Reid 2010: II.ii.v, 126; see also Reid 2010: V.vii, 348–9)

Reid, then, allows that the passions sometimes are inputs into the moral sense, which then yields normative judgments. The thrust of these passages, however, is that when they are, the moral sense is not working as it ought. For the passions are unreliable indicators of moral reality, "bribing" and "biasing" moral judgment. Only when the moral sense does not have passions as inputs does it function as it ought.

I doubt, however, that Reid's concern about the ways in which passion "bribes" and "biases" judgment cuts deeply against Hutcheson's sentimentalism. For one thing, in these passages, Reid is arguably in the grip of a picture of the self—one that informs a good deal of what rationalists ranging from Price to Kant say—that exaggerates the distorting effects of the passions, ignoring altogether the important epistemic roles they can play in yielding an accurate view of the moral domain. For another, the grip that this account of the self has on Reid is not nearly as tight as these passages make it seem. In fact, as I've argued elsewhere, Reid often expresses an admirable appreciation for the epistemic roles of affect.¹² Were affective states such as curiosity not to direct our attention to various features of reality, the mind, Reid writes, would be without direction, unable to form any "true and stable judgment of any object" (Reid 2010: III.ii.vi, 141). Moreover, and interestingly, Reid defends a view of concept formation that emphasizes the role of affect. Speaking of our "first moral conceptions," Reid writes, that they are "probably got by attending coolly to the conduct of others, and observing what moves our approbation, what our indignation" (Reid 2010: V.ii, 279). When one takes note of what rationalists such as John Balguy and Richard Price say about moral concept

¹² See Cuneo (2006, 2008), for example.

acquisition—namely, that it is an exercise of reason—one can appreciate the degree to which Reid's position is removed from others in the rationalist tradition.¹³

Let's take stock: so far, we've considered two reasons that Reid offers for rejecting Hutcheson's model of moral cognition. Both, I've claimed, fail to hit the mark. In the first case, Reid's objection fails to make contact with Hutcheson's views, while in the second, it expresses an implausible position that Reid less than wholeheartedly accepts. But if this is so, are there other, more persuasive reasons that Reid has for distancing his view from Hutcheson's sentimentalism?

I believe so. Appreciating these reasons, however, requires stepping back for a moment to take account of some more general features of Reid's position.

Reid on Reason and Justice

In his chapter entitled "On the influence of motives," Reid writes that nature provides human beings with a variety of instincts and habits. These instincts and habits are especially valuable since they "supply the defects of our knowledge," allowing us to navigate our environment successfully without relying on the often balky process of practical deliberation. At a certain point, however, every person "come to years of understanding, who has given any attention to his own conduct" forms a more abstract conception of that in which his well-being consists (Reid 2010: II.ii, 53–4). Reid calls that in which an agent's well-being consists his "good on the whole." Forming a conception of one's good on the whole, according to Reid, is largely a matter of making "an estimate of the value of health, of reputation, of riches, of pleasure, of virtue, of self-approbation, and of the approbation of his Maker" and determining how they should be pursued (Reid 2010: II.ii, 54). Ordinary practical deliberation, Reid continues, largely consists in forming and revising one's notion of one's good on the whole by determining how various activities and states fit into that conception, and stepping back from our various desires, impulses, and instincts, asking whether and how they contribute to it.

By defending this account of practical deliberation, according to which a person can both grasp the notion of her good on the whole and also determine that in which it consists, Reid takes himself to reject instrumentalist accounts of practical reason, such as that defended by Hutcheson and Hume. In Reid's view, these philosophers maintain that "reason cannot, with any propriety, be called a principle of action. Its office can only be to minister to the principles of action, by discovering the means of their gratification" (Reid 2010: III.iii.i, 153). By rejecting such views, Reid is careful to point out that he does not deny that desires are among the principles of action. After all, some of the goods that compose our well-being, says Reid, "depend only upon the constitution of the palate." Still, in those cases in which two persons have incompatible preferences, Reid emphasizes, it is not as if their tastes are beyond evaluation. Rather, says Reid, "we may give a very certain determination, to wit, that the two tastes are equally good, and that both of the persons do equally well, in preferring what suits their palate and their stomach"

¹³ See Price (1948: ch. 1, esp. p. 17) and Balguy (1976: part 1, 28).

(Reid 2010: II.ii, 54–5). If Reid is right, then, allowing desires to be principles of action does not preclude their being subjects of evaluation. They can be evaluated in such a way as to determine whether their satisfaction genuinely contributes to one's good on the whole or virtue.

In fact, it is precisely this ability to step back from our instincts, impulses, and desires and evaluate them—thereby engaging in "self-government"—that Reid says lies at the heart of practical reasoning (Reid 2010: Introduction, 5; see also V.v, 305). To be sure, modern philosophers, says Reid, have engaged in "very subtle disputes" about whether this ability ought to be called an office of reason and "not rather some internal sense or taste" (Reid 2010: II.ii, 56). But this verbal dispute, Reid says, does not interest him. The important point is that we have this ability. And for his purposes we do no harm—indeed, we track the practices of the "learned and unlearned" alike (Reid 2010: III.iii.i, 152)—in calling it a function of practical reason.¹⁴

Now return for the moment to Hutcheson's justification for positing the moral sense. Recall that, in its broad lines, it has three parts: in the first place, we are to assume that practical reason is wholly instrumental, concerned only with the evaluation of not ends but means. In the second place, we infer that since the moral judgments we form do not concern the satisfaction of (self-interested) desire, they cannot be the output of reason. Finally, in light of this, we are to posit the existence of an autonomous faculty, the moral sense. It is this sense that produces states of moral approbation in a non-inferential way.

Reid found this line of argument unconvincing. This is because, in Reid's view, Hutcheson reaches his conclusion by working with an impoverished account of practical reason—one that fails to capture the phenomenon of self-government in which we evaluate the various desires that we have in light of our good on the whole and duty.¹⁵ Of course by offering a competing picture of practical reason that attempts to do justice to this phenomenon, Reid has not offered reasons for rejecting Hutcheson's model of the moral sense. Rather, he has offered reasons to reject the *rationale* that Hutcheson offers for accepting his particular account of the moral sense. If Reid's competing account is correct and practical deliberation—whether prudential or moral—is largely a matter of self-government, then Hutcheson's rationale collapses. Moral judgment is the yield of the moral sense. But the moral sense should be understood not as a faculty distinct from practical reason but as a dimension thereof.

It appears, then, that Reid has principled reasons for rejecting the main type of consideration that Hutcheson offers for believing that moral judgments are founded not in reason but in sentiment. Moreover, these reasons are consistent with Hutcheson's insistence that, apart from our having affective tendencies of various kinds, we would

¹⁴ "That talent which we call *reason*... has in all ages, among the learned and the unlearned, been conceived to have two offices, to regulate our belief, and to regulate our actions and conduct" (Reid 2010: III.iii.i, 152).

¹⁵ By emphasizing the importance of self-government in Reid, I am echoing a theme in Schneewind (1998). According to Schneewind, the stress on self-government unites the work of Reid and Kant who, among the moderns, were unique in emphasizing it.

be unable to engage in genuine moral thought. But there is, I think, a deeper motivation for Reid's resistance to Hutcheson's view. In closing, it will be worth having it before us.

When one surveys Hutcheson's views, one cannot fail to appreciate its monolithic character. The moral domain, in Hutcheson's hands, is the domain of benevolence—the latter being Hutcheson's stand-in for the Christian virtue of agape. On some occasions, such as in *Reflections on the Moral Sense*, Hutcheson is deeply reluctant to speak of other dimensions of the moral domain, such as the domain of justice and rights. On other occasions, such as in the *Inquiry*, Hutcheson speaks of justice and rights but takes them to be aspects of benevolence. Addressing the topic of divine justice, for example, Hutcheson writes that the "Justice of the Deity is only a Conception of his universal impartial Benevolence" (Hutcheson 2008: 196).

For Reid, things are different. Reid in no way wishes to deny that benevolence is an important component of the moral domain. He has, for example, much to say about what he (following Hutcheson) calls the "benevolent affections." And he is in full agreement with Hutcheson that there is no way in which these affections can be resolved into considerations of self-interest. Still, there is a sense in which Reid maintains that Hutcheson has not gone far enough in appreciating the fine contours of morality. For, in Reid's estimation, justice can no more be viewed as an aspect of benevolence than benevolence can be seen as a dimension of self-interest. Hutcheson, in Reid's view, has failed to appreciate a fundamental division within the moral realm.

We can see this, Reid argues, by noting that in addition to there being benevolent affections such as natural affection and compassion, there are also malevolent affections such as resentment and indignation. When we focus our attention on affections of this latter sort, Reid claims, we can see that Hutcheson's model of the moral sense strains to capture the phenomena. For the malevolent affections such as resentment and injury, Reid says, presuppose that the person who experiences them believes or takes it for granted that he has been wronged or suffered an "injury." And the belief or supposition that one has been wronged "implies an idea of justice" (Reid 2010: II.v, 132).

The very notion of an injury is, that it is less than we may justly claim; as, on the contrary, the notion of a favour is, that it is more than we can justly claim. Whence it is evident, that justice is the standard, by which both a favor and an injury are to be weighed and estimated. Their very nature and definition consist in their exceeding or falling short of this standard. No man, therefore, can have the idea either of a favor or of an injury, who has not the idea of justice. (Reid 2010: II.v, 132)

If Reid is right, the malevolent affections reveal something deep about the texture of morality. In various places, Hutcheson claims that our overarching obligation is to produce the most happiness for the most people (Hutcheson 2008: 170; see also 2002: 39). But to fail to produce such a good, Reid says, is not perforce to commit an injury (Reid 2010: V.v, 326). Among other things, a good of this sort is so complex that we cannot be expected to understand it, let alone act effectively to bring it about. As such, a person's failure to maximize the happiness of all is not something for which he

is open to rightful resentment or indignation, wherein we hold him accountable for what he has failed to accomplish. But to fail to do what is just by injuring someone, says Reid, is to leave oneself open to attitudes such as resentment and indignation. It is, in Stephen Darwall's terminology, to make oneself the rightful object of a second-personal demand that one cease and desist from injurious behavior and make reparation for any injury done.¹⁶

Hume famously claimed that for every virtue, we must be able to identify a characteristic sentiment or motive associated with it.¹⁷ When it came to justice, Hume found himself groping to identify such a sentiment or motive. This, in large measure, is what leads him to identify justice as an "artificial virtue" born of convention. Reid, in contrast, maintains that the sentiments for which Hume searched are not difficult to find. We can identify a variety of them—resentment, indignation, and gratitude being the most prominent. But any plausible analysis of these sentiments must recognize that they presuppose moral judgments of a certain kind on the part of the person who experiences them. If so, the Hutchesonian model, according to which sentiments yield moral judgments, fails to explain the phenomena in this case. These sentiments are explained by the moral judgments, not the other way around. Paying attention to the nature of justice, if Reid is correct, allows us to see that.

Reid appears to be on to something important here, although what he says probably requires refinement. For example, in the passage quoted above, Reid says that one cannot have the concept *being an injury* without first having the concept *being just*. Suppose that he is right about this conceptual priority claim. Even if he is, it does not imply Reid's further claim that, when all goes well, the affective component of the malevolent affections depends on an agent's having judged an action to be wrong. (Here I understand Reid to have occurrent acts of judging in mind). This is because it is possible for a given experience to evoke an affection such as resentment in an agent without his having formed any moral judgment at all. The person may simply experience another's behavior *as calling for resentment* without forming the judgment that it is wrong or calls for resentment; he experiences it under this concept and is immediately prompted to respond. If this is right, Reid has overstated his case. Sometimes we react so quickly to what we take to be acts of injustice that we don't form the judgment that they are in fact acts of injustice.¹⁸

I suspect that Reid would accept this point were it put to him. Suppose, then, we were to amend Reid's position, allowing for cases in which malevolent affections are formed

¹⁶ Darwall (2006). In ch. 8, Darwall argues that Reid's appreciation of the second-person standpoint lies at the heart of his disagreement with Hume on the nature of justice.

¹⁷ Here I simplify. Hume also claims that these motives must be of a certain kind: they must be approved of, consistently motivate us, and be original.

¹⁸ Why not say, on Reid's behalf, that the moral judgment in question can be either an occurrent or a non-occurrent "standing" judgment to the effect that acts of this type are unjust? The problem with this suggestion is that an agent may have no standing belief about whether a given type of action is wrong; until his present experience, he might have never encountered acts of this type. Still, it seems possible for him to experience such an action as calling for resentment (even when he forms no occurrent moral judgment about it). For the capacity to form responses of this sort may also be built into the design plan of the moral sense.

absent moral judgment (although not absent the employment of moral concepts). Once amended, however, one can understand why Reid would still find himself deeply dissatisfied with Hutcheson's model of the moral sense. For it is plausible to believe that, some of the time, the order of explanation between moral belief and affect is as Reid claims. It is, moreover, plausible to hold that Hutcheson's model of the moral sense would have difficulty accounting for cases in which one experiences behavior as calling for resentment without judging it to be so. After all, Hutcheson attempts to characterize the yield of the moral sense simply in terms of pleasure, pain, love, and hatred. This, arguably, is far too crude. The output of the moral sense is considerably more conceptually rich than Hutcheson indicates, and Reid's account calls attention to this.

10.3 BLURRING THE BOUNDARIES

At the outset of our discussion, I noted that while illuminating in some respects, the standard division between rationalism and sentimentalism also has its limitations, as it tends to obscure the ways in which various philosophers fail to fit well into either camp. Along the way, I argued that this is evident when we take a closer look at Hutcheson's view. In some respects, I argued, Hutcheson's view come rather close to positions ordinarily attributed to the rationalists inasmuch, for example, it countenances necessary moral truths. In our discussion of Reid, we have now seen a second limitation of this way of thinking of the British moralists. While in many ways friendly to the rationalist program—Reid, for example, enthusiastically defended the existence of necessary moral truths—Reid embraced a role for the affections that makes them a central component of the moral life. In this way, he incorporated into his position what he considered to be important insights from the broadly sentimentalist tradition. Ironically, if what I've argued is correct, it is precisely his willingness to incorporate certain features of the sentimentalist tradition into his own view that led Reid to believe that the analysis of the moral sense offered by sentimentalists such as Hutcheson fails to capture the actual character of moral judgment.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For their comments, I thank Erika Cuneo, Kyle Swan, and the members of the University of Vermont ethics group: Lorraine Besser-Jones, Sin-Yee Chan, Tyler Doggett, Randall Harp, Arthur Kuflik, Crystal L'Hote, and Don Loeb.

REFERENCES

Balguy, John (1976 [1778]). *The Foundation of Moral Goodness*. New York: Garland.
Blackburn, Simon (1984). *Spreading the Word*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Bricke, John (1996). *Mind and Morality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cohon, Rachel (2008). *Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cuneo, Terence (2006). "Signs of Value: Reid on the Evidential Role of Feeling in Moral Judgment." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 11: 69–91.
Cuneo, Terence (2008). "Intuitionism's Burden: Reid on the Problem of Moral Motivation." *Journal of Scottish Philosophy*, 6: 21–43.
Darwall, Stephen (1994). *The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought"*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Darwall, Stephen (2006). *The Second Person Standpoint*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Frankena, William (1955). "Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory." *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 16: 356–75.
Gill, Michael (2006). *The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Greig, J. Y. T. (1932). *The Letters of David Hume*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hutcheson, Francis (1971). *The Correspondence between Gilbert Burnet and Francis Hutcheson. Appendix to Illustrations on the Moral Sense*, edited by Bernard Peach. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hutcheson, Francis (1993). *On the Social Nature of Man in Two Texts on Human Nature*, edited by Thomas Mautner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hutcheson, Francis (2002 [1728]). *On the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense*, edited and with an Introduction by Aaron Garrett. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.
Hutcheson, Francis (2008 [1726]). *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, revised edition, edited and with an introduction by Wolfgang Leidhold. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.
Kail, P. J. E. (2001). "Hutcheson's Moral Sense: Skepticism, Realism, and Secondary Qualities." *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 18: 57–77.
Kail, P. J. E. (2007). *Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kemp Smith, Norman (1941). *The Philosophy of David Hume*. London: Macmillan.
Kivy, Peter (2003). *The Seventh Sense*, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Korsgaard, Christine (1996). *The Sources of Normativity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MacIntyre, Alasdair (1966). *A Short History of Ethics*. London: Macmillan.
Norton, D. F. (1982). *David Hume: Common-sense Moralism, Sceptical Metaphysician*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Price, Richard (1948 [1787]). *A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*, edited by D. D. Raphael. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rawls, John (2000). *Lectures in the History of Ethics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Reid, Thomas (2002 [1764]). *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, edited by Derek R. Brookes. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Reid, Thomas (2010 [1788]). *Essays on the Active Power of Man*, edited by Knud Haakonssen and James A. Harris. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Schneewind, J. B. (1998). *The Invention of Autonomy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.