Assessing the Impact of the Global War on Terrorism on terrorism threats in Muslim countries

Journal:	*Terrorism and Political Violence*
Manuscript ID	FTPV-2019-6815.R1
Manuscript Type:	Original Article
Keywords:	counterterrorism, global war on terrorism, Muslim countries, quantitative, Bush Administration

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States called on Muslims to join it in its struggle against the attacks' perpetrator, al-Qaeda (AQ). America hoped Muslim states would adopt a set of policies that were in line with US counterterrorism efforts, ranging from legal reforms that increased counterterrorism capabilities to arresting suspected members of AQ in a country. As we are now over 10 years out from the beginning of this global war on terrorism, it is possible to both ask and answer the question posed by US demands: did they work? That is, did majority-Muslim states who implemented counterterrorism policies in line with America's counterterrorism priorities experience a reduction in the threat of terrorism?

I answer this question through a quantitative study on the effects of compliance with US counterterrorism priorities on terrorist activity in majority-Muslim countries. I use a quantitative analysis of majority-Muslim states' compliance with US counterterrorism priorities and data on terrorist attacks. I analyze this with a random effects regression along with numerous robustness checks to assess the stability of the findings. I find that majority-Muslim countries that implemented policies in line with US efforts experienced fewer deaths from terrorist attacks than those that did not.

This question touches on a few important scholarly and policy debates. The most obvious is whether the US approach to counterterrorism after 9/11 was misguided. If majority-Muslim states that went along with US counterterrorism efforts experienced increased terrorist violence, this casts doubt on the overall efficacy of the campaign. The question also touches on broader debates in the study of political violence. Many studies have analyzed various counterterrorism strategies and counterinsurgency tactics to determine their effectiveness. Understanding the effectiveness of US counterterrorism efforts—which generally involved coercive tactics—could contribute to these research programs.

A few notes on definitions and scope are required. First, I focus on the extent to which majority-Muslim states' adopted counterterrorism policies that were in line with the type of policies the United States preferred during the global war on terrorism. I refer to this throughout the article as compliance with US counterterrorism priorities. While this may seem one-sided, it does capture the nature of their interactions. Additionally, I define effectiveness in terms of reducing the number of deaths from terrorist attacks. There are some potential concerns with this, which I discuss below. Additionally, I focus on majority-Muslim states as most US pressure on counterterrorism fell on these states. Thus, analyzing the impact of majority-Muslim states' compliance with US counterterrorism efforts will tell us much about these efforts' effectiveness.

This article proceeds in five sections. The first discusses the history of the US counterterrorism efforts and relevant literature on its potential effectiveness. I derive a few hypotheses from this literature on the effects of the US counterterrorism efforts. The second presents the research design of the study, followed by the third section presenting the results of the analysis. The fourth section expands on the results to discuss their implications for my theory. Finally, the fifth section summarizes the findings and discusses their broader implications.

Debating the effectiveness of the US counterterrorism efforts

This article deals with a few debates in the scholarly and policy literatures. The most obvious is whether US counterterrorism efforts were effective in undermining the threat posed by AQ and other groups. But there are also broader implications for the study, as it can speak to work assessing the effectiveness of various counterterrorism strategies.

The US Global War on Terrorism and Majority-Muslim partners

Shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, US President George W. Bush launched the Global War on Terrorism in a speech to a joint session of Congress. He declared that the "war on terror begins with al-Qaeda but…will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."[1] He later clarified that the goal of the struggle was to "(1) fighting the enemy abroad; (2) denying terrorists state support and sanctuary; (3) denying terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction; and (4) spreading democracy," with many policymakers also focusing on the number of terrorists killed and the persistence of attacks by al-Qaeda and other groups.[2]

A significant element of the war on terrorism was calls for majority-Muslim states to cooperate with US initiatives. US policymakers pressured states like Saudi Arabia to reform their policies and eliminate passive support for AQ.[3] And as AQ members or sympathizers were present in several majority-Muslim states—such as Pakistan, Indonesia and Algeria—the United States expected Muslim regimes to crack down on potential support for the group and its activities.[4] Beyond this, the United States' efforts to craft a "moderate Islam" and counter what it

[1] "Transcript of President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Thursday Night, September 20, 2001," *CNN*, 21 September 2001. For useful overview of the Global War on Terrorism, see Dawn Johnsen, "The Lawyers' War: Counterterrorism from Bush to Obama to Trump," *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 1 (2017).; Lawrence Wright, *The Terror Years: From Al-Qaeda to the Islamic State* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016).; Peter Bergen, *The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between Al-Qaeda and America* (New York: Free Press, 2011).

[2] Raphael Perl, "Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness," (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005).

[3] See Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Rachel Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, "The Us Campaign to Squeeze Terrorists' Financing," *Journal of International Affairs* 62, no. 1 (2008); Fatma al Sayegh, "Post-9/11 Changes in the Gulf: The Case of the Uae," *Middle East Policy* 11, no. 2 (2004).

[4] Ishtiaq Ahmad, " The U.S. Af-Pak Strategy: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 37, no. 4 (2010); Ann Marie Murphy, "Us Rapprochement with Indonesia: From Problem State to Partner," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 32, no. 3 (2010).

sees as "extremist" messaging as part of its counterterrorism efforts ended up focusing primarily on states with large Muslim populations.[5]

The United States encountered mixed reactions from majority-Muslim states. Some weak states struggled to take decisive action against terrorists, or were wary of cracking down on terrorist groups they saw as useful foreign policy tools.[6] In a recent study, Tankel pointed to the relationship between a regime and terrorist groups, the effectiveness of diplomatic statecraft, threat perceptions and alignment dynamics to explain the extent of a state's cooperation on counterterrorism.[7] Another recent study argued some patterns of cooperation on counterterrorism may be explained by the interaction between Islamic opposition and regime ties to these groups.[8]

For those states that did go along with US counterterrorism efforts, the effect was to strengthen the coercive powers of the state. The policies the United States recommended—such as broadened legal frameworks to prosecute terrorist activities and more aggressive disruption of terrorist supporters—expanded the ability of majority-Muslim states to control their populations. This raised human rights concerns from several observers, who worried the global war on terrorism would weaken normative limits on repression in states that participated in the struggle.[9]

Debating the War on Terrorism and Counterterrorism Tactics

During the Global War on Terrorism, the Bush Administration argued it was working, based on the removal of hostile regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, capturing and killing al-Qaeda

[5] Steven Kull, *Feeling Betrayed: The Roots of Muslim Anger at America* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011); Mahmoud Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Three Leaves Press, 2005).
[6] Daniel Byman, "Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism," *International Security* 31, no. 2 (2006); *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism*.
[7] Stephen Tankel, *With Us and against Us: How America's Partners Help and Hinder the War on Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).
[8] Peter S. Henne, *Islamic Politics, Muslim States and Counterterrorism Tensions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
[9] Rebecca Sanders, *Plausible Legality: Legal Culture and Political Imperative in the Global War on Terror* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

members and disrupting terrorist plots.[10] Scholars and practitioners have vigorously debated these claims. Some claimed the global war on terrorism disrupted AQ and, in the words of Brands and Feaver "the aggressive counter-terrorism policies after 9/11" prevented further attacks.[11] Others, however, were more critical, pointing to the ineffectiveness of the struggle's "kinetic actions" or its lack of legitimacy.[12]

A broader question, however, involves whether the war on terrorism effectively disrupted AQ's ability to launch attacks worldwide, especially against the majority-Muslim states it pressured into cooperation. Thrall and Goepner, in their criticism of the war on terrorism, found that there was a higher increase in deaths from terrorism in majority-Muslim countries the United States targeted for invasions or air strikes than in those it did not.[13] Lehrke and Schomaker, by contrast, found that some coercive aspects of US counterterrorism efforts were effective.[14] Johnston and Sarbahi found that the controversial US drone strikes in Pakistan were effective in undermining terrorist activity.[15]

Additionally, this debate about the global war on terrorism touches on a discussion in the academic literature on the effectiveness of coercive tactics. Many have specifically argued that

[10] Perl, "Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness."
[11] Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, "The Case for Reassessing America's 43rd President," *Orbis* 62, no. 1 (2018).: 83. See also Robert J. Lieber, *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 3-14.
[12] Jenna Jordan, Margaret E. Kosal, and Lawrence Rubin, "The Strategic Illogic of Counterterrorism Policy," *The Washington Quarterly* 39, no. 4 (2017); Jeremy Pressman, "Power without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East," *International Security* 33, no. 4 (2009). Samantha Power, "Legitimacy and Competence," in *To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine*, ed. Melvin P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008)., 134.
[13] A. Trevor Thrall and Erik Goepner, "Step Back: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy from the Failed War on Terror," in *Policy Analysis* (Cato Institute, 2017).
[14] Jesse Paul Lehrke and Rahel Schomaker, "Kill, Capture, or Defend? The Effectiveness of Specific and General Counterterrorism Tactics against the Global Threats of the Post-9/11 Era," *Security Studies* 25, no. 4 (2016).
[15] Patrick B. Johnston and Anoop K. Sarbahi, "The Impact of Us Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan," *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 2 (2016).

coercive counterterrorist tactics are counterproductive.[16] Others found mixed results for coercive activities, including political successes by militants despite tactical defeats and short-term increases in violence due to successful decapitation strikes.[17] This would cast doubt on the prospects of US efforts, as they depended on coercive tactics meant to disrupt extremists and enable cooperation with moderates.

Thus, there has been significant debate over whether the global war on terrorism was effective, with a broader debate involving numerous, often conflicting, questions in the literature on political violence. That is why I adopt the specific scope conditions I laid out in the introduction: whether majority-Muslim states that adopted policies in line with US counterterrorism priorities in the global war on terrorism experienced a decline in deaths from terrorism in the years immediately following 9/11. By focusing on the overall set of policies the United States called for—rather than particularly dramatic policies like drone strikes—I can assess whether the initiative in general was effective. By looking in the years after 9/11, rather than the entire length of time since 2001, I can determine whether the global war on terrorism's proximate goal was accomplished; disrupting AQ. In the next section, I explain why I believe the global war on terrorism was effective, using these definitions.

Why compliance with US counterterrorism priorities worked

[16] Laura Dugan and Erica Chenoweth, "Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel," *American Sociological Review* 77, no. 4 (2012). James I. Walsh and James A. Piazza, "Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism," *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 3 (2010). For a similar finding on counterinsurgency, see Matthew Adam Kocher, Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War," *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 2 (2011).

[17] Daniel Byman, *A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).: 368. Frielich found similarly mixed results. Charles David Freilich, "Israel's Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective?," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 29, no. 2 (2017). Max Abrahms and Jochen Mierau, "Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killings on Militant Group Tactics," ibid. (2015); Asaf Zussman and Noam Zussman, "Assassinations: Evaluating the Effectiveness of an Israeli Counterterrorism Policy Using Stock Market Data," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20, no. 2 (2006).

I argue that the policies the United States called for as part of its global war on terrorism were aggressive and controversial, but they generally worked. They initiated direct action against AQ and its supporters, and ended states' tacit acceptance of terrorist activity in their territories. Moreover, existing research on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency suggests such tactics would be useful. I therefore argue that majority-Muslim states that complied with US counterterrorism efforts would experience a decline in deaths from terrorism.

Clarifications

First, what I do mean by compliance with US counterterrorism efforts? After the 9/11 attacks, the United States laid out a set of policies it saw as effective in defeating AQ and which it wanted other states—particularly majority-Muslim states—to adopt. Some of these were presented in official speeches, and others were included in official policy documents. Still others were included in the US State Department's annual country reports on terrorism. These reports include information on terrorist activity in countries as well as states' responses to terrorism, clarifying whether they have been making sufficient progress in implementing policies the United States prefers. Thus, we can define compliance with US efforts as the extent to which majority-Muslim states' policies were in line with the priorities laid out in these documents.

Also, what do I mean by effectiveness? This is not an easy question; indeed, a 2005 Congressional Research Service noted the ambiguity in US government language on this point.[18] Scholarly studies adopt a variety of measures for both terrorism and counterterrorism.[19] Various measures of effectiveness include the destruction of terrorist organizations, their entry into the political process, effects on terrorists' ability to maintain discipline, de-radicalization of

[18] Perl, "Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness."
[19] For a useful discussion, see Joseph K. Young, "Measuring Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 31, no. 2 (2016).

terrorists, public support for the government and the resilience of societies.[20] Likewise, some studies of the effectiveness of terrorist organizations look at things like political successes and longevity of organizations.[21] Many, however, focus on changes in the intensity of violence by terrorist groups, specifically the number of attacks by terrorist groups and the number of deaths these attacks cause.[22] That is, these studies look at whether counterterrorism strategies lead to decreased terrorist activity as a sign of effectiveness. This echoes US government language during the Global War on Terrorism, which often emphasized changes in attacks and deaths by terrorist groups.[23] Likewise, several studies of terrorist effectiveness focus on the intensity of their attacks as well.[24]

[20] Audrey Kurth Cronin, "“How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups” " *International Security* 31, no. 1 (2006); Seth Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008); Mary Beth Altier et al., "Why They Leave: An Analysis of Terrorist Disengagement Events from Eighty-Seven Autobiographical Accounts," *Security Studies* 26, no. 2 (2017). Patrick B. Johnston, "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns," *International Security* 36, no. 4 (2012); Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," ibid.31, no. 2 (2006); Jason Lyall, "Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy's Impact on War Outcomes and Duration," *International Organization* 64, no. 1 (2010); Arjun Chowdhury and Ronald R. Krebs, "Making and Mobilizing Moderates: Rhetorical Strategy, Political Networks, and Counterterrorism," *Security Studies* 18, no. 3 (2009). Abrahms and Mierau, "Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killings on Militant Group Tactics."; Max Abrahms and Philip B.K. Potter, "Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics," *International Organization* 69 (2015). Bart Schuurman, "Defeated by Popular Demand: Public Support and Counterterrorism in Three Western Democracies, 1963-1998," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36, no. 2 (2013); Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Bruce Dickson, "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrrorism and Mobilization," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 2 (2007). Zussman and Zussman, "Assassinations: Evaluating the Effectiveness of an Israeli Counterterrorism Policy Using Stock Market Data."

[21] Joseph K. Young and Laura Dugan, "Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8, no. 2 (2014); S. Brock Blomberg, Khusrav Gaibulloev, and Todd Sandler, "Terrorist Group Survival: Ideology, Tactics, and Base of Operations," *Public Choice* 194 (2011); Brian J Phillips, "Enemies with Benefits? Violent Rivalry and Terrorist Group Longevity," *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 1 (2015).

[22] Johnston, "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns." Jason Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgency Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 3 (2009); Dugan and Chenoweth, "Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel."; Walsh and Piazza, "Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism." Lehrke and Schomaker, "Kill, Capture, or Defend? The Effectiveness of Specific and General Counterterrorism Tactics against the Global Threats of the Post-9/11 Era."; Johnston and Sarbahi, "The Impact of Us Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan." Thrall and Goepner, "Step Back: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy from the Failed War on Terror."

[23] Perl, "Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness."

I follow this approach in this study, measuring counterterrorism effectiveness as a decrease in deaths by terrorist groups. Effective counterterrorism tactics would lead to a decreased ability of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to operate in a country, which would manifest in a lowered impact from their operations, such as fewer deaths. Other aspects of effectiveness, such as decreased support or organizational integrity, are important, but cannot be addressed for space considerations. I do, however, follow several of the above studies by also examining the impact of counterterrorism on the number of attacks by terrorist groups in a robustness check.

Expectations

Based on these definitions, there are several reasons to think majority-Muslim states' compliance with US counterterrorism efforts was effective. First, arresting terrorist members and disrupting cells through increased law enforcement activity, intelligence sharing with the United States, and joint operations with US forces should significantly undermine terrorist groups' capabilities. Additionally, crackdowns on terrorist financing and reducing support or sympathy for terrorist groups should further weaken them by limiting their pool of backers in society. Finally, many of the institutional and legal reforms the United States preferred would strengthen the state's hold over society, which should make it easier for the state to disrupt terrorist threats. These may lead to a backlash from society, but the intensified state powers they produce should manage any such backlash.

Scholarly studies on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency back up these claims. Quick and powerful responses to terrorist attacks, which include penalties for potential civilian

[24] Peter S. Henne, "The Ancient Fire: Religion and Suicide Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 1 (2012); Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, "The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks," *Journal of Politics* 70, no. 2 (2008).

supporters, can lead civilians to turn on terrorist groups.[25] This means that states that crack down on AQ supporters and messaging in line with US priorities would successfully undermine terrorist activity even if it upsets the populace. Similarly, coercive government acts against terrorist groups and their supporters, combined with outreach to rivals in society, could keep terrorists off balance.[26] The United States' emphasis on countering "extremist" messaging and supporting "moderate" Muslim groups—alongside actions against AQ—means it divided potential opposition to the regime, further undermining the threat from terrorism.

Additionally, the specific focus of US counterterrorism efforts could prevent attacks from occurring. Some studies found that threatening terrorists' political goals may effectively deter them from acting.[27] As AQ's broadly-defined goals involved the overthrow of hostile Muslim governments, counterterrorist tactics that strengthen these governments would stymie AQ's political goals and dampen its activities. Thus, these states' compliance with US priorities, which strengthened the state's coercive power, would have undermined the viability of AQ's struggle, lessening its supporters' morale.

These effects of compliance with US counterterrorism efforts should be apparent no matter the reason a majority-Muslim state works with America. The reasons behind differing levels of cooperation matter for the nature of US influence in the international system. But whether a state implemented the United States' preferred policies out of self-interest or as a result of US pressure, the effects should be the same. The state will gain greater power to disrupt terrorist networks and supporters, decreasing the level of terrorist activity. Additionally, some

[25] Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgency Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya."
[26] Jacqueline L. Hazelton, "The 'Hearts and Minds' Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare," *International Security* 42, no. 1 (2017).
[27] Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done," ibid.30, no. 3 (2005/2006); Alex Wilner, "Fencing in Warfare: Threats, Punishment, and Intra-War Deterrence in Counterterrorism," *Security Studies* 22, no. 4 (2013).

states may half-heartedly go along with US efforts, but this would be constitute a lower level of compliance that would reduce its effectiveness.

One could point to alternative expectations. If a state adopted coercive tactics to combat AQ and other terrorist groups, this may affect innocent bystanders directly—by being caught up in mass arrests—or indirectly by observing the brutal attacks on the suspected terrorists. These collateral effects of counterterrorism campaigns may convince otherwise neutral segments of society to sympathize with or actively aid the terrorists. Beyond that, having to deal with coercive counterterrorism campaigns and their disruptions of citizens' normal lives decreases many citizens' trust in the government. This may make it more likely other opposition movements—some violent—may emerge. Thus, we may find that US counterterrorism efforts had little impact on terrorism in majority-Muslim countries—as productive and counterproductive elements would cancel each other out—or may actually make terrorism worse by radicalizing the population.

Research Design

I answer this question through a quantitative study of majority-Muslim states' compliance with US counterterrorism initiatives after 2001. I focus the analysis on this time period as the nature of US counterterrorism operations changed after the Global War on Terrorism began (although I include earlier years in the analysis in a robustness check). I use recently published data on counterterrorism policies, as well as data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). I complement the quantitative analysis with an illustrative case study of Saudi Arabia's changing counterterrorism policies post-9/11 and consequent decrease in terrorist activity.

Dependent Variable

As I discuss above, the dependent variable measures the number of deaths from terrorist attacks. I use the log plus one of the number of deaths from terrorist attacks in a country that year, drawn from the GTD.[28] Because a few high-impact attacks skew the data, the log of the number of deaths is more appropriate. There may be some concerns about this variable, specifically whether the number of deaths is a better measure than the number of attacks, and whether it is appropriate to include attacks by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the same measure. I address these in robustness checks.

Explanatory Variable

The explanatory variables are *Overall Counterterrorism, Domestic Counterterrorism and International Counterterrorism.* They are drawn from a recent study on counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and majority-Muslim states. The dataset includes information on 48 countries in which Muslim make up at least half of the population.[29] The variables measure the extent to which a majority-Muslim state's counterterrorism policies were in line with US preferences. The variables run from -10 (completely uncompliant) to 10 (completely compliant).[30]

The data use the US State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism, which present information on terrorist activity in countries around the world and states' counterterrorism policies, and have been released each year since 1995. The reports discuss policy changes that are in compliance with US priorities, as well as actions or inactions that troubled US

[28] "Global Terrorism Database," ed. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2017).
[29] The study does not include the Palestinian territories as not all of the variables included data for this observation.
[30] The data is drawn from Henne, *Islamic Politics, Muslim States and Counterterrorism Tensions*. Data is available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/TCHCSD. The original source of the data discusses trends in the context of counterterrorism cooperation; I have adjusted terminology to better fit the theme of this paper but the underlying concepts are equivalent. More information on the dataset is available in the reviewers' appendix.

policymakers. The data quantify numerous elements of counterterrorism policy, indicating whether or not a state implemented a specific counterterrorism policy. The data also indicate whether actions contrary to US counterterrorism priorities took place. States' behavior is complex, and a dichotomous measure may seem inappropriate, but the reports generally provide clear assessments, and the manner in which the indexes are calculated allows for a full range of variation. The index represents the difference between the compliant and non-compliant elements of a state's counterterrorism policies. The average levels of each were calculated using min-max standardization, and the index is the difference between the two. Two additional indexes include just domestic and international policies, using the same process. Missing data was treated as a 0 in the calculation, although an alternate measure excluded missing data. More information on how the index was calculated is available in the online appendix.

There may be some concerns about this data. There are several questions about the manner in which it is calculated, what variables it includes, and how it deals with missing data. This is addressed through a set of alternative calculations, which are discussed and presented in the online appendix. Additionally, some may worry about the data's reliance on US government sources, which could represent diplomatic considerations or be skewed by information not released to the public. This article endeavors to assess the effects of states adopting policies in line with US priorities; these reports represent US priorities and so, even if they are not objective reporting, they can measure the impact of US pressure. Moreover, there is little evidence that countries whose foreign policies were generally in line with the United States received more favorable assessments.[31] There may be issues with classified information, but the effect would

[31] A study using this data found little impact between a majority-Muslim states' affinity for US policies—measured through UN voting—and the extent to which they cooperated on counterterrorism (based on reporting in these sources). Ibid.

vary across countries. In some countries, compliance with American initiatives may be classified in order to avoid upsetting the public. In other countries, American assessment that the state was not in compliance with counterterrorism priorities could be classified in order to insulate that issue from other important areas. Thus, while classified information likely has some effect, it is not clear it would bias the analysis in any definite direction.[32]

Methods

I use random effects regressions, with maximum likelihood estimation, and the log number of terrorist deaths as the dependent variable. Model 1 includes *Counterterrorism* as the explanatory variable, Model 2 *Domestic Counterterrorism* and Model 3 is *International Counterterrorism.* These tests include a variety of standard control variables from the study of terrorist attacks. The log of the population and amount of land, taken from the World Bank, affect the likelihood of terrorism occurring. The log of GDP measured through per capita purchasing power parity (also from the World Bank) measures the strength of the state; I included an alternate measure in a robustness check. Finally, I include the Polity2 score for the country, from the Polity IV dataset, to measure repression. This is a common measure of repression, meant to address its potential impact on terrorism; there are some concerns about this specific variable, which I will address in robustness checks.

The tests involve a potential methodological issue, simultaneity bias. It is very likely that states experiencing extensive terrorist activity are more likely to work closely with the United States on counterterrorism, so any potential effect of counterterrorism compliance on terrorism may actually indicate a reverse causation. The ideal solution to this problem would be an instrumental variable regression, although it would be very difficult to find a suitable instrument.

[32] Further information on the variable, including its calculation, data coding, and alternate measures, is available in the reviewers' appendix.

I therefore address this by including a one year lag of the log number of terrorist deaths. There are methodological concerns with using a lagged dependent variable in a random effects regression, as this can bias the coefficients in the model, making the lagged variable appear more significant than it actually is.[33] I address this by including the models without the lag variable and without the panel corrections in robustness checks; this will indicate whether issues with the lagged variable are undermining the results. I also ran numerous other robustness checks assessing the effects of the variables included, the specific models used, and influential observations. A list of these tests and their results is included in the online appendix.[34]

Results

The results of the analyses indicate that overall, majority-Muslim states that implemented policies in line with US counterterrorism efforts experienced a decreased threat from terrorist activity. The effects arose primarily from compliance with US domestic priorities; international aspects seemed to have little effect on a state's terrorist activity.

First, it is useful to get an overall sense of Muslim states' counterterrorism policies, specifically the extent to which they were in line with US priorities. In the post-9/11 period, the average *Counterterrorism* score was 1.24, suggesting states tended to implement policies in line with US efforts but not completely. By contrast, the average score before 9/11 was -0.56, indicating there was some increase in cooperation after the beginning of the US Global War on Terrorism. A more detailed picture is apparent when looking at Muslim states' average counterterrorism scores by year. While states' compliance with US priorities was increasing

[33] Paul D. Allison, "Don't Put Lagged Dependent Variables in Mixed Models," *Statistical Horizons*, 2 June 2015; Paul D. Allison, Richard Williams, and Enrique Moral-Benito, "Maximum Likelihood for Cross-Lagged Panel Models with Fixed Effects," *Socius* (2017).

[34] See the reviewers' appendix for more information

prior to 9/11, the scores increased dramatically after the attacks, with a resulting decrease over time. (See Figure 1)

[Figure 1 about here]

Thus, the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism corresponded with an increase in many Muslim states' cooperation with US priorities. What effects did this have on terrorism in these countries? *Counterterrorism* and *Domestic Counterterrorism* corresponded to a decrease in deaths from terrorist attacks between 1996 and 2009. In Model 1, *Counterterrorism* was significant at the 0.05 level with a negative coefficient, indicating an increase in compliance with US priorities led to a decrease in the log number of deaths from terrorist attacks. *Domestic Counterterrorism* was similarly significant, but at the 0.01 level. *International Counterterrorism,* by contrast, was not statistically significant, suggesting it had less of an impact on the number of deaths from terrorist attacks in a country. (See Figure 2 and Table I)

[Figure 2 about here]

[Table I about here]

The effects of complying with the United States' priorities on counterterrorism are also apparent in its substantive effects. The coefficients are difficult to interpret directly, as the dependent variable is the log number of deaths from terrorist attacks and the independent variable is units of an aggregated measure of counterterrorism policies. Some insights are apparent by looking at significant changes in counterterrorism policies, however, such as the change from a relatively non-compliant state to a relatively compliant one. In such a case, the model would expect the number of deaths from terrorist attacks to decrease by about 16%. (See Figure 3)

[Figure 3 about here]

The findings held up under the robustness checks. The findings were consistent under all robustness checks except for models that replaced *Polity* with alternate measures of regime type; in these tests, *Overall Counterterrorism* was not significant. I do not believe this undermines the results, however. First, *Domestic Counterterrorism* remained significant, in line with other findings. Additionally, these alternate measures either collapsed the variation in Polity scores or focused on a narrower element of regime type so they may not be the best measures for this study.[35]

Implications

What do these findings tell us? They indicate that the policies the United States called on majority-Muslim states to adopt were effective, in terms of their proximate goal of decreasing terrorist activity. Majority-Muslim states that complied with US preferences on counterterrorism experienced less of a threat from terrorism. This was particularly the case for countries that followed domestic aspects of US counterterrorism efforts, like reforming legal codes, cracking down on terrorist financing, and arresting AQ suspects. These countries saw the number of deaths from terrorism decrease by about 16% on average.

These findings raise an important question, however. Is the impact of implementing counterterrorism policies in line with US preferences sufficient to be noticeable? Complying with US preferences imposed significant costs on majority-Muslim states. They redirected resources to comply with US counterterrorism priorities, and at times experienced widespread public opposition. While any decrease in terrorism is good, would the decrease my analysis found corresponding to increased counterterrorism efforts be enough to justify these states altering their behavior to such an extent?

[35] Further information on these tests can be found in the reviewers' appendix.

This of course depends on individual regimes' considerations, but a deeper examination of the models' substantive significance suggests that the improved security for these states would justify working with America on the global war on terrorism. For countries with widespread terrorist activity and those with limited terrorist activity, going along with US counterterrorism priorities would correspond to a noticeable drop in deaths from attacks. Across the course of this study, Pakistan suffered over 400 deaths from terrorist attacks a year. A 16% drop in these deaths would be 73. The average number of deaths per terrorist attack in Pakistan was two. Thus, increased compliance with US counterterrorism priorities could have had the impact (in terms of deaths) of over 30 fewer terrorist attacks. Jordan, by contrast, experienced far fewer terrorist attacks, with an average of seven deaths per year, and two deaths per attack. A 16% drop in these deaths would be one person. But with far fewer deaths from terrorist attacks, effectively halving the impact of one of those attacks would be of great value to Jordan.

While it seems that complying with US counterterrorism efforts, particularly their domestic aspects, was effective, this raises another question: why would the domestic counterterrorism policies the United States pushed be more effective than the international ones? The international aspects involved sharing intelligence with the United States, granting US military forces access to a state's territory and participating in US-led military missions like the invasion of Iraq. These may have been effective in disrupting AQ around the world—although the invasion of Iraq possibly enhanced the group's power—but they would do little to help specific countries protect themselves against domestic terrorism. In contrast, the domestic aspects—arresting terrorist suspects, reforming legal codes, disrupting terrorist financing—would directly affect terrorist groups in a country. Thus, states that were particularly active in these areas should see the biggest decline in terrorist attacks as they were more effectively

disrupting AQ and other groups operating in their territory. International aspects of counterterrorism are not irrelevant. They likely disrupted AQ networks, making it more difficult for the group to launch attacks. And they may have interacted with domestic counterterrorism efforts. For example, increased arrests of terrorist suspects would provide a state more valuable intelligence to share with the United States. It thus makes sense to combine them into the overall counterterrorism scale. Yet, their differing effects in the models do suggest they had distinct effects on the threat from terrorism in states.

Illustrative Case Study: Saudi Arabia

I complement the quantitative analysis with an illustrative case study that highlights the relationship between a majority-Muslim state implementing policies in line with US priorities and decreased deaths from terrorism. Saudi Arabia was an initially problematic counterterrorism partners for the United States, but Saudi Arabia's cooperation increased significantly after 2003. The coordination with US counterterrorism forces, increased attention to disrupting terrorist threats, and increased capacity building enabled Saudi Arabia to undermine terrorist networks and decrease the number of attacks it faced.

In the 1990s, and in the initial years after 9/11, Saudi Arabia and the United States had a tense counterterrorism relationship. Tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia over the second *intifadah* intensified after 9/11, as US policymakers believed Saudi Arabia refused to take responsibility for its citizens' role in the attacks.[36] As al-Rasheed argues, many saw the Kingdom as being in a "state of denial" over support for extremists in the country.[37] Cordesman,

[36] Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia*.233-235.
[37] Madawi al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).: 226-227.

while generally defending Saudi Arabia's record, does note it was "slow in taking substantive action after 9/11."[38]

Saudi Arabia's limited counterterrorism cooperation was due to a mix of domestic politics and strategic considerations. The Saudi regime depended on Islamic legitimacy and oil wealth to maintain control. It faced criticism from both domestic and international Islamic groups for not adhering to the Islamic values it espouses. The regime was thus wary of cracking down too extensively on al-Qaeda supporters, for fear of provoking a backlash. At the same time, the Saudis primarily desired to maintain order, and depended on America's continued security support. As a result, they were at times willing to repress domestic dissent in order to ensure continued cooperation with America.

Saudi inaction on growing domestic terrorist threats arguably contributed to the outbreak of violence in the country in 2003. Hegghammer argues the "systemic weakness" of Saudi security forces enabled the rise of the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) network in that country through the lack of "capability" as well as the Saudi "non-confrontational culture of policing."[39] This "reluctance" to disrupt al-Qaeda support in the country made it easier for the AQAP cell that launched the 2003 attacks to form.[40]

Following that wave of attacks, Saudi Arabia greatly increased its counterterrorism activities, which included extensive cooperation with the United States. The government arrested militants and increased the security of potential targets.[41] Saudi Arabia also created task forces

[38] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror?," *Middle East Policy* 13, no. 1 (2006).: 32.
[39] Thomas Hegghammer, "Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia," *International Affairs* 84, no. 4 (2008).: 710.
[40] *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).: 77.
[41] al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*.: 226.

on terrorism and terrorist financing, and trained legal staff on terrorism investigations.[42] Saudi Arabia set up a "religious reeducation" program for captured militants, and fired over 300 clerics for extremist views.[43] But the Saudis did not just expand their counterterrorism operations; they aligned their efforts with the United States. For example, Saudi Arabia create a joint task force with America to combat terrorist financing.[44] Saudi security forces also worked with the FBI on counterterrorism investigations, and the US Homeland Security Advisor established a close relationship with the Saudi Interior Minister.[45] By 2004, the United States praised Saudi Arabia on its counterterrorism record.[46]

This increased cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism arguably led to a decline in the terrorist threat to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis adopted a mixture of forceful counterterrorism actions and a widespread counter-messaging campaign to disrupt AQAP.[47] Additionally, some of its intelligence cooperation with the United States helped it to uncover and arrest or kill members of the cell responsible for the 2003 attacks.[48]

Caveats

There are several caveats to these findings. A major one involves the motivation behind a majority-Muslim states' counterterrorism efforts. That is, would the impact of aligning policies with US counterterrorism efforts be different among states that saw these policies as in line with their interests and those that saw these policies as counterproductive? Additionally, would weaker states or those experiencing widespread terrorist violence struggle to cooperate with

[42] Cordesman, "Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror?."; Abdullah F. Ansary, "Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach," ibid.15, no. 2 (2008).
[43] "Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach."
[44] Cordesman, "Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror?."; Ansary, "Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach."
[45] Bronson, *Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia*.: 243, 244.
[46] Cordesman, "Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror?."
[47] Hegghammer, "Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia.": 713.
[48] *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979*.: 210.

America? If that were the case, then only those who see compliance as potentially effective would work closely on US counterterrorism efforts. The analysis includes all majority-Muslim states for each year of the study, so there is less of a concern about selection effects than if I only included states that, for example, were close allies of the United States. Yet, there may be selection effects among majority-Muslim states, or between majority-Muslim states and other states I did not include. I can partly assess this with the control variables. If states that already experienced significant terrorism were unable to work closely with the United States on counterterrorism and thus did not see a drop in activity, then this variable would undermine the significance of counterterrorism cooperation in my models. Similarly, if weak states were unable to cooperate and thus saw a continued terrorist threat, the variables I include to address state strength would have been significant. I also included the amount of aid a country receives from the United States as a control variable in a robustness check, and counterterrorism remained significant. This indicates that the benefits states receive from compliance—in the form of US aid—did not matter more than the counterterrorism efforts themselves.

An additional caveat has to do with the war in Iraq. My study may not have captured the transnational implications of this war. Yet, when I removed Iraq from the analysis, the findings were unchanged, suggesting the significant amount of terrorist activity there was not driving my results. Beyond that, the possibility that the war in Iraq complicated states' counterterrorism policy may actually support my findings, as it makes it even more surprising that compliance with the United States had such a consistent negative effect on terrorist activity. It is possible that states' counterterrorism policies have displaced the terrorist threat to states like Iraq. Yet, foreign fighter emigration would likely not be sufficient to explain all of the decrease in terrorist activity.

This dynamic may, however, have implications for the policy and ethical implications of my findings, which I will discuss in the conclusions.

Alternately, there may have been longer-term effects of the counterterrorism policies majority-Muslim states implemented. I can address that qualitatively. The countries with the counterterrorism policies most in line with US priorities—from the US perspective—across the time period of this study were Azerbaijan, Egypt and Turkey. Azerbaijan is currently stable, facing little terrorist threat. Turkey is experiencing political turmoil, and suffered a string of attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), but the group is currently not very active in the country. Egypt, by contrast, has been facing an insurgency linked to ISIL for several years. Based on these three cases there is thus little correlation between compliance with US counterterrorism efforts in the years after 9/11 and later threats from terrorism.

This study also does not explicitly analyze the impact of drone strikes, particularly in Pakistan. It is unlikely this affects my findings, however. Drone strikes do not occur across enough majority-Muslim countries to affect my cross-national analysis. It is possible their use in Pakistan—an influential observation—could affect my results, but they were unchanged when I removed this country from my analysis in a robustness check.

Additionally, some critics of US counterterrorism efforts focused specifically on the use of "kinetic activities," while I included a broader set of policies. I did distinguish between types of policies in the robustness checks, though. Also, the non-kinetic activities of US counterterrorism efforts still were rather coercive, so it is fair to assess their effectiveness through analysis of these policies.

A final concern has to do with my measure of counterterrorism effectiveness. Specifically, a decrease in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks may not be a sufficient

measure of effectiveness. I partially addressed this through the robustness check on the number of attacks, but a more comprehensive study would require analysis of group destruction, leadership decapitation, public support and terrorist de-radicalization. This is beyond the scope of this study, but may be a useful topic for further work.

Conclusion

Majority-Muslim states that went along with US counterterrorism efforts—implementing policies in compliance with US priorities—experienced a decrease in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks. That is, the impact of these policies was sufficient to cause a noticeable change in deaths from terrorism in these countries. This finding has significant implications for the study of terrorism and political violence, and policymakers attempting to grapple with contemporary terrorist threats such as ISIL.

The findings indicate the general effectiveness of the US global war on terrorism. As I discussed above, much of the debate around these efforts involved whether the coercive tactics would effectively undermine AQ and other terrorist groups. The United States relied on kinetic activity intended to capture and kill AQ members, as well as legal reforms and policy changes that generally increased the repressive power of states. It is possible that this aspect of US counterterrorism efforts could have provoked a backlash from society, leading to little change in the threat from terrorism or even a greater threat if it led many to sympathize with groups like AQ. These concerns seem unfounded. States that followed US counterterrorism priorities experienced, on average, 16% fewer deaths from terrorist attacks than those that did not. This suggests that, while there may be broader political or normative concerns about the coercive nature of these efforts, the US approach to counterterrorism effectively disrupted terrorist groups in many countries.

The differing impacts of domestic and international aspects, however, provide some insights into the most effective types of counterterrorism policies. The international aspects of US counterterrorism efforts seemed to have little effect on the level of terrorist activity in countries. Domestic policies, like legal reforms and restrictions on terrorist financing, by contrast, had a significant effect. The effects of the international aspects may be more diffuse—influencing the transnational readiness of AQ—so they may have less of an immediate impact on terrorists in a country. But this does indicate that counterterrorism policies based on security force improvements and law enforcement activity may be better ways to disrupt terrorists than large-scale attacks on their sponsors.

This article can also contribute to academic debates about the effectiveness of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies. There has been a particular focus on the question of whether coercive tactics and repression undermine non-state combatants or empower them; several studies on civil wars and counterinsurgency found coercive tactics and repression may be either helpful or not counterproductive.[49] My findings side with these studies, suggesting that coercive or repressive tactics by states can be effective against terrorists or insurgents. Granted, many of the terrorism studies that found otherwise focused on specific cases—such as Chenoeweth and Dugan's—or longer time-periods—like Walsh and Piazza's—so my findings may not be in direct opposition to them.[50] But when discussing the overall effects of US counterterrorism efforts on majority-Muslim states, the evidence suggests coercive tactics worked, at least in the short term.

[49] See Hazelton, "The 'Hearts and Minds' Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare."; Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgency Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya."

[50] Dugan and Chenoweth, "Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel."; Walsh and Piazza, "Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism."

This article can also provide some policy suggestions for the current struggle against ISIL. The obvious policy implication of my study for the struggle against ISIL may be to call for coercive tactics, but the preferred policy is subtler than that. The post-9/11 Global War on Terrorism involved a massive expenditure of resources both in the United States and around the world, and the United States is unlikely to launch another campaign on that scale. The relative effectiveness of the domestic aspects of US counterterrorism efforts, however, provide some insight for a campaign against ISIL. Kinetic activities like drone strikes or Special Forces operations against ISIL targets may be useful in disrupting the group's organizational capabilities. However, broader capacity building efforts focused on countries ISIL targets may prove more effective. The international community may want to work closely with states facing the threat of ISIL to improve their domestic law enforcement and legal frameworks, enabling them to wage their own struggle against the group.

Another, more troubling policy takeaway of this article relates to its ethical implications. Many people criticized US counterterrorism efforts for their coercive aspects, so there may be normative concerns in an analysis that seems to validate the efforts. This could make it harder to criticize counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns by the United States and other states that undermine the rights of citizens. And even the policy implications I presented above—a focus on capacity building over kinetic activities—would still increase states' power over societies, which could be normatively problematic.

I can respond to this through some of the empirical caveats I presented when discussing my findings above. I did not look at the effects of US counterterrorism efforts on democracy, human rights and social development. It is possible that majority-Muslim states that went along

with the global war on terrorism experienced a decrease in political freedoms or social stability. This is outside the scope of this study, but may be an interesting follow-on study.

Another concern may have to do with the possibility that coercive counterterrorism policies are merely displacing the threat. As I noted, coercive counterterrorism may promote the emigration of foreign fighters, so even as it decreases the threat of terrorism in one country it can intensify it in another. This does not mitigate its effectiveness, as those countries that suffer from the effects of foreign fighters may be experiencing civil war or state breakdown. This possibility does raise further ethical concerns about coercive counterterrorism policies, as their benefits may be gained at the expense of already unstable states' security.

America's struggle against AQ—and terrorism more broadly—shaped the international system both before and after 9/11. It led to new alliances, new tensions, and new forms of international governance. It also seems to have worked, at least in its proximate goal of decreasing the threat of terrorism. Those majority-Muslim states that worked closely with America on counterterrorism experienced a decline in terrorist activity. Yet, it is hard to deny these states—and the world—paid a heavy price in terms of political unrest and infringements on human rights. Hopefully, scholars and policymakers can use scholarship on US counterterrorism efforts to craft a strategy that effectively undermines terrorism without harming civilians before the next terrorist threat emerges.

References

Abrahms, Max. "Why Terrorism Does Not Work." *International Security* 31, no. 2 (2006): 42-78.
Abrahms, Max, and Jochen Mierau. "Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killings on Militant Group Tactics." *Terrorism and Political Violence* (2015): 1556-836.
Abrahms, Max, and Philip B.K. Potter. "Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics." *International Organization* 69 (Spring 2015): 311-42.
Ahmad, Ishtiaq. " The U.S. Af-Pak Strategy: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan." *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 37, no. 4 (2010): 191-209.
al-Rasheed, Madawi. *A History of Saudi Arabia.* 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
al Sayegh, Fatma. "Post-9/11 Changes in the Gulf: The Case of the Uae." *Middle East Policy* 11, no. 2 (June 2004): 107-24.
Allison, Paul D. "Don't Put Lagged Dependent Variables in Mixed Models." *Statistical Horizons*, 2 June 2015.
Allison, Paul D., Richard Williams, and Enrique Moral-Benito. "Maximum Likelihood for Cross-Lagged Panel Models with Fixed Effects." *Socius* (2017).
Altier, Mary Beth, Emma Leonard Boyle, Neil D. Shortland, and John G. Horgan. "Why They Leave: An Analysis of Terrorist Disengagement Events from Eighty-Seven Autobiographical Accounts." *Security Studies* 26, no. 2 (2017): 305-32.
Ansary, Abdullah F. "Combating Extremism: A Brief Overview of Saudi Arabia's Approach." *Middle East Policy* 15, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 111-42.
Asal, Victor, and R. Karl Rethemeyer. "The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks." *Journal of Politics* 70, no. 2 (April 2008): 437-49.
Bergen, Peter. *The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between Al-Qaeda and America.* New York: Free Press, 2011.
Blomberg, S. Brock, Khusrav Gaibulloev, and Todd Sandler. "Terrorist Group Survival: Ideology, Tactics, and Base of Operations." *Public Choice* 194 (2011): 441-63.
Brands, Hal, and Peter Feaver. "The Case for Reassessing America's 43rd President." *Orbis* 62, no. 1 (2018): 76-90.
Bronson, Rachel. *Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, and Bruce Dickson. "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrrorism and Mobilization." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 2 (April 2007): 364-81.
Byman, Daniel. *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
———. "Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism." *International Security* 31, no. 2 (2006): 79-115.
———. *A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Chowdhury, Arjun, and Ronald R. Krebs. "Making and Mobilizing Moderates: Rhetorical Strategy, Political Networks, and Counterterrorism." *Security Studies* 18, no. 3 (October 2009): 371-99.
Cordesman, Anthony H. "Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror?". *Middle East Policy* 13, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 28-41.
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "“How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups” ". *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 7-48.
Dugan, Laura, and Erica Chenoweth. "Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel." *American Sociological Review* 77, no. 4 (2012): 597-624.

Freilich, Charles David. "Israel's Counter-Terrorism Policy: How Effective?". *Terrorism and Political Violence* 29, no. 2 (2017): 359-76.

"Global Terrorism Database." edited by National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2017.

Hazelton, Jacqueline L. "The 'Hearts and Minds' Fallacy: Violence, Coercion, and Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare." *International Security* 42, no. 1 (Summer 2017): 80-113.

Hegghammer, Thomas. "Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia." *International Affairs* 84, no. 4 (July 2008): 701-15.

———. *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Henne, Peter S. "The Ancient Fire: Religion and Suicide Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 1 (2012): 38-60.

———. *Islamic Politics, Muslim States and Counterterrorism Tensions.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Johnsen, Dawn. "The Lawyers' War: Counterterrorism from Bush to Obama to Trump." *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 1 (January/February 2017): 148-57.

Johnston, Patrick B. "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns." *International Security* 36, no. 4 (Spring 2012): 47-79.

Johnston, Patrick B., and Anoop K. Sarbahi. "The Impact of Us Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan." *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 2 (January 2016): 203-19.

Jones, Seth, and Martin C. Libicki. *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa'ida.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008.

Jordan, Jenna, Margaret E. Kosal, and Lawrence Rubin. "The Strategic Illogic of Counterterrorism Policy." *The Washington Quarterly* 39, no. 4 (Winter 2017): 181-92.

Kocher, Matthew Adam, Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Stathis N. Kalyvas. "Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War." *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 2 (April 2011): 201-18.

Kull, Steven. *Feeling Betrayed: The Roots of Muslim Anger at America.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011.

Lehrke, Jesse Paul, and Rahel Schomaker. "Kill, Capture, or Defend? The Effectiveness of Specific and General Counterterrorism Tactics against the Global Threats of the Post-9/11 Era." *Security Studies* 25, no. 4 (September 2016): 729-62.

Levitt, Matthew, and Michael Jacobson. "The Us Campaign to Squeeze Terrorists' Financing." *Journal of International Affairs* 62, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2008): 67-85.

Lieber, Robert J. *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Lyall, Jason. "Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy's Impact on War Outcomes and Duration." *International Organization* 64, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 167-92.

———. "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgency Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 3 (June 2009): 331-62.

Mamdani, Mahmoud. *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror.* New York: Three Leaves Press, 2005.

Murphy, Ann Marie. "Us Rapprochement with Indonesia: From Problem State to Partner." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 32, no. 3 (December 2010): 362-87.

Perl, Raphael. "Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005.

Phillips, Brian J. "Enemies with Benefits? Violent Rivalry and Terrorist Group Longevity." *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 1 (2015).

Power, Samantha. "Legitimacy and Competence." In *To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine*, edited by Melvin P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, 133-57. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Pressman, Jeremy. "Power without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East." *International Security* 33, no. 4 (Spring 2009): 149-79.

Sanders, Rebecca. *Plausible Legality: Legal Culture and Political Imperative in the Global War on Terror.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Schuurman, Bart. "Defeated by Popular Demand: Public Support and Counterterrorism in Three Western Democracies, 1963-1998." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 36, no. 2 (January 2013): 152-75.

Tankel, Stephen. *With Us and against Us: How America's Partners Help and Hinder the War on Terror.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2018.

Thrall, A. Trevor, and Erik Goepner. "Step Back: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy from the Failed War on Terror." In *Policy Analysis*: Cato Institute, 2017.

Trager, Robert F., and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva. "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done." *International Security* 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): 87-123.

"Transcript of President Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress on Thursday Night, September 20, 2001." *CNN*, 21 September 2001.

Walsh, James I., and James A. Piazza. "Why Respecting Physical Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism." *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 3 (2010): 551-77.

Wilner, Alex. "Fencing in Warfare: Threats, Punishment, and Intra-War Deterrence in Counterterrorism." *Security Studies* 22, no. 4 (November 2013): 740-72.

Wright, Lawrence. *The Terror Years: From Al-Qaeda to the Islamic State.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016.

Young, Joseph K. "Measuring Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 31, no. 2 (2016): 323-45.

Young, Joseph K., and Laura Dugan. "Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8, no. 2 (April 2014): 2-23.

Zussman, Asaf, and Noam Zussman. "Assassinations: Evaluating the Effectiveness of an Israeli Counterterrorism Policy Using Stock Market Data." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 193-206.

Figures

Figure 1: Muslim states' counterterrorism cooperation over time



Figure 2: Effects of Counterterrorism and Domestic Counterterrorism on deaths from terrorism



Figure 3: Substantive effects of counterterrorism on terrorism deaths

Tables

Table I: The effects of counterterrorism efforts on deaths from terrorism

	Model		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES			
Lagged Terrorism Deaths	0.41***	0.42***	0.42***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Counterterrorism	-0.05*		
	(0.02)		
Land	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Polity	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Population	0.36***	0.36***	0.35***
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Domestic		-0.05*	
		(0.02)	
International			-0.01
			(0.02)
Constant	-5.17***	-5.13***	-4.95***
	(1.60)	(1.57)	(1.62)
Observations	513	513	513

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Reviewer's Appendix for "Assessing the impact of the Global War on Terrorism on terrorism threats in Muslim countries"

This document contains further information on the analyses in the article. It first presents the descriptive statistics from variables used, then further information on the calculation of variables, before presenting the results of robustness checks.

Contents

Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Terrorism Deaths	425	1.400132	2.122666	0	8.763584
Counterterrorism	425	1.241765	2.932001	-8.75	8.749999
Land	416	632711.5	735292.2	300	2699700
Polity	376	-1.24202	5.463815	-9	9
GDP	413	8.179178	1.730344	0	11.20675
Population	425	15.90179	1.997231	7.374098	19.28562
Domestic	425	1.158824	3.280628	-8.33333	10
International	425	0.664706	2.966388	-10	10

Calculation of CTCS and Domestic Cooperation

The Counterterrorism Cooperation Scale is an index based on the balance of cooperative and noncooperative counterterrorism behaviors in a Muslim state from 1996 to 2009. It is based on the US State Department's Country Reports on terrorism, whose online availability begins in 1996. These reports provide information on terrorist activity in countries around the world as well as their counterterrorist policies. They are thus useful sources of information on whether or not the United States believes a country is complying with its preference in counterterrorism. The data run through 2009 as they were intended to measure global counterterrorism dynamics in the Global War on Terrorism under US President George W. Bush.

Each of the variables is marked a 1 if the behavior occurred and 0 if it did not. The reports include information detailing behaviors or noting concerns that the state's policies were not in line with US preferences (see below). The former would be a 1 for the cooperative scale, while the latter would be a 1 for the non-cooperative scale. The US Country Reports on Terrorism did not indicate both cooperative and noncooperative behaviors for all types of counterterrorism policies; in case this affects the results, there is an alternative measure of the CTCS that only includes paired variables. Of course, all of these policies are more nuanced than a simple dichotomous measure can capture. Adding extra levels to each indicator, however would increase significant complexity to the measure and possibly lead to inaccurate measurements due to overly fine-grained scales. Moreover, the reports tend to provide clear indications whether or not a behavior was cooperative or noncooperative. If the study relied on any one of these indicators, then the possibility of inappropriately blunt measurement would be concerning. Because I combine the indicators together into a scale, this can provide a better overall sense for the full range of variation in a country's counterterrorism policies. Additionally,

a country can receive both a cooperative and non-cooperative score for the same indicator, if their behavior was nuanced in that year.

The average for both the cooperative and noncooperative sets of variables were calculated; 1 would indicate a state was fully cooperative, while 0 would indicate fully noncooperative. The values were then standardized according to the min-max method and multiplied it by 10 so both cooperative and noncooperative scores range from 0 to 10. The CTCS is thus the difference between the average of cooperative and noncooperative behaviors; it provides information on the range of cooperation on counterterrorism present. The Domestic and International measures follow the same procedure using only the appropriate variables.

There may be some concerns about missing data. Not all countries in this study were included in every State Department report, and not every indicator of counterterrorism was discussed in each country's report. It is fair to assume, given the systematic nature in which the State Department collects these reports, that missing data indicates the behavior did not occur or that there was no counterterrorism-related information for that country in a year. The missing data is therefore treat missing data as 0s. However an alternate version excludes the missing observations, in case treating them as 0s is inappropriate.

There may be a few issues with this measure. One is its reliability. The scale reliability index is 0.67; while this is slightly lower than the preferred score of 0.7, given the complicated nature of the information it is likely acceptable. Another may relate to the classified nature of much intelligence activity or the fact that the data source represent US interests. There is no way to get around the classification issue, although it is unlikely a country would appear incredibly cooperative or uncooperative via public information but have the opposite relationship with the United States based on classified information. Likewise, the data source probably does represent

US interests, and may not indicate an objective measure of counterterrorism cooperation. This is, however, the focus of this study—whether Muslim states that cooperated with US preferences in the GWOT experienced a decrease in terrorist violence—so this is not a concern.

The specific manner in which the index was calculated may also be a concern. The calculation resembles Polity's approach to democracy and autocracy; the final result is the difference between cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors. This is ideal, as Muslim states' cooperation with the GWOT was a combination of behaviors, some of which the United States favored and others it found frustrating. Using a separate scale for each captures the complex nature of this issue. It does differ from some similar studies, however. For example, Dugan and Chenoweth have an index of counterterrorism focusing on conciliatory or harsh government actions.[1] Similarly, Schrodt and Gerner used an event analysis approach to Middle East cooperation.[2] This data's approach focuses on the extent to which Muslim states followed US preferences on counterterrorism, so neither of these would be exactly the right approach.

Numerous alternate measures can address concerns with how it is calculated. This includes various alternate means of aggregating the data, using only paired variables, and treating missing values as missing rather than 0. It also includes alternate versions using factor analysis and principal component analysis to see if the equal weighting in the main CTCS was appropriate. Moreover, an alternate version separated domestic aspects of the CTCS that involved harsh counterterrorism activities from those that involved compliance with post-9/11 resolutions.

[1] Laura Dugan and Erica Chenoweth, "Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel," *American Sociological Review* 77, no. 4 (2012).
[2] Philip A. Schrodt and Deborah J. Gerner, "An Event Data Analysis of Third-Party Mediation in the Middle East and Balkans," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 3 (2004).

Components of the CTCS

Cooperative	**Domestic or International**	**CT actions or UN mandate?**
Counterterrorist operations	Domestic	CT actions
Limit terrorist financing	Domestic	UN mandate
Monitor borders and immigration	Domestic	UN mandate
Counterterrorism-friendly legal changes	Domestic	UN mandate
Counterterrorism-friendly institutional changes	Domestic	UN mandate
Intelligence Sharing	International	
Allow US troops to operate	International	
Host US troops	International	
Allow US overflight rights	International	
Counter terrorist messaging	Domestic	CT actions
Arrest or extradite US terrorist targets	Domestic	CT actions
Participate in US military operations	International	

Noncooperative	**Domestic or international**	
Fail to take counterterrorist actions	Domestic	CT actions
Fail to arrest or extradite	Domestic	CT actions
Fail to limit financing	Domestic	UN mandate
Fail to make legal changes	Domestic	UN mandate
Fail to share intelligence	International	
Fail to counter terrorist messaging	Domestic	CT actions
Fail to participate in US military operations	International	

Alternative Versions of the CTCS

CTCS with counts instead of averages
Just cooperative behaviors
Just noncooperative behaviors
CTCS using factor analysis, Cooperative factor 1
CTCS using factor analysis, Cooperative factor 2
CTCS using factor analysis, noncooperative factor 1
CTCS using factor analysis, noncooperative factor 2
CTCS using weights from principal components analysis
CTCS with missing observations as missing instead of zero

Example of Coding for CTCS

Coding involved reviewing the State Department reports on terrorism for information on each of the indicators. If the report indicates the country's policy was in line with US priorities, it receives a 1 for the cooperative indicator and a 0 for the noncooperative version. It receives a 1 for the noncooperative indicator and a 0 for the cooperative if the reports indicate the policy did not occur or the state refused US pressure. Below are two examples of coding.

First is the coding for the indicator on extradition: whether the country extradited to the United States a US terrorism suspect. The first example received a 1 for cooperation, while the second received a 1 for non-cooperation.

Bahrain, which hosts the US Naval Forces Central/ Fifth Fleet Headquarters and provides basing and extensive overflight clearances for a multitude of US military aircraft, has been essential to the continued success of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Bahraini military assets have participated in OEF Coalition naval operations including terrorist interdiction efforts, and Bahrain offered a medical unit for OEF duty. The King, Crown Prince, and other senior Bahrani ministers have been outspoken public proponents of the war on terrorism. The Government of Bahrain cooperated closely and effectively on criminal investigations related to the campaign against terrorism. In September, for instance, Bahraini authorities were essential in the transfer to US custody of Mukhtar al-Bakri, a US citizen suspected of terrorist activity.

-Source, Country Report on Terrorism, 2002

The Government of Yemen continued to run its surrender program for wanted terrorists that it believes it cannot apprehend. The program provides lenient requirements for completion of convictions to those who surrender. In 2008, however, 17 prior program participants were returned to custody for recidivism. In March, convicted terrorist and February 2006 prison escapee Jaber al-Banna walked into a Yemeni security court and posted bond. His sentence was later reduced from 10 to five years, supposedly for handing himself in to the authorities. The decision will need to be ratified by the Yemeni Supreme Court before it is implemented, and it remained unclear whether the time al-Banna had already served, including time he spent outside prison once he escaped, will count against the five-year sentence. Jaber al-Banna is wanted by the United States for providing material support to a terrorist organization and conspiring to provide support to AQ. Al-Banna is on the FBI's most wanted list, but the Yemeni constitution precludes extradition of Yemeni citizens, even though he also has American citizenship.

-Source, Country Report on Terrorism, 2008

A few other indicators involved qualitative distinctions. For example, the indicator for whether a state took actions against terrorist groups in response to US pressure can involve arrests, disruption and bans. Additionally, sometimes states performed well in some areas but not others, so they received a 1 for both cooperative and non-cooperative versions of an indicator. This is why using the index is helpful, to capture such variation. Below is an example, both of which are from Indonesia in 2003.

The Government, led by the Indonesian National Police, has taken effective steps to counter the threat posed by the regional terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiya (JI), which has ties to al-Qaida. Indonesian police have arrested 109 suspected JI members -- most in 2003 -- including suspects in the Bali attacks, the Marriott attack, and other criminal acts linked to terrorism. Those arrested included numerous senior JI leaders, a number of regional and subregional commanders, most of the masterminds of the Bali attack, several key planners of the Marriott bombing, former instructors at JI training camps, and financiers of terrorist attacks.

In a case symptomatic of persistent Indonesian domestic sensitivities, political pressures, and institutional weaknesses, however, the Government made little effort to investigate the activities and affiliations of six students suspected of terrorist involvement, who were deported from Pakistan in early December 2003 and released two within days of their repatriation.

Countries Included

Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Brunei
Burkina Faso
Chad
Comoros
Djibouti
Egypt
Gambia
Guinea
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kosovo
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Lebanon
Libya
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Mauritania
Morocco
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Palestinian territories
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Senegal

Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Syria
Tajikistan
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
United Arab Emirates
Uzbekistan
Yemen

Most active terrorist groups in each country

Country	Group
Afghanistan	Taliban
Afghanistan	Unknown
Afghanistan	Haqqani Network
Albania	Unknown
Algeria	Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Algeria	Islamist extremists
Algeria	Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)
Azerbaijan	Forest Brothers
Bahrain	Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
Bangladesh	Shanti Bahini - Peace Force
Bangladesh	Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami
Bangladesh	Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Croatians
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Croat Democratic Union
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serb Radical Party
Chad	Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD)
Chad	Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (MDJT)
Chad	Janjaweed
Comoros	Separatists
Egypt	Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG)
Egypt	Abdullah Azzam Brigades
Egypt	Egyptian Tawhid and Jihad
Guinea	Allied Democratic Forces of Guinea (RDFG)
Guinea	U/I Liberian Gunmen
Guinea	National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
Indonesia	Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Indonesia	Free Aceh Movement (GAM)
Indonesia	Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN)
Iran	Jundallah (Iran)
Iran	Jihadi Movement of the Sunna People of Iran
Iran	Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)
Iraq	Al-Qaida in Iraq
Iraq	Tawhid and Jihad
Iraq	Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)
Jordan	Al-Qaida in Iraq

Jordan	Abdullah Azzam Brigades
Jordan	Nobles of Jordan
Kazakhstan	Uighur Liberation Organization
Kosovo	Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
Kosovo	Mlada Bosna
Kuwait	Muslim extremists
Kuwait	Egyptians
Kuwait	Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
Kyrgyzstan	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Kyrgyzstan	Uighur Separatists
Lebanon	Hezbollah
Lebanon	Amal
Libya	Islamic Movement of Martyrs
Libya	Sudan Liberation Movement
Malaysia	Al-Ma'unah
Malaysia	Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Tuareg extremists	Mali
Tuareg Guerrillas	Mali
Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)	Mali
Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)	Mauritania
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	Mauritania
Salafia Jihadia	Morocco
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	Morocco
Al-Adl Wal Ihsane	Morocco
Movement of Niger People for Justice (MNJ)	Niger
Saharan Revolutionary Armed Front (FARS)	Niger
Tuareg extremists	Niger
Democratic Front for Renewal (FDR)	Niger

Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	Niger
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)	Nigeria
Modakeke Ethnics	Nigeria
Egbesu Youths of the Bayelsa	Nigeria
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Pakistan
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi	Pakistan
Al-Qaida	Pakistan
Organization of Soldiers of the Levant	Qatar
Iraqi extremists	Qatar
The Organization for the Return of Legality	Qatar
Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)	Saudi Arabia
Saudi Hezbollah	Saudi Arabia
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance	Senegal
Revolutionary United Front (RUF)	Sierra Leone
Civil Defense Force (CDF)	Sierra Leone
Kamajor Hunters	Sierra Leone
Al-Shabaab	Somalia
Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA)	Somalia
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	Somalia

Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)	Sudan
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)	Sudan
Janjaweed	Sudan
Islamic Movement for Change	Syria
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	Syria
Rizvon Sadirov Group	Tajikistan
Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (HT)	Tajikistan
Muslim Guerrillas	Tajikistan
Al-Qaida	Tunisia
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	Tunisia
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	Tunisia
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	Turkey
Al-Qaida	Turkey
Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C)	Turkey
Gunmen	Turkmenistan
Islamic Jihad Group (IJG)	Uzbekistan
Al-Qaida in Yemen	Yemen
Al-Qaida	Yemen
Houthi extremists (Ansar Allah)	Yemen

Robustness Checks

List of and Justification for Robustness Checks

Robustness Check	**Justification**
Domestic separated into kinetic activities, UN mandates	potential problem with conflating the two
States allowing US use of territory as variable	potential effect on deaths from terrorism
Alternate calculations of counterterrorism index (described in online appendix)	concerns about calculation methods
alternate measures of repression (Democracy and Dictatorship, Political Terror Scale)	concerns about inclusion of Polity scores
ethnic and religious diversity as control variables	potential impact on terrorist activity
including observations starting in 1996	in case longer time period matters
Middle East variable as control	different dynamics in the Middle East
number of deaths from terrorism before 9/11 as a control variable	potential effect of pre-existing cooperation
exclusion of Iraq and Pakistan in separate models	potential effect of large amount of terrorist activity in these countries
US aid as a percentage of GDP as control variable	potential impact on terrorist activity
CINC scores rather than GDP as control variable	potential issues with GDP as measure of state strength
using lagged versions of all variables	address potential issue with including lagged dependent variable
removed lagged dependent variable as control	address potential issue with including lagged dependent variable
matching pre-processing	alternate way to deal with simultaneity bias
fixed effects regression instead of random effects	potential issues with random effects
OLS regression instead of random effects	potential issues with random effects
Generalized estimating equation with auto-regression correlation	Potential effects of auto-regression
Both Iraq and Pakistan removed from the analysis	Assess joint effect of major countries in the war on terror
Include only activity by non-AQ groups	See if effects of counterterrorism extended beyond AQ

Discussion of robustness checks

Some of the policies states adopted were in line with United Nations resolutions, not just US demands. I addressed this with a robustness check. Additionally, the nature of US demands undoubtedly changed after the 9/11 attacks, which may affect the data. That is why I restrict the analysis to post-2001, but also include the full range of years in a robustness check. Moreover, there may be concerns about the specific way the indexes were calculated. The dataset included numerous alternate calculations of the index to address such concerns, which I drew on for robustness checks. There are also some issues with missing data, as the reports do not contain information on all policies for each country. The dataset includes missing data as a zero—that is, assuming the policy did not occur—but a robustness check also excludes missing data to determine whether this affected the results.[3]

I ran numerous robustness checks to address potential critiques of the work; more information on all tests is available in the reviewer's appendix. In case conflating kinetic counterterrorism activities with reforms in line with post-9/11 mandates was problematic, I separated these into separate measures.[4] An additional robustness check examined if states allowed the United State access to their territory for counterterrorism activities, in case this dramatic policy was affecting results. I also re-ran the models with the alternate calculations of the counterterrorism index provided in the data. Additionally, I re-ran the models using the number of attacks—rather than the number of deaths—as a dependent variable, and ran the models removing deaths by al-Qaeda, in case the findings were dependent on this.

Other robustness checks deal with potential issues in the models. Some of the specific control variables or observations I include may be problematic. The use of Polity scores may not

[3] See the reviewers' appendix for more information on these tests.
[4] For the specific variables in each of these measures, see the Reviewers' Appendix.

be ideal as they include measures of political violence.[5] I therefore also include a measure of regime type from the Democracy and Dictatorship (*DD*) dataset and a measure of political repression from the Political Terror Scale project (*PTS*).[6] The former alters Polity's calculations to exclude political violence, although it is only a dichotomous measure of democracy and is thus less sensitive to differences in regime types; the latter focuses specifically on human rights abuses by the state, which is a useful measure although it is narrower than Polity. I include these in separate models as they are highly correlated, so the inclusion of all of them would be problematic. I also include ethnic and religious fractionalization as control variables, as these may also affect terrorist activity.[7] Additionally, I ran tests with a dummy variable indicating an observation is in the Middle East, in case these dynamics affect the results. I included the number of deaths from terrorism before 9/11 as a control variable, in case the pre-existing level of violence affected interactions after 9/11. I ran the models without observations in Iraq, in case the great amount of terrorist violence in that country affected the results; I ran a similar test excluding Pakistan and a test removing both countries at the same time. Moreover, I ran the models with US aid as a percent of GPD as a control variable, and a separate model substituting the Correlates of War project's CINC score for GDP to measure state strength. Finally, I included an estimate of the fatality's from non-state conflict in each country in order to test the impact of civil wars on terrorist violence; I did not include this in the main analysis as it is highly correlated with the lagged dependent variable and may thus affect the results.[8]

[5] James Raymond Vreeland, "The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 3 (2008).
[6] Jose Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland Vreeland, "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited," *Public Choice* 143, no. 1-2 (2009); M. Gibney et al., "Political Terror Scale 1976-2015."
[7] Alberto Alesina et al., "Fractionalization," *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2003).
[8] Ralph Sundberg, Kristine Eck, and Joakim Kreutz, "Introducing the Ucdp Non-State Conflict Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 2 (2012); Therése Pettersson and Kristine Eck, "Organized Violence, 1989-2017," ibid.55, no. 4 (2018).

There may be issues with the statistical tests I use as well. The use of lagged variables may be problematic, as I note above. In order to assess the effects of this, I ran a model using all lagged variables, and a model removing the lagged dependent variable. I also re-ran the models using the results of matching pre-processing instead of the lagged dependent variable to deal with simultaneity bias. Another issue may be the choice of random effects for the regression. I therefore run alternate models using fixed effects and regular OLS regression to assess the extent to which the findings are dependent on the random effects. Additionally, I ran the models using a generalized estimating equation that take potential auto-regression into account to ensure this is not affecting the results.

Robustness Check results

Lagged Variables Removed

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(4) logdeaths
CTCS	-0.08***	
	(0.03)	
Land	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP	0.09	0.10
	(0.14)	(0.14)
Population	0.63***	0.64***
	(0.13)	(0.13)
Dom_avg		-0.07***
		(0.02)
Constant	-9.83***	-10.00***
	(2.61)	(2.59)
Observations	358	358
Number of ccode	41	41

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

OLS without lags

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(2) logdeaths
CTCS	-0.09***	
	(0.03)	
Land	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.04**	0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP	0.07	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Population	0.60***	0.60***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Dom_avg		-0.09***
		(0.02)
Constant	-9.26***	-9.32***
	(1.26)	(1.26)
Observations	358	358
R-squared	0.37	0.37

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

All variables lagged

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(4) logdeaths
CTCS = L,	-0.07***	
	(0.03)	
Land = L,	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_ = L,	0.00	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)
GDP = L,	0.11	0.11
	(0.15)	(0.15)
Population = L,	0.67***	0.68***
	(0.14)	(0.14)
Dom_avg = L,		-0.06**
		(0.02)
Constant	-10.66***	-10.74***
	(2.71)	(2.70)
Observations	358	358
Number of ccode	41	41

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Middle East dummies

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(4) logdeaths
CTCS	-0.09***	
	(0.03)	
Land	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.03	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP	-0.12	-0.13
	(0.17)	(0.17)
Population	0.60***	0.61***
	(0.13)	(0.12)
MENA	0.85**	0.89**
	(0.43)	(0.43)
Dom_avg		-0.07***
		(0.02)
Constant	-7.95***	-8.01***
	(2.63)	(2.61)
Observations	358	358
Number of ccode	41	41

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.

Alternate controls

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(4) logdeaths	(7) logdeaths	(10) logdeaths	(13) logdeaths	(16) logdeaths	(19) logdeaths	(22) logdeaths
logdeaths = L,	0.50***	0.50***	0.60***	0.61***	0.42***	0.42***	0.41***	0.42***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
CTCS	-0.03		-0.03		-0.06**		-0.07***	
	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.02)	
Land	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00*	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
pts	0.44***	0.44***						
	(0.12)	(0.12)						
GDP	0.05	0.05	-0.04	-0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Population	0.19**	0.19**	0.27***	0.26***	0.35***	0.35***	0.37***	0.37***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Dom_avg		-0.05**		-0.05**		-0.05**		-0.06***
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Democracy			-0.16	-0.17				
			(0.22)	(0.22)				
polity2_					0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
					(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ethnic					-0.43	-0.42		
					(0.45)	(0.44)		
Religion							-0.16	-0.19
							(0.45)	(0.44)
Constant	-4.02**	-4.06***	-3.41**	-3.37**	-5.17***	-5.18***	-5.79***	-5.78***
	(1.57)	(1.52)	(1.69)	(1.63)	(1.78)	(1.75)	(1.73)	(1.69)
Observations	404	404	359	359	349	349	358	358
Number of ccode	45	45	45	45	40	40	41	41

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Matching

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(2) logdeaths
logdeaths = L,	0.61***	0.62***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
CTCS	-0.08***	
	(0.02)	
Land	0.00*	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP	-0.04	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Population	0.16***	0.19***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Dom_avg		-0.07***
		(0.02)
Constant	-1.69	-2.63**
	(1.18)	(1.17)
Observations	365	365
R-squared	0.55	0.58

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Fixed Effects

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(2) logdeaths
logdeaths = L,	0.23***	0.24***
	(0.05)	(0.05)
CTCS	-0.06**	
	(0.03)	
Land	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)
GDP	0.43	0.41
	(0.48)	(0.48)
Population	0.75	0.87
	(0.62)	(0.62)
Dom_avg		-0.05**
		(0.02)
Constant	1,071.47	1,115.69
	(1,349.31)	(1,348.91)
Observations	358	358
R-squared	0.10	0.10
Number of ccode	41	41

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Models with Iraq excluded

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(4) logdeaths
logdeaths = L,	0.41***	0.42***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
CTCS	-0.07***	
	(0.02)	
Land	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP	0.06	0.06
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Population	0.37***	0.37***
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Iraq	0.33	0.39
	(0.98)	(0.96)
Dom_avg		-0.06***
		(0.02)
Constant	-5.78***	-5.77***
	(1.73)	(1.70)
Observations	358	358
Number of ccode	41	41

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Separating harsh counterterrorism activities from activities mandated by post-9/11 UN resolutions

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(4) logdeaths
logdeaths = L,	0.42***	0.42***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
CTCS_acts	-0.05**	
	(0.02)	
Land	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP	0.07	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Population	0.37***	0.36***
	(0.09)	(0.09)
CTCS_UN		-0.04**
		(0.02)
Constant	-5.99***	-5.64***
	(1.75)	(1.71)
Observations	358	358
Number of ccode	41	41

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Effects of allowing US access to territory

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths
logdeaths = L,	0.43***
	(0.07)
c_allowus	-0.16
	(0.86)
Land	0.00
	(0.00)
polity2_	0.02
	(0.02)
GDP	0.05
	(0.09)
Population	0.36***
	(0.09)
Constant	-5.74***
	(1.75)
Observations	358
Number of ccode	41

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

No Pakistan in analysis

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(4) logdeaths
logdeaths = L,	0.41***	0.41***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
CTCS	-0.05**	
	(0.02)	
Land	0.00**	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP	0.06	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Population	0.30***	0.30***
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Dom_avg		-0.05**
		(0.02)
Constant	-4.72***	-4.75***
	(1.60)	(1.58)
Observations	349	349
Number of ccode	40	40

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

With Aid as a variable

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(4) logdeaths
logdeaths = L,	0.36***	0.37***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
CTCS	-0.07***	
	(0.02)	
Land	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP	0.08	0.09
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Population	0.34***	0.34***
	(0.09)	(0.09)
US Aid	0.00**	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Dom_avg		-0.06***
		(0.02)
Constant	-5.64***	-5.65***
	(1.77)	(1.74)
Observations	349	349
Number of ccode	40	40

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

With CINC instead of GDP

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(4) logdeaths
logdeaths = L,	0.36***	0.36***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
CTCS	-0.07***	
	(0.02)	
Land	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Population	0.25**	0.26**
	(0.12)	(0.12)
US Aid	0.00**	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
cinc	37.48	33.25
	(38.56)	(37.85)
Dom_avg		-0.06***
		(0.02)
Constant	-3.54*	-3.67**
	(1.85)	(1.83)
Observations	349	349
Number of ccode	40	40

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Alternate dependent variables

VARIABLES	(1) Count version	(4) Just cooperative	(7) Just noncooperative	(10) Coop Factor1	(13) Coopfactor2	(16) Noncoop factor1	(19) Noncoop factor2	(22) PCA Weightings	(25) Missing observations removed
logdeaths = L,	0.41***	0.42***	0.41***	0.42***	0.43***	0.43***	0.42***	0.41***	0.62***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)
CTCSx_count	-0.08**								
	(0.04)								
Land	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
GDP	0.07	0.07	-0.01	0.07	0.06	0.00	0.05	0.06	-0.07
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Population	0.38***	0.38***	0.33***	0.38***	0.37***	0.33***	0.36***	0.37***	0.22***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)
CavgX		-0.51							
		(0.52)							
NCavgX			1.81***						
			(0.54)						
Scores for factor 1				-0.27					
				(0.26)					
Scores for factor 2					-0.15				
					(0.24)				
Scores for factor 1						0.62**			
						(0.24)			
Scores for factor 2							0.30		
							(0.45)		
PCAdiff								-0.07***	
								(0.02)	
CTCS_nomiss									-0.07***
									(0.02)
Constant	-5.99***	-6.05***	-4.77***	-6.03***	-5.82***	-4.96***	-5.69***	-5.71***	-2.41**
	(1.76)	(1.80)	(1.66)	(1.79)	(1.76)	(1.65)	(1.75)	(1.70)	(1.22)
Observations	358	358	358	358	358	358	358	358	284

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

With civil war as a control variable

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(4) logdeaths
L.logdeaths	0.41***	0.42***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
CTCS	-0.07***	
	(0.02)	
LND_TOTL	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
loggdp	0.06	0.07
	(0.09)	(0.09)
logpop	0.36***	0.36***
	(0.09)	(0.09)
best_fatality_estimate	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Dom_avg		-0.06***
		(0.02)
Constant	-5.70***	-5.70***
	(1.72)	(1.69)
Observations	358	358
Number of ccode	41	41

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

With AQ attacks removed

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(4) logdeaths
L.logdeaths	0.45***	0.45***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Dom_avg	-0.06***	
	(0.02)	
LND_TOTL	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
loggdp	0.03	0.03
	(0.08)	(0.08)
logpop	0.30***	0.30***
	(0.09)	(0.09)
CTCS		-0.06**
		(0.03)
Constant	-4.56***	-4.52***
	(1.62)	(1.64)
Observations	327	327
Number of ccode	41	41

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

With generalized estimating equation test for auto-regression

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(2) logdeaths
logdeaths = L,	0.72***	0.72***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
CTCS	-0.05***	
	(0.02)	
Land	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
GDP	0.03	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Population	0.18***	0.18***
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Dom_avg		-0.05***
		(0.02)
Constant	-2.78***	-2.85***
	(0.88)	(0.88)
Observations	358	358
Number of ccode	41	41

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

With the number of attacks as a dependent variable, and a negative binomial as the model

VARIABLES	(1) numattacks	(3) numattacks
Dom_avg	-0.09***	
	(0.03)	
Land	0.00**	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.11***	0.11***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
GDP	0.33*	0.34*
	(0.20)	(0.20)
Population	0.98***	0.99***
	(0.16)	(0.17)
CTCS		-0.09**
		(0.04)
Constant	-17.83***	-18.10***
	(3.36)	(3.42)
Observations	358	358

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

With Iraq and Pakistan removed

VARIABLES	(1) logdeaths	(4) logdeaths
logdeaths = L,	0.40***	0.41***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
CTCS	-0.05**	
	(0.02)	
Land	0.00**	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
polity2_	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
GDP	0.06	0.06
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Population	0.29***	0.30***
	(0.09)	(0.08)
Dom_avg		-0.05**
		(0.02)
Constant	-4.68***	-4.72***
	(1.61)	(1.59)
Observations	347	347
Number of ccode	39	39

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. "Fractionalization." *Journal of Economic Growth* 8 (2003): 155-94.

Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland Vreeland. "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." *Public Choice* 143, no. 1-2 (2009): 67-101.

Dugan, Laura, and Erica Chenoweth. "Moving Beyond Deterrence: The Effectiveness of Raising the Expected Utility of Abstaining from Terrorism in Israel." *American Sociological Review* 77, no. 4 (2012): 597-624.

Gibney, M., L. Cornett, R. Wood, and P. Haschke. "Political Terror Scale 1976-2015."

Pettersson, Therése, and Kristine Eck. "Organized Violence, 1989-2017." *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 4 (2018).

Schrodt, Philip A., and Deborah J. Gerner. "An Event Data Analysis of Third-Party Mediation in the Middle East and Balkans." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 3 (June 2004): 310-33.

Sundberg, Ralph, Kristine Eck, and Joakim Kreutz. "Introducing the Ucdp Non-State Conflict Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 2 (2012).

Vreeland, James Raymond. "The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 3 (2008): 401-25.

To: The Editors and reviewers of *Terrorism and Political Violence*

From: The author

Re: Revisions to manuscript FTPV-2019-6815

Thank you for the opportunity to revise my manuscript, "Assessing the impact of the global war on terrorism on terrorism threats in Muslim countries." I appreciate the time the reviewers put into these comments, as well as the time of the editors. The comments were very constructive and helpful; I have incorporated them into the manuscript and believe it is greatly strengthened.

In order to incorporate the reviewer's comments I have reduced some discussions in the text, particularly the literature review. Also, in line with reviewer 2's suggestion, I moved discussion of the robustness checks to the reviewers' appendix to allow more space for things like the illustrative case study. I also had to address some of the reviewers' comments in the appendix, and have noted this. The appendix is now rather long but I added a table of contents so reviewers could easily find the information they are looking for. This appendix can be adapted to an online appendix, however, so such information would still be available to readers. The main text is now 9874 words; with the figures and tables it will be approximately 10,000.

I will address each comment individually.

Reviewer 1 raised concerns about data and analyses, and conceptual issues. They also helpfully pointed out a few proofreading errors, which I appreciate. I will address each comment in turn.

1. I have expanded discussion of the dataset, in both the main text and the reviewers' appendix. I specify the number of countries and criteria for inclusion on page 12 of the manuscript. I included a list of the countries in the reviewers' appendix. I also discuss the nature of missing data and how I dealt with it on page 13, and in the reviewers' appendix.
2. I agree my discussion of the variables was insufficient. I now explain what the Polity scores are meant to measure. I also clarify the differences between Polity and Political Terror Scale, as well as what these alternates measure. I also clarify the relevance of the other control variables. I do this on pages 14 and 17, and in the reviewer's appendix.
3. I expanded on my discussion of the varying results using the different scores. I note that, while Polity may lead to some issues because of the manner in which it is calculated, the alternates are equally problematic as they collapse the range of regime types (*Democracy*) and focus on one aspect of regime type (*Political Terror Score*). I acknowledge that the results for *Counterterrorism* are not as consistent across these measures, but also note that *Domestic Counterterrorism* is consistent, so my results are not undermined. Generally, I don't think any of these scores are perfect, but Polity tends to be the most commonly used so I included that in the main model due to reader familiarity. This was on pages 14 and 17, and in the reviewers' appendix.
4. I agree with the reviewer on the usefulness of additional information on trends in counterterrorism over time. I discuss the average scores before and after 9/11, and added a time-series chart that shows overall compliance increased after 9/11 before dipping

again. This provides context for the analyses in the manuscript, which focuses on variations in Muslim states' policies. This is on pages 15-16 and figure 1.

5. I expanded on the methodological issues with the lagged dependent variable, in order to clarify the nature of my models. I referenced academic discussions on this topic. I also appreciated the note on auto-regression. I added a new robustness check that takes auto-regression into account, and found this did not undermine my findings. This was discussed on pages 14-15 and in the reviewers' appendix.
6. The reviewer's suggestion to run a check excluding both Pakistan and Iraq was helpful. I did so in a robustness check, and it did not undermine my findings. I discuss this in the reviewers' appendix.
7. The question about my particular measure of counterterrorism effectiveness is helpful (see my response to Reviewer 2 as well). I added a robustness check that used the number of attacks as a dependent variable rather than the number of deaths; this did not undermine the results. I also expanded discussion of my dependent variable, discussing alternate approaches and justifying mine (while noting potential limitations). I presented this on pages 7-9 and 23-24, and in the reviewers' appendix.
8. Finally, the reviewer's point on potential differences in counterterrorism pre- and post-9/11 is helpful. I clarified that the analysis focuses on post-9/11 terrorist attacks for this reason. I also included a robustness check that looks at counterterrorism across the entire range of available years, to ensure limiting the time period did not change the results. This did not undermine my findings. It may be interesting to further explore pre- and post-9/11 distinctions, but I unfortunately do not have space in this manuscript to do so. I discuss this on pages 11 and the reviewers' appendix.

Reviewer 2 raised useful questions about the concepts in the study, specifically how I measured counterterrorism effectiveness. The reviewer also asked for clarification on the nature of the data and more details on the relationship I found. I will discuss each comment in turn.

1. The reviewer notes that I need to defend my definition of effectiveness. As I noted above, I expanded discussion on this point, referencing other studies that measured counterterrorism effectiveness in a variety of ways and explicitly discussing why I chose those that focused on deaths from terrorist attacks. This was on pages 7-9 and 23-24. Specifically:
    a. I referenced US policy discussions on the metrics for success in the Global War on Terrorism to demonstrate that decreased deaths from attacks by terrorist groups was in line with US expectations in the struggle. This was on pages 7-9.
    b. I agree that I do not demonstrate Muslim states' policies were "worth it." I removed this language, and addressed the broader implications in the conclusion.
    c. I expand what I mean by effectiveness of both terrorist groups and counterterrorist efforts. As I discussed above, I referenced various approaches to this question in the literature to justify my approach while pointing to potential limitations. This was on page 7-9.
2. The reviewer requested more information on the counterterrorism index, particularly the validity of coding policies as dichotomous. I discussed this on page 13 of the manuscript,

and expanded discussion in the appendix and included an example of data coding. I presented examples of positive and negative coding for states extraditing terrorism suspects to the United States and taking acts against terrorist organizations in their territory. While it is difficult to categorize, for example, counter-financing efforts as either cooperative or non-cooperative, the data sources do present the policies in this manner. Additionally, states can received both cooperative and non-cooperative scores for an indicator if their behavior was nuanced. Moreover, by combining numerous different types of policies into one index—with methodological tests for its validity—we can avoid relying too much on one dichotomous measure and instead gain a sense for the broad range of variation in counterterrorism policies. There is unfortunately not enough room in the main text for an extensive discussion, but it is in the reviewers' appendix.

3. The reviewer asked for more context on which groups were active in these countries. In line with their suggestion, I included a table with the most active groups in each country (based on deaths from attacks); this was in the appendix, due to space considerations. The reviewer also asked whether other groups besides al-Qaeda were affected by counterterrorism efforts; I included a robustness check that includes only deaths from attacks by non-AQ groups (based on GTD perpetrator data), and my findings held up, indicating the counterterrorism efforts had broad-ranging effects. These are included in the reviewers' appendix.
4. The reviewer suggested adding an illustrative case. I did so on page 19-21, and referenced it in the research design on page 11. I added a discussion of Saudi Arabia, which increased its compliance with US efforts on counterterrorism and experienced a decrease in deaths from terrorism. I referenced secondary literature to serve as process-tracing evidence indicating the connection between these two variables. I unfortunately did not have space for an in-depth case, but this illustrative case provides further context for the patterns uncovered in the quantitative analysis.
5. The reviewer noted a proofreading error, which I appreciate and corrected.
6. The reviewer suggested I control for the presence of civil wars in countries. I did so in a robustness check, using data from the Uppsala Conflict database. This did not undermine my findings. I discuss this in the reviewers' appendix.

Again, I thank the reviewers for their time and detailed comments, and the editors for the chance to revise this manuscript for consideration in *Terrorism and Political Violence.* I believe I have been able to address all of the reviewers' concerns, although due to space considerations I have had to discuss some of them in the reviewers' appendix. But I believe the manuscript is greatly strengthened, and the reviewers' appendix could be made available to readers as an online appendix.

Thank you again for your consideration, and I await your reply,